

**COALITION POLITICS IN INDIA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
JAMMU & KASHMIR (2008-2020)**

Thesis Submitted For the Award of the Degree of

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Political Science

By

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LOVELY PROFESSIONAL UNIVERSITY, PUNJAB

2023

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the Ph.D. Thesis entitled “**Coalition Politics in India with Special Reference to Jammu & Kashmir (2008-2020)**” in Lovely Professional University; Phagwara Punjab was carried out by me for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science under the guidance and supervision of Dr. Javeed Ahmad Bhat. The interpretations put forth are based on my reading and understanding of the original texts and they are not published anywhere in the form of books, monographs or articles. The other books, articles and websites, which I have made use of are acknowledged at the respective place in the text. For the present thesis, which I am submitting to the University, no degree or diploma or distinction has been conferred on me before, either in this or in any other University.

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the work incorporated in the thesis “**Coalition Politics in India with Special Reference to Jammu & Kashmir (2008-2020)**” submitted by Rafiq Ahmad Sofi bearing registration no. 41800308 is an original piece of research work done under my guidance and supervision in partial fulfillment for the award of the degree of Ph.D. in Political Science to the school of Arts and Humanities, Department of Political Science. The candidate has fulfilled all the statutory requirements for the submission of this thesis. Such materials as has been obtained from other sources have been duly acknowledged in the thesis.

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Dr. Javeed Ahmad Bhat

Date: 06-09-2023

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List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Full Form
AA	Administrative Approvals
AD	Anno Domini
ADMK	Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazgham
AFSPA	Armed Forces Special Powers Act
AIADMK	All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
AIMIM	All India Majlis-e-Lttehadul Muslim
ANC	Awami National Conference
ARTO	Assistant regional transport officer
BC	Before Christ
BJP	Bharatiya Janata party
BSP	Bahujan samaj party
CBMs	Confidence building Measures
CIC	Community information center
CMP	Common minimum program
CPF	Central Provident fund
CPIM	Communist party of India (Marxist)
DIET	District institute of education and training
EDUSAT	Educational Satellite
IIDC	Integrated infrastructure development centers
INC	Indian National Congress

JAKEDA	Jammu and Kashmir Energy Development Agency
JKDPN	Jammu and Kashmir Democratic Party National
JKNC	Jammu and Kashmir National Conference
JLNM	Jawaharlal Nehru National Mission
JNNURM	Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission
JP	Janata Party
KP	Kashmiri Pandit
LAC	Line of Actual Control
LOC	Line of Control
MDSM	Mid-Day Meal Scheme
MGNREGA	Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
MISA	Maintenance of Internal Security Act
ML	Muslim League
MLAs	Minster of Legislative Assemblies
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NABARD	National Bank of Agriculture and Reconstruction
NCMP	National Common Minimum Programme
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NF	National Front
NPP	National Population Policy
NRHM	National Rural Health Mission

NSA	National Security Act
PDP	Peoples Democratic Party
PEPSU	The Patiala and East Punjab State Union
POTA	Prevention of terrorism Ac
PSGA	Public Service Guarantee Act
PSUs	Public Sector Undertakings
RSS	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
RTE	The Right to Education
SOG	Special Operation Group
SSA	Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan
UF	United Front
UIDSSMT	Urban Infrastructure Development Scheme for Small and Medium Towns
UPA	United Progressive Alliance
WSS	Water Supply Scheme

Abstract

Coalition politics is a form of government in which many groups work together to form a majority. The term "coalition politics" or "coalition government" is used to describe a political system in which many parties work together to create a government and wield political power based on a mutually agreed-upon policy or strategy. When no political party has enough votes to secure a majority in parliament or a state legislature, a coalition or alliance of smaller parties will often come together to create a government. A coalition government is a joint or collaborative endeavor, wherein many political parties or certain political parties in collaboration with some independent legislators create a government.

When many political parties work together in a cabinet of a parliamentary administration, the influence of any one party is diminished. The conventional justification for this setup is that no single political party has enough seats to govern alone in Parliament. In times of national difficulties or disaster, such as war or an economic downturn, a coalition government may be formed to help the government gain the high level of perceived political legitimacy or collective identity it seeks and to help reduce internal political struggle. Parties have created cross-bench coalitions during this period (national unity governments, grand coalitions). A vote of confidence or a motion of no confidence may be conducted if a coalition fails.

When general elections fail to produce decisive majorities, political parties sometimes resort to forming coalition or minority ministries. When a coalition holds a majority in a parliament, the cabinet that governs the country should be comprised of longer-lasting and steadier than minority cabinet administrations. Although the former are more likely to experience internal strife, the latter have less need to worry about losing confidence votes. Majority administrations based on a single party are often much more stable, as long as their majority can be maintained. In this background, the present study is an exploration into the prospect and challenges associated to the coalition regime in the union territory of J and K. The study has delved deep into the coalition politics in J&K post 2008 and all the political cum economic dynamics have been explored accordingly.

Considering the magnitude of research work, the study has drafted a set of objectives that were fulfilled by using appropriate research methodology and data

sources. Accordingly following research objectives have been framed. First objective of the study is to examine the evolution of coalition politics in India. Second objective of the study is to discern the origin and functioning of coalition politics in the State of Jammu & Kashmir. Third objective of the study is to assess the public perception with respect to the working of coalition government in two divisions of Jammu and Kashmir. Fourth objective of the study is to analyze the recent developments that took place under the Coalition politics in the State/UT of Jammu & Kashmir since 2008. In line with research objectives, a set of research questions have been framed followed by hypothesis that were subjected to validation by means of appropriate data analysis technique. Taking into consideration the diversity of subject matter and variety of variables, the study has adopted the mix of qualitative and quantitative approach and has made use of *primary cum secondary data sources*. The primary data has been collected from four state assembly electoral constituencies in the union territory of Jammu and Kashmir. *Stratified Random sampling technique* for data collection has been used with the help of *quantitative research* tool such as a *structured questionnaire*. After due data analysis from both sources, the data has been presented under appropriate themes and in tabular cum graphical form under the shadow of devised Chapterization.

In the above background, the findings of the study have revealed that the history of coalition administration in Jammu and Kashmir dates back to the feudal system when Maharaja Hari Singh asked the National Conference to depute its one delegate to join his cabinet in 1945, one representative from Hindu Community was also invited. Consequently Mirza Afzal Beig and Shri Ganga Ram joined the Cabinet Ministers headed by Shri Ram Chandra Kak as Prime Minister of the state. This arrangement remained till National Conference started the Quit Kashmir campaign in 1946 against the dictatorial Dogra government leading to the expulsion of Mirza Afzal Beig as Power Development Minister from the Cabinet. Shortly after Sheikh Abdullah was arrested and transported to the jail till India was separated and Pakistan was formed. However the post- independence era the state witnessed coalition governance in late eighties of the 20th century. But coalition politics arose as a phenomena in Jammu and Kashmir at the same time that other parts of India experienced the coalition administrations. However Jammu and Kashmir has witnessed regimes when outside

backing by parties was offered like in 1947. Hence the state has also entered the group of states where coalition administrations have been created.

After the Assembly elections in 2008, the state of Jammu and Kashmir went through another round of coalition building. When it came time to form a new coalition administration in the state, it was the national Conference that reached out to the State Congress for assistance. Because both the National Conference and the Congress Party had a history of political relations dating back to 1947, the National Conference did not have any trouble developing a framework for power-sharing with the Congress Party. In their respective election manifestos from 2008, the partners in the coalition government made a commitment to eradicate unemployment, poverty, and a shortage of electricity in the state. In addition to this, they stated that they would give a fillip to improvement of infrastructure and also rejuvenate all of the imperative sectors in the state. It is with this view that the political allies started their governmental journey. The coalition administration made a numeral of moves to improve the quality of delivery, including restoring institutions to promote openness and accountability in government operations and putting in place processes to ensure that programmes were carried out in an appropriate manner. Both the re-building of the Accountability Commission and the establishment of the Vigilance Commission were significant advances toward the goal of fostering honesty and integrity in public life. In an effort to put a stop to the rampant corruption in the state, a groundbreaking move was made in the form of the implementation of electronic tendering and electronic procurement for governmental contracts.

After Mufti Sayed, Gh. Nabi Azad assumed control of the administration, marking the handover of power in the state from the PDP to the Congress party after a three year period. He formulated the policies of the government within the backdrop of Khushal Kashmir (which translates to a flourishing Kashmir), which is a catchword in the language of the politics of the state. The overarching goals of this strategy were to ensure that there was no corruption in the government, to be transparent and accountable, and to promote all aspects of the state. Additionally, the administration that was governed by the Congress made efforts to remove political influence from the state bureaucracy. The transfer policy was modified to make it more efficient. The State Accountability Commission, the State Human Rights Commission, and the State Women's Commission could not be resurrected even during Azad's term, since gaps in

the coalition had a harmful influence on accountability and rule of law. In this state, all types of corruption flourished, and severe laws like as the Disturbed Areas Act and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act took a tremendous toll on the lives of the people living there. During this phase, Five Working Groups were formed by the Prime Minister to integrate the people in the peace process. They spoke with residents from all three areas of the state, but were unable to make any progress; as a result, cross-LOC trade has not been functioning as efficiently as it could.

Furthermore, the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which has various regional, sub-regional and religious moorings, presents a challenge not only to the coalition, but also to the coalition administrators. The people do not yet have positive memories associated with the coalition government that administered the state. There is a growing perception that coalitions are synonymous with regional waste and administrative incompetence. The major political parties, having their economic bases and support structures located in different regions, sub-regions, which are not natural, have a need to cultivate a behavior of coalition culture, organizational partnership, and a clear perspective towards their state. This is necessary so that the coalition government does not appear disenchanted, dishonest, and disoriented. The administration is limited in what it can accomplish at the state level, but the situation on the ground in all three parts of the Jammu and Kashmir state cannot be ignored. It is a fact that the coalition governance brought center-state relations closer together and enhanced the trust between the two. This could help the state in getting a good re-imbursement of the national purse of finance in terms of providing assistance to the people, and the hyphenated aspiration became de-hyphenated as a result.

Key words: *Coalition, INC, NC, Alliance Building, Party Politics*

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

Mesquita defines the term "coalition" as a "group of individuals or "groups of groups" that share at least one aim and agree to pool at least some of their resources in pursuit of that shared goal" (Mesquita, 1975). Thus, coalition is coming together as one for a specific goal, or, in other words, brings together means to achieve a specific aim. It also refers to the pooling of resources and the collaboration of multiple interests or organizations into a one government of multiple parties. It is widely understood that a coalition can only take place in the setting of mixed motives, in which both conflict and common interest are existing at the same time and must dictate the course of action chosen. Coalition refers to the amalgamation of one or more parties, more commonly, a subset of parties, who are willing to put aside their variances plus work together. Thus, a coalition is a transitory alliance of political groups or forces that come together to achieve specified goals. The study of coalition politics in Jammu and Kashmir administrations is important for understanding the meaning and context of coalition, coalition theories, coalition formation, and coalition experiences not only in India but also in other areas of globe.

This is also a fact, that in Jammu and Kashmir, there was single party dominance of National Conference along with Congress and later on again of National Conference. However, the political variations have gradually arisen that has badly affected the prosperity and destiny of National Conference in general and the Jammu and Kashmir state in particular. In this concern the several numbers of political parties were shaped from time to time. For the duration of the developmental practice of political parties in Jammu and Kashmir State, a small number of political parties stay in power earlier to the uprising incidences. It has been perceived that the few small region-based political parties either combined with the former political parties for some time or absolutely like Praja Parishad. Due to the one party dominance of National Conference, the few smaller parties rolled out. Nevertheless, some more political Parties are quiet in being concluded the coalition system of the state.

The presence of few smaller regional political parties of the Jammu and Kashmir state in processes of sharing is foreseeable to the development in this coalition process. Just about

altogether regional political parties having representations in the state legislature have done several alternatives and arrangements, and through political ideologies and socio-economic interests, have established an alliances and involvement in power sharing one interval or other. The practice of slow procedure in developing a stable governance system has been a desired objective of the alliance partners, observance of the distinctive socio-political culture of the Jammu and Kashmir state over the years. In this background, the present chapter will explore the basic facets of the research work including research objectives, research questions, review of literature and other subject matter. The chapter cements the theoretical base of the research and the subject matter has been presented under subsequent themes.

1.2. Theoretical Background

Coalition governments first emerged in countries with parliamentary democracy and a multi-party system. It is not rare in a parliamentary system, when more than two parties contest for parliamentary seats for none of the parties to be able to gain a majority on their own. Political parties in such situations have the option of forming a coalition government. Political parties must work together to share power in a coalition government, but smaller parties must also check the dominance of any one party inside that alliance. Typically, the larger party provides leadership and plays an active and effective role in ensuring the coalition's success. The prospect of coalition instability remains high in the absence of a larger or leading party in the alliance. This potential has become the standard in the bulk of the world's parliamentary systems, including India. Despite this possibility, coalition governance has become a requirement in modern Indian politics.

India has seen the development of coalition governments in numerous states and at the Centre in recent decades. The last nearly three decades of Indian politics (from 1989 to 2014) have seen a period of coalition alliance at the union level. Earlier than 1999, coalition formation in India was an insecure occurrence; however, with the founding of the NDA in 1999, a more settled chapter of coalition government caught the very heart of Indian politics. The new pattern in Indian politics brings in light many perplexing issues, such as why coalition administrations were needed after 1989. In what circumstances did the NDA and the UPA arise in Indian politics? What motivated the NDA & UPA collaborations to offer lasting governments post 1999? What restraints does a coalition government experience?

particularly those imposed by the coalition's key partners and the position of prime minister's & his functioning?

As an outcome, coalition government refers to a government controlled by several coalition partners functioning together, or to the method through which two or more parties or groupings join forces (Advanced American Dictionary, 2000, p. 255). The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary defines the coalition government as "a temporary combination of separate political parties, generally to create a government" (Hornby, 2011, p. 274). According to the Encyclopedia Americana, a coalition is a temporary alliance or union for combined action of multiple powers or governments, or of political parties or members of parties, in order to establish a government where no single party can command a majority (Encyclopedia Americana, 1985, p. 185). The Encyclopedia of Social Sciences defines coalition as a cooperative arrangement in which distinct political parties collaborate to establish government or ministry (Seligman, 1959, p. 600). William H. Riker defined coalition in a somewhat different way. Riker defines decision-making as the primary activity of politics; decisions are produced either by people or by the quasi-mechanical or conscious processes of groups. Coalition formation has resulted in decisions taken by the purposeful activities of groups (Riker, 1962, p. 11). Riker omits the need of a conflict of interest. He favours the phrase decision making (Raj, 2009, p. 3).

Mesquita defines the term coalition as a group of individuals or groups of groups that share at least one aim and agree to pool at least some of their resources in pursuit of that shared goal (Mesquita, 1975). Thus, coalition is coming together as one for a specific goal, or, in other words, brings together means to achieve a specific aim. It also refers to the pooling of resources and the collaboration of multiple interests or organizations into a one government of multiple parties. It is widely understood that a coalition can only take place in the setting of mixed motives, in which both conflict and common interest are present at the same time and must dictate the course of action chosen. Coalition refers to the amalgamation of one or more parties, more commonly, a subset of parties, who are willing to put aside their variances plus work together. Thus, a coalition is a transitory alliance of political groups or forces that come together to achieve specified goals. The study of coalition politics in Jammu and Kashmir administrations is important for understanding the meaning and context of coalition, coalition theories, coalition formation, and coalition experiences not only in India but also in other areas of globe.

The name "coalition" is extracted from the Latin "Coalescere," co meaning together and alescere, which means to go or growing together in collaboration. This phrase "Coalition" refers to a set of individuals who bond together to pursue a specific goal or a union of independent political parties that permits them to collaborate on forming a government and contest the polls jointly, according to the Advanced American Dictionary. Thus, coalition government refers to a government controlled by several political parties functioning together, or to the course through which two or more parties or clusters join forces (Advance American Dictionary, 2005, p. 265). The coalition government is shown similarly in the Webster Dictionary; however the Oxford Advanced Learner Dictionary describes coalition as a temporary union of separate political parties usually to establish a government (Hornby, 2001, p. 214). According to the Encyclopedia Americana, a coalition is a temporary alliance or union for combined action of multiple powers or governments, or of political parties or members of parties, in order to establish a government where no single party can command a majority (Encyclopedia Americana, 1965, p. 165). According to the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, a coalition is a cooperative arrangement in which distinct political parties cooperates to form a government or ministry (Seligman, 1959, p. 600).

William H. Riker defined coalition in a somewhat different way. Riker describes that the central activity of politics is decision making; decisions are produced either by people or by the quasi mechanical or conscious processes of groups. The process of coalition creation has resulted in decisions made by conscious acts of groups (Riker, 1962, p. 11). Riker omits the need of a conflict of interest. He uses the term decision making instead (Raj, 2009, p. 3). According to D. Mesquita, the term coalition originates in economic issues and is defined as a collection of individuals or "groups of groups" that share at least one purpose and agree to pool at least some of their resources in pursuit of that shared goal (Mesquita, 1975, p. 3).

Thus, coalition involves getting together as one for a specific purpose, which in turn entails sharing resources to achieve a specific end. It too refers to the pooling of resources and the collaboration of multiple clusters or organizations hooked on a sole regime of diverse parties (Singh, 2009, p. 58). Being widely agreed that a coalition can occur only in the setting of assorted object, in which both conflict and mutual concentration are present at the same time, and must influence the course of action chosen. It refers to the joining of dualistic or more parties, more commonly, a section of parties, agreeing to put aside the variances and work together. Thus, a coalition is a transitory alliance of political groups or forces that come together to achieve specified goals.

1.3. Rationale of the Study

In a democratic society, the democratic institutions such as political parties and voters are vital in governance formation. The policies and programmes as laid down by government fulfill the electoral manifesto of the party in power. However, in a democracy: instability is always looming around a government in terms of public mandate at large. The political scenario in the modern era is changing and there is dawn of political coalitions in terms governance formations. In the representative democratic establishments, coalitions are taking a lead to run the affairs of state. In this context, the union territory of Jammu and Kashmir has also witnessed the changing dimensions in electoral politics since 1990's more particularly in terms of coalition government formations by politically and ideologically different alliance partners. Therefore, it becomes imperative to explore and analyze the coalition governments in Jammu and Kashmir especially after 2008. More importantly, the emergence of coalition politics or multi-party governments, wherein the small political parties began to challenge the hegemonic control of the political parties predominantly in representing the Muslim majority.

1.4. Research Objectives of the Study

Research objectives are the pre-defined set of goals that specify the orientation of the research work. In other terms, a research objective is a distinct, concise, and declarative statement that specifies the variables to be studied. There can be no research or results if there are no objectives. The entire study process is carried out in accordance with predetermined objectives. Considering the magnitude of research variables, the present study has set the tune for research objectives that primarily intends to focus on the various aspects of functioning of Coalition politics and its impact on the overall governance structure of the country. The research will examine the various dimensions of coalition politics in J&K, its initiatives on the basis of empirical investigations in the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir. Accordingly, the present research work aims to fulfill the following objectives:

- To examine the evolution of coalition politics in India.
- To discern the origin and functioning of coalition politics in the State of Jammu & Kashmir.
- To assess the public perception with respect to the working of coalition government in two divisions of Jammu and Kashmir.

- To analyze the recent developments that took place under the Coalition politics in the State/UT of Jammu & Kashmir since 2008.

1.5. Research Questions

After independence from British rule, the leadership of the country has adopted the parliamentary form of government where the democratic stakeholders were given primacy. All the democratic institutions were termed as vital for garnering greater inclusivity in terms of socio-economic and political development. From the political perspective, the inclusion was given primacy in terms of contesting an election, forming a political party and became the participant in government formation. In such circumstances, the emergence of government with absolute majority or government in terms of coalition became visible dynamics in the political arena. In this context, the research has been conducted to find answers to the objectives under the given set of research questions. These research questions were set in synchronization of the research objectives. Accordingly, following research questions have been framed:

- What are the historical facets that explain the emergence of coalition politics in India?
- What are the circumstances that led to the emergence of coalition governments in the union territory of Jammu and Kashmir?
- What are the ideological bases of coalition government formation in context to Jammu and Kashmir after 2008?
- Why coalition governments are termed as instable governments and what are the reasons for instability?
- What is the public perception with respect to the socio-economic and political development in J&K in context to coalition government after 2008?
- What are the circumstances that led to the abrogation of Article 370 and what is its impact?

1.6. Research Methodology

A methodological approach to research is an organized strategy and set of procedures for accomplishing a job in a methodical manner. It is crucial that the research technique portion of the thesis be included since it will highlight the approach and procedure of the investigation. Both qualitative and quantitative methods of research have been utilized in the

current investigation. The current study is an investigation into the shifting dynamics of electoral politics in India, with a focus on Jammu and Kashmir in particular. When one considers the scope and variety of the factors that were subjected to the investigation, it is very necessary to use the right research methodology and research procedures. Therefore, the nature of the present study is explorative, analytical, and mixed, including qualitative and quantitative approaches.

Use of Data: In order to quantify the findings of the study and ensure that its objectives are met, a variety of primary and secondary data sources have been utilized. The secondary data sources include mostly of printed works such as books, journals, and newspapers in addition to official government publications such as census reports from 2001 and 2011 and ECI reports. Although primary data sources such as surveys and group discussions have been utilized, it is important to note that.

The Universe of the Study: The universe of the study includes the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and, more particularly, four electoral constituencies, namely Habba Kadal, Uri, Nagrota, and Jammu East. These electoral seats were chosen because two of them, Uri and Nagrota, have a voter turnout that is above the majority threshold, while the other two have the lowest voter turnout (Habba Kadal and Jammu East). In addition to this, two electoral seats were chosen from each of the administrative region to obtain insight into the trends seen in the elections and to compare the dynamics of the elections in relation to public opinion.

Size of the Sample: In this study, quantitative sampling was used almost entirely since it was the only method that allowed the researchers to get insight into the electoral dynamics in connection to J&K from the standpoint of public perception. Among the four different electoral constituencies, a total of 400 people agreed to participate in the survey. From the list of villages and wards that are provided below, a total of one hundred people were chosen to answer on behalf of each constituency. Using the Stratified Random Sampling (SRS) approach, we chose two wards or villages from each electoral constituency, and then we chose 50 respondents from inside each of those wards or villages. In spite of this, the inclusiveness of the sample was preserved with regard to gender, place of residence, age, and marital standing. The sample size distribution has been mentioned as follows:

Sample Distribution

Table 1.1: Sample Distribution

S. No.	Electoral Constituency	Village/Ward	Sample Size	Percentage
1	Habba Kadal	Munawarabad	50	25%
		Fateh Kadal	50	
2	Uri	Uri	50	25%
		Ramgal	50	
3	Jammu East	Kachi Chawni	50	25%
		Gujjar Nagar	50	
4	Nagrota	Nagrota	50	25%
		Jagti	50	
Total			400	100%

Research tool: To gather the data from respondents, a structured questionnaire with closed-ended questions was administered; however, respondents were free to submit their opinions with respect to the functioning of the coalition government in Jammu and Kashmir.

Analysis of the Data: We used a structured questionnaire to obtain the necessary information, and then performed a manual analysis of the data. Tabular representations of all the data have been arranged in accordance with the many topics. The tabulation has been provided under a systematic Chapterization in order to account for the wide variety of content and variables.

Chapterization: Considering the magnitude of the research theme and the essentiality of the research components, the research work "**Coalition Politics in India with Special Reference to Jammu and Kashmir (2008-2020)**" is divided into five chapters in accordance with the coherency and chronology of the subject matter, as shown below:

- Chapter I is titled "**Introduction**" where the basic framework of research including research objectives, research questions, research methodology and review of literature has been presented.

- Chapter II is titled “**Coalition Politics in India: A Historical Perspective**” where the history and rise of coalition polices in India has been discussed.
- Chapter III is titled “**Political History of Jammu and Kashmir and Emergence of Coalition Politics**” where the rise and reasons for the emergence of coalition politics of J&K has been analyzed.
- Chapter IV is titled “**Coalition Politics in Jammu and Kashmir from 2008 to 2020**” where the exploration of all the socio-economic and political avenues during 2008-2020 is discussed.
- Chapter V is titled “**Socio-economic profile and working of Coalition governments in study area: An analysis**” where the primary data collected by means of structured questionnaire has been analyzed under appropriate themes.
- Chapter VI is titled “**Conclusion and Suggestions**” where in the summary of all the chapters has been presented in systematic order followed by limitations and scope of the study.

1.7. Review of Literature

Coalition politics is an integral part of a multi-party democratic setting. Coalition politics offers an opportunity to fill the political vacuum in the time of political uncertainty.

Considering the nature of subject matter and nature of study, it becomes important to undertake a deep exploration into the previous studies. The review offers an opportunity to delve deep and explore the research gaps that set the tune for research objectives. In this context, the review of literature has been presented under appropriate themes using the deductive research approach.

Coalition Politics in India

Mukerji, S. (2022): The study examined that the 2014 elections were a pivotal political event in the India. Thu establishing the new social coalitions, the social media being a tool in campaigning, making the narratives of administration and development designed to attract the attention of big masses are fresh. Moreover, these new techniques were utilized to attract enormous crowds to Modi's “*Ache Din*” programme. In 2019, the BJP, under the leadership of Modi, conducted a broader social media effort to connect with the secondary and tertiary states. To achieve a stronger social basis, the most economically challenged areas created cross-cutting partnerships. This was another majoritarian prod from the BJP's mobilization

agenda. The technique was successful in Uttar Pradesh, as it was in numerous other states. As the state with the most Lok Sabha seats and the most intricate social system, UP poses unique challenges for all competing parties. The comparative advantage of the BJP in the state was based on its successful social engineering and stylized campaign in the state's urban and rural seats. In Uttar Pradesh, the BJP won with the help of a coalition of non-Jatav Dalits and non-Yadav OBC's, backed by the customary backing of advanced castes. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh's (RSS) grassroots mobilization also contributed to the party's win in rural constituencies. This chapter analyses the mobilization and campaigning efforts in urban and rural Uttar Pradesh for the Lok Sabha elections of 2019 in order to comprehend the continuity and change from 2014.

Mitra, S. K. (2022): This study concluded that the main problem with elections in India is not with the voting itself, but with the results, specifically the failure to carry out the mandate that is reached through voting. New electoral cycles, renewed, frantic elections, and ferocious party competition, unstable, short-term coalitions, and fragmentation are all triggered when there is a lag between election results and implementation of the mandate. While interests are typically expressed with great vehemence and condor during political campaigns, they are often slow to be aggregated into coherent agendas, and the costs and benefits of those agendas are rarely considered. A lack of effective execution is, therefore, the electoral democracy of India's Achilles' heel. This means that India would always be stuck in the 'middle democracy' rut because of its fixation on holding elections.

Biswas, F. (2022): This study expands on its central premise by analyzing the recent state election in Bihar. It focuses on the voting habits and patterns of different socioeconomic categories in the last election in the Indian state of Bihar. It made an effort to develop the particular voting design based on real electoral data that showed preferences for different political parties running for office. The challenges involved in getting the people of Bihar out to the polls have been dissected from a historical and societal viewpoint. With this goal in mind, the study examines the ancient, social, spiritual, societal, and various characteristics helping to reveal the polling behavior of social stratification based voters in Bihar. In general, this article examines the differences and similarities between the voting results outcomes, governing aspects, and societal ramifications in Bihar for three successive legislative body polling's from 2010 to 2015. In this theoretical study, we make use of secondary election data collected by the ECI. The archival materials are additional resources for understanding the political campaign and the articulation of associated arguments. A pictorial illustration and a Geographic Information System (GIS)-based election plot further illustrate the numerical

data. Bihar is interesting because it creates a distinct political milieu, one in which the characteristics of the location define distinctive characteristics of the people who live there. Caste is a major determinant of voting behaviors in the sociocultural context of Bihar. Though the recent 2020 election in Bihar demonstrates the re-emergence of social problems like class, occasionally religion, and Populism, which occupy the central space in shifting social dynamics, casting the identity of caste into the background.

Bulutgil & Neeraj, P. (2023): When comparing the incidence and frequency of community riots, what role does disparity within and across ethno-religious group's play? This article uses data from India to show that upper levels of variation between groups and lesser levels of disparity within groups reduce the incidence and frequency of communal rioting. The study argues that the contributory logic holds that politicians exploit ferocity to exacerbate ethnic identity to gain maximum support, this explaining the phenomenon. The authors contend that for an ethno-nationalist candidate to succeed in politics, he or she must appeal to voters on the basis of ethnicity. Citizens are less likely to identify strongly with their ethnicity in societies with high levels of inequality within groups and/or low levels of inequality, attention paid to ethnicity as a result of communal rioting in order to increase their chances of being elected. Thus examining the various predictions of the instrumental argument by looking at three features of the riot: pre-existing conditions, timing, and propaganda objectives.

Ahmed, H. (2022): The study found out that there are three main conceptual issues with current accounts of Muslim political participation in India. First, Muslims are assumed to form a single, unified community whose political and electoral behavior is obvious. Second, Muslim voting is conceived of as an autonomous act of self-governance, as if elections were the sole focus of Muslim politics. As a third point, understanding Muslim voting behavior is always contextualized via the lens of the proportion of Muslims in governing bodies. It is taken for granted, in fact very blindly, that Muslim voters and Muslim MPs and MLAs have a natural and functional connection (MLAs). Therefore, it is important to study Muslim political participation in modern India as a dynamic, autonomous discourse that does not always respond to the challenges offered by Hindutva politics. Considering the BJP's stunning triumph in the 2019 Lok Sabha election, this chapter poses two simple questions: does the Muslim vote still matter? What can we glean about its representation and involvement in national politics from analyzing the election process and the results that followed?

Blarel, N. (2019): The author found the emergence of coalition strategies in India and analyzed the causes of the decline of the INC and the rise of anti-Congress coalitions in the state & union levels. In addition, a brief overview of coalition governments in India is provided, along with a discussion of the coalition philosophy or norm that acts as an inescapable aspect of modern India's politics. The study examines the environment, personality, and scope of smaller coalitions in, which, while they can be viewed as a form of accommodating political aura, with ideologically divergent parties varying from r state to union coming together, were unstable and short-lived. As these temporary coalitions introduced a new chapter in the political account of India. The fruitful achievement of the terms of the NDA-I and UPA- I governments, however, established the coalition system viable option for India's democracy also bolstered the strong structure of the Indian political system. Thus suggesting that although engagements and arguments were unavoidable under coalition administrations in India, what was extra central was how succeeding coalition governments coped with these conflicts successfully and proficiently time and time again.

Bhavnani, R. R., & Jensenius, F (2019): According to the findings of the study, the politicization of resource distribution has a lasting effect on development routes. We stress on lasting impact of electing the government on India's primary education system. Following a tight, statistical parameters socioeconomic data of the assembly elections and seats in the span of 1971-2001. Neither the overall data nor the relevant subsamples provide evidence that this is the case. The null results are carefully calculated and pass numerous robustness tests, OLS and 2SLS requirements, and estimation techniques. These data suggest that the distribution is influenced by politics.

Kumar, R. (2016): The main motive of this study is to evaluate the evolution of coalition politics of India. Evaluations of coalition politics and their extent to which coalitions stay dynamic and stable demonstrate the difficulty of making policy decisions when a coalition of ideas forms the government. More frequently, coalitions are established to prevent a shared opponent from seizing political power. Equally intriguing is the fact that a coalition devoid of ideological reasons endures until the adversary is defeated. During the process of making political modifications, ideals may have to be sacrificed, with ideology becoming the first victim. After the winning euphoria subsides, discrepancies become apparent, and the edifice collapses like a house of cards.

Appaiah, P. (2008): This article provides a comparative analysis of the UPA & NDA. This article explores the distribution of power sharing patters, analyses their components of the

Common Minimum Program, and explains how the two coalitions operate. In order to evaluate the challenges and future of coalition politics in India, the pulls and pressures felt by these two coalitions are also highlighted. In the modern era, coalitions have emerged as unavoidable aspect of politics, in their existence in various aspects previously. A coalition usually emerges when the parties get a fractured mandate or there is a hung parliament. It is a political concept that coalitions and party alliances can be formed before or after elections.

Qazi, M., & Ahmad, I. (2015): The analysis indicates that India is a multicultural nation whose coalition politics reflect this diversity. After independence, the Congress party represented all aspects of Indian society due to its inclusive nature. However, as time passed and the socioeconomic character of the country shifted, new social groups arose and sought space in the Politics. The Congress was unable to accept and reconcile with the new groupings; consequently, new political formations formed around these social groups, making the political process more competitive and necessitating the formation of coalition governments. After the 1967 national election, however, other political parties began to assert themselves and play a role in the creation of a unwavering government in the states thus Congress party's dominance began to wane.

Chaurasiya, V. P. (2014) : The authors found that coalition governments are extremely unstable due to the government's persistent fear of losing the support of the associated party. Small parties are always threatening to withdraw their support from the government in order to obtain basic necessities. An unstable government causes inflation to rise. The coalition government is ineffective as a result. The government lacks the ability to make long-term choices. Typically, they are busy with resolving issues and serving the needs of small groups. The coalition lacks a philosophy of this nature. Each party must compromise on its own ideas, and the coalition government gets more confused as a result of the lack of ideological clarity. India has experienced coalition governments for the previous two decades and will continue to do so in the future. It is still too early to write the coalition era's epitaph. The partnership results in a government that is unstable. As there are no ready-made formulas or simple answers to make coalitions function well, it is crucial that political parties moderate their beliefs.

Pujar, M. (2011): The study examined the creation and development of India's coalition government. *International Journal of Sociology and Management Research* The coalition government of India began with the decision of 1989. In any case, the history of truly coalitional governance challenges predates the Indian constitution. In 1937, when decisions

to the common legislative bodies were made pursuant to the Government of India Act of 1935, Unified India had its first opportunity to explore various coalitional avenues. When it was uncertain whether or not the United Provinces' Legislative majority would be decisive, the Congress reached an unspoken agreement with the Muslim League. In the administration of the Interim Government of 1946, Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs were heavily represented.

Rajinder S. and Vasudeva (2011) in their book titled *Coalition Government of India: Problems and Prospects*, the authors examine the operation of parliamentary democracy in India as well as the phylogenies of coalition governments. It also gives light on provincial coalitions, coalitions from a theoretical standpoint, and the problems and challenges of coalitions in India.

Sardesai.R, (2014) in his book, *The Election That Changed India*, he provides thorough information on coalitions since 1967, especially up to 2014. Along the battlefield, the screenplay delivers an abundance of information regarding elections, leadership, the formation of the political party's wave, and the selection of the prime minister.

Sandeep. S, (2010) in his work, *Electoral Politics in the Indian States: Lok Sabha Elections in 2004 and beyond*, he discusses Indian elections and explains the dynamics of electoral politics. This volume details the survey data, which provides answers to many of the problems raised by researchers. The knowledge on each state might be utilized by the scholar during the elections. The comparisons in this script are based on the Lok Sabha elections.

S.K. Khanna (1999): In his book titled *Coalition Politics in India*, the author writes, In truth, coalitions began with the first general elections in 1952 in the then Madras presidency, when a liberal non-Congress United Front led by T. Prakasam and an undivided CPI gained a majority in the assembly elections. Governor General C. Rajagopalachari was ordered by Pandit Nehru to revive the United Front and restore the Congress's monopoly of force.

Subhendu Ranjan Raj (2004): *Coalition Politics in India: Dimensions of Federal Power Sharing* argues that while majoritarian politics may have flipped the script on democratic compromise and power while establishing an egalitarian attitude, incompatibilities within the representation process have presented restrictions to its expansion. This volume examines how coalitional Indian politics have historically been. According to the source, coalitions are silent revolutionaries in India. It focused on the authority, tenure, and development agendas of eight coalition governments. From the very beginning, alliances existed in embryonic form.

Paranjoy, G., and Shankar, R. (2007): The authors of *Divided We Stand: India in a Time of Coalitions* discusses the origins of India's coalition era. The authors also analyzed the outcomes and repercussions of contemporary events. In addition, emphasis is placed on statements regarding the government's multi-party system or coalition government.

S.R. Maheshwari (2015): Comparatively, the author of *Comparative Government and Politics* examines the new paradigms, conceptions, techniques, and problems of politics in Comparative Government and Politics. In addition, the book provides a wealth of material on comparative method and system analysis research methods in political science. It aids in acquiring fundamental understanding of the rapidly increasing field of political science. The application of comparative approaches to acquire a better knowledge of the workings of government in ancient Greece has been analyzed in detail, and this is related to the current research on coalitions.

Johari Johari (2012): Based on the results and observations of numerous prominent western authors, he elaborated in his book *Comparative Politics: The Study* on a number of significant advancements and new approaches, strategies, methodologies, and theories related to political reality. This book is useful for analyzing the study on coalitions in party politics and the relationship between the party system and democracy. This book provides fundamental knowledge on the structure of comparison, which is employed in the fifth chapter of the thesis, as the study focuses on the comparison of coalitions' operations.

J.C. Johari's (1974): This author's detailed book, *Reflections on Indian Politics: A Critical Comment on the Growth and Decline of the Indian Political System* was invaluable to the scholar as he analyzed the Indian coalition model, thanks to the author's insightful discussion of the Coalition System and other kinds of coalitions. Dr. Harman Singh's *the Indian Political Science Review*; Dr. J.S. Bains's *the Indian Journal of Political Science*, and Dr. S.C. Kashyap's *The Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies* were cited frequently.

Robert H. Blank (1980): Author has analyzed a full overview of American political parties and an election is provided in the introduction. It assisted the student in comprehending the concept of political parties and their function in a democratic society. Thus adding to the notion of political parties, thus gave a great deal of evidence regarding functioning of political parties, the appraisal of contesting parties in connection to electoral organization, and psychological affiliation. This helped the current study establish connections between political parties, elections, and the creation of coalition administrations. In the book, several

democratic models are addressed as prospective frameworks for political parties. However, this volume only covers political parties in the United States.

Dasarathi, B., and M. Simanchal (2004): In the book *Dynamics of Coalition Politics*, it is said, many states established coalitions during wartime in the past, and they had also experienced coalitional politics. During the Mahabharata conflict in ancient India (3100B.C., 1400 B.C., or 900 B.C.), a number of Janapadas sat either with the Kauravas or with the Pandavas. The electoral politics of India continue to be unpredictable.

Sridharan (2012): The article *Theorizing Democratic Consolidation, Parties, and Coalitions* includes extensive information on coalition politics and coalition alliances. The coalition and western theories offered in the paper were extremely interesting for studying (The emergence of coalition governments in India), and the table was extremely useful for analysing coalitions.

Tariq Ashraf (2010): Since 1952, in his book *Election 2009: A Complete Documentation and Analysis of Indian Parliamentary Elections*, he has included information on the NDA and UPA, as well as their makeup, contributions, and accomplishments, which may be used to analyzed the coalitions' operations.

Mahendra Prasad (2011): In his work titled *The Working of Coalition Governments*, the author examines coalitions utilizing theories that are then analysed and discussed. The article discusses forms of governance and systems of representation in Commonwealth politics, as well as systems of representation and forms of government.

Sahni (1982): Explores the theory of coalitions, coalition development, and Congress in his 1971 book *The Theory of Coalitions*. The origin, meaning, and definitions of the terms are provided. The elements of coalitions are discussed in depth. In addition to George Fernades and Joshi, other authors contributed to the same book. *Indian Elections, 1998*. This book was used as a source for information on election results. The book was reviewed in order to comprehend the discrepancies between the winning and losing election percentages of both parties. In addition, the book contains a wealth of information on polling, political parties, manifestos and accomplishments, state-wide election outcomes (including assembly elections), and other related topics.

Abrogation of Article 370 & aftermath

Wakode, P. (2020): This study sheds light on the fallout that will be caused by the current government of the Bharatiya Janata Party erasing Article 370 and Article 35 (a) regarding

Jammu and Kashmir on August 5, 2019. The current administration followed the law when it split Jammu and Kashmir from its position as a constituent state of the Indian federal state into the Union Territory states of J&K and a new UT-Ladakh. Also, given the circumstances, is this choice even an option? The research piece analyses the broad implications of this decision for the masses of Kashmir. According to Indian National Security Advisor Shri Ajit Dowal, 92% of Kashmir Valley residents agree with the decision, which is in line with the justifications stated by the current government: that the repeal of this section will bring J&K at par with rest of India. The government has promised to prioritize industrialization of J&K, the empowerment of women, and the advancement of the economically disadvantaged, including the Dalits and tribals. Corruption will be eliminated in Jammu and Kashmir. The rate of development will speed up in the future. In the present article, we do the review. Summary of the Research Paper's Results was there a call for the abolition of J&K's Articles 30 and 35 (a)? Was this a necessity for the governing Bharatiya Janata Party and other pro-Hindu groups? What exactly are the national advantages of this choice? The report has also examined research about the benefits of the Bharatiya Janata Party in politics.

Sharma, S, (2021): Findings from the study analysed the Modi government has divided J&K into two Ut's ,wherein Ladakh was not even give the Legislative Assembly without one, angering the vast majority of the local population by revoking the unique status given under in Article 370. Increased security and a large-scale deployment of troops have kept the quiet in the valley ever since. Since the evening of August 4th, when Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) went into effect, it has been illegal for groups of more than four people to congregate. There appeared to be a rigorous lockdown reinforced by the measures taken on the ground. Multiple dozens of streets all throughout the city are currently impassable to cars. Pedestrian traffic is slowed down in several areas as well. Barricades have sprung up all across Srinagar. The two main causes of people's anger are as follows. One reason is that they believe their decades-long perks were taken away from them in an unfair and unjust manner. Two, they're upset because the Valley has been without any kind of communication for the better part of a week. This includes no working cell phones, landlines, the internet, or any other means of sending or receiving messages. As long as there isn't a big power outage, you can still watch and listen to DTH programming and radio. Some post-paid phone plans also include sporadic, albeit limited, text message capabilities.

Lalwani, S. P., & Gayner, G. (2020): According to the research, the Narendra Modi government divided Jammu and Kashmir into twofold Union Territories and withdrew the region's special status on August 5; 2019. The landmark judgment triggered a dramatic

political and social transformation in the area, which had been granted special privileges since Independence. While explaining its decision, the government cited Article 370 as the root cause of terror in the Valley and an impediment to the regions economic and social growth.

G. Peer and J. Rahman (2012): The writers conclude that Art.370 of the Constitution, which recognises a distinctive position of J&K, is neither anti-federal nor anti-unitary by comparing it to the constitutions of the United States and China. Article 370's inviolability, Which has been steadily eroded over time, must be restored for J&K and India to coexist peacefully in accordance with constitutional principles.

Sandhya, J, (2019): The research suggests that residents of J&K will lose their LPR status and gain Indian citizenship. However, there were several limitations imposed by the Permanent Residents Law, including the fact that a Kashmiri woman (and her children) who marries a foreigner lose all property rights. For the sake of passing the property on to her children, this limitation was also extended to them. The women of Kashmir will finally get their independence restored. Jammu and Kashmir is being established as a union territory, which will be directly subordinate to the federal authority. In this way, the federal government may have more influence over the domestic security situation in the previously terror-affected area.

Hoskote, A. (2017): This study will investigate how Article 370 was conceived as a tool for a defenseless public worried about losing their cultural traditions and identities. At the same time, it was supposed to guarantee independence, making room for administration and giving people more say over their future. Based on the foregoing, it's clear that this delegation of authority has stayed in the hands of a select few. Given the widespread absence of responsibility in public life, the basic foundations upon which the provided autonomy rest are called into question. In the bigger picture of India, the failure of the state to create a system for redress, whether it is for the Pundits in exile or the refugees in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. No valid explanation is made by Article 370 or its supporters to justify such egregious discrimination. The basic basis for the article's inclusion has been undermined because of abuses committed in the name of "freedom of the people." The work also poses important questions that can be better answered by additional research. The difficulty of the exiled Local Pundits, who fled this region as terrorism spread in Jammu and Kashmir, is one that must be addressed. The population of Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir is also in limbo. Countless generations have perished as a result of the struggle, which shows no

signs of ending. It's possible that the only thing linking today's generation to events that happened decades ago is institutional memory. How likely is it that these individuals will ever face consequences?

Ashraf, W. (2019): In this study author says Article 35A was inserted in 1954, but it wasn't until a presidential order in 2005 that the proclamation was officially repealed. A law passed 65 years ago gave state citizenship and permanent resident's first dibs on housing, Employment opportunities. The BJP campaigned on a promise to abolish Article 370, which granted Jammu and Kashmir autonomy in all areas except for foreign and defense policy and the transmission of news and information. Indian H.M. Amit Shah made the announcement on Monday that the Indian Constitution now fully applies to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. A presidential order revoked a proclamation from 1954 that had inserted Article 35A; hence the proclamation was effectively nullified. The law, which is now 65 years old, gave state citizens first dibs on jobs and property.

Ahanger & A. H. Mir (2023): In this paper, we take another look at Art.370 Constitution, its implications for the state. This paper makes an effort to draw on the paths taken by Article 370's original inclusion, subsequent watering down, and eventual repeal. It also looks into the controversy surrounding this provision in state political circles. The political relevance, both then and now, is the main subject of this research. It examines the controversy around this clause in the J&K's political establishment. This article also delves into the political effects of repealing the special status. The ultimate repeal of the article raises the moral challenge of the long-term prejudice and neglect that the people of Kashmir have endured. For decades, millions of people's lives have been paralysed by a lack of progress in resolving the political impasse, despite repeated attempts to do so. A misguided conclusion, the repeal of Article 370, was reached in a conclusive manner was a stubborn refusal to engage in debate or acknowledge the political conflicts. Noting that neither repealing the article nor splitting the state in two would end the conflict is important here.

Sharma, S. (2019): This article will investigate the 2019 Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, which recommends splitting J&K in 2 Union Territories (UTs): J&K and Ladakh. Possibly foreseeing deadly civilian unrest in the Kashmir Valley, the pronouncement to recommend reorganisation soon after the revocation of J&K's distinct status was made. By upgrading J&K to a Union Territory, New Delhi will assume direct responsibility over the police and thus maintain the public order, among other responsibilities. Home Minister Mr. Amit Shah has secure house that Jammu and Kashmir

will again be granted full "state" status once situation returns to normal and the right time comes. The revocation of Article 370 by the governing BJP might have two effects: first, the BJP could gain electoral traction in J&K and remaining India. Two, this development may allow New Delhi to place much greater as an "internal" Indian issue in reaction to mediation from outsiders on the Kashmir dispute. The BJP sees the repeal of J&K's distinct position as a chance to gain power in region. When security in the Kashmir Valley improves, the Administration plans to delimit assembly constituencies in preparation for holding panchayat elections. In J&K, a proposed delimitation will redraw the boundaries of constituencies; establish the new reserved seats for the SC's, the lowest category in the Indian social hierarchy. After completion, the new constituency pattern in J&K may provide some voting benefit to the ruling BJP, as its heartland of Jammu may acquire more seats. In such case, the BJP has a good chance of forming the new government in and installing their own candidate for the chief minister ship.

Ahmed, A. (2019): The recent decision by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to abolish Articles 370 and 35A, which granted Jammu and Kashmir special status, has been met with widespread opposition. Critics perceive the proposal as the beginning of an authoritarian trend, while proponents stress that it fulfills the pledge of the BJP, which got a second chance by improved vote percentage of 6%. On the international stage, the approach is being applauded for transforming the Kashmir dispute from an issue with Pakistan into an internal one, therefore taking advantage of Pakistan's attention being diverted to its west border, the ultimate plan in Afghanistan. Critics argue that the status of Jammu and Kashmir as a UT (now shortened by the parting off Ladakh) does in no way reduce the conflict with the Pakistan in the region.

Shah and K. M. Shah (2020): Specifically, the study highlighted that the central government announce that the Article 370 will be repealed making the two UT's. The international community responded in a way never seen before, in large part because of the new limits placed on the region. Indeed, most nations concurred that the developments in Jammu and Kashmir were an interior matter of India and that differences should be handled through talks between India and Pakistan. But some of India's vital allies and long-time friends have voiced alarm and criticised the government's crackdown on free speech, journalism, and assembly. Now more than ever, countering the idea that the Indian State is restricting the rights of Kashmiris has become arguably India's greatest diplomatic problem.

Aslam, S., & Sudan, F. K. (2021): This article aims to examine how young people view

India's Jammu and Kashmir's economic recovery since the removal of Article 370, and to make plan suggestions for accelerating financial retrieval in conflict-affected regions. The study only covers the Jammu area and narrows in on four specific districts there: Jammu, Kathua, Rajouri, and Poonch. The districts were chosen at random, and respondents were then recruited using a cluster sampling method. Because they are the future and because they have a better understanding of what economic recovery means, the research was limited to the college students in different areas. Primary information came from a survey questionnaire administered to a sample of teens in the area. The population of each religion was taken into account in the selection of 120 college-educated young adults (40 Hindus, 40 Muslims, 20 Christians, and 20 Sikhs). Descriptive statistics have been used for the analysis. Recovery of the economy, as the report shows, calls for substantial growth of enterprises and local economies. It is the vitality and vitality of the young people that drives economic growth. Since the revocation, their input into the economic recovery is crucial to setting the economy in the proper path. Reforms in agriculture, investment in manufacturing, transportation, healthcare, education, infrastructure, and banking were high on the list of young people's desired changes to their communities, as was an increase in openness regarding the development process as a whole. Priorities for monetary retrieval after the repeal of Item 370 included expanding opportunities for education and preparation as well as self-employment, such as in the tourism, horticulture, and handicrafts industries. For Jammu and Kashmir's economy to thrive again, lowering the region's alarmingly high unemployment rate must be a primary focus. Getting the ill factories back up and running is essential if young people are going to have any chance at long-term work. Growing the tourism, handicrafts, and horticulture industries with help from the federal government and the private sector may alleviate poverty, boost exports, and provide jobs for the young.

Rather, T. (2020): According to the research, the Indian constitution's Article 370 did its intended job of giving the state a unique position inside India's quasi-federal political system. The real meaning of state autonomy inside the India and the constitutionality of Article 370 in the Constitution are explored. After seventy-four years, the author tries to show that Article 370 was finally abolished by the Centre without the local consent. The study also highlights how the Indian government, which used to be a champion of democratic concepts and techniques, has become predatory in recent years.

Khan, M. Z. Khan, and Z. Abbas (2021): According to the research, Article 370 of the Indian Constitution was revoked on August 5, 2019. The special and autonomous status of

IAK came to an end with the repeal of Article 370. India has sent a large military force to the region and instituted a curfew and government shutdown in the valley creating a sense of isolationism. Human rights advocates claim that Indian forces often violate universally recognised rights in the Kashmir valley. Particularly after Article 370 was repealed in Jammu and Kashmir, the writers investigated allegations of violations of the universal laws.

Sodhi, J. (2021): The research showed that the 2019 change to Article 370 was a watershed moment in the state, as it effectively removed the region's special status. The rest of the world agrees with you. Countries around the world were hesitant to publicly denounce India's policy on Kashmir, with an exception of China and Pakistan. Global reaction to India's actions was muted, with attention diverted from the constitutional modifications themselves to the large scale crisis in the Valley. The authors of this report investigate possible explanations for the global community's tepid reaction to the condition of people in Kashmir. There are three major disagreements about the proposed constitutional changes. To begin, the government might have been justified in withdrawing J&K's special status. Was the process by which the alterations were made constitutional and lawful? Finally, from a humanitarian and political standpoint, were the precautionary measures adopted by the Indian government for the purpose of nationwide security admissible in a democratic country? This last question is the most important to the world community. International condemnation of the government's decision would have had dire consequences for India: it would have given credence to Pakistan's claim that J&k is a disputed region under occupation by India, thus that third- party mediation is necessary; and it would have affected the Modi government domestically, providing fodder for opposition parties. The government may have been pressured to reverse course by international criticism, which could have serious electoral repercussions in the future.

Rani, S. (2020): The research confirmed that discussions about India's controversial Article 370 had always taken place. Section 370 of the J&K constitution has long been opposed by Hinduist parties and the BJP, as well as RSS & Hindu organisations. BJP had a comfortable majority in the elections of 2014 and 2019; therefore it eliminated Article 370 and 35 (A) of J&K to acquire added leverage. Thus, we can conclude that if the current government satisfies the needs of the Kashmiri people by guaranteeing assistance in all areas of life, then the situation in the region will improve.

Alam & Bhat (2020): Article 370's repeal, the author argues, will have lasting effects on

stability in South Asia. The Kashmir issue has contributed significantly to the tense IHK, this area has become one of the most violent and turbulent in the world. New Delhi's hegemonic, expansionist, and confrontational stance toward regional issues, especially the Kashmir crisis, has contributed to its continued non-resolution in accordance with UNSC resolutions. The major countries have been deferring to India and conceding on abuses of human rights, including the right to autonomy since 1947, while the international community ignores its subjective and suppressive policies to obtain monetary gains from the markets. As long as India refuses to budge on its position on the forcible annexation of IHK, the international community will remain unconcerned and international organizations would be unable to find a resolution to the Kashmir struggle. And the people won't just sit around and wait for help. They have shown for the past seven decades that they would battle for their basic rights.

Balu G. Nair (2019): The study reveals that Article 370, as it existed until recently, limited the powers of Parliament regarding the former state of J&K. Even before it was repealed, the provision had been challenged. In 2018, a challenge was made to its constitutionality on the grounds that it was only ever designed to be a stopgap measure. Attempts to repeal the provision without the backing of a constituent assembly for J&K are questioned in this paper as possibly violating the Constitution. This is supported by the text and by established norms. Because of the procedural restrictions and the asymmetrical nature of the federal organization established in Article 370, the Union cannot simply abolish this provision. The normative need for repealing a temporary provision like Article 370 is the formation of a constituent assembly, which has not yet been attained.

A. Bhatia (2021): As the author discovered, on August 19, 2019, the BJP government led by PM Narendra Modi, made the historic decision to abolish the special status. Political supporters celebrated the abrogation as the liberation of the nation from decades of secessionism and terrorism, while opponents portrayed it as an assault on democracy and the Constitution, and two main opposing narratives emerged as a result of the divisive action. This study will analyse the divergent political narratives of proponents and opponents, as well as how each group uses the discursive representation of abrogation to justify its own worldview. To do this, I will refer to Author's (2015) Discourse of Illusion framework, which will be applied to data analysis from three perspectives: historicity (referential use of the past to explain or foretell the present), linguistic and semiotic action (the emergence of significant metaphorical rhetoric revealing the speaker's

subjective conceptualizations of the world), and social impact (the emergence of delineating categories as a result of the speaker's perceiving the world in a certain way).

Shaw and Akhoon (2022): Economic consequences of partisan limitations in J&K, India, were calculated by the authors. On August 5, 2019, the Union Government of India revoked the special status, relatively autonomous status and enforced a lockdown in the state to prevent unrest. Strict mobility, curfews and a communications blackout persisted with varied degrees of severity until February 2021. Worse yet, in March of 2020, a nationwide lockdown was instituted due to an outbreak of COVID-19, further complicating circumstances in the state. We employ a natural experiment design using monthly panel data on households to estimate that a 26 percentage point drop in overall consumer expenditure occurred during the political lockout (Himachal Pradesh and Punjab). Total food expenditures decreased by 12%. Jammu and Kashmir's consumption dropped by more than 30 percentage points in comparison to its neighboring states as a result of the combined effects of the COVID-19 shutdown and the ongoing political lockdown. Our data indicates that the political closure probably had more long-lasting detrimental consequences on the Jammu and Kashmir economy than the uncertainty and fear caused by the COVID-19 lockdown.

Misra, R. P. (2022): The author found out that in light of the revocation of Art. 370, which granted Jammu and Kashmir (then a state with a Muslim majority) special status, this dissertation investigates how media reimagined nation in the wake of the event. Reviewing editorials from India's most widely read English-language daily from August 5 to September 30, 2019; this study draws several important conclusions. This article is part of a larger conversation on media and nationalistic studies, and it examines patriotism as a type of treatise. By selectively remembering and ignoring parts of Kashmir's past and by including and excluding certain aspects of the Kashmir conflict, as shown by by the editors as satire. Pakistan was portrayed as the antithesis of India and the other side of state, especially the radicalised young population in the valley. The government of India made an effort to create a homogenous and unified nation, with Kashmiris as domesticated minority. Editorials served interpretive and persuasive functions, helping to shape public debates over Article 370 and providing justification for India's territorial claim in Kashmir. It asserted that the Indian government should categorize Kashmiris into domesticated and undomesticated groups.

Mahire, M. (2022): According to the results of the investigation, the position given to the state by Article 370 was recently revoked. In this essay, we'll look at the history that led to this decision, as well as its consequences over self-rule of the Kashmiri masses. Kashmir as a state will gain more from losing its unique status than its people will. In this piece, we'll examine how the Union Government's plan would affect the people of Kashmir, their fundamental freedoms. The essay will also look at the history of provisions & effects of revoking it. Thus political ramifications of Abrogation are also discussed. In this essay, we will look at the political tensions between India and Pakistan across their shared border over the Kashmir problem, as well as the potential consequences for both countries if Kashmir loses its special status. We will also discuss the humanitarian disaster that has ensued in Kashmir since the region lost its unique status.

Chaudhuri, D. & S. (2022): This article looks at how cultural producers in Kashmir have reacted to the August 2019 abolition of Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution. These clauses had, in theory, ensured the minimal independence of the states. By an act of union legislature passed after 2014 election, the Muslim-majority state was reorganised into 2 union territories managed by the union with no proper political resolution. Disappearances, extrajudicial murders, human shielding, torture, sexual violence, and other crimes have all been reported as a consequence of the troops presence in the Kashmir valley, all in the pursuit of eliminating insurgency and bringing about peace. The use of this memorial language and the tools that make it possible are the subject of this paper.

Mustafa, A. (2021): According to this research, the Kashmir problem is there since independence of two countries in 1947. In this research, we examine how this disagreement has become one of the main sources of tension between India and Pakistan. How is it responsible for the bulk of India's and Pakistan's defense budgets and a large humanitarian problem in South Asia? However, both nations agree that the Kashmir dispute can and should be settled amicably, without resorting to force. Both governments continue to prioritize it at the heart of their domestic and foreign strategies. In this work, we use complex interdependence theory to the topic at hand, which emphasises the importance of peaceful cooperation between the two nuclear powers. As a result, the study delves into the Kashmir issue and the efforts of India & Pakistan to work together to arrive at a peaceful conclusion. The study gives a qualitative calculation of the situation in Kashmir following the repeal of Article 370, based on interviews with significant figures. The results demonstrate that the

status of Kashmir was altered by the government's unilateral abrogation of Article 370, which only served to escalate the conflict and undercut previous attempts at peace.

Pandow, B. A. (2021): To evaluate the extent to which communication is hampered in Indian-administered Kashmir. On February 5, 2021, the prohibition on high-speed internet access in Kashmir was lifted. Until the Narendra Modi government removed Article 370 from the Indian Constitution on August 5, the region had been granted quasi-autonomy. Kashmiris are no strangers to blackouts, but the current one has lasted longer than any other in the history of a democracy by a factor of 550. These obstacles, along with state-sanctioned intimidation, threats, and travel bans, make it impossible for the media to function freely in the region. This article is an attempt to assess how the repeal of Article 370 has affected the right to freely express oneself in the media throughout the area. We have also made an attempt to understand the opinions of local journalists who will be reporting from the scene after August 2019. According to the Asian Forum for Human Rights, the state of affairs in Kashmir has deteriorated since Article 370 was removed two years ago, reducing Jammu and Kashmir to centrally governed regions.

Karunanithi & N. (2021): According to the research, in 2019 the Indian government arbitrarily separated the state of Jammu and Kashmir into two Union Territories, both of which were under president's rule. The Union Government immediately instituted curfews and imprisoned a number of high-profile human rights activists and political figures following the revocation. Jammu & Kashmir experienced one of the longest internet shutdowns ever imposed by the government, with service being restored only after a protracted legal struggle before the Supreme Court lasted 18 months. To preserve "the Government of India should promptly restore the unique status under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution" background by signing a Instrument of Accession in 1947, the former princely state became a unit of Union. Since Article 370 was revoked and the state was reorganised into 2 UT's, Jammu and Kashmir's autonomy has been removed, and is now administered through a Lt. Governor, so limiting and restricting abilities of the UT.

Nadaf (2022): The research found that both online news outlets had stolen critical voices and public anger about terrorism in the region. Article 370 has been repeatedly linked to terrorism and the harboring of separatist ideologies in the national headlines. For the purposes of discrediting all forms of opposition and linking them to secessionist movements in the region, the government's narrative was entangled with the discourse in the headlines. In addition, the

news discourse portrayed the Hindu community in Kashmir as benefiting greatly from the repeal of Article 370. The media's framing of the hardships locals endured as a result of regional crises promoted a narrative of helplessness and suffering. However, the discontent of the Muslim majority people, who lost their regional Muslim identity, sovereignty, and special status owing to the arbitrary revocation of autonomy, was utterly lost in the mainstream discussion. Such biased victimhood affirms the media's exclusivity bias and its complicity with majoritarian nationalist political rhetoric.

Tiwari.S. (2021): In this paper, the author examined how the repeal of Article 370 has affected society, as well as how the state of social demography and legislative developments in J&K have left the state's future uncertain. It goes on to detail the human rights violations and communication blockade's ugly aftereffects, which have cast a pall of fear over the valley. The judicial system in Kashmir is also discussed at length. In this article, we see how oppressive laws like the Public Safety Act (PSA) and the AFSPA led to serious violations of human rights (AFSPA). Further, the article explains how the current legal framework provides the military with complete impunity for any illegal actions.

Wani, A. (2021): The distinctive status of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370 was revoked beside Article 35A in constitutional amendments enacted in August 2019. This report compiles insights from unstructured interviews with people in South Kashmir about their lives after these amendments were enacted. Topics discussed with respondents included how they make a living, the state of the regional economy, bureaucracy, and militancy, among others. To what extent do the constitutional amendments affect the daily lives of valley residents? That's what this report aims to find out.

Thirupathi, L. (2020): The goal of this article is to evaluate how positive or negative these outcomes will be for the author. Boost a democratic system by: Jammu and Kashmir can only hope for greater prosperity if the government releases political party leaders and opens the door to a more productive dialogue. Integration: Article 370 has not been the impetus for a merger between Jammu and Kashmir and India. The article also delves into the ways in which people of different sexes, socioeconomic backgrounds, and nationalities felt that Article 370 treated them unfairly. Opportunities for private investment in J&K will increase if Article 370 is scrapped, which might lead to greater economic growth in the state. More money going into the economy means more jobs and better social and economic infrastructure for the state. If land transactions were to be made public, it would entice both

individual investors and large corporations to put money into the area, helping to stimulate growth.

Hussain, M. (2022): The research found that Art. 370 gave state a high position in country's federated structure. Recognizing the special circumstances surrounding J&K's incorporation into India, Article 370 was written into the Indian Constitution. However, the article proved to be a hurdle in the route of the state as it sought to dictate and structure the politics of the state in service to the imagined national interest; therefore there were constant attempts to gradually diminish it, ending in its entire abrogation recently. By claiming that the Indian government's obsession with eroding Article 370 was really just a ploy to expand homogenization and, ultimately, to exert maximal control in a security-sensitive border state, this study seeks to dismantle that justification. According to the study, the state's attempts at homogeneity backfired, making matters worse by feeding the very dynamics they had hoped to tame. In the end, the report suggests that further federalization is the most likely solution to the growing conflict.

Ahmed & A. Bazai (2021): The study concluded that the Kashmir issue has exacerbated the already tense relationship between Pakistan and India, posing a threat to regional stability and prosperity. Kashmir was highly desirable to both countries, who argued that it was crucial to their respective partition strategies. Pakistan considers the area of Kashmir to be its jugular vein, and it has actively supported the liberation of the region from Indian rule. Disagreements over the topic sparked a nuclear weapons race, heightened tensions, political and economic reaction, and even a five-armed fiasco between the world's two largest nuclear powers. It's important to note that native and indigenous Kashmiris are also involved in a freedom skirmish to free their land from Indian occupation. The political landscape of South Asia has been drastically altered by the repeal of Articles 370 and 35(A). It has not only put in jeopardy the Eden Valley's demographic position as a mainly Muslim state. Conflict in state, Indo-Pak relations, and the political landscape of area will all be affected by this unlawful and unconstitutional action made by Modi's government. In addition, the paper will show the likelihood of a nuclear conflict between nuclear neighbors over the perplexing Kashmir issue and the legal and constitutional status of articles repealed.

Hajong & Shoeb, (2022): According to the author's observations, the granting of special status is the topic that receives the most attention. Because of its constitutional significance, the complex landscape of Jammu and Kashmir is seen as an international strategy issue rather

than a domestic one. The people of Kashmir are separated from the rest of India by a preposterous inlet. Although this is a minor issue, it regrettably brings up the same argument for repealing Articles 370 and 35A. Simply put, the problem is that the Kashmiri government's official stance on societal minorities tends to be misleading. As opposed to going the administrative route, Article 35A was ratified through a formal proclamation. In the Constitution, the legislative branch is granted extensive powers of administration. Only a constitutional convention can make constitutional change possible. A judicially rejected declaration should nonetheless be approved by the legislature. Article 370(1) makes the President's 1954 Executive Orders legally binding (d). Article 370 is seen as short; its main meaning is seen to be transitory. With a name like "Imperative, Transitional, and Special Provisions," this is still located in Part XXI.

Magar (2019): As the author notes, the loss of J&K's special status has been particularly hard on the young entrepreneur who relies heavily on the internet. On August 5, access to the internet was censored throughout Jammu and Kashmir. A lot of young people who built their businesses on social media have lost their jobs because of the economy. They've been suffering for almost four months since they rely on social media sites like Facebook and Instagram to run their enterprises and make a living. Unemployment is a serious problem for many people whose occupations require them to utilize the internet. As a result of the power outage, many workers have relocated in search of new employment. College students have also been severely impacted by the internet blackout. Students at Kashmir University who were working on their doctorates had trouble doing basic things like downloading and submitting papers, reading relevant academic literature, and communicating with peers online, and often had to travel outside of the valley just to do things like check their email or participate in academic conferences held in other parts of the world. There were over two hundred students enrolled in the PhD programme, and they were all severely impacted by the Internet censorship. The study found that just 10% of PG students and researchers opted to take competitive exams like the UGC NET.

Jadhav, D. (2021): Especially in a one-of-a-kind state like J&K, the study finds that decisions taken have had a bigger impact on federal features. It has been criticized as political deceit in the Instrument of Accession as constitutional dishonesty for causing more instability in the state of J&K or for possibly affecting the federal characteristics of this country due to the compromise of the autonomy of the state. Since the consent of the parliamentary assembly was not taken into consideration throughout the process, the federal features have

been watered down. We must not use preventive detention as a tool to silence dissent by locking up peaceful critics. Although they may be popular, some decisions may be dubious under the Constitution. Without this politically right choice, the Kashmir issue would have remained stalled for years, jeopardizing the country's integrity and sovereignty. In this situation, the political representatives would defer to the central MPs in order to reach a final resolution to the issue. Even on a national and international scale, people questioned the legitimacy of the decision. Other countries should not look to the repeal of Article 370 as an example. From a constitutional standpoint, this view is not shared by all. It has been argued that the process and timing of Article 370's repeal were tainted by a collision of constitutional and political priorities, damaging the federal character of the constitution and possibly causing irreparable harm to the tradition of constitutional propriety.

Kumar, R. (2021): After Article 370 was repealed; the author of this paper demonstrates that Jammu and Kashmir underwent a period of inclusive growth. All facets of progress in these areas will be discussed in this report. Youth in the area will be able to see the direct and indirect job prospects that exist because to this research. Union & state's responsibility is to win the trust of their citizens through various social initiatives. We'll talk about how the state's new reservation policy for disadvantaged groups in the wake of Article 370's repeal affects the tourism industry, which is the state's lifeblood, as well as the role of government job opportunities for young people. Jammu and Kashmir's statehood is altered as it was split into two union territories after its special state designation was revoked by the central government.

Utpal, V., Goswami (2022): The author noted that in October and November of 2019, Centreproduced a number of commercials explaining benefits of government's initiatives and informing the public about the single constitution. Articles 370 and 35A were blamed in these ads as contributing factors to Jammu and Kashmir's underdevelopment. These commercials address a wide range of issues, including but not limited to: panchayati raj institutions; corruption; laws and revisions; investments; development; employment; land ownership; and tourism. The Jammu and Kashmir administration promoted Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh in an ad titled "A single constitution for the entire country" that was released on October 7, 2019. The advertisement claims that these alterations will be good for the community and the area as a whole. These ads state that terrorist acts and anti-national propaganda have plagued the people of J&K since at least 1947. Parts of the programme were deliberately misleading, using Articles 370 and 35 A to incite violence and spread panic. These two articles served for

a long time to wall off the state from the developmental cycles of the country. These articles give benefits to a select few, especially the separatist leaders.

Mishra, A. (2021): After a political upheaval in 2014, the survey claims, Indians once again experience a sense of national pride & state enjoyed a false sense of autonomy. Now that preferential treatment has been eliminated and unification is complete, it will be interesting to see how the level of patriotism within and outside of the state changes, as well as how global politics affect future plans for a stronger, more unified India. The article discusses and examines and explains these social issues within a broader context, examining the national and international repercussions of this competing nationalism. The Supreme Court was correct in pointing out that the term temporary does not appear anywhere in either Article 370 or Article 35A of the Constitution. Relationships between India, Jammu & Kashmir, and Pakistan require this bridge, but we cannot overlook the discrimination against women and the violation of citizen's fundamental rights that exist on all sides of the border. Finding common ground is necessary to keep the peace and end prejudice. Even the process by which Article 370 was repealed is unconstitutional because the Government of India did not adhere to the legal requirements for repealing it. Given the foregoing, it is imperative that to gain confidence of the people of Kashmir before repealing the special status, as they have been victims of cross-border politics between India and Pakistan, such as mass killings, fake encounters, torture, rape, sexual abuse, control of freedom of expression by the Army, militant groups, and so on.

Ahmad and Pratima S. (2022): This article examines the legitimacy of India's resolution to revoke Article 370, which accorded state a special status in accordance with both the Indian Establishment and international law. This clarifies the following issues: what unique conditions led to accession, how Article 370 came to be; how it set J&K apart from others and where international law stands on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir's autonomy being revoked.

Pokhariyal and Kotwal A. (2022): The significance of the context of the Instrument of Accession and Article 370 is highlighted in the observation. The article then moves on to discuss Indian federalism and the lopsided relationship it has with Article 370. The article continues with an examination of the constitutional and international law concerns raised by Article 370 and its repeal. The report states that government's plan to end special status runs

counter to the letter and spirit of the Indian Constitution and to the norms of international law.

I. Kuszewska, A. (2022): According to the author, a new era in the history of J&K has begun in 2019 when the region was demoted from a state to two Union Territories due to legal and political factors. Unprecedented (even by Kashmiri blockade standards) lockdowns, curfews, and phone and internet disruptions occurred as a result of the unrest, which mostly focused on the Valley. When the Indian government claimed it was delivering peace to a territory that was already heavily militarized, many people began to wonder if the real goal was to improve condition or to just exert more control from New Delhi. There were many repercussions for the masses of the state after its special status was revoked in 2019. After the COVID-19 outbreak, the region implemented a double lockdown, which only made matters worse.

Coalition Politics in Jammu and Kashmir

Nisa, J. (2021): The paper deals with the party politics in Jammu and Kashmir with special reference to PDP. In the context of the one party dominant system which prevailed in this erstwhile state, the emergence of PDP had very positive implications for the democratic politics here. Prior to its emergence, people did not have any democratic alternative, especially in Kashmir's mainstream politics because the National Conference mostly operated as a hegemonic party. Capturing most of the democratic political space, NC did not feel the pressure of accountability. However with PDP in place, there was a very intense competition in the democratic space. It is in this context of competitive politics that this paper traces the history of PDP and its performance from 2002 to 2019 elections. It places special focus on the ideology of this party and raises important questions about the party politics, about the nature of democratic space in Kashmir. Thus it seeks to answer the questions like: Why the National Conference dominated the entire political scenario in Jammu and Kashmir? What was the reason behind the formation of PDP? How PDP took a stand against one-party dominance in Jammu and Kashmir? What are the reasons which led to the downfall of the party?

Bukhari, M., & Khalid, I. (2020): Have observed that the J&K being the oldest and most perverse disputes in the modern times. It is an unresolved issue between India and Pakistan since the partition of the country. People are denied their self-rule. But that should not

mean that this issue cannot be resolved. Negotiations will have to be organized to differ from anyone party line, one country, and one ideology. According to the Indian government people of Kashmir are satisfied under its secular, democratic form of government as they participate in elections of the state assembly. But the elections which were conducted in the state from 1996 to 2008 are mostly claimed as rigged. Political parties of Jammu and Kashmir also worked during that period by allying with the Indian government. People of the state participated in elections with the only hope that it would change their political, social, and economic conditions. But their participation in elections does not mean that they do not want freedom. Separatist's movements are also running in the state they also boycott the elections and demand independent status of the state.

Qazi, M. A. (2019): According to this study's author, major political figures must exercise caution while dealing with Jammu and Kashmir since it is a delicate region. It has occasionally been possible to develop a political coalition that could approach the Kashmir problem holistically thanks to the emergence of coalition politics in the state. However, given that these political parties have varying ideological stances and differ on the majority of the delicate issues facing the state, political opportunism on the part of mainstream parties, both regional and national, has worsened the situation. The delicate balancing act between the nationalist and regional parties was totally absent. The former has lost the most in terms of their credibility in all of the coalition administrations that have been established in the state amongst the state-based parties (NC, PDI, INC, and BJP). There is no doubting that the political climate in the state has been quite unstable since 2008, but the bad policies of the PDP and BJP merger, which was formed in 2014, made the situation even worse. The PDP-BJP alliance's extreme disregard for delicate subjects has made the situation worse, which has in turn delegitimized the mainstream political space that has been expanding in the state since 2002. This essay makes an effort to comprehend the PDP-BJP's influence on Jammu and Kashmiri politics.

Dar, M. A., & Vadiya, U. (2022): The paper has impetus on the provincial ideological groups in Jammu and Kashmir (U.T) are assuming an extraordinary part since it came into power in 1947 and job of National Conference from 1982 till Present. The current examination paper show that the development of National meeting as fundamental intention to make Jammu and Kashmir as Naya Kashmir. Public Conference brought right into it another idea of Naya Kashmir in a real sense meaning New Kashmir. Quickly after the

arrangement of state with union of India 26 October, 1947 its relations with the Centre were biased chiefly by its two shaft of force the ruler and the well-known pioneer and their common relations. The National Conference has given its perspectives on Centre-State relations. The majority rule interest of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution is that Country should be worked for Nation not so much for a party.

Gulzar, Y. (2019): The author has analyzed that the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) experienced a wave of fresh air during the September-October 2002 Assembly elections, it was simply a historic, fair and free elections particularly first after the Independence took place in the state. The election results were astonishing, though not quite unexpected. The verdict of the people overthrew the dynastic rule of the dominant National Conference (NC) and paved way for peoples rule by the PDP. In addition, it was rightly termed as 'the return of democracy' in the valley. The PDP patron Mufti Mohammad Sayeed took reins of the state government, by replacing Farooq Abdullah and disappointing young Omar Abdullah. The loss of NC appeared to be the gain of PDP; it seemed to be so simple. In other words, the voter clearly disapproved of NC's opportunistic attitude and lust for power.

Puri, R. (2022): The paper analyses that all three Assembly elections considered in this research produced coalition administrations. This demonstrates how, in practice, local parties in Jammu and Kashmir often choose to side with the central party in power, regardless of their philosophy. One that can be considered regional as was clear after the 2014 floods, a party will only be able to deliver and govern efficiently with the support of the Centre. Another glaring pattern of the twenty-first century has been the valley's voting for local candidates and the Jammu region's backing for the national party in power. The importance of identity politics has clearly always been a factor in Kashmiri politics. But as the national government's tone has shifted, the people of Kashmir have become even more adamant about preserving their unique culture, while those in Jammu have sought to strike a balance by advocating for closer ties to the national capital.

Even though the current generation of Kashmiris is the first to have grown up after the partition, and is therefore focused on other matters, the question of Kashmiri identity still continues to be of great concern to them. As a group, they have known democracy only in brief flashes and have grown up in a region that is highly military. There are three such opportunities in the elections covered here. In any case, after article 370 was repealed, it

became obligatory for residents of the union territory of state to accept the central government of India's conception of India if they wanted to enjoy democratic freedoms like everyone else in the country.

Batti, I. A. (2020): The author in his work democratic practice in Jammu and Kashmir as the title reads the democratic process in Jammu and Kashmir. This is a comprehensive investigative analysis of the democratization of Jammu and Kashmir since 1947. It shows that after the British rule and partition of India, handing over the political power to elected government of the people marked as a milestone in the democratic history of the state. An unsound elected system marked by the setting up of weak governments; strength of the state's unique constitutional rights; considerable electoral malpractice start of supporter of independence movement and the fall down of democracy. To achieve democratic supporting stability, central government controlled the state by turning its political leadership and curbing opponents on the other for maintaining effective political control over the Kashmiri leadership and formulation of policies and programmes suitable for national interrogation and favorable for nationalism and secularism national political elites collaborate and alliances with the local political leadership gave rise to new class of political leaders and emergence of new political parties and new ideologies in state politics.

1.8. Identification of Research Gap

The review of literature is the critical activity that hones the intellect of a researcher. The review of literature has presented an opportunity to delve deep into the aspects of coalition politics in the Indian context. However, the review of literature has explored a wide array of gaps that are subjected to verification and research. Accordingly following research gaps have been identified:

- There is dearth of studies that have exclusively explored the dynamics of coalition politics in the realm of J&K.
- There is limited number of studies that undertook an exploration into the ideological basis of coalition politics in context to J&K.
- The limited study related to abrogation of Article 370.
- So far very few studies / limited the scope for public perception with respect to coalition politics in J&K.

1.10. Coalition and its Types

In the democratic settings, the multi-party system is gaining momentum and there had been a visible shift towards the acceptance of coalition politics. In the modern democracies, there are variety of coalitions are taking place. Accordingly, following types of coalitions have been analyzed:

Pre-poll and Post-poll Coalitions: Coalitions or party alliances can occur before or after an election. Pre-election Alliance or Pre-poll Coalition refers to an agreement reached between several political parties prior to elections. This type of coalition is significant because it indicates agreement among political parties, provides a single platform, and attracts voters through a united agenda. A pre-election alliance/coalition is a calculated action made by two or more political parties based on their judgment of the election outcome. Political parties work together to gain enough seats to establish a government (Mehra, 2000, p. 81). This form of alliance is sometimes referred to as an electoral coalition (Chander, 2004, p.6). A post-election alliance or post-poll coalition/alliance, on the other hand, is a partnership formed to share political power and rule the country. These alliances represent a post-election compromise or agreement (Doddamani, 2007, September, p. 15). It is either (and mostly) a political convenience arrangement or a political compulsion arrangement. The pre-election alliance is thought to be beneficial for the durability of any coalition government.

Positive and Negative Coalitions: The term Positive Coalition is uplifting since it is constructive. It was created with the goal of critically evaluating the performance of the ruling party and providing an alternative policy and governance platform. Whereas a "Negative Coalition" means that the parties joined and banded together just to bring down the government that is already in power, without taking on the task of forming a new government or providing better alternatives (Doddamani, September, 2007, p. 15).

Political and Government Coalitions: The term Political Coalition refers to an agreement between different political parties to work together in order to contest an election and profit from voting system characteristics for government formation after the election. The general reason for this structure is that while no party has its own majority in parliament, the possibility of a grand coalition remains open (Narula, 2012, p. 7). A power sharing coalition forms when two or more parties, none of which can achieve a majority on their own, join forces to form a majority government. The parties in such coalitions are not required to form an electoral pact; they may continue to contest electorally with their coalition partners.

This type of power-sharing alliance is common in continental Europe (Chander, 2004, p. 11). In India, we have numerous examples of this type, including the Janata Dal government led by V.P. Singh in 1989 and the Congress government led by Narsimha Rao in 1991, both of which had comparable qualities.

Legislative and Executive Coalitions: The term legislative coalition refers to a front between two groups of parties, one of which forms the government (by one or more parties), and the other of which provides legislative support without serving in the cabinet (Singh, 1998, p. 232). Typically, this is a deal to pursue particular legislative objectives without dividing up cabinet or executive powers (National Democratic Institute and the Oslo Centre for Peace and Human Rights, 2015, p. 18). This kind of circumstance is also referred to as outside assistance. On the other hand, an executive coalition is a collection of parties that work together to establish a cabinet and a government. A new phrase, federal coalition, is defined as parties forming governments at the national and state levels simultaneously (Singh, 1998, p. 232).

Tacit and Formal Coalitions: A coalition may be formal or express or tacit or inferred. A Tacit Coalition is one that is suggested, internal, or secret. Thus, an understanding with some organizations without formally uniting with them constitutes a tacit alliance (Banerjee, 1962, p. 116). For instance, Mrs. Gandhi formed a covert alliance with regional parties like the DMK, the Akalis, and the BKD following the Congress split in 1969. A similar coalition was formed in Punjab, where the Communist legislators gave their complete support to prevent the Congress from retaking power without joining a formal alliance or obtaining any share of the authority (Sahni, 1971, p. 24). A formal or express coalition is an agreement with another party that is legal and has a clear knowledge of the benefits and drawbacks. The power sharing within a formal alliance has been genuine, significant, and true.

Grand Coalitions: Grand coalitions take place when the major political parties, which have historically been the main rivals for power, come together to form a coalition government. Given their historical rivalry, forming coalitions between these natural competitors can be particularly challenging. When a nation is in a political crisis, grand coalitions can emerge because it seems impossible for anything else to be set up. This approach may be used to lessen the influence of a few unpopular parties (National Democratic Institute and the Oslo Centre for Peace and Human Rights, 2015, p. 17). As a result, there are numerous terms that describe the coalition government depending on its structure. It may be a pre- or post-election

alliance, a negative or positive coalition, a political, electoral, parliamentary, or federal coalition; tacit or implied; formal or expressed; etc., but all of these terms and jargon related to coalition politics can be understood primarily in the context of more general theories of coalition politics.

1.11. Theories of Coalition Politics

Regarding the creation of the coalition, there are numerous theories. The first theory is called Game Theory, which was developed by O. Morgenstern and J. Von Neumann and made popular by William H. Riker. This theory focuses on clarifying the formal logical linkages in a particular circumstance rather than on explaining real coalition behavior. This theory was based on the supposition that political issues could be resolved similarly to how players would approach games like chess, bridge, or poker, where participants use rational techniques to maximize their gains. They evaluate the best course of action to attain their goals and move accordingly after taking into account all relevant elements, including the countermoves of the other players. They have resources, goals, and established sets of game rules. Political parties are viewed as participants in the game of politics, and this comparison is expanded to coalition politics (Kumar, 2004, p. 4). Finding the outcomes that are most likely to take place in a game played by rational players is a fundamental problem in game theory. In other words, given an n-person cooperative game, it makes sense to wonder first what the eventual distribution of rewards will be for each participant and then which potential coalition can be expected to develop. These two coalition behavior facets are strongly related to one another. The coalitions that eventually emerge depend on the payoffs that are available to each member in each of these coalitions, and the coalitions that ultimately take shape or form depend on the final distribution of payoffs to each of the participants (Lawrence, 1979, September, p. 133).

The power maximization theory, which is a subset of game theory, is another theory pertaining to coalition formation. The main proponents of the power maximization theory are Lawrence Dodd, William Gamson, and William H. Riker. Gamson proposed that players with comparable resources should establish coalitions in the context of alliances. He makes no mention of what might transpire in the case of an unequal allocation of resources. This is obviously more of a single postulation concerning coalition behavior than it is a theory. Gamson says that many coalition scenarios are performed in a way that does not lend itself to rational calculation and analysis... as a result; coalition formation is best understood as an

essentially random selection process (Raj, 2009, p. 20). Accordingly, power maximization theories forecast minimum winning coalitions, which are coalitions in which each party is required to help the coalition win a single majority of seats since in such coalitions; each member's share of the reward is maximized. It was also known as the minimal resource theory by Gamson and Riker (Gamson, 1961 & Riker, 1962). This theory's fundamental premise is that a coalition will emerge with total resources that are as minimal as feasible while still being adequate.

With a focus on the longevity of governments, Lawrence C. Dodd has improved Riker's size theory and applied it to party politics. He added two more requirements to the Minimum Winning Coalition theory: the first is if there is a generalized priory willingness of the parties to bargain, and the second is when there is a high level of information certainty. Information certainty refers to complete knowledge of all prior moves, such as offers, bargains, and counteroffers, as well as perfect knowledge of the weight, or the voting strength, of the party in the legislature. A generalized priory willingness to bargain refers to the readiness of all parties to form a coalition. A coalition of parties with a reliable majority but no party that is required for majority status, according to his definition of the minimal winning alliance (Dodd, 1976, p. 37). Michael Leiserson and Abraham De Swaan have independently sought to construct models with other variables to help solve its incompleteness problem by reorganizing the limits, the size principle as a uni-causal model of coalition formation (Leiserson, 1970 & 1968; Swaan, 1970). Leiserson began with the fundamental premise of rationality of agents defined in terms of their intentions to maximize their payoffs by striving to create a successful coalition. This is similar to how Riker and Gamson did (Singh, 1977, p. 174). The so-called bargaining proposition, which Leiserson adds to his model, basically argues that as the number of participants increases, the actors prefer to establish a minimal winning coalition with as few actors as possible, probably because doing so makes it easier to negotiate and find a compromise. This is where the Leiserson coalition model outperforms the Riker-Gamson model (Singh, 1977, April-June, p. 175). Therefore, power maximization theories emphasize the maximization of payoffs (i.e., power and derivatives- as the fundamental determinant in coalition formation) and downplay the importance of ideological and policy affinities.

Policy based theories are some other explanations for coalition formation. The policy-based theories forecast the smallest number of parties required for a majority and minimally connected winning coalitions, that is, coalitions made up of member parties who

align ideologically or are at least not incompatible on key topics. This reduces ideological anger. Later supporters of the second wave of game theory created the policy-based theories. Additionally, they have been labeled as a policy seeking group that created this model in opposition to the policy blind presumptions of the first generation of game theoretic studies of government formation (under the rubric of power maximization theories). It especially contested the notion that all parties would make equally viable coalition partners, i.e., those parties would choose their coalition partners randomly. The supporters of this school include Robert Axelrod, Abraham De Swaan, Michael Leiserson, and Sven Groennings. Their works are an effort to improve the realism and predictive capability of coalition theory. The policy-based theories, on the other hand, presuppose that coalitions may only be formed with parties that cleave amicably or who have similar political ideologies. In order for a coalition to be successful, the parties involved must have some elements of ideological congruence or, as Robert Axelrod put it, they must be spatially linked. Taking views on various topics or, more specifically, on policy dimensions relating to public policies is the act of pursuing policy (Sridharan, 1997, p. 3).

While both the Power maximization and the Policy based theories are significant turning points in the theorization of coalitions (as we will see later, their importance for the analyses of coalitions in the Indian setting), they are unable to predict the emergence of minority coalition governments, which have done so frequently. In truth, minority governments have been used throughout more than half a dozen cases in India. This phenomenon was brought about by the Congress split after 1967, which was followed by coalitions at the state and federal levels after 1989. For instance, the minority National Front coalition was formed in 1989 with a new alignment of forces; the short-lived Chandra Shekhar government was formed in 1990; the Narsimha Rao government was formed in 1991; the AB Vajpayee government's 13-day administration in 1996; and the Deva Gowda and I.K. Gujral governments were formed. Therefore, the assertions of Power maximization theories that it is an aberration and would eventually sort itself out are refuted by the fact that minority governments have dominated the world and are still in place. Additionally, E. Sridharan has developed a different method of reviewing the key coalition theories from an Indian perspective, such as the Power Maximization and Policy-based Theory, by classifying the motivation of the key actors, such as politicians or societies' political cultures, into "Opportunistic" and Partisan politics, as in the literature on the political business cycle. Accordingly, one might label a society's politics as opportunistic if obtaining political

office is primarily done for the sake of power and pelf, i.e., the rewards of power. On the other hand, partisan politics takes place when an individual runs for office in order to change public policy in line with their party's professed social agenda and constituency (Sridharan, 1999 & 2002). Similar to this, when in office, opportunistic parties and politicians modify policies to appease as many followers as they can in order to win election. Societies without distinct party divides and an ideological scale tend to favour opportunistic measures, as is the case with India's centrist Congress-dominated party system, where ideological parties like the Left parties and the BJP have historically played a minor role (Raj, 2009, p. 29). In each of the categories, purist-conforming coalitions may be found; nevertheless, the truth may lie anywhere in the middle.

1.12. Coalition Politics in European Countries

States and governments have historically used coalitions in both politics and war. We saw the two Great World Wars even in the 20th century. In reality, World War I (1914–18), which involved the Allies and the Central Powers, was a conflict between two coalitions; similarly, World War II (1939–45), which involved the Allies (coalition) and the Axis Powers, was a conflict between two coalitions (coalition). Additionally, the Western Bloc (coalition) and the Communist Bloc (coalition) fought each other throughout the Cold War (1945–1990), which was governed by the USA and the USSR, respectively. Even in an era of intense economic competition, there is a form of coalition between the G-7 of the Developed North and the G-15 of the Developing South. Additionally, in the Nuclear Club, there are coalition members who support non-proliferation and those who oppose it. In conclusion, the idea of a coalition may be used to describe any game of power struggles, whether they take place at the world, national, regional, or sub-regional levels (Pakem, 1999, pp. 1-2). If we discuss coalitions in governments, particularly in democratic parliamentary nations, we see that this tendency originated in Western European nations. It is vital to talk about coalition governments in European nations as a result.

European politics gave rise to coalition governments. The speed of coalition politics and governments around the world has been set by Western democracies, which are comparatively more developed. A number of democracies in developing nations are still figuring out the main paths of coalition politics and governments, in contrast to the mature experiments in coalition building of some western nations. The phenomenon of coalition politics between some of the industrialized industrial countries and developing countries has

undoubtedly evolved in an unequal manner (Harshe, 2000, p. 52). Coalition governments are typically associated with parliamentary forms of government, but they have also been created in countries with modified parliamentary or semi-presidential systems, such as France and Switzerland. Nearly all political parties in industrialized nations adhere to centrist philosophy. Such governments are typically formed on the basis of power sharing. However, coalition administrations have been created on an ideological basis in developing nations like Sri Lanka and India. In several affluent nations, such as Italy, Denmark, France, and Sweden, coalition administrations based on ideological similarity have also existed (Chaturved & Kumar, 2014, p. 12).

However, coalition governance has more often than not been the rule rather than the exception in many parliamentary democracies, particularly in Europe. The "National Government" of the United Kingdom from 1930 to 1940 was the most notable coalition government. ⁶ In the UK, multiparty coalitions existed during both world wars. In addition, Finland, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands have never had a one-party administration between 1945 and 1974. In actuality, from 1918 until 1974, neither Finland nor France had a single-party system in place. From 1918 to 1940, Germany did not have a single-party system of governance. Between 1945 and 1974, there had only been one instance each in Australia and Belgium where a single party had constituted the government. Between the two World Wars, the United Kingdom had three multi-party coalition governments, the worst of which was King George V's 1931 experiment with a national coalition government, or government of personalities, as it was known, led by Ramsay MacDonald (Reddy, 2000, p. 169). There hasn't been a consistent pattern in any of these coalition trials. Most Western European nations' political cultures since World War II have produced coalition governments that have exhibited significant stability and continuity (Jain, 2000, p. 5).

In the Nordic nations of Denmark (87.1%), Sweden (73.1%), and Norway (65.4%), minority governments have been very prevalent and have even grown to be seen as the norm. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that the Nordic cases have had a significant impact on the development of theories relating to the emergence of minority governments, from Luebbert's (1986) examination of the function of corporatism in these consensual democracies to Strom's (1990) emphasis on oppositional influence and electoral competitiveness. They have been unusual occurrences in many countries, such as Austria (4.8%), Greece (10%), and Germany, as well as Scandinavian states like Luxembourg (0%), which has never had a minority administration (11.5 percent). This table also shows that throughout this phase, all of these nations formed the minimal winning coalition cabinets, with Luxembourg forming the

highest percentage of these (93.8%), followed by Austria (66.7%), Germany (65.4%), Iceland (65.4%), and so forth.

In contrast, coalition governments have been effective in the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, and Germany; however there has been instability in the coalition system of governments in nations like France and Italy. It was based mostly on the politics of accommodation in stable coalition governments (Rao, 2001, p. 30). Thus, coalitional governments have been in place since the late 1990s in nations including Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Israel, France, and now even Canada and Australia. The majority of these nations have legally institutionalized coalition formation by combining various proportional representation models that political scientists and activists have previously designed in accordance with the national characteristics of each country (Chaudhuri, 2005, April-June, p. 406).

In addition, the party system is the main factor in how coalitions are formed and maintained in Western democracies. Over the past more than six decades, a variety of political parties have operated in these nations. The paths of the development of political parties in numerous western cultures and their potential involvement in the administrations or opposition can be recognized in similar patterns due to the sheer repetition of more than six decades of democratic rule. For instance, conservative, liberal, socialist, and even communist ideological groups and parties have already formed in nations like Britain, France, Italy, and Germany (Harshe, 2000, p. 56).

Three types of coalition systems—a uni-polar system, a bi-polar system, and a multi-polar system—can be distinguished based on the party system. There is just one main party and three to four minor ones in nations with a uni-polar political system, such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland. In coalition politics, which is customary, the big party frequently creates a minority administration with or without the consent of one of the other parties. In bi-polar systems, such as those in Austria and Germany (where there are often two major and one or two minor parties), the majority of coalition governments have weak connections and success. There are often two main parties and at least two more little parties in multi-polar systems like Belgium, Luxembourg, or Iceland. Minority or surplus coalitions are rare, and successful minority coalitions typically make up governments. In fragmented systems like those in the Netherlands, Finland, and Italy, there are frequently two or three big parties and four or five minor ones. Particularly in Finland and Italy, short-lived surplus coalitions centering on a bigger party and include two or more of the four or five minor

parties are the norm. Schofield, 1993, January, p. 2). Another thing to note is that successful European coalitions almost always developed before elections, rarely as post-election opportunistic alliances or coalitions. The majority of stable and long-lasting coalitions have emerged before elections (Sathe, 1997, p. 20).

Firstly, under a proportional or partially proportional system of elections, they have realised that a two-party system like that in the United Kingdom or the United States of America is unachievable and have, therefore, learned to live with it under a system of compromise because these countries have multi-party systems. Secondly, they have learned to live with it under a system of compromise because they have multi-party systems. Second, many of them have developed a distinctive form of democracy known as the consociational system, which provides institutional protections for the many cultural or ethnic groups in society even while the differences in their cultures, societies, and economies are only little (Gadkari, 2000, pp. 78-79).

Despite the prevalence of coalition governments in both developed and developing nations, there are no constitutional rules governing the process of coalition government establishment and dissolution. The German constitution is a notable exception, as it contains clauses that prevent governance without being willing to support an alternative. In Sweden, a 1974 instrument of government made an effort to explain the process of coalition government formation (Chaturved & Kumar, 2014, p. 13). In other words, a coalition in European nations is a political tool as well as a mechanical or technical accord.

1.13. Coalition Politics in India

The Indian experience with coalition politics merits investigation in light of the numerous research and ideas surrounding this topic as well as administrations in European nations. In general, there are certain similarities and variations between the political systems in India and Europe, however because political experience is different due to variances in political culture and individuals. India's experiments are crucial to the political globe since it is the largest parliamentary democracy in the world (Chander, 2004, p. 10). Caste, religious, linguistic, and minority/majority identification are all significant political factors in India, according to our research. It can be claimed that these particular elements tend to intervene and build coalitions within the general guidelines that other theories on the subject of coalitions recommend (Raj, 2009, pp. 4-5). It has long been customary in India for each prime minister to form his cabinet by making an effort to include at least nominal or token

representation for all significant minority groups, whether or not they personally agreed with this practice and regardless of whether their policies supported the same culture of accommodation or not.

India has experimented with coalition governments, initially at the state level and subsequently nationally. At the state level, coalition politics started considerably earlier than at the federal level. After the national elections of 1967, when the One Party Dominant System or Congress System ended (Kothari, 1964, December, pp. 1161–1173), numerous state governments were established on the basis of coalitions (Singh, 1975, p. 47). The 1967 assembly elections marked a turning point in Indian politics following independence. At the state level, it signaled the end of the age of one-party rule and the start of a new era of coalition politics. Due to its defeat in several states, the Congress had significantly less power. Opposition parties banded together and established coalition governments in numerous states, including Bihar, Kerala, Orissa, the Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, and West Bengal, in an effort to profit from the Congress's defeat. Defection politics also evolved at the same period, particularly in these coalitional nations. As a result, the majority of these coalition governments in these nations did not serve out their terms. The Janata Party government, led by Morarji Desai as prime minister, was the country's first coalition government. Janata Party was governed by Congress (O), Congress for Democracy, and Jan Sangh (1977-79). Leaders were motivated by Jayaprakesh Narayan to unite under the banner of a movement that included socialists and Charan Singh's Bhartiya Lok Dal. During the emergency years (1975–77), they banded forces to oppose Indira Gandhi's authoritarian rule, and in 1977, they ran for office with a unified manifesto and a shared electoral emblem (Chander, 2004, p. 30). Therefore, despite the fact that this government was technically a one-party (Janata Party) government, it actually consisted of a coalition of different ideological groups that were brought together as a result of the extraordinary political environment. The experiment initially failed due to ideological differences and leadership egos.

After 1989, there was a collapse in one-party rule that led to fractured mandates. From 1989 to 1999, there were five Lok Sabha elections in India, heralding the beginning of the coalition period. A dilemma occurring between votes seeking on the one hand and office seeking on the other resulted from the numerous coalition governments at the Centre that India has experienced since 1989. These coalition governments were sometimes formed through formal coalition agreements and other times through informal understandings. The rise in the number of regional parties led to this situation (Meena, 2010, July–Sept., p. 734).

This marks the start of the national coalition era in Indian politics. In reality, the creation of the coalition and the stability or volatility of the coalition's rule is significantly influenced by both national and regional parties. In the 1989 Lok Sabha elections, V.P. Singh (Janata Dal) led the formation of the second non-Congress government at the centre, although it was unable to serve out its full term. As an outcome, mid-term elections were pronounced in May 1991. The Congress, led by P.V. Narsimha Rao, won the most votes and went on to form the government, which lasted until the end of its full term in 1996. India experienced other coalition governments between 1996 and 1999, including the United Front governments (1996–1998) led by H.D. Deve Gowda and I.K. Gujaral, respectively, with support from the Congress outside of India, and the BJP government (1998–1999) led by A.B. Vajpayee, which held power for just thirteen months. Because none of the major political parties received the required number of seats, these coalition governments were unstable and could not finish their terms, forcing both the BJP and the Congress to reevaluate their political positions and strategies and consider the viability of stable coalition governments.

In addition, regional parties saw a tremendous upsurge between 1989 and 1999, which significantly contributed to the development of coalition governments. The Samajwadi Party (1992), Samata Party (1994), Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (1994), Biju Janata Dal (1997), All India Trinamool Congress (1998), Janata Dal Secular (1999), Peoples Democratic Party (1999), etc., were the major regional parties to arise during this time. Cultural plurality, religious elements, regional imbalances, personality cults, political divisions, caste elements, and ideological differences were the main causes of the formation of these regional parties. The regionalization of a number of national parties was another significant factor. Several so-called national parties, including SP, BSP, JD, Janata Party, CPI (M), CPI, etc., remained restricted to particular states or regions (Naidu, 2000, pp. 385–386). Therefore, while only having a small regional support base, these national parties claimed to be national parties. Even the BJP, a party with national sway, was restricted to a certain region of the nation. In addition to the local parties, the history of coalition politics has a strong connection to the demise of the Congress Party (Ratna, 2007, April–June, p. 337).

The necessity of coalition governments was proven after 1998. The NDA was established following the 1998 general elections. Despite winning the most votes in this election, the BJP was unable to secure an outright majority in the Lok Sabha. The BJP, led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, decided to put the more divisive aspects of its political platform—such as the building of the Ram Temple, the adoption of the universal civil code, and the repeal of Article 370—on hold in order to create a coalition government. Many opportunistic

politicians from smaller parties, including Mayawati and George Fernandes, were willing to forgo their anti-communal stance in order to work with the BJP to form a coalition government. So, despite being a minority party, the BJP helped form a coalition administration that went by the moniker National Democratic Alliance (NDA) (Tarkunde, 2003, August, p. 3).

After 13 months, the AIADMK lost its support, and Vajpayee's administration could not be replaced, leaving it in a minority. In 1999, the Lok Sabha was once more dissolved for a second round of midterm elections (Dalal, 2005, p. 132). Because some of the allies had been replaced and the total strength had increased to create a grand coalition of 24 parties, the 1999 elections were different in character from the ones won by the BJP-led coalition in 1998. The pre-election coalition of the NDA lacked the cohesiveness, ideological fusion, and programmatic consensus that a true coalition required (Chander, 2004, p. 62). In addition, the NDA formed the government, and Vajpayee successfully oversaw a coalition government for a full term while pulling off one of the most extraordinary feats in the history of legislative government. He demonstrated that coalition governments can be durable and that coalition members can cooperate within the parameters established by the coalition's agenda, also known as the National Agenda for Governance (Ratna, 2007, April-June, p. 342). The BJP made an effort to shift from a communal to a secular character between 1999 and 2004. The BJP was forced to pay attention to both the RSS and its coalition partners. They all put forth a lot of effort to make India stable and powerful (Minch, 2003, May, p. 28). The NDA lost popular support in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections despite Vajpayee's strong reputation, the presence of a NAG, the feel good factor, and the "India shining" slogans because to its emphasis on the incorrect priorities and disregard for the rural masses (Doddamani, 2007, September, p. 17). In addition, a number of issues caused the Congress to reconsider and reassess the creation of coalition politics because it now appears to be necessary. As a result, it stated that it was eager and ready to participate in a coalition government (Ratna, 2007, April-June, p. 342).

When it became obvious that no single party could succeed in becoming the majority party following the 2004 general elections, the UPA was quickly established. When it was established in 2004, the Congress and a group of Indian center-left political parties led it. Sonia Gandhi served as the UPA's chairwoman. The Prime Minister Manmohan Singh took the oath of office (Gaur, 2012, p. 1). The UPA alliance shown its ability to endure for the whole five years (2004–2009) and finished its term despite numerous difficulties. There were two significant coalitions in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections—the NDA and the UPA—in

which the Congress-led UPA comfortably retook power. The lack of a strong opposition had become the political talking point in India (Gupta, 2010, January, p. 41). Additionally, this administration proved that it was a reliable one.

At the time, the centre was led by Manmohan Singh, and it lasted till 2014. When the 16th Lok Sabha elections were held in May 2014, the BJP, led by Narendra Modi, won 282 seats, becoming the first party to do so since 1989 (Bhambhri, 2014, p. 261 - 262). There are now only 44 seats in the Congress. To construct the NDA administration, the BJP did not break away from its coalition allies (Farooqui & Shridharan, 2014, December, p. 10). The NDA took back control of the government in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, in which the BJP gained 303 seats on its own but forged an alliance with other parties to win more seats. Because the BJP kept its alliance partners after winning a majority in the Lok Sabha, the compulsion and necessity of coalition governance can also be seen in the NDA led by Modi.

In summary, from 1998 to 2014, our national and regional political parties' moral principles, goals, and modes of operation underwent significant important changes. These developments were the result of what is commonly known as the compulsion of coalition politics, which is widely acknowledged. The party is prepared to join forces with any other party for potential political or electoral gain or seats in the central government, and ideology and programme have diminished in importance (Tyagi, 2008, July-Sept., p. 621). Instead of all of these factors, the NDA and UPA governments encountered numerous obstacles or challenges to central stability. However, there have been far too many crises of governance during this time, including unfavourable politics, strained relationships with partners, issues with group decision-making, issues with the CMP, and issues with either India's internal or external issues. Politics and governance were ineffective even during the duration of the UPA-II government, and scams emerged one after another like they were falling out of a cupboard: CWG, 2G Spectrum, the nomination of the CVC, the Colgate case, etc. (Giri, 2011, July, p. 4). Perhaps never before, not even in the midst of a dire crisis, has a prime minister spoken so little to the populace. The administration vacillated and hesitated. So, Vajpayee led the NDA government, Manmohan Singh led the UPA government, and Modi led the NDA government, all of which demonstrated stable coalition administrations. A larger support base, lessons learned from the past, pre-election alliances, the creation of common minimum programmes, and a steering committee made up of all Coalition partners, along with the realisation by all political parties that they are not in a position to win power alone, have ensured the viability of coalition government (Dalal, 2005, p. 137-138). This process has also been facilitated by the accommodation of important personalities in the

union cabinet or at the state level. However, the future of our parliamentary democracy and the sustainability of such coalition administrations are beginning to work in concert. In order to keep the current system of governance, we must not only acknowledge the coalition but also fight to ensure its stability. Additionally, the current study has examined the similar phenomena in relation to the NDA and UPA governments (1998-2014).

1.14. Scope of the Study

Without a doubt, India's political and administrative systems are facing a lot of challenges as a result of coalition politics. We can quickly compile a long list of vexing issues to demonstrate how pervasive they are in modern culture. Delays in decision-making and implementation, ineffective political coordination, loss of ministerial authority, squandering of time and resources dealing with uncontrollable ministers and parties, instability, expansion of extra constitutional power centers, and many other governance difficulties. Studying and analyzing the coalition's political matrix becomes quite interesting. With the new trends surfacing at the center, wherein a small number of parties got together and challenged the supremacy of the political parties specially the Congress which had dominated the first three general elections in India. It was after the fourth general election of 1976 that the smaller factions and political parties based on different ideologies began to get together keeping aside their differences and began opposing the Congress. This altogether came to be known as Non-Congressism, as it included all the parties that were ideologically or politically against the Congress.

Furthermore these oppositions again organized themselves under a new Banner Name SVD- Samyukt Vidhayak Dal or Joint Legislator's Group. As the Congress broke into factions, the prominent leaders like Morarji Desai led a campaign to end the Congress dominance by getting all parties against Congress under a new name Grand Alliance. After Pronouncement of National emergency by the then President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed on the directions of Indira Gandhi on 25 June 1975, the political mood in the country began to swing more in an anti-Congress sentiment. This was the first time that the smaller oppositions got together after National Emergency elections were declared in which opposition led by Janta party secured victory. This was the first major incidence that the smaller factions were able to defeat Congress and form the Government at the Centre led by Morarji Desai.

1.15. Significance and Relevance of the Study

In reference to the above scenario, the state of Jammu & Kashmir was no exception, as the National Conference remained the Hegemonic political party like the Congress was at the center, led by the rarest leader of the masses Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. With the passage of time the National Conference too began to lose ground and parties like PDP, Congress, Awami National Conference, Panthers party and in recent times BJP surfaced getting a majority vote from Jammu.

The advent of coalition administrations at the Centre in India is one of the political trends that caught the attention of political experts. It became necessary to concentrate on these most recent phenomena in order to summarize its general significance and relevance in modern Indian politics, both at the Center and State. The value of this work is more closely related to its intellectual, social, and political importance. Since more than 40 years ago, coalitions have dominated Indian politics at the nationwide level. Given the pervasiveness of coalition governments, it is the duty of inquisitive academics and critics to investigate the phenomenon's ever-growing influence. Although the most renowned researchers have published a great deal of work on coalition governments or politics in the context of India, very little work has been done in the context of the emergence of coalition politics in Jammu & Kashmir with reference to recent developments in the state, such as the PDP-BJP Alliance, Governors Rule after the coalition Government fell, and most importantly the Abrogation of Article 370 & 35A, which is considered to be one of the biggest victories of the country. As a result, a humble effort is being made to examine the shifting dynamics of coalition politics in the context of new challenges and questions raised on the sensitive topics of governance and political stability at the State level since 2008. As a result, the topic of coalition politics in state government is receiving more attention.

1.16. Conclusion

The research presented above demonstrates that coalition governments accurately replicate the hung assemblies that have become the standard in Jammu and Kashmir as a result of the division that exists in the political parties there, which has revealed a shocking inability to form coalitions that are stable over time. On the other hand, the partnership between the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and Congress had come to a violent end, and the state was now fractured along sectarian and regional lines. The scars left by the events of 2008 are still there in people's thoughts. As a result, in order to reach a conclusion, we may

assert that a coalition administration in Jammu and Kashmir must have robust backing from the federal government, and that successful coalition governance must be acknowledged by all parties involved. The situation has evolved, and the newly formed alliances now have to demonstrate their effectiveness. There can be no room for trickery in economic matters; rather, new innovative approaches of demonstrating development while maintaining redistributive fairness ought to be explored.

CHAPTER 2
COALITION POLITICS IN INDIA: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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2.1. Introduction

Coalition politics in India have evolved rapidly in recent years, but they have a history and trajectory that cannot be overlooked. It is clear that coalition administrations in India have gone through several stages. Coalition politics in India generally arose after 1967 at the state level and after 1977 at the national level; however there were few examples of legislative and executive coalitions before to this. This chapter examines the various stages of coalition governments in India. The pre-independence era (i.e. before 1947) is covered by the initial phase of coalition politics, particularly the 1937 provincial elections with coalitional outcomes in some provinces and the 1946 coalitional interim government.

The second period of coalition governments lasted from 1947 to 1967. Although this period was characterized as the dominance of a one-party system, i.e. Congress control at the Centre as well as in the states, non-Congress or coalitional governments existed in a few states at the same time. From 1967 through 1989, the coalition administrations were in their third phase. During this period, one-party dominance was dramatically reduced, and non-Congress coalition administrations were created in certain Indian states; the Janata Party formed the first official coalition government at the centre in 1977. The fifth phase lasted from 1989 to 1999 and was characterized by a pure coalitional era that was politically unstable due to five general elections and six different prime ministers. From 1999 to 2014, the second phase of coalitional governments consisted of coalitional governments formed out of necessity, which have shown to be fairly stable in compared to past experiences. During this time, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) (1999) and the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) (2004), led by the BJP and the Congress, respectively, emerged at the national level. Prior to this, previous coalitional fronts like as the 1989 National Front (NF) and the 1996 United Front (UF) were not led by these big national parties. Thus, the period from 1999 to 2014 is renowned for two main coalitional blocs, the NDA and the UPA.

Historically, the central authority of India encountered numerous obstacles in uniting the country in the years succeeding independence. These include the incorporation of 561 semi-autonomous princely states into the Indian Union, state linguistic reorganization, the resolution of the official language problem, the grant of partial official status to minority

languages in numerous states, and many more (*Vishawanathan, 2005*). India chose a parliamentary form of governance, with Jawaharlal Nehru serving as the primary architect of this parliamentary democracy system (*Patil, 1965*). Because of India's geographical expanse and population on the one hand, and the diversified structure of its society on the other, the country's constitution architects chose a federal system over a unitary one. At the same time, the exhilaration of freedom, the agony of partition, the challenge of princely state integration, and the need for planned economic development to eliminate backwardness, poverty, and food scarcity compelled them to construct a strong centre. As a result, the Indian constitution enhanced the centre's control over the states and established the country's quasi-federal polity.

India's politics are more regionalized than any other federal system in the world, reflecting the country's cultural variety. The Indian political system, as envisioned by the constitution, is socialist, secular, democratic, and republican, based on three basic principles: first, a parliamentary form of government based on the Westminster System or British Model, second, the existence of a multiparty system, which represents Indian society's multi-ethnic and culturally plural character, and third, a federal structure in which the country's governance is divided among the states. The Indian Constitution substantially follows the Westminster model of parliamentary structure. Because India is a huge subcontinent with numerous culturally and ethnically varied populations, political behaviour within the country varies from area to region or state to state. Within the same constitutional and legal framework, ethnic allegiance and cultural variety have tended to promote divergent political behaviours. As a result, the legal structure is same across the country, but political behaviour and practises vary (*Chander, 2004*).

For various reasons, the framers of the Indian Constitution picked the parliamentary form of government. First, this system was already in use in certain nations and had been accepted by India since the Minto-Morely Reforms (1909). The people of India were thus familiar with it; second, disagreements between executives and lawmakers on various matters are a typical occurrence in the presidential form of government. To avoid such conflicts and disputes between these two, the parliamentary form of government was required; and finally, one of the most important reasons for adopting this model was the vastness of the country, as well as the richness and plurality of its cultures (*Kumar, 2008*). The writers of the Indian constitution chose the parliamentary form of government due to the country's vastness and

the wide range of diversity based on faiths, languages, regions, caste, history, and physical qualities (*Pal, 2008*).

Post-independence India has been endowed with a rich legacy of democratic history as a result of these parliamentary and federal qualities. India had its 17th Lok Sabha election in 2019, despite the fact that we have seen some unstable regimes due to the advent of a string of coalition governments since 1989, but the democratic path has persisted and strengthened with each election. With the establishment of a multiparty system in India, the spotlight is now on regional parties, which have grabbed the potential for governance and made government formation at all levels a monumental effort (*Chaturved & Kumar, 2014*).

2.2. Pre-Independence India's Coalition System

In Political setup of India, coalition politics are not a novel idea. Although coalition governments are widespread and frequently used in Europe, India has also gained significant experience with governing structures. One can go back to ancient India to find the origins of coalition politics there. There have been several instances of coalition creation in historical conflicts like war and politics. For instance, during the epic war of the Mahabharata, there were two coalitions, and several Janapadas sided with either the Kauravas or the Pandavas (*Pakem, 1999*). Most conflicts in the mediaeval era might also be classified as coalitional warfare fought solely for political benefit. Even in the 20th century, the nationalist movement, particularly the Gandhian conception of Swaraj, served as a prime example of a social coalition because Gandhi forced not just Muslims and other minorities but also various Hindu sects to band together for freedom. For a nation like India, which was bonded by its religion, race, culture, and shared history of persecution and suffering, this seems to be the most practical solution imaginable (*Chakrabarty, 2006*).

Additionally, after the 1937 Provincial elections, when the Governance of India Act, 1935, went into effect, undivided India experienced coalition government for the first time. Mohammad Ali Jinnah requested a coalition made up of Congress and the Muslim League after the Provincial Election results dealt the Muslim League a setback. He claimed that in India, coalitions were the only credible way to ensure that Muslims received a fair part in the executive branch (*Maheshwari, 1997*). The Congress Party rejected this demand. In addition, the All-India Muslim League (with 37 seats) and the Krishak Praja Party of A.K. Fazlul Huq (with 36 seats) formed a coalition government in Bengal, where the Congress was the leading

party (with 54 seats) (*Jalal, 1994*). With 33 seats, Congress joined the Assam Valley Muslim Party in alliance in that state (with 24 seats). Congress secured 19 out of 50 seats in the North- West Frontier Province (NWFP), which has a preponderantly Muslim population, and was able to establish a government with the help of smaller parties.

Congress wasn't quite in the majority in Bombay. Nevertheless, with the help of local parties, a coalition government was able to be formed. The government established by Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan in Punjab was appropriately referred to be a Unionist Coalition administration as a result of reaching an agreement with other political groups. The Unionist leader made the decision to enlist the support of the Khalsa National Party, certain Hindu independent candidates, and members of the National Progressive Party who were elected on the Hindu Election Board ticket.

When J.L. Nehru formed the Interim Government in 1946 with Lord Mountbatten serving as the last British Governor-General of India, it had representatives from the Congress, the Muslim League, the Akali Dal, and a few other minor parties, which was a political coalition with the partition of India hanging over their heads at the time (*Mehra, 1997*). A coalition of diametrically opposed parties struggled to function during the nine months this government was in office (*Riddick, 2006*).

One Party Supremacy and Rise of Political Opposition in India: From 1947 to 1967

Even when Jawaharlal Nehru acquired office as India's first Prime Minister and chose ministers to his cabinet after independence, we saw the clouds of a coalition government in motion. He chose cabinet members from both the Congress party and the non-Congress party. Some of them accommodated varied view points. Even his fiercest critics, such as B.R. Ambedkar (elected from the Scheduled Caste Federation), Shyama Prasad Mookerjee (elected from the Hindu Mahasabha), R.K. Shanmugham Chetty (elected from the INC but belonging to the Justice Party), and Baldev Singh (from the Panthic Party), joined Nehru's cabinet (Gandhi, 2000, p. 71). Others, such as John Matthai, served in the government as experts in their own right, unconstrained by party discipline to toe Nehru's line. Naturally, the cabinet was likely to act as a coalition, which it did. The prime minister was *primus inter pares* since few of his cabinet members were dwarfed by his charisma. It should be stressed, however, that this coalition was not the outcome of the ruling party's political compulsions. It was a coalition formed by the political party's leader, and it was firmly in place. As a result, it

would have lasted only as long as the leading party and its leader could accommodate the coalition members' ideas. Thus, by the late 1950s, cabinet members such as Matthai, Mookerjee, Ambedkar, and C.D. Deshmukh had left due to policy disputes (*Mehra, 1997*).

From the First Lok Sabha Elections in 1952 to the Fourth Lok Sabha Elections in 1967, Indian politics has been referred to as a single party dominance system or one party dominance system, and it is commonly referred to as the Congress system. This supremacy was strengthened when the Muslim League lost its lustre in India as a result of the founding of Pakistan and the role of Congress to India's independence (*Singh & Mishra, 2004*). Throughout the Nehru era, the Congress received widespread support from all segments of society (*Ahamad & Nilofer, 2009*). At the state and national levels, it was the powerful Congress vs the opposition's small and divided political forces.

Duverger's Law, which predicted the formation of a two-party system in a plural electoral system by including political competition and consociational voting, was effectively defined by Congress, arrangements within its borders while keeping it together with deft faction management (*Yadav, 1996, January*). The Congress won more than two-thirds of the Lok Sabha seats in the first three general elections (364 seats in 1952, 371 seats in 1957, and 361 seats in 1962), though this fell to 283 seats in 1967. Its vote share varied between 44 and 48 percent (45 percent in 1952, 47.8 percent in 1957, and 44.7 percent in 1958). He received 40.78 percent of the vote in the first three elections (*Raj, 2009*).

Table 2.1: Major Political Parties & their Electoral Performance in 1952-1967 General Elections (*Source: ECI Official Website*)

Year	Lok-Sabha Elections	Total Seats	First			Second			Third		
			Party	Seats	%age votes	Party	Seats	%age votes	Party	Seats	%age votes
1951-52	1 st	489	INC	364	44.99	CPI	16	3.29	SOC	12	10.59
1957	2 nd	494	INC	371	47.78	CPI	27	8.92	PSP	19	10.41
1962	3 rd	494	INC	361	44.72	CPI	29	9.94	SWA	18	7.89
1967	4 th	520	INC	283	40.78	SWA	44	8.67	BJS	35	9.31

Prior to 1967, the Congress received roughly 45% of the vote and 75% of the seats in Parliament in the first three general elections. Comparatively speaking, the largest opposition parties—the Socialist Party in 1951, the Praja Socialist Party in 1957, and the Communist Party of India in 1962—could only get about 10% of the vote and fewer than 5% of the seats. The idea of one-party supremacy also suggested that the Congress held a similar sway over all of the states. Over the course of ten years of organised political activity, the Congress has grown to dominate the nationalist movement in various regions of the nation. However, because a sizeable percentage of independent India was not a part of British India, the Congress did not necessarily inherit a position of equal control in all the states at the moment of independence. Throughout fact, in the 1950s, the sharpest opposition to the Congress was frequently found in states like Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Tripura, which encompassed significant portions of the former princely states' boundaries (*Butler et al., 199*). Therefore, until India's fourth general election in 1967, Congress was the dominant party both at the national level and in the states (Table No. 2.2).

Table No. 2.2: Electoral Performance of Congress Party in Legislative Assemblies in India (1952-1967).

Year of General Election	Total Seats	Seats Won by Congress	Percentage of Seat	Vote Polled by Congress	Percentage of votes polled by Congress
1952 ^a	3199	2183	68.20	43445655	42.12
1957 ^b	3102	2038	65.70	55661165	45.65
1962 ^c	3334	1957	58.37	50374463	43.42
1967 ^d	3487	1693	48.60	56972083	40.07

Source: Data has been taken from Kochanek (1968, p. 408)

Note: a: excludes information from the former Delhi and Himachal Assemblies;

b: Only the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh participated in the 1957 election. Data from the Andhra Pradesh midterm elections of 1955 have been added;

c: No parliamentary elections for Kerala or Orissa were held in 1962. Data from the 1961 midterm elections for the Orissa Legislative Assemblies and the 1965 general elections for Kerala have been included.

d: The results of the legislative assemblies of J&K, Goa, Daman and Diu, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, and Tripura are also included in the data for 1962 and 1967.

According to table 2.2, from 1952 and 1967, Congress won a minimum of 48.60 percent and a maximum of 68.20 percent of the seats in all Indian legislative assemblies. As a result, it received a minimum of 40.07 % of votes cast in the 1967 assembly elections and a high of 45.65 percent of votes cast in the 1957 assembly elections. It demonstrates unequivocally that the Congress was India's only major party and that it was a pan-Indian organisation. There were a few nations where coalition governments existed between 1952 and 1967. Following the first state legislative assembly elections in December 1951–January 1952, the former state of Travancore–Cochin and PEPSU were the first two states in the nation to form coalition governments (*Yellaiah, 2013*). Three other coalition governments were established in Andhra Pradesh (1953–56), Orissa (1957–62), and Kerala (1960–64) between the years of 1953 and 1967 (*Chander, 2004*).

2.3. Crisis in the Congress and the Post-Nehruvian Phase

After the death of Jawahar Lal Nehru on 27 May 1964, the Congress Party faced numerous organisational and leadership issues. During the three-year period from 1964 to 1967, there was an internal party plan for the national leadership before to the 1967 elections. After Lal Bahadur Shastri's untimely death, Indira Gandhi assumed power. She rose to the top by surpassing a number of senior Congress officials, although initially she was not well accepted. Thus, the fourth general elections were held during a transition in the national political organisation and leadership of the Congress.

The fourth general elections of 1967 were a watershed moment in the development of Indian democracy. The belief that Congress was invincible was dispelled. The year 1967 has been described as a quiet revolution against the monopoly of power held by the Congress. Over time, the developing political, social, economic, and regional tensions led to the formation of many regional parties with differing power in states (*Ahamad & Nilofer, 2009*). The decline of Congress led to the creation of numerous competing groupings and political factions, which aided in the consolidation of regional political parties (*Bhambhri, 1997*). This poorer performance and the Congress party's setback gave rise to coalition politics in other states. In the 1967 election, the Congress was unable to duplicate its previous landslide victories. The Congress vote decreased by over 4 percent, and whereas it had 73.07 percent of

the seats in the previous parliament, it won only 54.60 percent of the seats in the current parliament (table no. 2.3).

Table No. 2.3: Electoral Performance of Congress Party in General Elections in India, 1952 to 1967

Year of General Election	Total Seats	Seats Won by Congress	Percentage of Seat won	Vote Polled by Congress	Percentage of votes polled by Congress
1952	489	364	74.40	47665875	44.99
1957	494	371	75.10	57579593	47.78
1962	494	361	73.07	51509084	44.72
1967	520	284	54.60	59538197	40.78

Source: Kochanek (1968)

The Congress Party won the first three general elections with sizable majorities for the following reasons: It is headed by a charismatic person, to start Nehru up to his death in 1964 and other political figures that fostered a personality cult (*Singh, 2006*). Due in large part to powerful leaders like Sardar Patel, Rajendra Prasad, and Pandit Nehru, who were backed by a galaxy of unselfish politicians like Lal Bahadur Shastri, Kamraj, Chavan, and others, India experienced a period of stable governments at the centre, despite all the social and economic issues. Such charismatic individuals were less prevalent in 1967, but what Churchill refers to as men of straw was supported by a group of seasoned politicians, some of whom were outright felons (*Gadkari, 2000*).

The second factor was the high level of sovereignty that the local party units within Congress were able to exercise in respect to the central party headship, in addition to the charismatic leadership during the Nehru era. The Pradesh Congress Committees (PCCs), which mainly attained financial independence, raised their personal party funds for managing the organisation or contesting elections and awarded favours via their ministers in the state legislature. With the exception of times when the state party was severely divided, the central leadership nearly always accepted their suggestions for candidates for parliamentary or assembly seats without alteration (*Chatterjee, 1998*). Decentralization of leadership and the

formation of new power centres within the party followed as the central leadership started to lose control of the generally autonomous and financially independent state units of the party. As a result, other parties were able to use this as a platform to make a strong statement about their existence and weaken Congress's hold on power.

Third, the division of opposition votes during the first three elections can help to explain the Congress success. The situation pitted a sizable Congress Party against weak and dispersed opposition forces both at the state and federal levels (*Chaturved & Kumar*). The exceptions were one or two states that only had coalitions once or twice, necessitating only five additional state elections. A turning point in Indian politics occurred when the Congress lost three times solely in Kerala, greatly undermining its monopoly on power (*Singh, 1998*). In actuality, the opposition parties were parties of pressure, but the ruling Congress Party was a party of consensus. The opposition parties played a very unique role. Fourthly, the Congress had grassroots organisations that assisted in determining the needs and interests of the populace (*Singh, 2006*). In actuality, the Congress party was a coalitional one.

Prior to Independence, the Indian National Congress served as a sort of unifying platform for people of many backgrounds and ideologies. Within the Congress were the Swaraj Party, the Socialist Party, and for a while even the Communist Party. Each member of this umbrella group shared the common objective of freeing the nation from foreign rule. For many people, Congress represented far more than just a political party. Gandhi would have liked that the Congress be abolished or changed into a charitable organisation so that India could create a strong, ideologically based party system after it got independence. Gandhi was opposed by the Congress leaders, even the tallest one. They might have believed that the Congress was essential to administering the government (*Kashyap, 2000*).

Consequently, a number of variables had a role in the Congress's disaster in 1967. The party's top leadership failed to modernise and eliminate factionalism. As a result, the Congress organisation was nearly destroyed in many states. The obvious factionalism among the key leaders served to incite rival groupings, and for the first time since 1951, the Congress experienced significant defections. Dissidents felt so helpless in the minority— isolated by the state party's powerful groups and unable to appeal to a unified central leadership—that leaving seemed like their only option. As a result, disgruntled Congressmen in almost every state—especially West Bengal and Orissa—played a crucial role in the Congress's defeat (*Kochanek, 1968*). Massive defections occurred as a result of intra-party factionalism and disputes, and branch organisations including the Janata Congress in

In addition, the Jana Kranti Dal in Bihar, the Jan Pakasha in Mysore, Rajasthan, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, and Orissa made an appearance. The emergence of splinter groups and subsequent reconciliation with opposition parties allowed for a competitive multiparty system and coalition politics. (*Kumar & Lone 2013*). As a result of both supporters and opponents harshly criticising Congress's performance in the art of government, its power was noticeably reduced. The allegations of corruption against some of the Congress's leaders as well as the nation's deepening economic crisis both damaged the institution's reputation in the public eye (*Kumar & Lone, 2013*).

Indian politics had two key shifts as a result of the 1967 experiment. First off, the era of one-party majority was almost ended, and in its place emerged a coalition of parties that were not just ideologically compatible but also motivated by a desire to unseat the Congress Party. The majority of the parties suffered as a result of defection, which was a key component in coalition building, with the exception of the extreme right and left parties, which retained their organisational integrity via discipline and ideological consistency. Second, after the 1967 elections, anti-Congress groups gained support, and the notion that the Congress Party was unbeatable appeared to have reached its limit (*Singh, 2001, March-April*). It was a period of opportunity. The Congress was forced to reinvent itself in order to regain power while taking into account the altered dynamics of Indian politics. Similar to this, the opposition parties saw a chance to remove the Congress from power in numerous Indian provinces by capitalising on the antagonism to the Congress. But this joy with the electoral victory over Congress was just momentary. There was also a period of political ambiguity during this time, with none of the major political parties convinced of their future (*Chakrabarty, 2006*).

The hegemony of the Congress was weakened in 1967, and anti-Congress governments were established in the nine states where the Congress was unable to achieve a majority. At the state level, opposition to the Congress brought together different non-Congress political groups with distinct ideologies. With the exception of Madras, where the DMK had an absolute majority, the Congress was not overthrown by a single party. Instead, most of the non-Congress governments that were created were coalitions. For instance, after winning a majority in Bihar, the Samyukta Socialist Party, Praja Socialist Party, Jan Sangh, CPI, and Jan Kranti Dal established a Samyukta Vidhayak Dal. The popular United Front administration in Punjab was established by the alliance of the CPI (M), Akali Dal (Sant Group), Akali Dal (Master Group), CPI, Janna Sangh, and Republican Party. The Swatantra

Party, the Jana Congress, and the backing of former princely state scions came together to create the administration in Orissa. The Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), Karshaka Thozhilali Party (KTP), CPI, Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP), CPM, and the Muslim League formed the United Front of Kerala Socialist Party in Kerala. The Bangla Congress and CPM joined up with fourteen other parties to create a coalition in West Bengal. Thus in the states where the non-Congress parties were in a position to challenge the dominance of the Congress, a coalition formed (*Raj, 2009*).

This ended up being the start of a non-Congress era that had not yet completely bloomed, perhaps because there was no well connected organisational network of opposition parties over the entire country at the time (*Kothari, 1988*). Unfortunately, during this time, the majority of coalitions disbanded quickly. Large-scale defections, leadership instability, and the absence of minimal shared programmes all contributed to their inability to build a cohesive coalition force. As the United Front governments in UP, Bihar, West Bengal, Haryana, Punjab, and MP fell, defections became commonplace (*Raj, 2009*).

The Congress didn't lose its hegemonic control of Indian politics as a result; rather, the federal system was now required to handle the interactions between the Congress government at the federal level and a number of non-Congress administrations in the states (*Chatterjee, 1998*). The years 1967-1969, represented a clear change from the past by creating a unique space for coalition politics as opposed to monocentric, single-party government, were characterised by uncertainty and on-going political instability. Thus, the occurrence of the union of parties with various interests was a part of a larger democratic process wherein a new wave was crystallised with a substantial impact on future political articulation (*Chakrabarty, 2006*). After the 1967–1977 periods, inter-party political coalitions replaced intra-party factionalism and intra-structural coalitions as the dominant form of political organisation in India (*Narain, 1974*).

At this point, the parties were transitioning from transitory party coalitions to coalitional party systems, in which the major political parties attempted to form electoral alliances in order to work together to form a governing coalition. The 1967 elections also replaced the single dominant party system with a multiparty one in which no single party claimed an absolute majority at any level of the political structure, resulting in the creation of an inter-party or formal coalition system (*Maheshwari, 1970*).

In addition, the Trimurti of Kamraj, Nijalingappa, and Atulya Ghosh became the Congress Party's power centre and influenced most of the chief ministers following the deaths of Jawaharlal Nehru in 1964 and Shastri in 1966. The Trimurti opposed Morarji Desai becoming prime minister because they thought he was too independent and unyielding. They were concerned that they would lose control of Indian politics if he were to become prime minister. They therefore began looking for someone they could control and then swap out as and when they saw fit. Indira Gandhi, the daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru, was the one they discovered (*Halan, 1997*). Furthermore, the party split in 1969 as a result of the leaders' personality cult. The grand old party of India, the Congress, saw its first significant split when the old guard, led by the party president,

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was removed from the party by Nijalingappa for favouring a cult of personality. The Syndicate, as the senior members were commonly referred to, struggled to accept that Indira was more than just a gungi gudiya (stupid doll), as they dubbed her in jest. When Indira advised congressmen to vote according to their conscience after suggesting N. Sanjeeva Reddy for the presidency, the break was over. The oppositional Congress candidate, V.V. Giri, won (*India Today, 2007*). Indira Gandhi, the prime minister of India at the time, was consequently jerked out of the Congress party on November 12, 1969, for breaking party rules. The party eventually broke up, and Indira Gandhi founded a competing group that became known as Congress (R). 446 of the 705 members of the All India Congress Committee walked over to Indira's side (*Chandra et al., 2008*). Other informal names for the Indian National Congress (Organisation) include the Syndicate and the Indira faction. The INC was led by Kamaraj and then Morarji Desai(O).

2.4. Coalition Governments after 1967

First Legislative Coalition Government: Indira Gandhi's government was lowered to a parliamentary minority after the Congress split of 1969, but it survived by creating a legislative alliance. She maintained her position as prime minister with the support of parties including the CPI (M), DMK, and CPI. The CPM was a member of the anti-Indira government coalition in West Bengal, but the ministry quickly collapsed under the weight of its own contradiction, just as similar formations in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Haryana had done. Indira sought the cooperation of the DMK despite the opposition of Congress MLAs in Tamil Nadu to the DMK government in the state. The CPI also defected from the opposition

to support Indira Gandhi at the time. This brief experience with a minority administration was quickly supplanted by the return of the Congress under Mrs. Indira Gandhi with a large majority in the 1971 mid-term Lok Sabha elections, and by the Congress Party under her leadership in the 1972 state assembly elections (*Singh, 2001*). Thus, anti-Congressism, factionalism, and a leadership crisis inside the Congress Party provided the opportunity for opposition groups to unite and polarize against the Congress.

Pre-Electoral Alliances in Fifth Lok Sabha Elections (1971): The first midterm elections in India's independent history were held in 1971 for the Fifth Lok Sabha. In this election, Indira Gandhi was supported by the CPI, the DMK, the Akali Dal, and a fraction of the PSP. She did, however, run into resistance from the Congress (O), Jana Sangh, Swatantra Party, SSP, and BKD. The Congress (R), led by Indira Gandhi, earned a strong majority despite the pre-election coalition. It was the biggest election campaign that had ever been held in India. Additionally, it was the first time that parliamentary elections were held separately from state assembly elections, focusing the campaigns only on national concerns. (*Chatterjee, 1998*). Indira Gandhi's victory in this election¹⁸, with 352 out of 518 seats and 43.1% of the vote share, was a definite improvement over her performance in 1967, when she won 281 out of 518 seats, and led Morris Jones to believe that the opposition parties would now have to operate less through confrontation and more through interaction (*Raj, 2009*). The CPI (M) came in second with 25 seats and 5.12 percent of the vote, while the Congress (O) came in third with 16 seats and 10.43 percent of the vote, which was the second greatest vote percentage in this election (see table no. 2.4).

Table No 2.4: Electoral Performance of Major Political Parties in 5th GE 1971

Party	Seat won (out of 518 seats)	% age
INC(R)	352	43.68
CPI(M)	25	5.12
CPI	23	4.37
BJS	22	7.35
INC (O)	16	10.43

Source: Retrieved from <http://eci.nic.in/eci/eci.html>

The Congress won handily, even in the Congress (O) strongholds of Mysore and Gujarat (R). Only the DMK and the Left parties, many of which were allied with Indira Gandhi, continued to have significant support (*Chatterjee, 1998*). Due to the parties' fear of losing, this election also served as an illustration of coalitional agreements between parties. The "one party domination" system evolved into the "one person dominance" system after a resounding victory. The fact that Mrs. Gandhi used to settle any disagreements at the inter-party level during her tenure instead of the Congress high command during the Nehru era demonstrates her control over both the organisational and parliamentary wings. Pertaining her relationship with the Congress Party, she used it as a dual weapon to accomplish her goals and complete the process of identification between the party and the government. The organization's decision-making process became centralised, and she was given complete control. No ideological debate or dissent was tolerated within the organisation (*Chakrabarty, 2006*).

Every institution in India began to confront and endanger Indira as she fought for control of the party and the government starting in 1973. Her reputation and credibility suffered significantly as a result of a nationwide drought in 1971, 1972, and 1973, international inflation, the railway workers strike in 1974, and Jaya Prakash Narayan's campaign in 1974. Indira Gandhi was also found guilty of breaking electoral laws at the same time by the Allahabad High Court. Jai Prakash Narayan demanded that the chief ministers and Indira step down, and that the military and police reject unlawful and immoral commands. He promoted a social change agenda that he called Sampoorna/Samagra Kranti (Total Revolution) (*Singh, 2006, September*). Ultimately, she came to the conclusion that the only way to maintain control over the situation was to declare an emergency.

2.5. Declaring a National Emergency and the Political Repercussions

The declaration of a national emergency happened at midnight on June 25, 1975. 20 Due to it, hundreds of opposition leaders and activists from all over the nation—including J.P. Narayan and 59 members of Parliament—were detained under the state of emergency. They belonged to the Jana Sangh, the Akali Dal, the DMK, the Bhartiya Lok Dal, the Socialist Party, the Congress (O), the CPI (M), the CPI (M-L), and the Congress (O). Critics

of Indira Gandhi who were members of the Congress, particularly the Young Turks, were among those who were detained. Both left and right-wing political organisations were outlawed in large numbers. The Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) was tightened by removing nearly all requirements for the government to provide justification for holding someone (*Chatterjee, 1998*). These events drove the opposition's leaders and parties to band together against Indira Gandhi, and when she lifted the emergency on January 18 and called for the upcoming Lok Sabha elections, these competing parties joined forces to challenge Indira Gandhi in the polls.

First Non-Congress Coalition Government: Four opposition parties—the Congress (O), the Jana Sangh, the Bhartiya Lok Dal, and the Socialist Party—came together to take on the challenge and create a new political party known as the Janata Party under the direction of Jai Prakash Narayan, who at the time served as the opposition parties' moral leader. The parties that made up the Janata Party ran for office in the 1977 Lok Sabha elections under a single banner, with a single candidate list, and a single electoral symbol. Thus, it provided another option for those who didn't like Congress. Three expelled Congressmen, Chandra Shekhar, Krishan Kant, and Ram Dhan, joined the Janata Party. Jagjeevan Ram, one of the senior-most members of Indira Gandhi's cabinet, as well as two other former Chief Ministers, H.N. Bahuguna of the U.P. and Nandini Satpathy of Orissa, had also announced his retirement from the Congress.

Together, they created the Congress for Democracy (CFD), a new party that joined the Janata Party's electoral alliance. For the first time at the centre, the Janata and the CFD mobilised all anti-emergency forces in the nation to assure their success (*Chander, 2004*). The Janata government had captured the attention of the populace and sparked their hopes and aspirations by committing to a unifying, progressive election platform, "Bread with Freedom" (*Dandavate, 2000*). *The Revolutionary Socialist Party, All India Forward Bloc, Marxist Forward Bloc, Revolutionary Communist Party of India, and the CPI (M)*, and Biplabi Bangla Congress were founding member parties of the Left Front, which was created concurrently in India as the oppressive conditions of the emergency were lifted in January 1977. (*Menon, 2001, June 9-22*). The Left Front also participated in the Lok Sabha election through a coalition with the Janata Party. Due to several abuses committed during the emergency period, the sixth general election, held in 1977; saw a nationwide anti-Congress wave that was unprecedented. The Congress suffered its worst rout in this election. After 30 years in power, the Congress was overthrown in a historic election. The party lost because of

Indira Gandhi's abuse of power and Sanjay Gandhi's autocratic leadership style. She and her son Sanjay Gandhi were ejected from their seats. In a humiliating loss, the Congress received 154 seats, 198 fewer than in 1971, and its vote share dropped to less than 35%. (See table no. 2.5).

Table No. 2.5: Electoral Performance of Major Political Parties in the 6th GE 1977.

Party	Seat won (out of 542 seats)	% age
BLD/Janata Party	295	41.32
INC (I)	154	34.32
CPI(M)	22	4.29
AIADMK	18	2.9
CFD (Jagjiven Ram)	13	5.28

Source: Retrieved from <http://eci.nic.in/eci/eci.html>

With a share of votes of more than 41 percent, Janata Party was able to win 295 seats. Intriguingly, the AIADMK, a recently established regional party in Tamil Nadu, gained 18 seats in this election. The Janata Party was able to take power after the defeat of Congress. In truth, the Janata Organization was a combination of many anti-Congress groups despite appearing to be a unified party. The Janata Party's win served as a resounding protest against the Congress administration's authoritarianism under Indira Gandhi. The bitterness that brought together the desperate opposition parties into a functional coalition (*Vishawanathan, 2005*).

Under Morarji Desai's leadership, the Janata Party formed the nation's first non-Congress administration in 1977 (*Tiwana, 1996*). However, the tug-of-war between the various party leaders and sections prevented the Janata Party alliance from remaining in place for more than 28 months, which led to a midterm election. The Bhartiya Lok Dal (BLD) and the Jan Sangh, two of the strongest Janata Party factions, engaged in power struggles over the governance of north Indian states, which was the main cause of the coalition's demise. Both George Fernandez's socialist group and Charan Singh's Lok Dal were unable to adapt to the new circumstances. As a result, Morarji Desai was elected as prime minister, while Jagjivan Ram of the CFD and Charan Singh of the Lok Dal continued to run for the position after they were appointed as senior cabinet members. The rapid growth of the Jana Sangh through the Rashtriya Swayan Sevak (RSS) infuriated secularists, who questioned the former Jana

Sangh's dual membership with the RSS. The claims of corruption against Kanti Desai, the prime minister's son, were the other issue. The ministry entered a minority as a result of resignations and defections from the ruling party following Y.B. Chavan's vote of no-confidence against the government in July 1979. As a result, Morarji Desai decided to leave his position as Prime Minister (*Khan, 2000*).

Midway through 1979, Charan Singh left the Janata Party and overthrew the Morarji Desai-led Janata government. Charan Singh, the leader of an interim coalition government, was able to lead India as Prime Minister by maintaining the balance between both the Janata Party and the Congress Party (*Devanathan, 1999*). As a result, on July 28, 1979, Charan Singh established a coalition government at the federal level with the Congress Party's unqualified backing. After the Congress (I) withdrew its support on January 14, 1980, the government of Charan Singh also dissolved, and his term came to an end without having to face the Lok Sabha. It was not surprising that the administration crumbled within three weeks of its formation because this coalitional structure was once again characterised by ideological incompatibility (*Chaturved & Kumar*). Due to Indira Gandhi's intrigues, the Congress pulled its support, Charan Singh resigned, and he recommended to the President that the Lok Sabha be dissolved. The Lok Sabha was dissolved, and the President called for midterm elections.

The Janata Party's coalition administration failed as a result of personality conflicts, ideological disagreements, and defections. The Congress's manipulation tactic served as an additional aggravation of these shortcomings. Having gained experience and training in the single-party dominance system of the Congress, the leaders of the Janata Party were unable to envision how to forge a consensus or coalition among the various political groups that made up the Janata Party, which led to the end of the Janata experiment because it was neither a single-party government nor a coalition government. The constituent parties lost sight of their struggle with the Congress and began to look askance at one another. Additionally, their strategy during the administration seemed to be retaliatory action against Mrs. Indira Gandhi rather than any constructive programme of action to correct the mistakes made by the previous Congress government (*Chander, 2004*). Elections in 1977 demonstrated the strength of the democratic process against authoritarianism, which was encouraging for Indian democracy. Coalition-oriented parties were warned by the failure of the Janata experiment to resolve their differences before to preparing for governance (*Khan, 2000*).

The Janata Party's rule also demonstrated the strength and negotiating skills of the smaller allied parties against the central Congress, which was the dominating party and had

never been challenged. 24 It's interesting to note that this was the only instance of a bipartisan trend. A dual-party system was introduced for the first time in India during this period (1977–1979), when the Janata Party and the Congress together had more than 80% of the votes and seats (*Singh, 1992*). Analytically, we can see that at this point, coalition partners join forces to advance a common goal and overthrow the political establishment, which is a trait of coalition governance. The on-going tug-of-war between the coalition members, each of whom has their own objectives, is, however, another characteristic of coalitions. During this time, we also discovered that coalition governments were unstable.

2.6. Resurgence of Congress' dominance (1980-1989)

In January 1980's midterm Lok Sabha elections, Indira Gandhi and the Congress (I) regained control of the government. It was the return of Congress's centralised dominance until 1989. This time, the Congress gained 199 more seats than in the Lok Sabha elections of 1977, winning 353 of the 542 available seats. In contrast, the Janata Party (Secular), which had been the second-largest party in terms of seats with 41, lost 264 seats and had a vote share of only 9.39 percent, while the Janata Party gained 31 seats and had a vote share of 18.97 percent, making it the second-largest vote share in this general election. The Janata Party (S) and INC (Urs) are two new factional parties that developed at this time and performed well in the elections (see table no. 2.6).

Table No. 2.6: Electoral Performance of Major Political Parties in the Seventh General Elections, 1980

Party's Name	Seats won (out of 542 seats)	%age	+/-
INC (I)	353	42.69	+199
Janata Party (S)	41	9.39	New*
CPI (M)	37	5.28	+15
Janata Party	31	18.97	-264
INC (Urs)	13	5.28	New**

Source: Data has been taken from the Reports of the Election Commission of India and computed by the researcher. Retrieved from <http://eci.nic.in/eci/eci.html>

After 1980, Mrs. Gandhi made an effort to win over the Hindi-speaking population and businesspeople by abandoning her previous message of "Secularism and Socialism" (Kohli, 1991, p. 311). Additionally, it should be noted that the Congress' electoral success in 1980 was not a testament to the strength of its internal organisation or to its power to win back its base of support, let alone to its ability to forge tenable social support. The 1980 elections demonstrated the electorate's reluctance to experiment further; instead, they decided it was safer to place their bets on the Congress (I) (*Satyanarayana, 1997*).

Due to her involvement in Operation Blue Star, On October 31, 1984, two Sikh bodyguards of Indira Gandhi assassinated her. The Eighth Lok Sabha elections were announced following Gandhi's murder. With 404 seats, the Congress received a sizable amount of sympathy votes. After the elections in Asam and Punjab, it grew to 414 seats, the most since independence, and Rajiv Gandhi was elected prime minister. The vote share for the Congress climbed to 49.10 percent, continuing to be the greatest as far the voter turnout is concerned.

Table No. 2.7: Electoral Performance of Major Political Parties in Eighth General Elections, 1984-85

Party	Seat won (out of 514 (541) seats)	% age of vote share	+/-
INC	404 (414)*	49.10 (48.1)	+51 (61)
TDP	30	4.31	New
CPI(M)	22	5.87	-15
AIADMK	12	1.69	+10
Janata Party	10	6.89	-21
BJP	2	7.74	New

Source: Data collected from the Reports of the ECI and computed by the researcher.
Retrieved from <http://eci.nic.in>

Note:* Thus data into the parenthesis is added after the polls took place in Punjab and Assam in 1985.

With 30 seats and a vote share of 4.31 percent, Telugu Desam Party placed in a distant second place and became the first regional party to join the national opposition. Interestingly, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), which split off from the Jana Sangh in 1980, started out with only 2 seats but ended up with the second-highest vote share at 7.74 percent. The election results, which were thus accompanied by a wave of widespread sympathy, swung the tables in favour of the Congress and decimated the opposition, allowing it to continue its second term as the main party in power until 1989. A coalitional age was about to begin as numerous regional parties began to develop in the 1980s, as seen by the ballot papers' expanding size. These parties made an effort to grow their support base based on factors including language, caste, geography, and religion. For instance, RJD and SP regarded themselves to be the protectors of Muslims, while BSP attempted to position itself as the protector of dalits. They all attempted to promote themselves as representatives, or better yet, protectors, of the interests of one particular community. Political parties like the AIADMK, DMK, and TDP attempted to appeal to voters on the basis of language or caste, while others, like the BJP and Shiv Sena, saw themselves as the guardians of Hindu nationalism.

The Bhartiya Jan Sangh (BJS), which united with the Janata Party in 1977, was actually succeeded by the BJP. But throughout this decade, the Congress was in power at the Center for two periods in a row, from 1980 to 1984 and 1984 to 1989. Each time, a crisis brought the Congress to power. However, politically speaking, the Congress had less sway than ever before. Up to eleven states had non-Congress governments throughout the 1980s (*Satyanaryana, 1997*). Rajiv Gandhi, according to Myron Weiner, failed to complete.

2.7. Coalition Politics in an Era of Unstable Governments, 1989–1999

Five general polls were conducted from 1989 & 1999, and as a result of the fragmented mandates, multiple coalitions of various parties ruled the nation. This period of unrest began in 1989 with the declaration of the Ninth Lok Sabha elections. As a result of the election, fragmented factions rather than a party with a simple majority, like the Congress, emerged as India's government, resulting in an odd system of governance. The BJP on the one hand and the Left Front on the other provided assistance to the NF led by V.P. Singh

administration in the form of a fabricated parliamentary majority. Because the Left Front, the BJP, and the Janata Dal had diametrically opposed ideologies, this 1989 arrangement was built on "contradictions" (Bhambhri, 1997, p. 223). At addition, while it gave the BJP and the Left a chance to stay in the centre of Indian politics, their decision to support the government from the outside was motivated by strategy and was philosophically incongruent. They feared that joining the V.P. Singh administration would be bad for their ideological positions; hence they were reluctant to do so. They consented to offer assistance from the outside only in opposition to the Congress administration at the core. Consequently, the United Front was created, and on the basis of its resistance to the Congress, reinforced, at least initially, its presence as a viable political alternative (*Chakrabarty, 2006*). The 1989 Lok Sabha elections managed to the establishment of the second centrally located non-Congress government. Even though Congress won 197 seats, making it the only party to reach the majority threshold in the Lok Sabha, it struggled to do so after suffering a humiliating loss.

Table No. 2.8: Electoral Performance of Major Political Parties in the Ninth General Elections, 1989

Party	Seat won (out of 545 seats)	% age of vote share	+/-
INC	197	39.53	-207
Janata Dal	143	17.79	New*
BJP	85	11.36	+83
CPI(M)	33	6.55	+11
CPI	12	2.57	+6
AIADMK	11	1.5	-1

Source: Data compiled from Reports of the ECI and computed by the researcher from <http://eci.nic.in/eci>

With 143 votes, Janata Dal's National Front (NF) government chose Vishwanath Pratap Singh as its new prime minister. Charges of malfeasance associated with the Bofors acquisition forced V.P. Singh to resign from Rajiv Gandhi's cabinet prior to the 1987 elections, and they also inspired him to launch a successful attempt to bring together multiple opposition parties by establishing the Janata Dal. V.P. Singh established the National Front,

which included the Janata Dal and numerous regional parties, in late 1988 by utilising the corruption issue (*Thakurta & Raghuraman, 2007*). The Bofors deal served as a metaphor for corruption in high places during the 1989 Lok Sabha elections. It struck the electorate's deepest nerve. The Janata Dal government established under the direction of V. P. Singh addressed this issue during the 1989 election campaign, becoming the face of the fight against corruption (*Dandavate, 2000*). Other problems included whether government should be centrally controlled or decentralised, media independence, the restoration of democratic institutions and principles, the Mandal Commission Report's implementation, Hindu revivalism, and the future of the Muslim minority (*Gupta, 1991*).

However, after becoming PM, Devi Lal, his deputy, threatened to quit, which posed V.P. Singh with his biggest problem (*Andersen, 1990*). Devi Lal and his son Chautala desired complete control over Haryana. They started attacking the NF government directly when they saw how challenging this was under the new political climate. The government was weakened by Devi Lal's removal in a way that could not be patched. V.P. Singh took the Mandal Commission's Report and chose from it a 27 percent reservation for OBCs in the federal government and public sector organisations in order to restrain Devi Lal's peasant influence. This required that 52% of government positions be reserved for members of Schedule Castes (SCs) and Other Backward Classes (OBCs). Without consulting the parties who would have supported it, the government made its choice. The decision enraged the BJP since it would have negatively impacted the party's electoral aspirations. The BJP's base of support found V.P. Singh's choice to be quite unpopular (*Chander, 2004*). The BJP actively encouraged the student anti-reservation uprising that resulted in several fatalities by openly and transparently siding with the higher caste Hindus. Despite this, the BJP and the Communists came together in support of the prime minister to head off the potential for a major political catastrophe. This incident also showed the state chief ministers of the Janata Dal, each of whom had a strong power base in their respective states, gaining independence and influence (*Andersen, 1990*).

The Ram Mandir controversy, the BJP's withdrawal of support, and a rift in the Janata Dal all faced by the NF government at the same time that the V.P. Singh-led administration fell (*Yellaiah, 2013*). In addition to announcing their intention to move through with the Ram Mandir's construction, the BJP and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) issued a call for Indians to gather in Ayodhya to perform Karseva. L.K. Advani, a BJP leader, began a Rath Yatra from Gujarat's Somnath Temple to Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh. If Advani was detained, the BJP

threatened to stop supporting the NF government. This threat did not deter V.P. Singh, and on October 23, the withdrawing of support for Prime Minister V.P. Singh's minority administration, which had 85 seats and it was overthrown on the house floor (*Ahamad & Nilofer, 2009*). The biggest drawback of the V.P. Singh administration was that it was dependent on the continued support of parties that were not members of the Janata Dal (i.e., outside support); as a result, they had no vested interest in the coalition's survival and the system it established could not function well (*Chopra, 2000*).

So, in November 1990, Chander Shekhar succeeded V.P. Singh as prime minister and established a government with the help of the Congress Party. Additionally, it only lasted for six months and proved unstable. Technically one-party minority, the NF governments of VP Singh (1989–1990) and Chandershekher (1990–1991) were established with the assistance of one or more outside political parties (*Ratna, 2007*). The inability of the leaders to effectively control the party, organisational discipline, and ideological loyalty caused both coalition ventures to collapse. V.P. Singh resisted becoming as authoritative a leader as he could be despite the leaders' strongholds on their own party, especially the Janata Dal, which was a combination of factions. It's possible that he did this out of a desire to stand out from Rajiv Gandhi to his constituency of urban voters and the intelligentsia, but any way, it was misinterpreted as a show of weakness and difference. He tried to establish a political base for himself over the Mandal issue, but it was too late; he was checked both by allies and adversaries, both inside and beyond the Janata Dal (*Khare, 1991*). The same may be said for Chandershekhar's administration. Both governments lacked the second imperative, organisational discipline. Naturally, this led to questions about the coalition's leaders' ability to follow through on whatever agreements and understandings they may reach (*Gupta, 1991*). Most political parties in the post-Congress Dominant System, or after 1989, kept switching their political allies to join forces. One central government after another fell as a result, which disrupted political stability and generated instability. Only the P.V. Narsimha Rao-led minority successfully served its entire term (1991–1996); the others failed on this front between 1989 and 1999. This entire incident led to the holding of five legislative elections during this time.

A non-Congress experiment at the national level had failed for the second time in India's independent history, imploding with horrific and all-consuming conspiratorial fury. Once more on show were acts of sabotage, backspattering, and horse dealing that were reminiscent of the Janata government's overthrow in 1979. 32 The rise of other groups,

including the BJP and its supporters as well as a coalition centred on the Janata Dal, can be seen in particular in the general elections from 1989 onwards, which show an unmistakable trend of Congress collapse (*Saha, 1999*).

The market has come to represent the massive expansion of the international financial institutions' coercive power. Mandal represents how caste-class dynamics are shifting in their articulation. There are strong connections between the rising global and local class configurations and India's political economy's growing integration with the global economy. On the other side, the word *mandir* refers to the government and political figures. It served as a symbol of the novel and creative manipulation techniques employed to change governmental institutions in order to satisfy shifting demands from both domestic and international actors (*Lele, 2007*). Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated during the Tenth Lok Sabha elections in 1991, a day after the first round of voting on May 20. Voting ultimately occurred on June 12 and 15, after the final election days were postponed until mid-June. The BJP crossed the 100-seat threshold for the first time in its electoral history to win 120 seats and garner more than 20% of the vote, making it the second-largest party in terms of seats and votes after the Congress, which won 244 seats and received 35.66% of the vote. Only 69 seats, or 74 fewer than the previous election, went to Janata Dal. Two regional parties, the TDP and the AIADMK, also reached double digits in seats in this election, winning 13 and 11, respectively (see table 2.9).

Table No. 2.9: Electoral Performance of Major Political Parties in the Tenth General Elections, 1991 (*Source: ECI*)

Party	Seat won (out of 545 seats)	% age of vote share	+/-
INC	244	35.66	+47
BJP	120	20.04	+35
Janata Dal	69	11.77	-74
CPI(M)	35	6.14	+2
CPI	14	2.48	+2
TDP	13	2.96	+11
AIADMK	11	1.61	0

Following the 1991 mandate's fracture, the Congress was elected with the help of the AIADMK (11 seats) and a few smaller partners. Due to the opposition's abstentions in confidence votes and the defection of members of smaller parties, the Congress established this minority administration. Later, the Congress government increased the size of its coalition by dividing smaller parties like the TDP and Lok Dal (under Ajit Singh). This minority administration was led by P.V. Narsimha Rao, who later was elected the PM. The establishment of this government also foreshadowed the fact that unstable minority or coalition governments would characterise the ensuing era of national politics (*Vanaik, 1997*).

Moreover, the National Front was up against both the BJP and the Congress in this three-cornered contest, which had essentially the same electoral alliances as in 1989. The key change from 1989 was that the BJP now believed it could compete on its own without seat modifications. Two factors led to this action. First, it had chosen a divisive sectarian platform in the midst of a massive push to liberate Ram janmabhoomi, BJP believing it to be buried under Masjid. Despite the ensuing religious bloodshed, the BJP persisted in supporting Hindutva, or Hindu nationalism (*Sridharan, 2003*). Second, the Mandal Card, or so-called Mandal Politics, allowed the BJP to take advantage of upper class for NF in 1991 over the Mandal Commission Report and the OBC reservation issue. The BJP and the NF-Left group refused to work together to overthrow the government, allowing it to pass many contentious laws and survive a vote of confidence while being in a minority House of people. In the interim, the BJP intensified its push to build a temple at the contentious temple location. It relied on this issue to win the UP elections in June 1991. Its mobilisation peaked after the state had its own government. Kar Sevaks assaulted the location on December 6, 1992, met minimal resistance, and destroyed Masjid within no time. Muslim disenchantment with the Congress was at an all-time high following the demolition of the Babri Masjid and the Congress's increasing willingness to accede to Hindu communalism. In addition to these events, one of the most significant changes that occurred at this time was the astonishing new ferment that was occurring inside the Muslim community. Internal discontent arose as a result of the tremendous strain that political Hindutva placed on Muslims (*Vanaik, 1997*).

Following the end of Narsimha Rao, the 11th Lok Sabha got elected in a general election in 1996. The Hawala scandal, which happened under the Narshima Rao administration, was one of the key electoral topics in 1996. According to (*Verma's 1997*) analysis, individuals felt uneasy and insecure during the election campaign and polling. There was a strong and unprecedented undercurrent of disturbing popular apathy towards the entire

practise of politics and the electoral process because they appeared to be so convinced of the criminal character of many candidates, the corrupt nature of politicians, and the inability of the official machinery to protect their interests as voters considerations, the BJP emerged as a rival force and won the most seats with 187, including its own 161 alliance seats from the pre-election and those of Shiva Sena allies, the Samta Party, often known as the, and the Haryana Vikas Party (3). With the election of the Akali Party (8) and the post (15), the BJP gained 195 seats in the Lok Sabha, forcing the Congress to reluctantly acknowledge that one-party rule was finished. The TDP (16 seats), DMK (17 seats), AGP (8), and other regional parties all saw increases in seats and vote share in this election (see table no. 2.10).

Table No. 2.10: Party-wise Position in Lok Sabha Elections from 1989 to 1998

Parties	Seats Won			
	1989	1991	1996	1998
Bharatiya Janata Party	85	120	161	182
Communist Party of India	12	14	12	9
Communist Party of India (Marxist)	33	35	32	32
Indian National Congress	197	244	140	141
Janata Dal	143	69	46	6
All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam	11	11	0	18
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam	0	0	17	6
Shiromani Akali Dal	0	0	8	8
Telugu Desam Party	2	13	16	12
Bahujan Samaj Party	3	3	11	5
Shiv Sena	1	4	15	6
Rashtriya Janata Dal	-	-	-	17
All India Trinamool Congress	-	-	-	7
Samajwadi Party	-	-	17	20

Source: Figures collected from Reports of the ECI and computed by the researcher.
Retrieved from <http://eci.nic.in/eci/>

Thus outcome demonstrates unequivocally that Indian voters did not overwhelmingly support one party in 1996. While the regional parties generally did well, several national parties lost support in some regions of the country (*Reddy, 1997*). In other words, it was a multifaceted battle, and the BJP was able to create the illusion of a coalition by itself. With possible state-level electoral changes, the Congress battled it alone. A Third Front as a competitive alternative to the Congress and the BJP was not agreed upon by the National Front and Left Front parties. As a result, the President asked the BJP leader A.B.Vajpayee at the centre, and he was instructed to establish a majority on the Lok Sabha floor by May 31, 1996. On May 15, 1996, Atal Bihari Vajpayee was sworn in as Prime Minister (*Tiwana, 1996*), although he only held the position for 13 days before resigning. Vajpayee made every effort, but he was unable to convince enough parties to back him.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee resigned, and president summoned the Congress Party, the second-largest party with 140 seats, to form a government. However, the Congress Party declined. Instead, it opted to support the Janata Dal and other parties' United Front administration (192 seats, 28.52 percent of the vote), and H.D. Deve Gowda became the next prime minister. Under the direction of H.D. Deve Gowda, a new United Front coalition government with 13 parties was established. Although the CPI (M) remained outside the government, the CPI joined it. Additionally, the CPI also participated for the first time on this occasion. The National Conference afterwards became a part of the coalition government. Even the BJP's former ally, the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (MGR), joined the coalition.

Table 2.11: United Front's Post Poll Alliance (Under Deve Gowda)

	Alliance	Party	Seats	Vote Share (%) age)
United Front Seats= 332; %votes=61.1	National Front Seats=79; % vote=14.13%	Janata Dal	46	8.08
		Samajwadi Party	17	3.28
		TDP	26	2.97
	Left Front Seats=52; % vote=9.10%	CPI (M)	32	6.12
		CPI	12	1.97
		Revolutionary Socialist Party	5	0.63
		All India Forward block	3	0.38
	Other Parties	Tamil Maanila Congress	20	2.19
		Asom Gana Parishad	5	0.75
		Congress Party (Outside supporter)	140	28.8
		Others	19	3.78

Source: Data is computed by the researcher which is taken from the ECI <http://eci.nic.in/eci/eci.html>

Regional parties were crucial to the United Front government. The United Front's regional allies received 58 seats, compared to Janata Dal's 46 seats, or just one-fourth of the total (192 seats). However, the Janata Dal was the source of the United Front's Prime Minister (*Sinha, 2000*). To be distinct from the Congress and the BJP, both of which focused on the mainstream to the exclusion of the peripheries, the regional political parties' solidarity was nevertheless a reflection of their shared desire for their own identity. The regional parties came together because to their shared desire in maintaining a decentralised federal framework. This government was tasked with articulating regional goals and giving state leaders a clear voice in central decision-making. The coalition partners in this government were allowed to pursue their own agendas at the state level while yet remaining in the centre.

The new coalition, in contrast to prior ones at the centre that had an anti-Congress bent, was primarily focused on the BJP (*Brar, 1998*). The H.D. Deve Gowda-led UF coalition administration was like a chariot being dragged occasionally by 13 horses in various directions (alliance parities). The UF leaders lacked cohesion as a result of personality conflicts among them. It appeared as though fights were in charge and ideology had taken a back seat. In actuality, the UF steering committee had evolved into a super cabinet within the first six months of its existence, and coalition party ministers were attempting to assume the role of super Prime Ministers. Sitaram Kesri, the leader of the Congress, had decided to stop supporting the Deve Gowda administration, which had caused new political unrest in the country (*Srivivasroa, 2009*). The Congress withdrew its support for the Deve Gowda coalition government in March 1997 as a result, which caused a significant crisis. With the backing of the pro-Congress factions in the United Front, the Congress manoeuvre appears to have been intended to stake its own claim to form the government. However, the United Front's extraordinary unity thwarted the Congress's strategy. The Congress then requested Deve Gowda's dismissal in exchange for renewing its support for the administration. On April 21, 1997, Inder Kumar Gujral succeeded Deve Gowda as Prime Minister (*Brar, 1998*).

I.K. Gujral's United Front cabinet lost seats (332 to 318) and a larger portion of the vote compared to H.D. Deve Gowda's United Front government (61.1 percent to 59.7 percent). However, the Congress party enjoyed unwavering outside support from both governments. The partnership was split by Deve Gowda's departure, which further strained ties between the Congress and the United Front. The "Jain Commission" also turned in its findings in August 1997 while I.K. Gujral was in office. The CIA, MOSSAD, Indian individuals, and the LTTE were named as the four main organisations responsible for the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in the report. Justice Milap Chand Jain's interim report accused the DMK of working with the LTTE. The research came to the conclusion that the DMK gave the LTTE shelter, which made it simple for the rebels to kill Rajiv Gandhi. Subramaniam Swamy's dealings were also the subject of question, according to the Jain Commission. Following the report, the Congress overthrew I.K. Gujral's UF administration. The party also called for the expulsion of the DMK from the United Front administration, claiming that it was a major contributor to Rajiv Gandhi's demise. I.K. Gujral's United Front coalition government ultimately fell in December 1997 as a result of the Congress' stance on the Jain Commission's recommendations, but I.K. Gujral continued in that position as caretaker prime minister until the subsequent mid-term Lok Sabha elections. Thus, on the one hand, Congress's outside support for the UF

administration was essential to its survival under Deve Gowda and Gujral, but on the other, it was Congress that overthrew the same government by withholding that support.

After the Congress Party drew its support from the I.K. Gujral-led UF administration, the country was once more drawn to yet another set of mid-term Lok Sabha elections, which took place in February and March 1998. United Front with its allies emerged as the three main parties in these elections (Dalal, 2005, p. 132). The BJP won the most seats in these elections, taking 182 of them (25.59 percent of the vote), whereas the Congress only achieved 141 (25.8 percent) (Godwa & Sridharan, 2009). India experienced a steady period of coalition governments at the national level after 1999. BJP served as the leader of the NDA created in 1999, which ended in 2004. UPA, which is led by Congress, was established in the 2004 Lok-Sabha elections and ruled till 2014.

Therefore, India experienced coalition governments in 1977, 1989, and 1996 during the time before the NDA, at least at the national level. Starting with the 1977 elections, every national election produced a minority or coalition administration, with the exception of 1980 and 1984. (Gandhi, 2000). Regional parties had a major role throughout this phase of all other elections, which culminated in either a minority or coalitional administration. In conclusion, the final ten years of the 20th century were marked by both increased regime instability and relative political stability. However, after examining the political and electoral developments of the aforementioned time period, we may discover that coalition politics started to gain traction in Indian politics prior to the advent of the NDA. Based on this observation, we can identify the following factors as the ones that contributed to the beginning of coalition politics at the centre:

- 1. *The decline of one party dominance or Congress System after 1967:*** Achin Vanaik identified five major factors as the primary causes of this decline: (1) the widespread defections that occurred after the Nehruvian era; (2) the gradual transformation of the urban class and professionals; (3) Changing leadership in Congress; (4) the ever increasing expectations the rising electoral impulsiveness of the main factions; and (5) the rising expectations and increasing consumerist aspirations
- 2. *The emergence of regional parties, especially in the 1990s decade:*** According to the ECI'S reports on General Elections (1951 to 1998), there were only 53 political parties at first general election now up to 176 in the Twelfth Lok Sabha Elections of 1998. These regional parties came into being because the general populace assumed that it would be beneficial for regional parties to unite in order to advance regional interests.

The second is the development of the idea of regionalism slightly than nationalism in the minds of the general public as a result of their perception that national-level political parties have fallen short of resolving regional issues and achieving the regional aspirations that have grown significantly in recent years. Third, the regional parties' primary goal remained to further their regional interests even after they joined forces parties to create government at the centre. This is so that the regional parties may remain strong and continue to exist. To further their regional interests, they made an effort to apply pressure and exploit the central government; finally, politics and corruption started to resemble two sides of the same coin. (*Sinha, 2000*).

The decline of the Congress, which started in the states and later spread to the national level, the rise of regional parties, which are typically based in a single state, and the emergence of the BJP as a force both at the federal and state levels are all interconnected trends in the party system, according to Sridharan. (*Sridharan, 2003*). The political space left by the Congress in the 1990s was filled by a variety of national political parties, including the BJP, BSP, and SP, as well as numerous regional political parties, including the TDP, NLD, DMK, AIADMK, RJD, etc (*Varshney, 2000*). This process has also been aided by the fact that smaller political parties continue to be in a stronger negotiating position and have gained greater power.

- 3. *Features of coalition governments:*** Coalition governments exhibit a number of traits, including defection politics, a desire for power, opportunism, corruption, nepotism, a decline in moral standards, and an ideological underpinning that has been broken.. Prior to the NDA, the coalition government had devolved into a contest between egotistical, narrow-minded, opportunistic, and power-hungry politicians, who were only required to consider their own interests (*Doddamani, 2007*). Due to the lack of national character, statesmanship, and mutual confidence and faith in politicians, a "coalition" has become necessary as a result of the proliferation of political parties. Other elements that have created favourable conditions for the formation of new forces in our political structure and the demise of the Congress vote base include rising intergroup conflict, intergroup rioting, and a sense of insecurity among minorities (*Dalal, 2005*).

2.8. Conclusion

In this chapter following concluding observations were made. It was due to the coalition government's personality conflicts, ideological conflicts (especially between Jan Sangh and the Communists), and confusion regarding the philosophies and objectives of both the newly created parties and the government. The central coalition government of 1977 was unable to function effectively due to Raj Narayan's actions and Charan Singh's ego, and it was forced to fall by Madhu Limaye's unreasonable demand on dual membership. Personality conflicts between VP Singh, Devi Lal, and Chandra Shekhar contributed to the downfall of the 1989 coalition government. Back in 1967, when the Samayukta Vidhayak Dal (SVD) was in power, SP and Jan Sangh members were frequently hurling insults at one another.

Political defections, instability in politics, and confusion in politics—leaving one party and joining another or switching floors represent opportunism in politics, shifting allegiance and alliance from one party to another—were widespread during this time, and the politics of defectors became responsible for the formation and failure of coalitions (*Doddamani, 2007*). Sridharan identified four groups of variables that have an impact on the coalition government's stability. First, the characteristics of the regime or the institutional frameworks through which coalitions were established. The outcome of the election has been a polarisation of views. Second, more political parties are forging partnerships than ever before. Third, whether the coalition is single-polar, bi-polar, or multi-polar in terms of ideology will depend on the makeup of the ideological spectrum. Fourth, the frequency of any political occurrence that elicits conflicting responses among coalition members (*Sridharan, 1999*).

Due to the strains and pulls of the many constituents as well as inconsistencies and conflicts, these coalition administrations were unstable:

1. Because any national coalition in India must rely on the backing of regional parties and breakaway organizations with activities restricted to a single state or ethnic group, the coalition administration was equally at risk.
2. Therefore, expecting a strong government to take decisive action to carry out the national programme was pointless.
3. To address their respective concerns, the process has evolved into a coordination committee in an effort to reach a consensus.

4. However, they take pleasure in using the media to voice their alleged problems in public, which makes effective administration hard (*Singh, 1997*).

This volatility was also brought on by the prime minister's precarious position. Even the smallest party in the alliance might exert pressure on the prime minister in a partnership. The prime minister is not permitted to choose his own cabinet. Even the cabinet cannot be changed without the alliance parties' approval (*Gadgil, 1997*).

5. Another factor contributing to the coalition's instability was foreign backing. Consequently, a pre-election alliance with clear policies is better for stability (*Singh, 1997*).

6. It may be concluded that no sole party has obtained a bulk of seats in the Lok Sabha during the pre-NDA era, particularly from 1989 to 1998. It became essential to have a minority or coalition administration. From 1989 until 1999, unstable coalition and minority governments popped up one after the other like musical chairs (*Singh, 2001*). The minority Congress Party government led by Narasimha Rao served its full five-year term during this time, while the other governments were brief. As a result, politics were tense throughout this time. However, the NDA, UPA-I, and UPA-II governments signalled the commencement of a new, stable coalitional age in Indian politics after 1999.

CHAPTER 3
POLITICAL HISTORY OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND
EMERGENCE OF COALITION POLITICS

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3.1. Introduction

The history of coalition government in Jammu and Kashmir dates all the way back to the feudal state, whereas in 1945 Maharaja Hari Singh invited the National Conference to assign its one delegate to join his government. In this background, the present chapter will explore the history and reasons for the emergence of coalition governments in Jammu and Kashmir. Furthermore, it is imperative to discuss the demography, history and geography of Jammu and Kashmir as it has direct bearing on political episodes in the political spheres of J&K, accordingly the subject matter has been presented under appropriate themes in the below section.

3.2. Demographic Profile of Jammu and Kashmir

Population, sex ratio, and literacy in Jammu & Kashmir

According to information from Census 2011, Jammu and Kashmir has a population of 1.25 million, up from 1.01 million in the 2001 census. According to the most recent census, there are 12,541,302 people living in Jammu and Kashmir, with 6,640,662 men and 5,900,640 women. 10,143,700 people called the country home in 2001, 5,360,926 of them male and 4,782,774 of them female. In comparison to the prior decade, this decade saw a total population rise of 23.64 %. Jammu and Kashmir contributed 1.04 % of India's population in 2011. The percentage was 0.99 % in 2001.

According to recent census data from Jammu and Kashmir, 96.73% of homes are privately owned, while 2.19% are rented. In total, single families made up 73.51% of all couples in Jammu and Kashmir. 70.00% of the people in Jammu & Kashmir have access to banking and non-banking financial businesses in 2011. In Jammu and Kashmir, only 2.88% of the population has access to the internet. In Jammu and Kashmir, 7.47% of families had a car, while 12.92% had two. The populace of Jammu and Kashmir is becoming more interested in acquiring health and life insurance plans as a result of the state's rising literacy

rate. We will also receive information about election data for Jammu and Kashmir in a few months.

Sex Ratio in Jammu and Kashmir

The ratio of females to males is known as the average sex ratio. According to the Census 2011, Jammu and Kashmir has an average sex ratio of 889, which is higher than the national average of 943 females per 1000 males. Additionally, Jammu and Kashmir has a child sex ratio (age less than 6 years) of 862, which is lower than India's 918.

Literacy Rate in Jammu and Kashmir

According to the most recent population census, Jammu and Kashmir's literacy rate has been increasing, and it is currently 67.16%. 56.43 % of women and 76.75 % of men are literate out of that total. The literacy rate in Jammu and Kashmir was 55.52 % in 2001, with males and females having respective literacy rates of 66.60% and 43.00 %. In Jammu and Kashmir, there are 7,067,233 people who can read and write, with 4,264,671 men and 2,802,562 women.

Jammu and Kashmir's population and religion

India's Jammu and Kashmir state has a Muslim majority, with 68.31% of the total population identifying as Muslims. With about 28.44 % of the population, Hinduism is the second most common religion in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In Jammu and Kashmir, Buddhism is practised by 0.90 %, Sikhism by 1.87 %, Jainism by 0.02 %, and Christianity by 0.28 %. 0.01 % of respondents indicated "other religion," while 0.16 % indicated "no specific faith."

History of the population of Jammu and Kashmir

Jammu & Kashmir is without a doubt the most picturesque state in the nation. The state is blessed with deep valleys and breath-taking beauty because it is encircled by the Himalayas and numerous other mountain ranges. The main source of income in the Kashmir valley when war was not a big problem was tourism. According to the 2011 census, Jammu and Kashmir has a population of roughly 12 million, ranking it as the 19th most populous state in India. The state serves as the nation's northern border and is found in its northernmost region. The state is the tenth largest state in terms of area in the nation, with over 222,000

square kilometres. Due to the state's preponderance of snow-covered hills and mountain ranges, the population density per square kilometre is roughly 56, which is slightly lower than the national average. Terrorist attacks and militant activity by Pakistan and China, two of the state's neighbours, have also caused problems. The state's growth rate, which is over 23%, is slightly higher than the national growth rate, which is roughly 17%. The state's people are dealing with a variety of problems that are preventing it from developing into a prosperous state. About 68% of the state's population is literate, a statistic that calls for government attention. The possibilities for education in Jammu and Kashmir have been negatively harmed by the on-going hostilities and the threat of attacks from across the border. Jammu and Kashmir's sex ratio is significantly lower than the national average, leaving much to be desired. Only if the state administration strives to enhance the lives of women in the Kashmir valley will the sex ratio improve.

The results from the 2011 Census for Jammu and Kashmir provide information that is useful for creating a more effective development strategy for the region. Srinagar, the state's capital and largest city, is located in Jammu and Kashmir. Urdu, Kashmiri, and Dogri are among the languages spoken in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Jammu and Kashmir (JK) state has 22 districts in total. The state of Jammu and Kashmir has been given the ISOCODE JK by the International Organization for Standardization.

Population of Jammu & Kashmir, Urban and Rural

According to demographic statistics, 27.38% of Jammu and Kashmir's total population resides in urban areas. There are 3,433,242 people residing in urban areas, 1,866,185 of them are men and 1,567,057 of whom are women. The urban population has grown by 27.38 % over the past ten years. In Jammu and Kashmir's urban areas, there were 840 females for every 1000 males. In the urban area, there were 850 girls for every 1000 boys in the child (0–6) sex ratio. There were 425,897 kids aged 0 to 6 overall who resided in urban regions of Jammu & Kashmir. 12.41% of the population in the urban area was made up of children (0-6). In Jammu and Kashmir, the average literacy rate for urban areas was 77.12 %, with males having a literacy rate of 83.92% and females having a literacy rate of 56.65%. There were 2,319,283 literates in Jammu and Kashmir's urban area.

In Jammu and Kashmir's urban areas, there were 840 girls for every 1000 males on average. Additionally, in Jammu and Kashmir's metropolitan areas, there were 850 girls for every 1000 boys in the 0 to 6 age group. Thus, 425,897 children (0–6 years old) lived in

urban areas of Jammu & Kashmir, making up 12.41% of all urban residents. Similar to this, there were 908 females for every 1000 males on average in rural Jammu & Kashmir. In Jammu and Kashmir's rural areas, there were 865 females for every 1000 boys.

Rural Population of Jammu and Kashmir

The majority of people in Jammu and Kashmir State 72.62 % live in rural and agricultural areas. There were 4,774,477 men and 4,333,583 women in the real world, respectively. 9,108,060 individuals called Jammu & Kashmir State's rural areas home. For the years 2001 to 2011, the population growth rate was 72.62%. In Jammu and Kashmir State's rural areas, there were 908 females for every 1000 males, while the ratio for young children (0–6 years) was 865 girls for every 1000 boys. 1,593,008 kids (between the ages of 0 and 6) in Jammu & Kashmir live in rural regions. 17.49% of the total rural population is made up of children. In rural Jammu and Kashmir, the literacy rates for males and females were 73.76 % and 46.0 %, respectively. In Jammu and Kashmir, the average literacy rate for rural regions was 63.18 %. 4,747,950 people in rural regions were literate overall.

Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is described in length in this chapter, along with its geography, the early stages of Kashmir's history, the advent of Islam as a new faith, Sufism, and the establishment of the contemporary state of J&K. Kashmir has long been a location where followers of different faiths can peacefully coexist. Jammu and Kashmir is a composite socio-political entity founded in 1846 by the union of the three zones or countries which existed anciently as separate from one another. Jammu developed becomes the state capital. Jammu & Kashmir, with its northernmost latitude, is the most northern state in the Indian Union. The coordinates are 32°15'5" to 36°50'5". The state's entire area of 222,236.2 sq kms accounts for nearly 7% of India's total land, and this does not include the 78,114 sq kms that Pakistan illegally ceded to China. Towards the north is Myanmar, to the east is Tibet, to the west is Afghanistan, and to the north-west is Pakistan. Its southern boundary is shared with the state of Punjab and the state of Himachal Pradesh. Two-thirds of the state's inhabitants are Muslims, 30% are Hindus, and the rest are Sikhs, Buddhists, and other minorities, according to the 2001 census, omitting the territories under the illegitimate occupation of Pakistan and China.

Kashmir Valley is truly a breath-taking destination. Located in the heart of the Himalayas, this place is a dreamland of beauty and delight. This area is the paradise on earth that priests and poets have sung about, with its snow-capped peaks and sparkling streams,

wide valleys rich in fruit and flora, and beautiful lakes of brilliant blue waters. Nature is said to be at its most lavish in the Kashmir valley, where visitors may feast their senses on an abundance of natural splendours and delicious flavours.

Neither the natural beauty nor the delightful temperature of the valley has been so overstated in the novels that I have read, said Sir Walter Lawrence, who spent a few years in Kashmir as the settlement commissioner. Every year's stay in the valley unveils some fresh attraction and new interest. Kashmir has been able to shape her identity in a way that makes her stand out from the rest of the world thanks to her advantageous location, strategic protection, unique topography and climate, and unique cultural specialty. This has earned her the respect of friends and foes alike, as well as the admiration of royalty and commoners, believers and nonbelievers of all stripes, and people of all faiths and none.

In Kashmir's early history, it is known that Hindu rulers governed the region for more than four thousand years before Raja Daya Karan became the first head of a firmly established dynasty in 2180 B.C. Twenty-one dynasties in succession held the kingship of Kashmir throughout this time. In *Rajtarangini*, Kalhana narrates the early history of Kashmir (river of kings). Pandit Jonargaja continued the work of Kalhana and provides the chronicle of the valley up to the first few decades of the fifteenth century. *Rajtarangini* begins in the year 1184 B.C., during the reign of the powerful Gonanda, the ruler of Kashmir, whose smile is provided by the dazed Kail and whose scarf is thrown by the tossing Ganga. Although Kalhana starts his narrative with this king, he also makes reference to a previous time frame of 1266 years during which approximately 52 kings had reigned, but of whom he had no knowledge of the names or dates.

The narrative is brought up to the time of the Mughal invasion of Kashmir in 1856 by the two additional historians, Srivara and Prajyabhatta. While this section of the history was published in Sanskrit, 18th-century historians like Haider Malik, Mohammad Azim, and Narayan Kaul focused mostly on the Mughal era and wrote their accounts in Persian. The subsequent history of the valley is covered in the writings of Diwan Kirpal Ram and Birbal Kachri. By compiling the available information and providing a thorough description of the events, Birbal and European historians have also significantly added to our understanding of the state's dark past. *The Valley of Kashmir*, the most influential work by Sir Walter Lawrence, is one of the most fascinating accounts of Kashmir in the final years of the nineteenth century.

Kalhana lists a few of the works on Kashmiri history that he referenced. like the Nilamatpurana, the Padmamihira and Chavilakaran histories, and Kshemendra's Nrapavali. Helaraja, who had compiled a list of rulers, is where Padmamihira allegedly got his information on prior kings (Parthivavali). With the exception of the Nilamamtpurana, all of the eleven previous works of scholarship that he consulted that contained the Chronicles of Kings have since been lost, making the Rajatarangini the only historical record in Sanskrit literature. The Nilamatpurana, one of Kalhana's sources of information, is said to contain sacred traditions about the valley's beginnings, the specific ordinances that Nila, the lord of Kashmiri Nagas, disclosed for his devotion and the rituals that the populace is to perform to ward off Pisacha's malevolent intentions. This old text's sections on the numerous tribes in the valley's descriptions and traditions help reconstruct Kashmir's ancient geography. Since ancient times, Kashmir has been primarily a location of holy sites and destinations for pilgrims of all stripes. In Nrapavali, Kalhana alludes to The Kshemenedra (11th century A.D.), a useful author who describes the sociopolitical life of Kashmiris during his period. The only piece of ancient Indian writing that can be considered an authentic historical book is Rajtarangini. The author has gone to considerable lengths to gather the data from existing archives and other source, but he has also taken the unusually advanced step of outlining at the start of his book a few broad guidelines for writing history.

In fact, these may be seen as largely predicting the critical technique of historical study, which wasn't fully formed at the time up till the 19th century. There are eight cantons in the Rajtarangini. From the earliest era up until the time of the author, who started writing in 1148, Sanskrit stanza recounts the history of the numerous kingdoms that ruled Kashmir. A.D. Kalhan's book nonetheless maintains a coherent picture of Kashmir history that has withstood the test of historical criticism successfully, even after allowing for the legendary character of some of the events recorded in the first three chapters. As one gets closer to the author's time, it slowly gets more detailed and interesting and may be trusted as a reliable account starting in the seventh century. Rajtarangini is a great treasury of information, political, social, and economic, said Jawaharlal Nehru. It is a work of art as well as a significant contribution to history. In a protracted series of stories that include the many ragas, or moods, of love and heroism, sadness, and masurel, Kalhana creates vivid portraits of a bygone period.

According to many historians and locals, Raja Jambulochan built Jammu around the 14th century BCE. The term was twisted over time and changed to Jammu. Conferring to

lone folk etymology, the term Kashmir derives from the Sanskrit verses Ka for water and shimeera for desiccate and meaning desiccated country. Another folk etymology claims that the sage Kashyapa drained a lake in accordance with Hindu mythology to create the region that is currently known as Kashmir. The valley is known for the quality of its wool and is abundant in rice, vegetables, and fruits of all types because to its fertile soil and mild temperature. Since prehistoric times, people have lived in Kashmir, sometimes on their own and other times under the control of invaders. Animism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and (after the period of history) Islam have all held sway at various points in history.

The Rajatarangini is the first in a quartet of histories that chronicle Kashmir's history. The Rajatarangini begins with an account of old history from very early times (3102 BCE), and it ends with the reigns of Kalhana and Sangrama Deva (about 1006 AD). The additional volume, by Jonaraja, picks up somewhere Kalhana port off in the history and, upon entering the Muslim era, details the reigns all the way up to Zain-ul-Abad-in Din's 1412. The chronicle was kept up until Fah Shah's ascension in 1486 by P. Srivara. The history is finished in Prajnia Bhatta's fourth book, Rajavalipataka, which covers the period from Kashmir's integration into the Mogul emperor Akbar's realms in 1588. His Dvity Rjataragin is a continuation of Kalhana's Rjatarangin and gets Zain-ul-Abidin, the author's patron, into the history of the Kashmiri monarchs (1423–74). But because Jonaraja passed away in the 35th year of the monarchy, he was unable to finish the history of the patron. The Trity Rjataragin, his work that covers the years 1459–86, was continued by his pupil, rvara. Jonaraja has eloquently narrated that the weakening of the rulers allowed the Muslims to take over the rule.

The Rajatarangin (The River of Kings) is a cadenced history of Kashmir's kings from the beginning, documemted by Kalhana in Sanskrit. The book is thought to have been composed between 1147 and 1149 CE. In general, the book documents Kashmiri history, but 120 verses of Rjatarangi chronicle the misgovernment that existed in Kashmir during King Kalash, the son of Kashmiri King Ananta Deva. Even though the earlier works' chronologies are wildly inaccurate, they remain a priceless basis of knowledge ancient Kashmir and are frequently cited by later writers and chroniclers

The Kashmir valley was once a lake, according to according to kalhan in the middle of the 12th century. Asaint named Kashyapa avatar of Brahma drained by carving a hole through mountains of (Varaha-mula). Following the draining of Kashmir, Kashyapa invited the Brahmans to reside there. This remains a local custom, and given the country's current

physical state, there may be some basis for the tale that has assumed this shape. The name Kashyapa refers to the lake's emptying, and Kashyapa-pura, the valley's principal settlement or cluster of homes. Ptolemy's Kao-ir-pta also refers to the nation of Kashmir. The author of Rajatarangini and the earliest historian of Kashmir, Kalhana (12thCE), was a Brahmin. In fact, Aurel Stein, his translator, believed that his was the sole authentic Sanskrit history. Apart from what is known about him from his own book, not much is known about him. Champaka, his father, served as the Kashmiri king's minister.

3.3. Birth of Kashmir

The history of Kashmir, formerly known as Kaschmira, is as abruptly uneven as the towering mountains that encircled the rich valley and before the Mahabharata and most other human civilizations. It tells the story of how a group of people who were geographically confined to a small valley that gained a reputation for being stunningly beautiful over time. Poets in far-off nations strove to portray its beauty; some did so without ever having visited, but they were captivated by travellers' euphoric descriptions.

According to certain myths, the valley was once a huge lake recognised as the Satisar or the Lake of Sati, the wife of Lord Shiva. Sati is also referred to as Parvati. From Konsarnag Lake in the south to Harmukh Mountain in the north, Goddess Parvati used to ride her pleasure boat over this lake's immense breadth. But many pishachas, yakshas, and nagas, led by the vicious demon known as Jalodbhave, who was supported by Brahma, dwelt in the lake. These blocked the lake, and his destruction caused enormous hardship to all the areas nearby. By coincidence, Prajapati Kashyapa, the lord of all the Nagas, happened to be passing by the lake at the time of the seventh Manu, and he learned the reason for this grief through his son Nila, the king of the Kashmir Nagas. The sage went to Brahman to ask for the assistance of his son and other gods in order to punish the evildoer. At Brahmas' instruction, every god set out for Satisaras and established themselves atop the peaks above Kunsarnag. The demon, which was unstoppable in his natural state, resisted emerging from the water. In order to drain the lake, Vishnu then requested the help of his brother, Balabhadra, who accomplished this by using his hare, ploughs to pierce mountains. Kashyapa's habitation, also known as Kashyapmar, or the land that arose from the lake after its water had been drained as a result of Kashyapa's penance, was later distorted to the present-day Kashmir.

The minor demons lost heart once Jalodbhava died and stopped harming people significantly after that. Prajapati Kashyapa was able to encourage an increasing number of

people from the plains to come and reside in the valley as a result. As a result, men flocked to the valley in great numbers throughout the summer. However, when winter arrived, they again withdrew for the drier areas of Kishtwar, leaving Kashmir in the hands of the demons. He came across Nila Nag, Kashyap's son, who rescued the Brahmins. The Nilamata Purana, which the Brahmins of Kashmir were able to defeat via its study, was given to them by him, and as a result, the valley of Kashmir was permanently populated. It is supposed that some twenty centuries before the beginning of the Christian period, heavenly fairies and goddesses settled here as rivers and lakes, creating small kingdoms along their borders while men and kings came to the valley during the summer to enrich and beautify it. Thousands of visitors and tourists still come to this valley every year to have vacations and view the sights.

Famous mountains and their passes include: Both the Karakoram mountain range (8615.17m) and Kyunlun mountain Ranges that fall to the north N.E. of the state, dividing it from Tibet and Turkistan. The Hindukush mountain Range goes upto Karakorum, which is home to K2 Mountain. There are also two peaks there, Gashorbram peak (8570 metres) & Masharbram peak (7827 metres). Through the Changla and Kharudangala passes, one can travel from Ladakh to Tibet (5609 metres). The Zanskar Range, which splits the Indus Valley from Kashmir at a height of roughly 600 metres, keeps chilly winds from the south-west from reaching Kashmir. near the Zojila Pass (3,529 metres), here Kashmir valley starts, Ladakh region comes to an end. Poat Pass (5716 metres) is another well-known pass in this area.

Between Ladakh and the Kashmir border is the Nun Kun Range. The height above sea level is 7055.1 metres. From Kulu, one must cross the Bawalocha pass (4891 metres) to get to Leh (Ladakh). When Pakistan attacked Kargil in 1947, the Indian Union used this pass to transport Indian troops, weapons, and ammunition to Ladakh. Gilgit is surrounded by the Nanga Parbat Range. It is completely free of vegetation and 8107.68 metres above sea level. Italian mountaineers overcame it in 1954. Between the Jhelum and Kishan Ganga valleys in Bandipore is the Himalayan range known as Harmukh Mountain. Burzil Mountain: It separates Kashmir and Ladakh, and on its slope is Burzil Pass.

Amarnath Mountain: This Mountain is well-known for the sacred Amarnath Cave, which draws tens of thousands of pilgrims each Rakshabandan to its height of 5372 metres above sea level. On their way to Shri Amarnathji, they must cross the 1475-meter-high Mahagunas Pass. In the Lidar valley, approaching Pahalgam is Gwasharan (5450 metres), where the renowned glacier Kolahi is located. Toshmaindan: The Inner Himalayas are home

to the Toshmaindan and Kajinag mountains. All year long, they are covered in snow, but in the summer, when the snow melts, water rushes into the Jhelum. The Gulmarg valley is traversed by this mountain. On its summit sits the well-known spring Alpathar, from which Nullah Nagal runs into Wullar Lake.

The 2621-kilometer-long and 50-kilometer-wide pirpanjal cuts off Kashmir from Himalayas. On its summit, the famed Banihal Pass (2832 metres) is located. During the winter, snow covers it, making it impassable. Currently being built is a new tunnel called the Jawahar Tunnel, which is 2200 metres above sea level. The tunnel was finished on December 22, 1956, and it is 2825 metres long. Hajipir Pass and Baramulla Pass (1582 metres) are located at the other end of this range (2750 metres). Hajipir joins Uri and Poonch. The Indian army controlled this route during the Indo-Pak War in 1965. It was then transferred to Pakistan.

Range of Siwalik: This Mountain is home to a temple, and the hill's base is home to a large number of sulphur springs. Kashmir's earthquakes are caused by these volcanic mountains. In Kashmir, there have been twelve deadly earthquakes so far. The most severe of these was the earthquake in 1885. This earthquake caused the earth to crack, hundreds of houses to collapse, and thousands of deaths.

In harmony with the physiography of Jammu and Kashmir, a triangular division having three separate physiographic divisions. The Great Plains plain, which is surrounded by the Shivalik hills in Jammu, forms the ground floor. The Pir Panjal is a notable peak in this group. The second level makes up the middle Himalaya, which borders Kashmir Valley on the south. The bigger or inner Himalayas, which stretch in numerous parallel ranges from north to south-east, are situated beyond the Kashmir valley. The same facts that give Kashmir's geographic position a distinctive, and in some ways almost unique character also account for its historical unification and isolation, the author noted. There, among a steep mountain range, is a lush plain that could support a well-developed civilisation and be large enough to constitute its own kingdom.

Kashmir is one of the most strategically important locations in global politics due to its unique geographic location. While each of the three regions of Jammu and Kashmir is distinct in the characteristics they share, the three regions taken as a whole have been a part of the larger identity known as Jammu and Kashmir, which has been distinctive in terms of ecology, history, and culture. There are characteristics that stand out in the state as a whole in

terms of its cultural and ecological region. Historical histories, which exist for 46.85 percent of groups compared to the national average of 38.43 percent, indicate that there is a strong sense of identification. Culturally, Muslims and Hindus both belong to the same group, speak the same languages, and share the same practises and norms. Geographically, Jammu and Kashmir is divided into three zones: Jammu, the frontier regions, which include Ladakh, and the Kashmir valley. Geographically, the Zojila lies between the Kashmir valley and Ladakh. Pir Panjal range divides Jammu from the Kashmir.

3.4. A Diversified Society

The state of Jammu and Kashmir is incredibly diversified. Here, diversity manifests itself on a number of levels, painting a nuanced portrait of society. There is a variety of religions, to start. In this state, there are adherents of all three major religions: Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam. Despite being centred in the valley, there is a greater volume of Muslims and the Ladakh region as well. Buddhists are concentrated in Ladakh, whilst Hindus are concentrated in the Jammu region.

Kashmir: From the political context, Kashmir is important. Its terrain, history, language, and cultural legacy are a few of the distinctive qualities that help Kashmiris recognise their distinctive identity. Despite being highly connected internally, it has enjoyed a beautiful seclusion in terms of geography. The largest valley in the world is located in Kashmir, at the base of the tallest mountain. A tightly knit culture is sparked by Kashmir's legendary beauty, which has been compared to paradise on earth. The history of the Kashmir Valley extends back to antiquity and includes a variety of races and sects. As a result of numerous physical and racial features, they have a variety of customs, traditions, behaviours, and social usages.

Kashmir is the part of the state with the most uniform culture and is least impacted by its divisions. In the valley, 90% of the population is Muslim, and more than 89% of them speak Kashmiri as their first language. In Kashmir, Islam is practised by a resounding majority of the population. The introduction of Islam in the 13th and 14th centuries gradually altered Kashmiris' social structure, but they upheld their traditions of tolerance and love. The different tribal names or Krams are just names, according to Walter Lawrence: Although it is possible that some Hindu practises, such as endogamy within the caste and exogamy outside of the gotra, were practised by the Musalmans of the valley for some time after they converted to Islam, there is no evidence that these practises are still followed today. Kashmir has always been a consensual community in

which many religious and ethnic identities have coexisted but have not been easily assimilated into a single identity. In order to prevent the development of opposing traditions, indigenous beliefs and practises were always converted nearly entirely to Buddhism, Shaivism, and Islam, along with little minority who also shared these beliefs and practises. The enormous accomplishments of the past and the current problems of Kashmir are due to and reflect this aspect of the Kashmiri identity.

Jammu: Jammu's location is not tight and geographically closed. It is not uniform in terms of religion or ethnicity. The Dogras live in this hilly region that stretches from the snowy mountains bordering the Kashmir valley on its south to the plains of the Punjab. They speak the Dogri language, which is an amalgam of Sanskrit, Punjabi, and Persian terms with Indo-Aryan roots, and they are members of the Aryan race. Jammu, which spans a region of 26,000 square miles, is home to 45% of the state's population; according to the census 2011. There are 8.274% Hindus, 7.03% Muslims, and 7.47% Sikhs in its diverse society. A majority of Muslims live in six former districts that border the Kashmir area, including Rajouri, Poonch, and Doda. In contrast to Kashmiri Pandits, Jammu's Hindu population has a strong caste system just like the rest of the nation. Compared to many other regions of the nation, Jammu's scheduled castes are a more viable and separate entity from an economic, social, and political standpoint.

Ladakh: The third-highest and one of the highest inhabited regions of the planet is Ladakh. Only 2.28 percent of the state's population resides there, despite it making up more than 70% of the state's land area. Ladakh joined the Indian Union on October 27, 1947, when Kashmir joined India, despite the fact that its constitutional ties to the state that had finally acquired it in 1842 were severed as a result of National Conference win. The two most significant races that contributed to the creation of the Ladakhis were the Tibetans and the Dards. The Baltis, who live to the northwest of the Indus, speak an ancient dialect of Tibetan and have Tibetan racial traits, although

3.5. Before the advent of Islam

The records of Kashmir's history from the establishment of the Karkota dynasty onward receive a boost from the availability of the historical account in Sanskrit titled *Rajtarangini*, authored by a scholarly Brahmin named Kalhana. Kalhan's history takes on an authentic character with the ascension of Durlabhavardhana (625–661 AD) to the throne of

Kashmir, and it provides more thorough and trustworthy information on the dynasties that ruled from the seventh century AD to his own time (1149 A.D.). Durlabhavardhana ruled for 36 years, according to Kalhana. Gonanda is the first ruler whose name Kalhana mentions. According to legend, he ascended to the throne 653 years into the Kali year.

Gonanda engaged Krishna in the Jarrasanda War with a sizable troop before being killed. His son Damoder succeeded Gonanda as king of Kashmir. After Gonanda, Kashmir was governed by at least 35 kings. They were all insignificant and frail. Ashoka (273-232 B.C.) expanded his rule over Kashmir after that. In Kashmir, he promoted Buddhism. According to Kalhana, Buddhism and Hinduism coexisted throughout Asoka's rule. At Vita Stakra and Sus Kaletra, stupas and viharas were constructed during his reign. But Ashoka was not hostile to Hinduism. He erected two new Ashkoesvara temples and had the ancient Vilayesdvara Siva temple renovated. A five-kilometer drive from the contemporary city of Srinagar, he also established the town of Srinagari. Kalhana claimed that it was opulently wealthy.

Kashmir became independent after Ashoka's passing and was governed by his son Jalauka. In the meantime, Hinduism saw resurgence in north India, which spread to Kashmir. It had an impact on Jalauka, who constructed two new Shiva temples at Srinagari and Nandi-Kshetra while demolishing a few Buddhist viharas. The Kushans came into power three centuries later and ruled Kashmir. Huska, Juska, and Kanishka were the three well-known Kushan emperors. A series of regional emperors, including Abhimanyu, Vibisana I, Indrajit, Ravana, and Vibisana II, succeeded the Kushans. Their names imply that Kashmir and northern India share a close cultural bond. These kings' rule saw the advancement of Shaivism and the decline of Buddhism.

3.6. The Rise of Sikh Rule in Jammu & Kashmir

The Sikhs ruled Kashmir from 1819 to 1846. The Kashmiris were given new overlords from the Punjab during this time, although the transition had little positive impact on the populace's circumstances. The Sikh kings were unable or unwilling to investigate the country's internal operations. No less vicious, intolerable, or predatory than the Afghans were the Sikhs. Muslims in the valley suffered martyrdom once Sikh control was established, which persisted until 1947. Islam was in danger as a result of the Sikh governors' intolerance. They prohibited the azan, shuttered the ancient Jamia Masjid of Srinagar and other mosques,

ordered the closure of Khangahi Mohalla, and made cow slaughter a criminal offence. Land belonging to Muslims was taken away from them and given to non-Muslims. During this time, there was Shia-Sunni conflict, and Hasan Abad and Zadibal, two Shia-populated areas, were set on fire. The persecution of Kashmiri Muslims appears to have taken the straightforward form of racial retribution for the hardships earlier experienced by the Sikhs in India at the hands of Aurangzeb. Without a doubt, the shawl trade was thriving under Sikh rule, but in the end, it was highly taxed, which accelerated the decline of the illustrious business.

The province was run by governors chosen by the Lahore Darbar while it was under Sikh sovereignty. As many as 10 governors were chosen in succession during this brief span of twenty years when the governors were regularly replaced. The end of the vile tyranny that the Pathans exercised over Kashmir must have provided an immense sense of release for all of the region's constituents. It is not my intention to imply that Sikh rule was in any way benign or good, but there is no denying that it was an improvement over Pathan rule., the speaker said. But regardless of the rulers, the people's suffering, misery, and anguish persisted. Because of Jamadar Khushal Singh's poor management, there were several famines throughout Sher Singh's term as governor, which had a devastating effect on human life. Hugal, Vigie, and Henderson, three European travellers who visited in 1835 eloquently described the contrast between the wealthy aristocracy's opulent residences and the deplorable poverty of the average man. The people of Kashmir continued to experience more degradation, poverty, and suffering under Sikh control than they had under Afghan authority. Sikh tyrants began focusing their animosity on Muslims, especially Kashmiri Muslims. These directives were given by the Sikh tyrants in an effort to stop the rise of a Muslim resistance in the valley.

3.7. The Genesis of Dogra Rule

The Dogras' conquest of Kashmir in 1846 marked the beginning of a new period in Kashmiri history. Non-Muslims now held a majority in politics in addition to foreigners. Due to this, national identity and religious identity came into confrontation with the ruling authority of the period. Now, in addition to the people of Kashmir, another Muslim was attempting to overthrow a non-Muslim government. The close ties that Kashmiri Hindus had with the ruling class served to emphasise their religious identity. The Dogra Rajputs were unquestionably autocrats who vainly viewed the valley's inhabitants as conquered land, worthy neither mercy nor anything more than serfdom. The Sikh emperor Maharaja Ranjit

Singh appointed Gulab Singh, from the Jammu district, as raja of Jammu in 1820. Gulab Singh ruled Ladakh and Baltistan for the next 20 years.

Gulab Singh was recognised by British government, by the Treaty of Amritsar, which was signed on March 15, 1846. The Valley of Kashmir, revered in Hindu mythology and well-known across the world, was once more ruled by Hindus who were not natives of Kashmir. Ten years of Gulab Singh's Dogra rule were a dismal tale of avarice, oppression, and exploit by a feudalistic government. People lost their inherited rights to property ownership and occupation, and the king took possession of all territories, including woods and mountains. People were made into tenants, forced to pay taxes to the king, and their dissatisfaction was brutally put down. The populace was constrained by the greed of the Maharaja, dishonest government officials, and moneylender tyranny. In Kashmir Valley, there was religious prejudice towards the Muslim population. They were treated as a subject race, and the government confiscated their mosques and shrines.

The Kashmir valley's peasants were compelled to perform forced labour (as beggars) without receiving any money while also being denied property rights over their land. In addition to harming the residents of Kashmir, this resulted in a human cost from lugging loads to the border inclement weather and under inhumane conditions. The harsh bureaucracy was dubbed by outsiders, mainly Dogras and Panjabis, and taxes on the peasantry were high. Muslims were not allowed to serve in the military or other government positions, and Dogras controlled the economy. The local Brahmins, also known as Kashmiri Pandits, were given low-level positions. During the despised Dogra regime, Sir Walter Lawrence wrote, "I found the people sullen, despondent, and suspicious," describing the situation of Kashmiris as extremely unhappy. They had been indoctrinated for a very long time that they were disabled serfs with no rights. Soldiers coerced them into ploughing, and the same soldiers were present during harvest. Later, they were captured in verse by the renowned Urdu poet Sir Mohammad Iqbal, who wrote: Even the peasants who lived in the valley had to sell all they owned, and that included their farms, their harvests, and their streams. How affordable the sale was.

More than a century was spent under the leadership of Gulab Singh (1846–1857), Ranbir Singh (1857–1885), Pratap Singh (1885–1925), and Hari Singh (1925–1947). It was under Pratap Singh's rule that Kashmir entered the modern era. His nephew Hari Singh replaced him after his death in 1925. Hari Singh started his legal career with a significant London lawsuit. At home, he allowed court favourites to fill important administrative positions with Dogra Rajputs, further alienating the valley's Muslims. Even Hari Singh, who

was viewed as a more progressive leader than his forebears, was not immune to religious prejudice. Twenty Kashmiris were dispossessed of their jagirs, which were worth between 5,000 and 10,000 rupees apiece, from Maharaja Hari Singh's coronation until November 1931. Twenty more people received these jagirs; 18 of them were Rajput Hindus, while the remaining ten were Muslims. The Maharajas founded the Dharmath trust and endowed it with a significant sum of money to further Hinduism while seizing the rent-free gifts received by Muslim religious individuals and organisations. Additionally, Muslims were required to pay taxes known as Mandri and Ashgal; Mandri was used to support Hindu priests, while Ashgal was used to maintain temples.

3.8. Position of Kashmir in 1947, at the time of Indian independence

While the people of Kashmir, united under the National Conference, fought valiantly against the Maharaja's government's representation of feudalism and bureaucracy, crucial events throughout the rest of the nation were also happening. Before the devastating blows of the Indian National Movement, British Empire was rapidly disintegrating, and India's Independence Day was rapidly approaching. A gulf formed on the other as a result of the National Conference's politics, which included the demand that Kashmir should be under popular political party, reorganization of the agricultural sector. It was different for the National Conference to rely on the Muslim League for the fulfillment of its purpose of handing power to the people because the Muslim League supported the people's right to decide the political future of a princely state. The National Conference leadership was likewise suspicious of the Muslim League's feudal nature. The Muslim League's political ideology did not align with its concept of land redistribution, which was based on the land to the tiller premise. The notion that Pakistan is the country of origin for all Muslims was rejected by Kashmir's political leaders for this reason. They desired a separate political space since they had their own unique political agenda, which Pakistan could not accommodate. On the contrary, the leadership in India, particularly Nehru and Gandhi, had exhibited consideration for the Kashmiris' desire for a separate political arena. This is due to a tendency on the side of the Kashmiri leadership, particularly Sheikh Abdullah, to choose an alliance with India. This preference resulted from a realization that creating a distinct political entity for Kashmir may not be the best option in terms of functionality. His autobiography provides insight into Sheikh Abdullah's thoughts at the time of his succession. I had my thoughts, the author writes, we would turn into a battleground for India and Pakistan if we acquiesced to

their demands. My coworkers had different thoughts. They asserted that feudals will always dominate the Muslim league, which are opposed to modern, progressive ideas. The newly formed Pakistan will never embrace the people's vision of a new Kashmir. The influence of slavery on the world will not diminish. However, India was unique. In India, there were parties and people with views similar to ours. Wouldn't we advance toward our aim if we acceded to India? The alternative was a Kashmir that was independent. However, it was impossible to maintain a small state's independence while it was being given up by powerful nations. It would be different if these nations could ensure Kashmir's independence from instability.

The only state in India that decided not to join the Constituent assembly for framing the constitution was Jammu and Kashmir, along with the other princely kingdoms, were freed from British paramountcy control when India gained its freedom from the British yoke. The technical independence the princes had attained was hardly something they could have kept. The princes were left with the single choice of amalgamation one of the two dominions, India or Pakistan, or choosing to stay an independent sovereign state because the British were not willing to recognise the state as a dominion or fulfil any duties the paramountcy imposed.

However, the state's geographical position and the circumstances behind its separation made the decision challenging. It seemed obvious that Hari Singh, the princely state's absolute ruler, would be reluctant to either the two. He was worried about the conflicts that either decision would cause because racial and religious tensions were rising in both countries. He deemed it important to give B.L. Batra, his newly appointed deputy prime minister, instructions to communicate his strategy to the New Delhi press. After his release, it appeared that Sheikh Abdullah and the Maharaja may collaborate to secure an independent, neutral status for Jammu and Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah looked to Switzerland as a role model. However, Sheikh Abdullah's demand that an elected government, not the Maharaja, should make the final choice about the state's future drove them apart. Hari Singh was unable to resolve the accession question and recognise the pressures of the circumstances. He suggested to carryout a standstill agreement between Pakistan and India. Soon after the standstill agreement was reached, Pakistan's attitude shifted, resulting in an economic blockade of the state and a tribal invasion that followed. The Jammu-Sialkot route and the Srinagar-Rawalpindi route were also closed off. Beginning in early September, Pakistan started to encroach on the state's borders. Maharaja recognised his danger right away. Mehar Chand Mahajan, a judge on the Punjab High Court, took Pandit Ram Chandra Kak's position

after he was fired. Sheikh Abdullah promised that he would not compromise Kashmiris' interests because of Pakistan's animosity and Nehru and Gandhi's friendship. Whatever notions I had about Pakistan, he claimed, had come to pass.

Maharaja Hari Singh joined Indian dominion on the base of a restricted accession, ceding just three domains—external affairs, defence, and communications—to the union. In all other respects, the state had to continue to function as an entirely autonomous part of the union. Since the Maharaja's accession was unannounced and the state's citizens' leaders, who were still detained in connection with the Quit Kashmir Movement, had not given their agreement, popular approval of such an accession was necessary. When he said, If the states' accession with India or Pakistan is done from the upper chambers without the consent of the forty lakh people of Jammu and Kashmir, I shall raise revolt, and they will all have to launch another struggle, Sheikh Abdullah made this condition clear in one of his speeches. The jurisdiction over matters relating to communications, defence, and foreign affairs was handed to central government with the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and the Parliament was given the authority to create legislation solely for those three purposes. In connection with running of the state was concerned, the monarch maintained sovereignty. After the accession, the state established an emergency administration under the headship of Sheikh Abdullah. The Maharaja wanted his body of ministers to have control over the emergency management system. However, this setup was unworkable.

Sheikh Abdullah dominated the National Conference and completely in control of the political situation in Jammu and Kashmir after having control over both political and administrative powers. He quickly propelled the state toward self-rule and monarchy from a political perspective. Sheikh Abdullah supported a restricted admission because he believed that people ultimately will decide the state's political future. Therefore, he wished for this state to be given a particular place in the Indian federal constitution. According to Sheikh Abdullah, joining India was necessary because the region was multiregional, multilingual, multicultural, multiethnic, and had a variety of customs, was safer there than in a theocratic Pakistan and that independence was impossible because there were no guarantees to that effect.

3.9. Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir: Constituent Assembly Proclamation of May 1, 1951, J&K

Wherein the state subjects of Jammu and Kashmir generally support the formation of a Constituent Assembly with the goal of drafting a constitution for J&K, it is widely believed that further postponing the Assembly's meeting will be detrimental to the State's future well-being. And considering that the articles 4 to 6 of the operative section of the Maharaja's declaration of March, 5, 1948 about the calling of a national assembly do not correspond to the demands of the current scenario. Yuvraj Karan Singh thus issues the following instructions:

- i. As soon as possible, a Constituent Assembly made up of peoples representatives who were chosen using the adult franchise will be established to draft the state of Jammu and Kashmir's constitution;
- ii. The division of state into various constituencies for the purposes of the aforementioned elections, with each constituency choosing one representative and having a population of at least 40,000.
- iii. The Government shall establish a delimitation committee to offer recommendations regarding the drawing of the boundaries. Elections for the selection of members of constituent assembly be based on Universal adult franchise, which means that anyone who is a permanent resident of the state can vote, who is at least twenty-one years old on March 1 and has lived in the constituency for the time period specified by the rules is eligible to register on the electoral rolls, with the caveat that anyone who is insane or mentally ill is not eligible to vote.
- iv. The election will be conducted using a ballot box.
- v. The Constituent Assembly is empowered to take action despite any vacancies in its membership;
- vi. The Constituent Assembly will choose its own programme and establish guidelines for how it will conduct business and control its procedure. To implement this order, the Government shall issue all appropriate regulations, directives, and orders.

3.10. Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir

The Assembly and Council of Ministers, the first two branches of Jammu and Kashmir's legislature, were established in 1934. On January 26, 1957, the constitution was drafted. According to Section 46 of the Constitution, the Governor, the Legislative Council, and the Legislative Assembly make up the Legislature. There were 100 members in the Legislative Assembly. The J&K Constitution (Twentieth Amendment) Act of 1988 altered the total of seats in the legislature, allowing the chamber to hold 111 members.

Up until Maharaja Hari Singh contracted the Instrument of Accession in favour of the India on October 26, 1947, the State was ruled by Dogra kings. In 1934, Jammu and Kashmir's first legislature, which included an Assembly and a Council of Ministers, was constituted. A distinct Constituent Assembly drafted the Constitution of the State, which went into effect on January 26, 1957. One hundred people made up the Legislative Assembly, who were elected directly from the State's territorial constituencies. Later, this was increased to 111 via the Constitution of (20th Amendment) Act, 1988. However, 24 seats in the Legislative Assembly will remain empty for the portion of the State that Pakistan now occupies per section 48. Seats are not counted when calculating the Assembly's overall membership. Additionally, if the Governor believes that females are not fairly symbolized in the Legislative Assembly, he may nominate two women to serve as members of the Assembly.

Jammu and Kashmir has a bicameral legislature. Currently, there are 89 members of the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly, 87 of them were elected and two who were nominated. The Assembly's Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business govern how the House conducts business. These guidelines have occasionally been changed. Unless it is dissolved earlier, the Assembly is in office for six years. 24 seats in the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly should be maintained empty for the legislators from the portion of the state that is now occupied by Pakistan, according to provision 48 of the State Constitution. These seats are not included in the assembly house's overall capacity. In the event that there are insufficient numbers of women representatives in the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly, the Governor has provided the provision to nominate two women members. Legislative Assembly is divided into two houses. The Legislative Assembly currently has 89 members, including the two nominees.

1934 saw the beginning of the initial two branches of the legislative branch, which were the Assembly and the Council of Ministers. The draught of the constitution for the territory of Jammu and Kashmir was completed on January 26, 1957. The Governor, the Legislative Council, & the Legislative Assembly are the three components that make up the Legislature, as stated in Section 46 of the Constitution. The Kashmir's Legislative Assembly was comprised of a total of one hundred members.

3.11. Role and Functioning of Political Parties In Jammu And Kashmir Since 2002:

Concept of Political Parties

In every democracy practiced in the modern era, political groups are foreseeable. A democracy is a kind of government that is run by the people, for the people, and with the participation of the people. A democratic system of governance can be inferred from the fact that the people themselves rule the administration that represents them. When put into action, the democratic system of governance sees power vested in delegates who are chosen by the populace at large. And through election system, voters choose who will serve them in government. Political parties are the entities that are responsible for nominating aspirants under the rules of the election process. In representative democracy forms of government, major parties always play an important and constructive part. In nations where elections are held democratically, political groups are generally seen as necessary tools for the formation and operation of the government. As a result, we are able to make the assumption that democracy can favourably function in nations that have competitive party systems. When it comes to the smooth operation of representational government, political parties are an absolute necessity. In each and every democratic structure, political parties are responsible for carrying out various features to help. They allow the wider populace to have a say in elections and other kinds of governance, and there has never been an instance of a sovereign modern democracy existing lacking political groups. They are the apparatuses that hold the highest significance in a democratic administration. In point of fact, the nature of the political parties that drive any given structure of democratic democracy can be used to identify the working of such a system. The religious plurality, caste and regionalism, cultural diversity, the social, ethnic, and communal conduct of the nationalist movement, and competing intellectual conceptions have all contributed to the purely debatable characteristics of political parties and the coalition government in India.

3.12. General Functions Performed By the Political Parties in the Context of India

They do this in the midst of public and governmental scrutiny by making a surety attainable. They educate individuals and contribute to the formation of popular perception as well as help frame debates.

- They make recommendations for candidates throughout the electoral process;
- By way of election manifesto, they provide the voter with prior notice of their objectives and plans.
- They run advertisements in an effort to sway voters in favour of their contender in the upcoming election;
- They articulate the needs of the people and express those needs to the authorities;

When one or both of a legislature's political groups are in the minority, the remaining members come together to form an opposition and maintain constant pressure on the ruling party to improve its administrative practices. Since 2002, political parties in Jammu and Kashmir have been doing the aforementioned duty of bringing people up to speed in a fairly respectable manner. For the past three decades, the existence of political groups in Jammu and Kashmir has increased the likelihood of the potential for an elected administration there. They are responsible for ensuring that there are open channels of interaction between citizens and their respective governments, on the one hand, and voters and the representatives elected to represent them, on the other. They make an effort to organize political involvement and fulfil the requests of the people about subjects of public concern. The conduct of elections in the absence of political parties would have been nearly impossible to tolerate. In point of fact, democracy necessitates the existence of credible and well-supported political parties that are in a position to represent the people and allow access a political decision that establishes the people's capacity to administer for the benefit of society as a whole.

It turned out that all it takes to comprehend the operation of the formal institutions that make up a legislative democratic system is a dynamic force, such as a political party. This is true in both a literal and figurative aspect. Jammu & Kashmir, as with the other states of India, has a distinctive unique political party structure. One of the kinds of government that receives the greatest amount of support is democratic one. On the other hand, the growth of a true democracy is impossible to accomplish in the absence of this favourable state of events. A strong party system and a well-functioning democracy stand out as particularly important components of this list of prerequisites. Not only does the party system help to modernize

politics, but it also helps to build an accountable and transparent administration. Kashmir is representative of a sub-political system that has historically held a distinct position and mode of operation. This sub-political system, which was first established in 1947 and is comprised of legislative structures operating inside a democratic framework, has had relatively little involvement with the general population ever since it was first established.

In summary, the contextual factors of Jammu and Kashmir State, along with the more fundamental concerns of rationality, religion, ethnicity, family, and leadership effectiveness, have created a slanted environment for the state's political party system. The majority of parties have traditionally been organised along geographical or religious lines issues that concerned or were represented by a coalition of chosen politicians granted prosperity in the social, economic, and political realms. They directed the complexities and grievances of the populace along with ethno-communal and regional appearances; numerous of them have served more additional duties rather than acting as spokesmen for a particular community, household, individuals, or organization. On the grounds that they are unable to move above the archaic divisions of tribe, ethnicity, and religion, many political groups have, up until this point, shown them to be entirely committed to the Indian country. Their reason for this loyalty is that they are incapable to do so. Almost no political party can be described as an organised group with clear ideological foundations. In point of fact, the vast majority of them are not organised along ideological lines. Their policies have been left wide open to consistent shifts in direction in response to shifting political priorities from moment to moment.

There is no requirement that the various political organizations have a single, cohesive identity. However, there are some that make perfect sense in particular localities or seats, but they have no backing in any other area. The most of them have kept operating despite being grabbed by indications of power support or attractive leadership skills. They have also managed to seize power. In addition, it is not always easy to tell the difference between too serious regional-religious organizations and those who claim to be secular, reformist, or nationalist. In point of fact, many of them used the preliminary intervals to contemplate and build on issues that were important to the community. It is clear from the behaviour of political parties in Jammu and Kashmir State over the course of the past 3 decades that all these political groups have been engaged in the formation of public opinion, the cultivation of political awareness, and the instruction of individuals in electoral culture. Political parties are able to successfully form administrations in their respective states, at

which point they can garner the support of the general public and put their policies, frameworks, and programmes into effect. In the time just before the institutions and practices became completely democratic, major parties were already making important contributions. As a consequence of this, we are in a position to assert that the democratic form of governance in Jammu and Kashmir has been improved by the presence of a competing and inter system. With this thorough summary in hand, let's move on to a quick analysis of the important political events and major political parties in Jammu and Kashmir.

3.13. The Jammu and Kashmir National Conference

The National Conference was the first historically important region-based major party in Jammu and Kashmir State, and it continues to play an extremely important position in the political affairs of the state. The origins of the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference may be traced all the way back to the times before independence when Dogra rulers were in power. Sheikh Abdullah and Choudhary Ghulam Abbas founded the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference party in 1931, which was the beginning of what would later become the National Conference we know today. In this regard, it was only applicable to the Kashmir region; yet, in 1938, the party group that was in power at the time made the decision to throw open the doors of the party, which had been kept closed for a considerable amount of time for all regions of the Jammu and Kashmir State. Its name was changed from the Muslim Conference to the all Jammu and Kashmir National Conference as a result of this expansion driven nature (AJKNC).

In 1947, the National Conference party voted in favour of Jammu and Kashmir State's incorporation into India's union with other states. From 1947 until 2015, it exercised complete political dominance over the state of Jammu and Kashmir, despite repeated challenges from the People's Democratic Party and the Congress Party, using a variety of electoral systems and political strategies. The autonomy of Kashmir is at the forefront of this organization's political objective. The most significant results of the National Conference are the drafting of a separate constitution for the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the implementation of land reforms. Both of these goals were successfully accomplished.

The National Conference is the only state political party in Jammu and Kashmir, and it holds the position of Chief Minister, which is traditionally held by the state's prime minister. In later years, this top titular position became widely known as the chief ministerial

post, just like its counterpart in the other Indian states. Since 1947, the State of Jammu and Kashmir has been governed by the Party National Conference in one form or another until the year 2002 and then again between the years 2009 and 2015. It ensures the state's autonomy under the special Status (article 370) of the Indian constitution, and in 1957, the National Conference drafted its very own independent Jammu and Kashmir constitution. Additionally, it is responsible for carrying out land developments within the state. Between the years 1981 through 2002, it was Farooq Abdullah, and between 2002 and the present, it has been his son Omar Abdullah.

The Philosophy, the Social Foundation, and the Function of the National Conference

Ideology is defined as an openly confident philosophy that lays down the foundation for a social, economic, and political system. Ideology also refers to the intellectual capacity for which a promise is made, a programme is established, and joint actions are taken. The programmes and ideology of the National Conference taking aim at all-sided growth alongside all possibilities of human influence constrained in a democratic routine on a country-wide scale covering agriculture, industry, transport, tourism, handicraft, and public services. This objective was stated in the conference's mission statement.

As a result, the ideology and programmes of the National Conference in the state of Jammu and Kashmir are as follows: Belief in Democracy, Secularism, Socialism, and State Autonomy; Strong Support for Special Status Article 370; Unity of the State; Economic improvement; Employment assistance; and Rehabilitation of Kashmiri Pandits. In point of fact, the formation of the National Conference was predicated on the philosophy of secularism. At the time of the party's founding in 1938, membership in it was open to anyone who was willing to take an oath declaring that they would uphold the unity and integrity among the various classes of the people and be willing to make any rational sacrifice for the achievement of freedom and an accountable and responsible government in Jammu and Kashmir. This was one of the requirements for joining the party.

A significant shift had taken place in the political party system of Jammu and Kashmir before to the elections for the Legislative Assembly in 2002. The emergence of yet another regional political party in Kashmir, one that challenged the preeminent position held by the National Conference and helped to create a highly competitive democratic environment in the valley, was the most significant contributor to this shift in power dynamics. The National Conference, which had been dominating the electoral system and

cleaning up the subsequent elections later in 1977, was unable to continue down its appealing path. Despite the fact that it is gradually developing into the dominant party in the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir as well as the region surrounding it, the National Conference was unable to gain a majority of the seats in the Legislative Assembly. This is despite the fact that it has been successful in securing a majority of the seats in previous elections. Because of this, the goal of reducing its influence in the political system of the Jammu and Kashmir state was also to reduce its hegemonic position in the Kashmir region. The outcome of the Legislative Assembly election in 2002 was unreliable, and in addition to the three major parties—the Congress, the National Conference (NC), and the People's Democratic Party (PDP), among others—there were a small number of other parties, including the Panthers Party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, and the Communist Party of India (Marxist). The end of the hegemony of a single party's supremacy managed to bring about new arrangements not only regarding the results of the polls but also regarding the distribution of power. Every election that has taken place since 2002 has resulted in an irregular finding, which has disrupted the delicate balance of power in the region. Regional disparity, which was a reproduction of the politics of party system in the pre-2002 period, has given way to regional homogeneity. This is primarily owing to the hegemonic mechanism to rule over the electoral space of Kashmir region in the sway of a single party. As a result of the election results in the Kashmir region changing to be split between two or more political parties, there is currently an on-going development of coalition governance. This is being accomplished through an alliance between a Kashmir-based regional party and a party that is rooted in the Jammu region.

However, it is also a fact that in the later politics of the state in 2002, National Conference realized this truth, which is that the relationships between the party and the people, particularly its own political constituency, had been severely damaged. This is a fact that cannot be denied. The Bharatiya Janata Party and Congress, as well as the Panther's Party and a few other political parties in Jammu, competed for voters in this particular polling constituency. In Kashmir, the People's Democratic Party was the party of choice. By addressing a variety of different political concerns, including as the situation in Kashmir, the National Conference was able to create an election climate in which it was certain of regaining its acceptability to seize power. The electoral politics of Jammu and Kashmir became, to a certain extent, more vibrant and competitive as a result of this. It was under these conditions, that National Conference emerged as a significant challenger in assembly election in later 2002, that the party was compelled to re-evaluate its ideas and programme.

Maintaining a position in opposition was likely also advantageous for National Conference because it not only democratized the politics of the state but also required National Conference to place itself within the constantly shifting political perspectives and position. This was a win-win situation for National Conference. It is possible that the rise of competitive politics in the state is to blame for the fact that the National Conference has been compelled to address the issues of governance and development in each of the states.

In spite of overwhelming odds, the National Conference was able to form a coalition government with the Congress and rule the state of Jammu and Kashmir from 2008 till 2014. However, during the elections for the state legislative assembly and the parliamentary seats in 2014, numerous political dynamics caused the political future of the National Conference party to be in a state of turmoil. During the time that the National Conference and Congress were in coalition government, the differences between the two parties regarding contentious issues such as the repeal of the Armed Forces Special Rights Act (AFSPA), politics involving separatist groups, demilitarization, and a number of additional controversial topics became abundantly clear. Because of the Congress and the National Conference's joint control over the government, irregular conditions arose, which ultimately resulted in a complete inability to implement any new policies in Jammu and Kashmir. Because of this, many people in the Jammu region and the Kashmir region lost faith in the Congress and the National Conference respectively. Because of the National Conference's ideas and policies, particularly the broken promises regarding the subject of increased state autonomy on the part of the central government, the National Conference has lost its appeal to a regional audience. The dominant political leadership in Jammu and Kashmir's political affairs developed a perception of despotism as a result of the aggressiveness of the National Conference and its leaders toward the formation of an alternate political conflict force. It is forbidden for democratic ideals and principles to take root and grow as a philosophical system. The existence of any democratic form of opposition, in particular in a state torn apart by violence such as Jammu and Kashmir, had a number of repercussions for the institutions of the state.

A well-known political analyst by the name of Balraj Puri provides the following concise analysis of the political phenomenon:

Allow the people who live in this state to have the same level of self-esteem and confidence as those who live in the rest of the country. They ought to be accorded the same rights in selecting, contesting, and

reshaping the government of the state that are accorded to citizens in other places in the world. In an ideal world, the political party that is now in power in the state of Jammu and Kashmir should have the same amount of autonomy in its political relations with the government of the dominant party that is currently in power at the union level, as well as with local parties and other national political parties.

Electoral Performance of NC (2002-2015)

When it comes to Jammu and Kashmir's political affairs and electoral setup, the National Conference has been kept on as a dominant force in the years leading up to the 2002 Assembly elections. The People's Democratic Party defeated the National Conference in the election for the Legislative Assembly in 2002, which resulted in the establishment of a coalition government that was supported by the Congress Party. Prior to that, the National Conference was the major political force in the state. However, it subsequently lost its position to the People's Democratic Party. In 2008, elections were held for the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly. The National Conference came out on top, with 28 seats, and formed an alliance with the Congress Party, which came in second, winning 17 seats. The 2009 Lok-Sabha election results give National Conference three seats in parliament. The National Conference only won 15 seats in the 2014 Lok-Sabha elections, leaving them with the role of opposition. Therefore, the National Conference has always been in the background of Jammu and Kashmir's political scene. Whether as United Province Alliance UPA or National Democratic Alliance, National Conference has played a significant role in the union administration (NDA), being an integral part of both state and federal administrations.

3.14. Legislative assembly elections 2002: the emergence of PDP and competitive politics in Jammu and Kashmir

Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, a former Janta Dal leader, Congress Organization leader, and Union Home Minister, created the PDP, the state political party with a regional base in Jammu and Kashmir, on July 27, 1999. Several concerns, including local, regional, and national ones, which have dominated Jammu and Kashmir state politics historically, came together to form the PDP in that state's politics. The People's Democratic Party's entry into state politics in 1990 was a significant milestone that fundamentally altered the political landscape. The National Conference had

previously lost popularity at the grassroots level in the Kashmir area because of its coalition partner, the Bharatiya Janata Party.

A significant portion of the National Conference's vote bank in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, most notably in the Kashmir area, has been alienated as a result of the conflict between the Bharatiya Janata Party and the National Conference about the unique status that is accorded to each state in accordance with Article 370. The People's Democratic Party was able to deepen its roots in the valley as a result of the National Conference's increasing disdain and failures in state politics. The State Congress Party's decision to create a new political party, the People's Democratic Party, mainly demonstrated Mufti Mohammad Sayeed's political dynamism. Although Mufti Mohammed Sayeed's political career had to upset the Ruling Coalition when he became the Home Minister of India's central government, and second, there was a political void in Jammu and Kashmir that Mufti Mohammed Sayeed needed to fill, both factors contributed to the formation of the new political party.

As seen by Congress, the People's Democratic Party ran in its first-ever election for the Jammu and Kashmir state legislature in 2002, won, and established a coalition government. In addition to being held in the precarious political unit of Valley, the 2002 Assembly elections were historic because they were closely contested. In the post-1951 era, these electoral results were more competitive than ever before. It was the first time in history that all three regions (Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh) saw a significant "multi-party competition" over the previous fifty years of disputed constitutional relations with India. The People's Democratic Party, a newly founded regional political organisation with a base in Kashmir and led by Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, first to overthrow the National Conference. The National Conference's one-party dominance since the beginning of its existence is coming to an unexpected conclusion. People's confidence in elections and government institutions was significantly impacted by the National Conference's end to one-party rule in electoral politics.

Regardless of the fact that major parties lost their specific regained electoral districts that we attacked in the later 1989 time of insurgency, the Jammu and Kashmir state entered a new phase. The National Conference's hegemonic nature changed into a competitive one as a number of fresh political forces opposed its continued existence. The emergence of new political forces is said to have mellowed the state's democratic structure, especially in the Kashmir valley, where the National Conference faced nothing in the way of resistance. The level of discontent among the populace, government agencies, and the Indian Union

administration was likewise excessive. The majority of political parties lost their electoral base in such political situations and remained fictitious. The People's Democratic Party, another significant political force in the state, secured 28 seats in the 2014 state legislative assembly elections, and together with the Bharatiya Janata Party, which won 25 seats, they formed a coalition government. However, the Bharatiya Janata Party's withdrawal of support for the People's Democratic Party causes the coalition government to collapse in June 2018. Mehbooba Mufti is currently occupied with her duties as the People's Democratic Party's state-level president and party patron.

PDP's ideologies, social foundation, policies, and programmes

The People's Democratic Party continues to be motivated to devote all of its resources to the fight for justice and the rule of law by the promises it made to the electorate in 1999. There is widespread agreement that the state of Jammu and Kashmir currently has conditions that demand public attention. Administration that can be provided by a political party with a simple commitment. Contrarily, the people were paid to put an end to the game of double-dealing politics. For the People's Democratic Party, taking part in the election is a pledge to the cause of internal structural reform. The People's Democratic Party believes that ideals and beliefs should always come first. It is not discriminatory, but it is built primarily on political power for the benefit of all. In order to create a new agenda of peace and prosperity, Mufti Mohammed Sayeed declared that if elected, he would cooperate with the region's secular, democratic, and liberal elements, which make up the majority of society.

The People's Democratic Party's programmes and policies are quite unique, as may be shown in the following ways:

- Policy on Healing Touch
- Employment, women's empowerment, Kashmiri Pandits' repatriation and rehabilitation, tourism,
- policy on youth development, demilitarization
- People should be able to live in dignity, prosperity, and peace.
- an unrestricted line of contact for separatists,
- Act to Prevent Terrorism,
- release of all political prisoners and revocation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act

Having autonomy in a new Kashmir As a guiding principle for resolving the conflict in Kashmir, respect for the region's identity and the unique status of Article 370 of the state are required.

Role of People's Democratic Party in Jammu and Kashmir

Mufti Sayeed's entry into state politics with the establishment of the People's Democratic Party in Jammu and Kashmir was seen as a pro-Kashmir shift. The objectives of the People's Democratic Party were more fundamental and anticipated to solve the basic suffering of Kashmir's injured population. The Kashmiri people have been promised by the People's Democratic Party. They have told the people that they will function as a conduit and stir up popular sentiment on both a national and state level. The PDP has placed a strong emphasis on addressing and communicating the problems of the state's ordinary man through constitutional channels. It is committed to pursuing the restoration of democracy, the rule of law, and normalcy in the state so that the basic human rights of the populace would be appropriately safeguarded and upheld.

The People's Democratic Party's guiding ideas have traditionally appealed to the state's working class. As a result, the People's Democratic Party seemed to be a strong contender in the elections. PDP and the Congress created a coalition government in 2002. The coalition government's Common Minimum Programme mostly made the party ideologies clear. Its focus on the Healing Touch policy was clear in the CMP. Concerning the isolation of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, especially in the Kashmir valley was the main goal of the Healing Touch Policy. The Special Operation Group (SOG) was finally abolished by Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, who also removed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) from state jurisdiction and made an effort to institutionalize a line of communication between the union administration and the separatists. The repatriation and rehabilitation of Kashmiri Pandits were arranged for by Mufti Sayeed and its Party, notwithstanding this. Mufti Mohammed Sayeed supported open lines of communication between India and Pakistan, and the federal government responded favorably to his request.

In the Legislative Assembly polls for the State Assembly elections in 2014, the People's Democratic Party stood out as the only significant political party in the lead. For the first time in the history of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Bharatiya Janata Party emerged as the second-place party. Political parties with opposing ideologies were engaged in conflict with one another. In Kashmir, the People's Democratic Party usually anticipated

public support in addition to potential effects on Bharatiya Janta Party rule. To combat the dynastic rule of Abdullah and Mufti in the respective states of Jammu and Kashmir, the Bharatiya Janata Party formed electorates. Despite the fact that the two political parties received the support of their respective regions or areas, political pragmatism brought them close together, and the PDP and BJP established a coalition government. This partnership was seen by Mufti Mohammad Sayeed as the North and South Poles coming together. Jammu and Kashmir experienced an unexpected political situation because, up until 2002, the Single Party National Conference ruled the region's politics on its own. There was a time when National Conference, the dynastic political party in power, won 90 percent of the seats since there were virtually no other political parties running for office that may have posed a threat to National Conference. Rekha Chowdhary observes the characteristics of the party system in Jammu and Kashmir and writes

Therefore, the omens of one-party hegemony with no alternative available to the general people characterised the politics of the Kashmir valley. This status quo altered with the emergence of the People's Democratic Party as a clear challenger of the National Conference, and the electoral race became competitive as voters had an opportunity to choose between the two parties. The National Conference's single-party dominance structure has been replaced by a regional political party centered in Kashmir, which has also altered the basis for power politics in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Electoral Performance of Jammu and Kashmir People's Democratic Party (2002-2015)

In 2002, the People's Democratic Party ran in the elections for the first time in Jammu and Kashmir, where it ultimately won 16 seats and joined forces with the Congress party to establish a coalition government. After the elections for the Assembly in 2008, National Conference only obtained 21 members, which meant that it was forced to sit in the opposition because it had lost its hegemonic role. As a result of its success in the elections for the state legislative assembly in 2014, the party was able to create a coalition government along with the Bharatiya Janata Party, which is now being led by Mufti Mohammed Sayeed. Mehbooba Mufti made history when she was the first woman to hold the position of Chief Minister of the state of Jammu and Kashmir after the passing of Mufti Mohammed Sayeed. The Bharatiya Janata Party made the decision in June 2018 to stop lending its support to the People's Democratic Party, which led to the collapse of the coalition government that had been in place up until that point. Apart to this, the People's Democratic Party was successful in winning three seats in the election for the Lok Sabha in 2014 and one seat in 2004.

Table 3.1: ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE OF JKPD (2002-2014)

YEAR	ELECTION	SEATS WON
Assembly Elections, 2002	8 th Assembly	16
Parliamentary Elections, 2004	14 th Lok Sabha	1
State Legislative Assembly Elections, 2008	9 th Assembly	21
Parliamentary Elections, 2014	16 th Lok Sabha	03
State Legislative Assembly Elections,	10 th Assembly	08

Source: The Website of the Election Commission of India (www.eci.nic.in)

3.15. The Congress in Jammu and Kashmir

The Indian National Congress (INC) was founded by Allan Octavian Hume in 1885. In the national struggle for liberation, the Indian National Congress and its leaders played a significant and active role, which earned them the country's respect, affection, and affiliation. The history of the Indian National Congress in the state of Jammu and Kashmir dates back to the second half of the 1930s, when the party began to publicly engage in Kashmiri politics. On December 28, 1935, a public convention was organised in Amira kadal, Srinagar, in conjunction with the Indian National Congress' 50th birth anniversary. During the course of the discussion, the leaders of the Indian National Congress and the National Conference decided to launch a combined challenge to Dogras' exploitative and dictatorial leadership. In the Kashmir valley, the Indian National Congress had an important role throughout the post-independence period. Indian National Congress was uninterested in entering the power politics of Jammu And Kashmir State and seizing control of the state. During the years 1947 to 1953, when Sheikh Abdullah led the National Conference government, the Indian National Congress did not intervene in its political activities. However, following the expulsion and detention of Sheikh Abdullah from the interior of the National Conference in 1953, the Indian National Congress began taking a keen interest in the National Conference's political activities. In actuality, a number of political observers believe that the National Conference in 1953 was an extension of the Indian National Congress's leadership. However, in the state of

Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian National Congress was unable to maintain its primary existence until 1965. Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq, who was also the chief minister of the Jammu and Kashmir State, was the first member of the Jammu and Kashmir Indian National Congress when it was officially constituted in the state in 1965.

The introduction of the Congress party into Kashmir resulted in the disintegration of the National Conference and the formation of the Congress, with all supporters of the governing National Conference merging into the Congress. Subsequently, the Congress became an influential political force in the state. Syed Mir Qasim founded the Congress political party. In 1971, Qasim became the Prime Minister. In the 1963 Lok-Sabha elections, the party lost all three seats. In this regard, the Congress party was officially constituted in the state in 1964, during the administration of Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq. From 1965 to 1975, the Indian National Congress ruled the Jammu and Kashmir state. In the Indira-Sheikh deal of 1975, the National Conference reclaimed its identity under the leadership of Sheikh Mohd Abdullah as the state's chief minister. Since then, the Indian National Congress has played an essential and vibrant role in Jammu and Kashmir State politics.

Congress, being National Conference and People's Democratic Party coalition allies and occasionally sitting in opposition. Jammu and Kashmir's first coalition government was established following the 1987 Legislative Assembly elections. Through primary elections, the National Conference and Congress parties create an alliance. However, the NC-Congress coalition lost its dependability in a very brief period of time. The 1987 elections for the state assembly were perceived to be entirely prearranged, and there was a general lack of anticipation not only regarding the polls but also the political process. From 1965 through 1975, the Congress party dominated the state for eleven years. It also ruled the state as a coalition partner of the National Conference (1987-1990) and the People's Democratic Party (2008-2014). (2002-2008). Therefore, as time passed, congress was unable to expand in Kashmir due to the absence of quality leadership in Kashmir. In contrast, in the Jammu region, the Congress Party had one significant figure, Makhan Lal, but due to the altering political landscape after 2008, the Congress Party was unable to maintain its unique electoral base. It is reasonably true that the Congress performed well in Hindu-dominated areas of Jammu. However, the Congress party lost its electoral space in the Jammu region to the Bharatiya Janata Party in 2008, and this trend continued in 2014, when Congress was only able to negotiate 12 of the state's assembly seats. Numerous factors contributed to the overthrow of Congress. However, one obvious reason was that the Congress party lacked a

charismatic leader (like the People's Democratic Party's late Mufti Mohammed Sayeed and the National Conference's Dr. Farooq Abdullah) who could have organised the masses in all three regions of Jammu and Kashmir.

Ghulam Nabi Azad generally fills the void in 2005, when he was sworn in as chief minister and Mufti Mohammed Sayeed stepped aside to make room for the coalition agenda. Ghulam Nabi Azad was the first Chief Minister from the Jammu area in the history of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Ghulam Nabi Azad reformed the Party group and launched the party's election campaign as a result of his superior leadership and extensive expertise in national-level politics.

Extensive memberships drive campaign in all three regions of the state of Jammu & Kashmir. However, the political climate surrounding the Amaranth agitation of 2008 placed Congress once again in a precarious position. Still, the Congress party was successful in making the coalition government see the National Conference in 2008 and regaining power, although it was unable to expand its electoral base. However, Ghulam Nabi Azad was elected to parliament in 2009, which prevented it from weakening the Jammu and Kashmir Congress leadership. Professor Saif Din Soz appeared to be a powerful Congress voice in the Kashmir valley, but he was unable to expand the party's influence on the ground. Mr. Monga, a prominent party politician, aptly stated this political portent in 2010: It is because of his leadership that people have regained faith in our Congress party, and Mr. Soz does not promote factionalism. Due to poor organisational abilities, the Congress party in Jammu and Kashmir was thus weak and vulnerable.

Dr. Mirza Ashraf Beg, a prominent newspaper columnist and novelist, spoke on the importance and function of the Congress party in Jammu & Kashmir:

"Returning to the National Conference and Congress Association, their patterned relationship has created more problems for the Jammu and Kashmir state than it has resolved. However, due to its weak background, the National Conference will need to form an alliance with an arbitrary partner in Jammu and Kashmir, regardless of some inactive city ducks in the National Conference's swamps."

From the preceding analysis, it appears that Congress has played a significant role in the political landscape of the valley from its inception. Since 2014, however, the shift in the political climate following the establishment of the Bharatiya Janata Party in Jammu has

significantly diminished the Congress party's presence and decision-making position in the power-sharing conditions of the Jammu and Kashmir state. The only way for the Congress party to reclaim its political base, particularly in the Jammu region, is if it revisits and rewrites its ideological policies and programmes within the context of its inclusive balance of strong political leadership and secular politics. In all parts of Jammu and Kashmir, this will facilitate the reorganisation of party associations and the establishment of political replication at the grassroots level. This development can only make Congress a significant political power in the state to hostage fortune forces such as the Bharatiya Janata Party in Jammu, which used to be Congress's strongest constraint in the previous era.

Ideology, Social Base, Policies/Programmes of Congress Ideology and Principles of Congress

It encompasses trust in democratic values, secularism, socialism, mixed economy, economic liberalization, India's unity and integrity, and nonalignment.

The Congress Party's Social or Support Base: The Congress party is supported by individuals of all classes, castes, religions, and regions. It has the following social or support base: Religious Minorities, Illiterate Masses, Women, Labor Classes, and Capitalist Class.

Policies Programmes of Congress: During the 14th and 15th Parliamentary Lok-Sabha elections, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, president of the Congress party, released the party's election manifesto. The manifesto asserted that Congress was the only party capable of effectively governing and serving the nation. The electoral manifest describes the following primary policies and programmes:

Stability, self-reliance, establishment of Lok Pal, accountable government, information and media, accountable administration in Jammu and Kashmir and observance of Article 370's unique status, battle against corruption, employment generation programmes. Other policies and programmes include promoting agriculture, industry, communication, irrigation, train and road, education, drinking water, cheaper rice and wheat, health, family welfare programmes, rural and urban problem resolution, and the development of services and technologies.

Performance of Congress in Jammu and Kashmir Elections (2002-2014)

After the Congress gained 20 seats in the 2002 Legislative Assembly elections with the help of other minor political parties including the People's Democratic Party & the Panthers Party, etc., Jammu and Kashmir State was administered by a coalition government (PDP-Congress). The Congress gained 17 seats in the 2008 legislative elections and helped the National Conference create an Omar Abdullah-led coalition government. The Congress secured two constituencies in Jammu & Kashmir at the 2009 elections for the 14th and 15th Lok Sabha. The Congress only secured 12 seats in the 2014 assembly elections.

3.16. THE BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY (BJP) IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR

The Bharatiya Janata Party is one of the major political parties that hold a prominent centre place in the mainstream national politics of the Indian Union. The origins of the Bharatiya Janata Party may be traced back to 1951, when Shyama Prasad Mukherjee founded the Bharatiya Jana Sangha, which later amalgamated with the Anti-Congress special consideration –Janata Party in 1977. In 1980, however, the Janta Organization was disbanded, and the members of the previous Jana Sangh formed a new political party known as the Bharatiya Janata Party. In Jammu and Kashmir, the Bharatiya Janata Party originated in the late 1980s, when the first Jammu-based regional political party, Praja Parishad, joined with Jana Sangh, and then Jana Sangh merged with the Bharatiya Janata Party in 1980. The party's position on Jammu and Kashmir was no longer diametrically opposed to those of its predecessors, such as Praja Parishad. The party adhered to the concept of Parishad from the past. That is the incorporation of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Union by abolishing the state's unique status under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.

In spite of the increasing prevalence of regionalism, communalism, and religious-based political parties in India over the past three decades, the Bharatiya Janata Party has made its presence felt in Jammu. However, in its early years, the party could not withstand its impact. But gradually, it succeeds in gaining a foothold in the electoral politics of Jammu and Kashmir. As the distinguished academic Rekha Chowdhary observes:

“Since the Praja Parishad merged with the Bahratiya Jana Sangh, it has continued to focus on the topic of merging the state with the India union. This issue remained the primary focus of Bharatiya Janata Party politics

until it won a coalition government at the center in 1998 and suspended its demand for the abolition of Article 370's Special Status until a future age”.

Through the passage of time and the alteration of the political landscape at the state and national levels, the Bharatiya Janata Party channeled local political criticism against the governing political leadership, primarily Congress at the Centre and National Conference at the state, through its ideology of inclusive unification of the Jammu and Kashmir state with India and as the principal party opposing article 370. As Chowdhary observes once more,

“Without delving into the question of what exactly this article implies, the Bharatiya Janata Party has generated feelings of contradiction in this article and created a politics of hostility towards it that appeals to the common sense of a large number of masses in the Jammu region, primarily Hindus in urban areas”.

The Bharatiya Janata Party utilized political instability and the Kashmir conflict in the practice of armed conflict to reinforce its extensive intellectual philosophy that autonomy in Jammu and Kashmir exacerbates separatist. By use of this political theory, the BJP has expanded its political base beyond the Jammu district and into other units or regions of the state. The aforementioned electoral research of the Bharatiya Janata Party in both state assembly and parliamentary elections demonstrates conclusively that the BJP party has succeeded in gaining a foothold in the democratic politics of Jammu and Kashmir. That was earlier moreover the time dominated by National Conference or some intervals of time by Congress. This political environment is appropriately illuminated by Chowdhary's words:

“This electoral reward for the Bharatiya Janta party is not as significant as the electoral verdict of the national level party politics of the as a result of local issues interconnected with militancy. During the period of militancy, the Bharatiya Janata Party was able to consolidate its position in Jammu due to its vigorous and consistent battle against separatism in the Valley. The fundamental theme of this campaign was opposition to Article 370 and the unique status of Jammu and Kashmir”.

In state legislative assembly elections in 2002, the Bharatiya Janata Party won just one seat. Though, the BJP Party even though out of power later 2004, at the national level, sustained its emphasis on central and the state government to revoke the special status under

Article 370. The party has demonstrated its fury by consolidating a number of protests and shutting calls in Jammu and by organizing its electoral and social bases.

The leaders of the Bharatiya Janata Party not only criticized the government led by Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, but they also criticized all of these political groups, particularly the National Conference, the Congress, and other Kashmiri-centric political parties. All of these parties were pro-Kashmiri separatist, anti-Hindu, and anti-Jammu in the eyes of the Bharatiya Janata Party. Thus, the party achieved its purpose of expanding its electoral and social base in Hindu-dominated sections of Jammu gradually and steadily (Sambha, Kathua, and Udhampur districts). This can be assumed by the state legislative assembly elections of 2008 that were conducted after Amaranth protest stir 2008. It was the first time that the Bharatiya Janata Party was able to win eleven seats from the Jammu area of the country.

The rise of Bharatiya Janata Party as a strong and central political powers have far reaching issues pre dominantly in Jammu and Kashmir. In this political climate, the Bharatiya Janata Party had no further concerns regarding Jammu and Kashmir. In the 2014 Lok-Sabha elections, the party defeated National Conference and Congress in order to win three Lok-Sabha seats (one from Ladakh and two from Jammu). In the same year, however, in the state legislative assembly elections, the Bharatiya Janta Party won 25 seats and became the second largest party, forming a coalition government with the People's Democratic Party. However, this coalition government was unable to complete its six-year term and disbanded early. In the 2018 municipal elections held in Jammu and Kashmir, the Bharatiya Janata Party won around 212 seats in the Jammu region and 106 seats in the Kashmir valley. The BJP party called for the end of the Khandaani Raj (Dynasty Rule) and "Kashmir Raj" (Kashmiri Rule) over the state of Jammu and Kashmir, i.e. the Jammu region in particular and the Kashmir region in general. In actuality, the party promoted the notion of "Dogra Raj and Dogra Pride" in Jammu as a counter-narrative against the National Conference, People's Democratic Party, and Congress. This was repeated at a number of Bharatiya Janata Party-organized election rallies from time to time. Even though the Bharatiya Janata party leaders openly declared themselves to be Dogra descendants and entitled to the reestablishment of this lost identity, they believed that regional parties such as the People's Democratic Party and the National Conference were holding up the process. However, following the announcement of the election results, the Bharatiya Janata Party established a coalition government with the People's Democratic Party to realize its long-held goal of administering the majority-Muslim state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Ideology, Social Base, Policies/Programmes of BJP **Ideology and Principles of BJP:** The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) supports Gandhian values of socialism, nationalism, and integration, positive secularism, and value-driven politics.

Social or Support System of the BJP: The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) enjoys the backing of all elements of Indian society, including the impoverished, Brahmins, Shudras, and Tribals, as well as urban and rural populations, including the Urban Middle Class, Rural Masses, Women, and Intellectuals.

BJP's policies/programs: At the time of the fourteenth Lok Sabha elections, the Bharatiya Janata Party was the most significant member of the National Democratic Alliance. In April 2004, for the 14th Lok Sabha election, Atal Behari Vajpayee issued the National Democratic Alliance's joint election manifesto on behalf of the National Democratic Alliance. At the time of the 12th Lok Sabha election on 3rd February 1998, Bharatiya Janata Party President Lal Krishna Advani released the party's election manifesto, which included the following policies and programmes: Centre-state Relation, Constitution Reforms Restoration of State Authority, National Unity, Positive Secularism, and Right to Information, Inter-State Council, Identity Cards, and Minorities. Other goals include the eradication of corruption, social, political, and economic justice, human rights commissions, Panchayati Raj institution changes, employment, Swadeshi, agriculture, industry, education for all, women's status, etc.

Table 3.2: Electoral Performance of BJP (2002-2014)

YEAR	ELECTION	SEATS WON
State Legislative Assembly Elections, 2002	8 th Assembly	1
State Legislative Assembly Elections, 2008	9 th Assembly	11
State Legislative Assembly Elections, 2014	10 th Assembly	25
Parliamentary Elections, 2014	16 th Lok Sabha	3

Source: The Website of the Election Commission of India (www.eci.nic.in)

3.17. JAMMU AND KASHMIR NATIONAL PANTHERS PARTY

Prof. Bhim Singh launched the Jammu and Kashmir National Panthers Party on March 23, 1982 as a state-level political organisation. This party was once registered as the Jammu and Kashmir Panthers Party; in 1996, the Election Commission allowed a new title to the Jammu and Kashmir National Panthers Party. Panthers led by Prof. Bhim Singh remained a vocal advocate for the rights and concerns of the common people in the Jammu region. The primary objective behind the formation of the Panthers Party was to overturn the forces of communalism, abolish corruption, criminalise politics, fight the elements of the drug epidemic, and construct a factual and trustworthy democratic system of governance in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Role of the JKNPP in the Politics of J&K

State politics have been significantly impacted by the Jammu and Kashmir National Panthers Party. In defense of the Jammu Kashmir National Panthers Party, human rights advocate and attorney Bhim Singh approached the Supreme Court in 1996 to conduct elections in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which had been decimated by militancy. Due to Jammu and Kashmir's efforts, the Chief Election Commission of India was convinced to organize elections in Jammu and Kashmir.

National Panthers Party. It has prevented the collapse of the Chowkidari and Numberdari system under the National Conference and Congress coalition government. The Chowkidars and Numberdars resumed their duties and were compensated. The Jammu and National Panthers Party has fought ceaselessly for the reserving of Scheduled Tribe designation for the Paharis in Jammu and Kashmir State, who occupy the territories between Kupwara and Rajouri. JKNPP additionally sought Schedule Tribe designation for the state's Gaddies, Bakarwal, and Gujjars. Dogri language's inclusion in the eighth schedule of the constitution is a result of the Jammu Kashmir National Panthers Party's tireless efforts. 29 It also made possible Union Government funding for the welfare of border migrants entering the state and the protection of Pakistani refugees. In addition, the group agitated for the urgent repeal of Article 35A. It desires its removal and Jammu and Kashmir's full incorporation into the Indian Union.

Electoral Performance of the JKNPP in the State of Jammu and Kashmir (2002- 2014)

In the 2002 elections for the state Legislative Assembly, the Jammu and Kashmir National Panthers Party won 4 of the 36 seats for which it had candidates. The JKNPP won in

four electoral constituencies, including all three in the Udhampur district. Along with the People's Democratic Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party, the JKNPP ran for 73 seats and held three seats in reserve in the 2008 legislative assembly elections. Jammu and Kashmir National Panthers Party lost every seat in the 2014 state Legislative Assembly elections. For the first time in the preceding 18 years, the Jammu and Kashmir National Panthers Party won every seat in the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly. Jammu and Kashmir National Panthers Party fielded contestants in the Lok Sabha elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014 in addition to the Assembly elections; nevertheless, the JKNPP has been unable to retain its position in the country's mainstream of politics.

3.18. JAMMU AND KASHMIR AWAMI ITTEHAD PARTY

Engineer Rashid converted the most contentious politician in Jammu and Kashmir. Rashid's life is the pursuit of justice that led him to enter politics. Rashid ran as an independent candidate in the 2008 elections for the state assembly from the Langate Handwara constituency. He won the Langate seat by defeating the top leaders of the People's Democratic Party and the National Conference after the decision to run for office brought him success.

Rashid's position within the State Legislative Assembly after 2008 speaks volumes about his beliefs and manifestos. It remained National Conference and Congress or People's Democratic Party Coalition administrations; he continues to criticise the policies and programmes. Frequently, he disrupts Legislative Assembly and has even prevented the governor from addressing the Assembly. In the coalition government of the People's Democratic Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party, Rashid was beaten by a member of the Bharatiya Janata Party in the Legislative Assembly; the next day, he planned a beef party. In addition, Rashid uses his social media tools, such as Facebook and other networking sites, to reach the greatest number of individuals and communicate with them. There are few external and internal matters that Rashid does not discuss. Rashid is one of the serious voices in the valley, whose demonstrations on a variety of issues, including the killing of civilians, corruption, nepotism, governance, Article 370, Article 35A, VVIP culture, and the broader issue of Kashmir divergence of opinion and its likely resolutions, have garnered widespread attention. Rashid believes that the entirety of Jammu and Kashmir, including the pieces administered by China and Pakistan, is a frontier territory that requires a political solution to

end the violence, regardless of the mainstream political consensus. However, it is difficult to distinguish between the politics of Engineer Rashid and the Hurriyat Conference when both want a settlement to the Kashmir issue in accordance with United Nations resolutions.

3.19. JAMMU AND KASHMIR PEOPLE'S CONFERENCE

Abdul Gani Lone established the Jammu and Kashmir People's Conference. Nevertheless, it is assumed that in the 2002 State Assembly elections, it was not only the People's Democratic Party that challenged the National Conference-the People's Conference. Rather, the late Abdul Gani Lone is believed to have sent proxy candidates into the election fight on the basis of his character. People's Conference's quiet electoral constituency in north Kashmir's frontline district Kupwara (Kashmir) posed a formidable challenge to the National Conference. It is assumed that at least five People's Conference proxy candidates were successful in entering the Legislative State Assembly. People's Conference, on the other hand, was led by the sons of the late Lone-Bilal Gani Lone and afterwards Sajad Gani Lone. Both remained members of the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) under the leadership of Mirwaiz Umar Farooq.

However, Syed Ali Geelani's prediction came true when People's Conference president Sajad Gani Lone ran as an independent candidate from Baramulla District in the 2009 parliamentary election. 32 Peoples Conference's advent in local electoral politics had a profound effect on Kashmir's political affairs. The primary effect of Sajjad Gani Lone's entry into mainstream politics was his decision to run in the 2014 State Assembly elections. People's Conference of Sajjad Gani Lone won two Assembly seats from north Kashmir, one for each (Kupwara and Handwara). By supporting the Bharatiya Janata Party, the separatist-turned-mainstream Sajad Gani Lone has become the most divisive political figure in the Jammu and Kashmir state. In 2014, Sajad Gani Lone joined the coalition government of the Bharatiya Janata Party and the People's Democratic Party and was appointed a cabinet minister in the respective administration. In the valley, it is widely believed that Sajad Lone is a close associate of the Bharatiya Janata Party. Nevertheless, it is widely believed that Sajjad Gani's emergence as a third-front that can dominate the valley for the next decade. However, only time will tell if such a remark is accurate. However, one thing is certain: neither state, regional, nor federal parties can marginalise Sajad's existence due to his centralising position in Kashmir's fragile political entity. Moreover at a Jammu & Kashmir is

currently experiencing a period in which insurgencies and popular fury are at an all-time high, and the mainstream has once again lost its political influence.

3.20. RELATIONSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA TO STATE POLITICS

In Jammu and Kashmir, the history of Communist Party of India doctrine dates back to the pre-partition era. Communist ideology prejudiced significantly leaders who fought against Dogra power, like Sheikh Abdullah, Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq, and countless others. In the post-accession period, however, the Communists' influence remained minimal, and their ideology failed to create much interest among the People. The Communist Party of India Marxist (CPIM) and Communist Party of India (CPI) contested the Jammu and Kashmir Parliamentary State legislative elections, but neither faction was successful. However, shortly following the upsurge in insurgencies, the situation shifted. As a national party, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) fought to secure the electoral constituency in Jammu & Kashmir. After the 1990s, Mohammad Yousuf Targami of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) emerged as one of the most enduring voices. Due to the excellent leadership of Targami, the CPI (M) Party's successor won the Kulgam Assembly segment in 1996 by defeating Ghulam Nabi Dar of the National Conference.

In the 2002 state legislative elections in Jammu and Kashmir, the CPI (Marxist) Party emerged as one of the potential political parties by contesting seven Assembly seats and securing two from South-Kashmir. Since 2002, the party has expanded its basic membership throughout the state, although it was unable to repeat its result in the 2008 state Assembly elections. In 2014 Assembly elections, the CPI (Marxist) Party only competed for three seats and won the Kulgam constituency. From 1996 through 2014, Mohammad Yousuf Targami was the only Communist candidate to win the State Assembly elections four times in a row. In Jammu and Kashmir, however, the CPI (M) Party has performed poorly in the Lok Sabha elections of 2004, 2009, and 2014. It was unable to score a single electoral victory from the Jammu & Kashmir state throughout its entire history. Nonetheless, since 2002 coalition governments in Europe

The Communist Party of India (Marxist) has played a significant role in the democratisation of Jammu and Kashmir State as a responsible opposition party. The CPI (M) party continued to criticise the coalition governments' policies and programmes with great vehemence. Together, the Communist Parties, CPI (M) and CPI, have a parallel approach to

Kashmir and blame the Jammu and Kashmir state and central governments for failing to adopt prudent strategies for resolving the vexing Kashmir issue.

3.21. Conclusion

Since 2002, the mainstream political leadership in Jammu and Kashmir has played a vital role in democratizing the state institutions by reflecting diverse political viewpoints both inside and outside the state Legislative Assembly. Nonetheless, the emergence of several performers has diminished the ability of regional parties to deal with the central government over the most critical subject of Self-Government and Autonomy. Even though the political position of mainstream regional political parties in power to engage in dialogue on issues such as the repeal of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, talks with Hurriyat and Pakistan, human rights violations, and the release of political detainees is to engage in dialogue, this is not the case. Both the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Congress have strengthened their participation in the political conversation of Jammu and Kashmir, which has significant political implications for Jammu and Kashmir.

CHAPTER 4

COALITION POLITICS IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR FROM 2008 TO 2020

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4.1 Introduction

A coalition is formed when two or more political parties decide to form the government, typically for one term, to achieve a common objective, such as forming a majority administration. If all political parties agree that a coalition will best serve the interests of the country, it may be formed. When one party does not control a majority of the seats in the house, two or more parties must form an alliance. This is a result of India's multiparty system. The erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir has witnessed the dawn of coalition governments since 2002. The coalition partners include national as well as regional political parties. In this context, the present chapter will explore the coalition governments and their developmental initiatives and policy formulations. All the subject matter has been presented under appropriate themes in a systematic order.

4.2. India's federal government and coalitions

Federalism is a style of political system that divides authority equally between the national government and the several regions. Federalism is a Latin word that refers to a coalition of political forces. In a federated political system, two levels of government acquire their authority from several sources. The Indian political system has always allowed coalition governments to be formed. The central stage is the higher level of government, and a state is the lower level of government. When putting policies into place, the centre must communicate with and negotiate with state governments. Coalitions are short-lived administrations that take office when numerous political parties cooperate. They were developed to handle the challenges presented by democracy, multi-party systems. Two or more parties that hold a majority in the legislature come together to create a coalition.

India's coalition government and federalism

The 1935 Government of India Act had a significant impact on how the Indian federal system evolved. Granville Austin asserts that "cooperative federalism" was ingrained in the

Indian Constitution from the start. India depends on cooperation because of its federal system. Since coalitions first started to emerge in 1967, India's party structure has seen significant change. Old parties disbanded and new ones were formed as a result of the shift in government. With the advent of regionalism, India's political system was transformed into a coalition one. The coalition government in the centre represents a major concentration and sharing of power in governance. The Indian government is more influenced by regional parties. Changes in regional-national relations resulted from this. For a very long time, coalition governments have been the standard in all democracies. When a group of parties forms a coalition, the government is known as a coalition government. Contrary to single-party governments, coalition governments require participation and teamwork to implement their laws and policies. This is because they lack the necessary number of seats to pass the necessary legislation on their own. Additionally, they must be more inclusive and make contact with political parties that can support the passage of legislation.

4.3. Indira-Sheikh Accord

Sheikh Abdullah, a politician from Kashmir, was able to reclaim the position of Chief Minister after 22 years thanks to the Indira-Sheikh Accord, which was struck in 1975 between her and the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

Context: After the Indian army won during the 1971 India-Pakistan War, Sheikh came to the conclusion that he had no choice but to abide by India's demands. As a result, he decided to do so. As prime minister of India following India's triumph in Bangladesh, Indira Gandhi gave the Kashmiris' request for a referendum careful thought. Sheikh Abdullah's insistence that Kashmir and India's ties revert to how they were in 1953, as she put it, was impractical as "the clock could not be turned back in this manner." In 1975, Sheikh Abdullah dropped his demand for the Kashmiri people to be given the ability to self-govern. Even five years earlier to the Accord, Abdullah, whose popularity since 1953 has been based on his antagonism to India, would not have accepted such terms.

Accord: The agreement, the provisions of which are considered to equate to a "capitulation" to India, confirmed Jammu and Kashmir's integration with India since 1953 and included the blatantly false language that the state's government would be kept in line with Article 370. A historian named Sumantra Bose points out that by the end of the 1970s.

23 constitutional directives had already been made to incorporate the state with the Indian Union, and Union legislation had already been enacted in the state. Despite maintaining Article 370, the state was admitted to the Indian Union, and 262 Union legislation was already in effect there. Despite maintaining Article 370, the state has been referred to as a constituent part of the Indian Union. The Indian government could keep control over the areas that mattered most because it had the authority to pass laws controlling acts meant to undermine Indian sovereignty. Only those laws that were listed on the schedule of concurrent authority that both the Centre and State retained and those that were made available to the State after 1953 were allowed to be evaluated by the state government under the terms of the Accord. Just these rules could be changed or eliminated. The Accord also "patronizingly recognized the State's authority to establish rules on matters such as social security, social, and cultural problems, and also Muslim personal law."

The Indira-Sheikh Accord's text

1. The State of Jammu and Kashmir, which is an integral part of the Union of India, shall continue to be governed by Article 370 of the Indian Constitution in regard to its interactions with the Union.
2. The State will continue to hold the remaining legislative authority; but, Parliament will still retain the authority to enact laws pertaining to the avoidance of actions intended to renounce, doubt, or obstruct sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or causing the cession of a portion of India's territory or the secession of a portion of India's territory from the Union or giving offence to the Indian Constitution, the Indian National Anthem, and the Indian National Flag.
3. Any provision of the Indian Constitution that has previously been implemented to the State of Jammu and Kashmir with modifications and alterations may be modified or revoked by an order of the President under Article 370, with each request for change being looked at on its own merits; nevertheless stipulations of the Indian Constitution that are currently in effect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir without adapting or modification are unalterable.
4. It is understood that the local Government may evaluate any legislation passed by Parliament or granted to the State after 1953 regarding the Concurrent List and determine which ones, in its judgment, require revision. This is done to guarantee that the State of Jammu and Kashmir has the flexibility to enact its own laws in a way that is appropriate to the unique circumstances in the State on issues like social policies, culture issues, social protection,

personal law, and procedural laws.

Following that, actions may be taken in accordance with Article 254 of the Indian Constitution. Such law would be sympathetically reviewed for the President's assent. Under the Proviso to Article 2's clause 2, the same methodology would be used for any future laws passed by Parliament. Regarding the application of any such law to the State, the State Government shall be consulted, and its opinions shall be given careful attention.

5. As a way to make up for what Article 368 says, a Presidential Order should change Article 368 so that no law passed by the legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir that wants to change or affect any part of the Constitution of the State of Jammu and Kashmir about any of the following things can go into effect until the bill has been reserved.
6. The Principals have been given the task of resolving the issue of the Governor and Chief Minister's nomenclature because no consensus could be reached.

Signatories: On February 24, 1975, in New Delhi, the agreement was signed by G. Parthasarathy on behalf of the Indian government (led by Prime Minister Gandhi) and Mirza Mohanhad Afzal Beg on behalf of Abdullah.

4.4. 1977 Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly election

The first free and fair elections in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir were held in June 1977, and they are still widely recognised as such. Sheikh Abdullah was re-elected as Chief Minister by the Jammu & Kashmir National Conference, which had recently emerged from the defunct Plebiscite Front.

Background: Sheikh Abdullah was chosen as the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir following the 1974 Indira-Sheikh accord by the Indian National Congress party, which was in fact the original National Conference created by Abdullah in the 1930s but absorbed into Congress before the 1967 elections. Throughout the 1975 National Emergency declared by Indira Gandhi, Abdullah stayed in power. The Janata Party won the general election of 1977 and took control of the Center after the emergency was abolished.

In June 1977, elections were called for the state Legislative Assembly. The former Plebiscite Front's National Conference has recently been recreated by Sheikh Abdullah. It was the first time since the state's admission in 1947 that the National Conference and Congress faced off against one another on an equal footing in an election. Morarji Desai, the prime minister and leader of the Janata Party, announced that any election cheating would be severely punished and took steps to increase security in the state. The political climate in the state holding its first free and fair election was affected by this, which had a salutary effect. The Kashmir Valley reacted quite positively to the National Conference's resurrection. "The entire valley was red with NC flags, said a Kashmiri. Every home and market had bunting hanging from it.

Results: The National Conference obtained a majority in the Assembly with 47 of the 76 members. 40 of the 42 seats in the Kashmir Valley were won by it, but just 7 of the 32 seats in the province of Jammu. The Indian National Congress (the former National Conference, which had been in power since the state's admission) fell to third place after winning 11 seats in Jammu and none in the Valley.

The Janata Party (which comprised the former Jammu Praja Parishad) won 13 seats, its best performance to date. It also won 11 seats in Jammu in addition to gaining two in the Valley for the very first time. It is also noteworthy that Jamaat-e-Islami only got one member, down from five seats in the previous session. formation of the government. Sheikh Abdullah was sworn in as the State's Chief Minister as a consequence of the election. Mirza Afzal Beg was sworn in as the deputy chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir. At the end of the 1970s, the 70-year-old Sheikh Abdullah named his son Farooq Abdullah as his successor. After the Sheikh passed away in 1982, Farooq Abdullah was appointed to hold the position of Chief Minister. The National Conference's leadership served throughout the whole five years of its existence.

Prior to his death, Sheikh Abdullah filed a divisive Grant of Permit for Resettlement law in the state's Legislative Assembly. Any state subject of Jammu and Kashmir who inhabited there prior to May 14, 1954, or any of his descendants, may apply for resettlement in the state if they swear loyalty to both the Indian Constitution and the state Constitution. The bill was passed by the Legislative Assembly after Sheikh passed away, but it alarmed Jammu's Hindu community since it made Pakistani advocates and agents more likely to enter the state and incite violence. The national government forced Farooq Abdullah to send the matter to the Supreme Court of India; therefore it has been put in cold storage.

1983 Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly election

In October 1983, voting took place in the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir. Farooq Abdullah, the head of the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, was chosen as the new chief minister.

Background: The National Conference government passed the Resettlement Bill, which granted the state's residents who left for Pakistan prior to 1954 the right to come back to the state, reclaim their properties, and resettle, during Indira Gandhi's aggressive campaigning in the state. She did this by bringing up the bogey of a Muslim attack on the Jammu region. The 1983 Jammu and Kashmir polls served to further entrench the political divide along religious lines.

Result: In the 1983 state elections, Indira Gandhi's policy paid out as the Congress gained 26 seats and the NC won 46. With the exception of one unusual district, the Congress won every election in Jammu and Ladakh, whereas the National Conference won every election in the Kashmir Valley. In the 1983 election, the National Conference stayed in the Kashmir Valley, while the Congress gained the majority of its seats in Jammu and Ladakh. The precedent for any subsequent Congress-NC alliance was set by this. As the new Chief Minister, Farooq Abdullah was sworn in once more.

1987 Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly election

Jammu and Kashmir, an Indian state, held elections on March 23, 1987. As Chief Minister, Farooq Abdullah received a second term. Many people believe that the election was manipulated. The conflict in Jammu and Kashmir is thought to have been sparked by the election being rigged. After the Parliamentary elections in 1989 saw poor attendance, Jammu and Kashmir was placed under Governor's Rule in 1990, which lasted until 1996. The 1987 election marked a turning point in Jammu & Kashmir state politics.

Background: The history of the 1987 election is complicated on many levels. The Plebiscite Front was founded when Sheikh Abdullah's supporters left the National Conference party during Sheikh Abdullah's protracted imprisonment. The National Conference's remaining members merged their organisation with the Indian National Congress. Following Abdullah's release and agreement with Indira Gandhi, the Congress party elected him as the state's chief

Minister and acknowledged him as its own leader. However, Abdullah avoided the Congress party in the 1977 election and resurrected the National Conference party from the defunct Plebiscite Front. The election went well for him. The Congress party sought a new alliance with the National Conference for the 1983 election after Sheikh Abdullah's passing. Farooq Abdullah, the next leader, won the election on his own after it was once more avoided. However, Congress became the official party of the Jammu area. In order to overthrow Farooq's government, Congress collaborated with his brother-in-law, G. M. Shah, by taking advantage of the internal disputes within the National Conference. As a result, there was a time of unrest, during which the Governor's Rule was put in place.

Another agreement was made with Farooq Abdullah after Rajiv Gandhi took over as the head of the Indian National Congress. After the Governor's Rule was lifted, Farooq came back to power in 1986, but only after agreeing to work together with the National Conference and Congress to win the next election in 1987. According to academic Sten Widmalm, the two biggest parties in the state had developed an election cartel, which prevented the popular discontent from being channelled. Before the election, a number of anti-establishment organisations, notably Jamaat-e-Islami, banded together to form the Muslim United Front (MUF), with the main goal of highlighting how the NC had capitulated to the Center for the sake of power and traded away the State's unique position. There were attempts to incite Muslim sentiment on a communal level. In its electoral platform, MUF emphasised the importance of finding a Simla Agreement-compliant resolution to all unresolved issues, promoting Islamic unity, and opposing central government political meddling. Their catchphrase was that they desired the Assembly to uphold Quranic law. The MUF ran for 43 seats, whereas the NC-Congress (I) combo ran for all 76.

Voting: On March 23, 1987, the election took place. The greatest voter turnout ever recorded in the state was almost 75% of the electorate. Nearly 80% of voters in the valley cast ballots. In June 1987, elections were conducted for Bhadrawah, Leh, and Kargil.

1996 Assembly Elections

Jammu and Kashmir, held elections in September and October of that year. Following the elections, Farooq Abdullah was named C.M of Jammu and Kashmir. Due to the work of counter-insurgents like Kuka Parray, the state was able to hold both the Lok Sabha elections and the assembly elections in 1996. (Head of Ikhwan-ul-Muslemoon).

Background: After Prime Minister H. D. Deve Gowda promised Jammu and Kashmir full autonomy, the NC, which had previously refrained from the 1996 poll, eventually agreed to participate in the 1996 assembly elections. 57 of the National Conference's 86 seats. For the first time, BSP campaigned for 29 seats in the state and won 4. In 1996, the BJP gained eight seats, up from only two in 1987.

2008 Assembly Elections

In November and December 2008, the state witnessed elections over a seven-day period. When the PDP withdrew, the previous administration—led by the PDP in partnership with the INC was overthrown. The NC and the Congress formed a partnership after the election, and Omar Abdullah, the NC's leader, was appointed becoming the youngest cm of the state at 38.

Boycott: The All Parties Hurriyat Conference, the major separatist organisation in Kashmir, urged Kashmiris to abstain from voting, calling them a futile exercise that would never fulfil the aspirations of the people. Despite these requests for a boycott, NC officials asserted that Jamaat-e-Islami activists turned out to vote for the PDP. Throughout the election, there were sporadic separatist demonstrations, including many demonstrations in Srinagar. Police fired tear gas and baton charges to clear away the protestors after they hurled stones at them after they were prevented by police from marching to the city's core.

Security: Given the boycott and protest appeals from separatist leaders and the previous violence related to the Amarnath land transfer incident, Indian electoral officials expressed serious worries about the security of the polls. So that security forces could keep control, the voting was spaced out. During the election, thousands of security personnel were on duty. Security personnel were stationed at intersections, patrolled the streets, and watched over polling places in Srinagar. Neighborhoods were cordoned off by steel barricades and razor wire, gatherings of more than five individuals were prohibited, and an unofficial curfew was in effect. Additionally, three individuals were detained by police on suspicion of organising suicide strikes in Jammu with the Jaish-e-Mohammed group. One of those detained was a Pakistani Army soldier who, according to Pakistan, deserted in 2006. Farooq Abdullah, the

NC leader commended the Pakistani government for its "non-interference" in the elections after the results were announced.

Results: Despite demands for a boycott of the election from Pakistan and Kashmiri separatists, turnout increased by 17%. Sonia Gandhi, the head of the INC, called the election a triumph of Indian democracy. Supporters of the secession movement allegedly backed the PDP. According to reports, the Amarnath land transfer controversy caused polarisation, which helped the BJP gain more support and boost its seat total from 1 to 11 seats. A total of 1,354 candidates, including 517 independents and representatives from 43 political parties, filed to run for office.

Government establishment: Farooq Abdullah, a former chief minister of the National Conference, declared he did not want to run again because it needed the vigour of a younger man and proposed his son Omar Abdullah and the leader of the JKNC in his place. National Conference or the PDP were the two possible coalition partners that Congress discussed. According to rumors, if the Congress allied with them, the PDP would have supported the Congress's choice for chief minister. In order to respect the mandate of the election, PM Dr. Manmohan Singh and Congress leader Sonia Gandhi reportedly supported the largest party. Omar Abdullah will serve as the chief minister of the coalition government that Congress and the National Conference decided to assemble on December 30.

4.5. Working of National Conference and Congress Coalition Government

Introduction: The National Conference once again came out on top in the 2008 elections, but it did not garner enough seats to take over the state on its own. Due to a hung assembly after the 2008 Assembly elections, a new coalition government was required. Congress moved quickly to support the National Conference, which made it an ally in the creation of the new coalition administration. It was decided to give Omar Abdullah the position of Chief Minister for the full term after the leaders of the two political parties negotiated the details of the new coalition administration. As a result, a new era of coalition government got off to a successful start between the political partners.

2008 Assembly Elections: On December 3, 2008, the 2008 Assembly elections came to a finish. It established numerous records in numerous disciplines, making it a historically significant state election. The fact that there were 1353 candidates running for 87 Assembly

seats was noteworthy and historically significant. The 2008 elections also featured 67 female candidates and 468 independents. When it came to the Assembly elections in 1972 and 1977, the number of independent candidates was significantly larger than the overall number of candidates. The state's election timetable was made public by the Indian Election Commission on October 19, 2008. In 2008, a record breaking 61.23% of eligible voters cast ballots, making up 39.67 lakh voters in all. State Legislature election was to be held in seven phases, and candidates began their campaigns as soon as the election timetable was made public.

New Coalition Government Formation: Omar Abdullah was declared as the New CM by the new coalition allies on December 30, 2008. He was sworn in as Chief Minister on January 9, 2009, by Governor N.N. Vohra. In addition to Tara Chand, who served as deputy chief minister, the other cabinet members were Abdul Rahim Rather, Altaf Hussain, and Taj Mohi-ud- Din, S.S. Slathia, and Sham Lal Sharma. Jammu and Kashmir's Governors' Rule, which had started on July 10, 2008, was ended with the creation of the coalition government (when the Legislative Assembly was dissolved).

4.6. 2009 Lok Sabha Elections

In their united decision to run in the Lok Sabha elections in 2009, the National Conference and Congress also resolved to split the available seats. The Congress won the seats of Poonch-Jammu, Doda-Udhampur, and Leh-Kargil, while the National Conference obtained those of Srinagar-Budgam, Baramulla-Kupwara, and Anantnag-Pulwama. Dr. Farooq Abdullah, Sharif ud-Din Sharik, and Mehboob Beig, candidates for the National Conference, won these elections in the aforementioned constituencies. Jammu-Poonch and Doda-Udhampur were won by Congress candidates Madan Lal Sharma and Chowdary Lal Singh, respectively. Independent candidate Gh Hussain Khan won the Ladakh Lok Sabha seat of Leh-Kargil. Ghulam Hussain Khan did eventually join the National Conference.

Dr. Manmohan Singh was chosen as the prime minister for another term in office on May 22, 2009, among 19 other cabinet members. Gh Nabi Azad and Dr. Farooq Abdullah both received the central ministeries. Under his energising leadership, the health industry experienced a series of transformative actions envisioning health care facilities with an emphasis on extending these essential services in rural and inaccessible areas of the country. He also made an effort to modernise the health care system in Jammu & Kashmir. The state

received approval for a number of new hospitals, and the ones that already existed were upgraded with the newest medical technology. The National Cancer Control Program's approval of two tertiary Cancer Centers and four medical institutions for Jammu and Kashmir was Gh Nabi Azad's most significant accomplishment. The choice made it possible to provide patients with better and timelier healthcare, and also inspired future doctors in remote locations to pursue their further study.

4.7. Programs & Achievements of National Conference- Congress Coalition in Jammu & Kashmir (2008-2014)

Development of Agriculture Sector: The state's economy is based on agriculture, and the NC-Congress coalition made attempts to improve the agriculture and related sectors broadly during their time in office. These efforts included:

For the first time in the state, Rashtriya Krishi Vikas Yojana (RKVY) was implemented, covering all essential components and re-energizing the agrarian sector. Thus many new ventures were initiated as part of the joint venture methodology for producing biodegradable packaging. 1,300 kanals of land were placed under saffron production for the first time in non-traditional places, and at Dialgam Nursery, and hybrid vegetable seeds were being created for the first time. The largest canal in the region, Budgam's Ahaji Canal, which cost 20.51 crore to construct, also the distribution of mulberry saplings among its cultivators.

Six hundred and twenty-five minor irrigation schemes, totaling Rs. 1.02 crore, and four new major or medium irrigation projects, totalling Rs. 210.34 crore, were taken on by the NC-Congress coalition for execution under the Accelerated Irrigation Benefit Programme (AIBP-522) and NABARD. The Major and Minor Irrigation Scheme's Rajpura Lift Irrigation Scheme, which cost Rs. 63 crore to complete and has an irrigation capacity of 2, 429 acres, is a component of the scheme. Budshah Pond, Hatlangoo Pond in Sopore, and Nilnag Lake in Budgam were all restored to their full potential by two lift irrigation schemes, Rohama and Daulatchul. With a total cost of 2,705.15 crore, 19 out of 117 projects submitted to the Indian government's Flood Management Program were approved (FMP). Three projects, with respective costs of Rs. 9.81 crore, Rs. 15.66 crore, and Rs. 13.46 crore, that were presented to the Indian government under the Flood Management Programme have got investment clearance. In 2010, after a visit by the federal team, the state agreed to receive Rs 62.37 crore for the renovation of Jammu's Ravi-Tawi Canal. In order to cover thousands of female

sericulture workers in the first phase, the state government introduced a novel health insurance programme developed in partnership with ICICI Lombard. The programme envisions medical coverage worth Rs. 15, 000 per year, including prescription costs and hospital expenses, with a minimum premium of Rs. 56 to be paid by the sericulture workers and Rs. 650 as the state government's share.

Additionally, the state's livestock was improved by the government, which opened up opportunities for the next generation. The state is rich in livestock, including cattle, buffalo, sheep, goats, chickens, and other animals. Among all livestock, cattle and poultry are thought to be the most crucial in the growth of the rural economy. 900 sheep kernels are being brought into pilot bases from a Canadian organisation. At the sheep breeding farm Panthol, the skilled veterinarian has already imported and implanted 420 sheep embryos from the Dorper, Rambouillet, and Corriedeable breeds in surrogate ewes. The state and country of Kashmir receives some foreign currency via the sale of shawls and other items like carpets, shawls, and blankets. For the first time ever, SKUAST-Kashmir was able to clone a Pashmina goat named Noori using a straightforward, hand-guided cloning method. This achievement, which has received both state and national recognition, will go a long way toward paving the way for further research and enhancing the lives of those who raise Pashmina goats. As a result, the state's livestock industry has a lot of room to grow and generate quick financial gains. There is a discrepancy between supply and demand for animals. The valley has a high demand for meat and warm clothing as a result of the weather. The kind of animals that can be found in the valley cannot supply both elements in appropriate amounts. Therefore, the industry requires additional focus and incentives to achieve adequate expansion and close the supply and demand gaps.

Revenue Department: The government used a settlement method to make it easier to collect taxes that were exact and extracted, as well as to make money acquisition public. In accordance with the settlement process, measurements were finished in 2,300 villages over the past five years, and 1,800 villages had rights records made and finished. Computerized records for 800 villages have been created, and 11 modern record rooms have been finished. To fill the positions, 1,470 Patwaris were chosen. The coalition government also made a significant contribution to the state by finishing the land acquisition process for more than 50,000 canals of land under the four-land planning of the National Highway, PMGSY, and railways. The Public Service Guarantee Act was implemented for a number of Revenue Department services (PSGA).

Infrastructure for industry in the state: The efforts to support & nurture micro, small, and medium-sized businesses have shown good results, but it is challenging to compare them to the industrial growth that has occurred in other regions of the nation during a short period of time. Its worth mentioning that food processing industry has begun to produce results. In addition, the industrial census showed a 74% decrease in non-functional units over the industrial census conducted in 2001–2002. The Jammu and Kashmir Industries and Commerce Department is a key player in terms of industrial development concentrating on luring capital into the state to build world-class infrastructure in order to accomplish goals like:

- To investigate the state's resources.
- To generate industrial employment that is favorable.
- To encourage labor-intensive companies to relieve the strain on the state's job market.
- To enhance industrial performance by supplying necessary inputs in order to lessen the state's reliance on imports.

A new and comprehensive industrial policy was developed by the government in 2004 to begin a new chapter in the industrial sector. This plan was created to encourage quick industrialization. Along with outlining the benefits of establishing industrial enterprises in the state, the policy included all of the critical factors of the state's sustained industrial growth. Private investment was extremely interested in the policy. The program included a wide range subsidies and incentives for different types of enterprises, especially small scale industries, to enable them to be competitors in the market. The soft industrial policy placed a strong emphasis on private sector investment to construct world-class infrastructure, industrialize underdeveloped areas of the state, and modernize prevailing units. There have been efforts completed to certify that the policy's inducements reach real industrialists quickly. The policy's incentives were superior to those offered by other Indian states. The state is unique in as it has dual incentive policy one from state and another from the Centre.

Statutory Compendium

- 100% of the cost of new diesel generating sets is subsidized.
- A 100% subsidy on project reports and equipment for quality assurance.
- A 75% research and development subsidy.
- A 3% rebate on interest on working capital.

- A 5% interest rate reduction for technocrats on term loans.
- Special rewards for modernizing and boosting brands.
- Power and land at discounted prices.
- Imports of raw materials and exports of completed goods are exempt from toll taxes.
- Exemption from CST.
- Remission of VAT.
- An increase in stamp duties.

Central Package

*A 15% tax credit for capital investments in machinery and plant.

- A 3% rebate on interest on working capital.
- Industrial units have complete insurance coverage.
- 90% subsidy on transportation. 100 percent excise refund
- Exemption from all income taxes.

7,833 kanal were purchased for the building of 10 industrial estates and the expansion of industrial estates that already existed in several state districts. The department of commerce and industries will equip each village with industries in the state to encourage industrialization. Numerous centers, including Udyog Bhawan, Development of Clusters under Small Industries (SICOP), and action plans for both clusters had been approved by the Indian government in order to mature and grow industrial development in a realistic sense.

Growth in the Education Sector: Education is an essential component of both general and specific human resource development. It is a catalyst for progress as a whole, poverty alleviation, and empowerment. According to the recognized indicators, such as the literacy percentage, teacher-student ratio, school drop-outs, and the pattern of absorption of trained teachers and academicians, the state is classified as educationally backward. To improve education in the state, the government periodically launched a number of measures in the form of center/state support program targeted specifically at disadvantaged and backward groups of society. It is a major factor in energizing the population in the state and has wider consequences and an impact on society. The subsequent five year plans gave appropriate regard to the requirement for universal education from 06-14 because it was recognized as an

essential component of nation-building, national integration, and societal improvement. The extension of education over space, the availability of infrastructure, and the coverage of different social groups all improved as a result, but the aim of ensuring that everyone had access to a basic education remained elusive. Throughout the NC-Congress coalition's rule, the literacy rate rose to nearly 70%. The coalition took the following actions to strengthen the state's educational system:

- The state established two central institutions, two campuses north and south of Srinagar, 23 colleges, 5000 schools, 50 polytechnics, and IITs. 521 schools have received upgrades.
- A total of 16,475 educational facilities were built. 16.50 lakh pupils received mid-day meals, and 45,386 schools participated in the program annually. 3,856 masters received promotions.
- 16 polytechnics were opened and put into operation.
- 396 new jobs were created and 6 polytechnics received upgrades.
- In Industrial Training Institutes, 89 new trade units, 12 women wings, and 9 female ITIs were all introduced.
- At Hajan, Banihal, Gurez Khori, and Nowshera, six contemporary industrial training institutes were created.
- The upgrade of 39 Industrial Training Institutes is being considered. About 12,000 children received training outside the state in a variety of disciplines.
- 26,633 educated adolescents without jobs were given jobs in educational departments.
- 2,521 primary schools were refurbished, and 5,480 new ones were opened.
- 526 middle schools received a high school grading.
- 16,475 buildings were built, including 9,932 kitchen sheds, 367 intermediate schools, 2,300 primary school buildings, and 3,231 more classrooms.
- In addition to creating 540 call centres, construction of around 50 KGBs, 105 Block Resource Centres, and 564 Cluster Resource Centres was completed.
- 246 sanitary blocks were built in schools, while 168 high and higher secondary schools received repairs and renovations.

- For modernized schools, 7, 000 new positions were created.
- Construction of a new Polytechnic college on BGSBU Rajouri campus.
- The opening of polytechnic institutes in state unincorporated areas and the construction of positions in several categories.
- New programmes including the Beti Anmol Schemes, the Rahtriya Madhumik Shiksha Abhiyan, and the Saakshar Bharat Mission 2012 were introduced in the state.
- The state had tremendous increases in female literacy from 43% to 58% between 2001 and 2011, as well as overall literacy, which rose from 50.52% to 68.74%.
- Both the Central Universities of Jammu and Kashmir are currently operational; 3,321 kanals of land were allocated to the higher education department for the construction of the CUK Ganderbal, and 3,000 kanals of land were allocated to the construction of the Central University of Jammu. The Kashmir University has offered several career-focused courses.

4.8. NC-Congress Coalition Employment Policies: Achievements and Policies

In their respective 2008 election manifestos, the NC-Congress coalition administration promised to end the state's unemployment issues by opening up new work opportunities for the educated youth. The National Conference acknowledged that the issue is disturbing and that it needs to be handled delicately and quickly in its page 7 of election manifestos. We vow that we would look into all options for their meaningful employment locally, nationally, and abroad, it said. We will give them maintenance payments up to that time, similar to how "Social Security" is offered in certain other nations. The Sher-i-Kashmir Work and the Welfare Programme for the Youth (SKEWPY), which aims to provide employment opportunities and facilitate skill up gradation among the state's youth, was introduced by the coalition led by Omar Abdullah. The Voluntary Service Allowance for educated and unemployed youth was one of the most significant features of this policy. The District Employment Corporation, which was created to oversee the operation of all employment-related organisations, had replaced the formerly known as Employment Exchanges with an updated name. On the one hand, the government had pledged to expedite the hiring process via recruiting firms. Chief Minister Omar Abdullah declared that creating jobs in the state was the coalition administration's top goal and he also pledged a quick hiring

process for educated young people in government positions.

To address the issues with unemployment in the states, both the state and the union government initiated a number of other activities. The most significant were the 2007 launches of the Umed Scheme and the Himayat Programme. The state with help from the national government. Under the Himayat Scheme in the state, one lakh youth were to receive jobs. Chief Minister Omar Abdullah emphasized the significance of keeping this out of all interventions and influences by making individual merit the only criterion for picking qualified youth, supporting the Himayat project as the suitable approach to alleviate the state's job crisis. The Chief Minister has highlighted employability improvement and skill development as crucial components of providing young people in Jammu and Kashmir with work possibilities outside the public sector. The Youth Programme (SKEWPY) and the Himayat Programs have been introduced in an effort to realise this ambitious goal.

In the state, the Umeed Scheme was also introduced for the benefit of women. It had a significant impact on women's empowerment, particularly for those living in rural areas. For others who were struggling to make ends meet, this led to a newfound sense of joy and renewed optimism. In terms of offering financial support to abandoned and defenseless women who had had several horrifying injuries as a result of the state's conflicted situation, catering to women turned out to be the most successful strategy. SKEWPY sparked the state's youth's dormant desire for entrepreneurship. In the fight against the prospect of unemployment, they were made equal partners with the government. The government is more determined than ever to launch SKEWPY-II in the upcoming years if they continue to hold power as a result of the huge response and success stories of SKEWPY. The successful Phase-I businesses would be encouraged to expand their operations under the new plan by receiving the open, financial, and technical assistance of the government and its agencies. With the great help of the business community and corporate America, UDAAN has been able to close the skill-employability gap among educated young.

The coalition government has achieved the following in the area of employment: Three thousand entrepreneurship units have been developed, creating an additional seventy thousand jobs, and forty thousand people are receiving skill-upgrading training. One lakh jobs have been made available for young people. 20, 348 RETs, 10,000 physicians, specialists, and paramedics were hired in the health sector. 266, 633 educated unemployed youth were employed in 7, 000 new roles for improved Education. In order to give 13, 000 young people jobs, around 3000 industrial units were established under SKEWPY. 10, 964

young people were served by the District Employment Counseling Center's 141 job fairs and 301 counseling sessions (DECC). 374 young people received unemployment compensation totaling 87 crores under Voluntary Services Allowance Scheme 52, creating 50 man-days of employment under MGNREGA.

Plans for Udaan and Himayat: Over the course of five years, 40,000 youths received training aimed at integrating them into the private employment market. More than 61,000 graduate students from Jammu and Kashmir are expected to be unskilled and employed through the pledges of 36 corporate/private organisations and seven public sector organisations. Currently, 200 candidates are undergoing training with various corporate organisations, and 1070 candidates have completed their training. In the corporate sector, there were about 550 applicants who received employment offers. Top private companies including Yes Bank are working together to deploy Udaan. Similar to this, youth were given training and jobs in the private sector through the Himayat programme. About 300 manufacturing facilities were established as part of SKEWPY to employ 13,000 young people. 15,479 entrepreneurs have received loans through the recently launched Youth Startup Loan Scheme were established, and the state government gave financial assistance of Rs. 141.93 crores, leading to the creation of jobs for 63,462 people.

The coalition government also considered sixth pay commission's decision in favour of employees to be a significant accomplishment. The cabinet also approved the historic Public Service Guarantee Act (PGSA) for Jammu & Kashmir. Omar Abdullah established a top-level Monitoring Cell in the GAD to oversee the appropriate execution of the PGSA and routinely assessed the benefits of the Act's application throughout the state. Posts in newly established districts were also given approval by the State Cabinet.

Youth Skill Development: The government launched an ambitious initiative to provide young people with the necessary training and skills for gainful employment in order to increase the employability of educated youth. In order to promote tourism, trade, and brand investments in Jammu and Kashmir, a task force was established in partnership with the Confederation of Indian Industries. University of Kashmir to offer a variety of information technology skills in state colleges.

Health Services: Through a network of public health institutions, the state had been working continuously to deliver preventative care that was acceptable to all of the state's residents as

well as accessible, inexpensive, and readily available. The most significant area of social services is health, which is closely related to societal well-being. As a result, it occupies a significant space in the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals. In recent years, the Department of Health, a government priority area, achieved impressive strides, but there was still much work to be done to reach the top. Although the state had its own unique limitations, such as a low population density, a problem with accessibility due to the terrain, and a partial occurrence of the private sector, NGOs and the existing private sector were primarily owned and run by doctors who were currently practicing medicine. Nevertheless, over the past ten years, the state's health indices have improved. This was only achievable because of ongoing efforts and commitment to developing this industry. A sizable network of healthcare organisations has grown throughout time. 2012's state conclave honored the chief minister, Omar Abdullah, for improving the state's healthcare system. A total of Rs. 232.65 crore was allocated for plan investment in the health sector for the 2012–13 fiscal years; moreover, Rs. 270.76 crore had been set aside for the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM).

Access to Safe Drinking Water: In all three regions of the state, various efforts were undertaken to ensure that people had access to safe drinking water, in urban and rural areas. The government gave it top importance because it was a lifeline for the people, and the following actions were done in this regard:

With a daily capacity of 54 lakh gallons, Sitlee Jammu's third input filtration facility is now complete. In Jammu urban, the commissioning of 25 new tube wells with ERA will add almost 30 lakh gallons of water daily. Lar water projects were finished and put into service in Ganderbal and WSS Manigam, adding 5 lakh gallons of water daily to the 5 lakh gallon capacity filtration facility had been finished and put into operation, adding 5 lakh gallons of water daily to the Ganderbal Town and Fatehpura areas.

In Barsoo, Awantipora, and Shalpora, a water delivery scheme with a daily capacity of 2 lakh gallons was finished and put into service. The Arizal-Zehinpora Budgam filtration facility has a daily capacity of 1.5 gallons. After 20 years, a filtration facility at Batpora Kunzar with a daily capacity of 5 lakh gallons was reopened. Safe drinking water was made available to 28 lakh people, 30 lakh gallons per day were added to the system in Jammu, and one crore gallons of water were made available to 5,000 schools. Additionally, 1050 water supply schemes, 10,000 hand pumps, 45 treatment plants, and 169 others were still under construction.

As part of the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission, the WSS Tangnar, which cost Rs. 148 crore, and WSS Sukhnag, which cost Rs. 120 crore, was being built in Srinagar (JNURM). A total of Rs. 6,029.99 lakh was used to pay for these projects. The Jammu and Kashmir Water Resource Regularization and Management Act 2010 was passed as a complete piece of law. The Water Resources Regularization Authority was established by this act to ensure the wise and effective use of water resources in the state. As a result, power firms operating in the state paid out Rs. 131.53 crores under this Act.

Energy initiatives: On September 29, 2009, National Hydro-Projects Corporation (NHPC) executive director Omar Abdullah and Union Power Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde officially declared the 120 MW SEWA-II hydropower projects in Jammu's Basholi Belt operational. The electricity produced by these outstanding projects was intended to help Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, and Chandigarh in addition to residents of the state. The NHPC built the project for Rs. 1,061 crore, and it took 7 years to finish. The state corporation, which can generate at least 1200 MW, undertook the Doda-Sawalakote Hydro-Projects I and II. The state power development company undertook the lower Kalnai Power Project, which has a capacity of 50 MW, and a joint venture project between JKSPDC, NHPC, and PTC Projects in Progress undertook the Rattle Hydroelectric Project, which has a capacity of 690 MW. Since these projects are intended to facilitate others, a drive and focus have been created for their completion and beginning.

Other Power Generation Sources: It was decided to build a 1,000 MW thermal power plant, and coal blocks were being constructed. Families living in remote, non-electrified areas received about 37,700 solar home light sets. With the Union Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, a Memorandum of Understanding was inked to enhance power generation in Leh and Kargil by 5,000 MW.

The tourism department's science and technology division undertook a large number of modest power initiatives. Tourism may play a significant role in the preservation of cultural heritage, intellectual growth, emotional stability, and moral development in addition to enhancing the state's economy. Despite setbacks over the previous 20 years, the coalition administration started taking a number of actions for review. State had developed a specific package for the revival and development of tourism in the valley, which had remained the mainstay of more than 30% of its population. It had started a number of initiatives for the resurgence and expansion of tourism. Soft loans were made available for the revival of

privately owned tourism businesses like houseboats, and outright investment subsidies were made available for the construction of well-liked businesses in less well-known regions of the state. A tourism-related plan called for setting up familiarization trips for department employees, travel brokers, journalists, and tool operators as well as enticing well-known TV networks to film their programmes in Kashmir.

The state government has sought the Ministry of External Affairs to order all Indian embassies to spread information about the altered situation in Kashmir. They then had to get in touch with foreign embassies in various nations to tell their citizens to plan a stop in Kashmir when travelling to India. The state legislature passed the Jammu and Kashmir Registration of Tourists Trade Act. As a result, the employees of the tourism department were given magisterial authority, including the ability to compound in cases of tourist fraud, overcharging, harassment, and other forms of intrusive behavior. Additionally, the department unveiled certain vacation packages. This era saw the completion of sixty (60) of the 79 tourist locations and circuit development projects that the Indian government had approved for funding, totaling Rs. 366.33 crore. In April 2011, the administration updated the incentive rule packages and improved their appeal. This adjustment was anticipated to promote private sector investment in the tourism industry, which is crucial for the lodging and transportation of tourists.

To preserve and restore the largest freshwater lake in Asia, the Wular Conservation Authority was created. Starting in 2012, this project was executed in five stages. In addition, Rakh-i-infrastructure Arth's development cost Rs. 416.00 crore. The Surinsar and Mansar water bodies' surroundings now have a fresh new look thanks to the construction of the tourism infrastructure. Additionally, the government received two projects worth Rs. 9.38 crore from the Indian government, which were approved and were currently being implemented. These projects were expected to develop high-end tourist infrastructure at these tourist spots. About 80 000 people were employed as a result of tourism, 40 000 of whom were direct beneficiaries and the remaining indirect ones. In programmes related to hotel management, 5,232 youngsters were trained. In the previous five years, an average of 10 lakh tourists per year were recorded, while the number of pilgrim tourists every year was in the neighbourhood of one crore. In the state, 87 tourism-related development projects were approved and started. The Nagar Nagar Mega Project was started, and Mubarak Mandi conservation efforts were intensified. The Jammu-Mahamaya-Shahbad Cable Car Project is now planning to include Mubarak Mandi. Leh's Trans Himalayan Center got underway. It

was established the J&K Golf Development and Management Authority. The Makhdoom Sahib Ropeway project and the Kongdoori-Mary Shoulder Ski Chairlift in Gulmarg have both been finished. At a cost of Rs. 15 crore. For Mata Sukrala Devi and Mata Balasundri, shrine boards have been erected. The state experienced an increase in tourists that exceeded 10 lakh annually between 2012 and 2013.

Table 4.17.1 below shows the number of tourists who have visited over the previous six years (2009-2014)

Year	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Domestic	4,51,869	5,47,434	8,66,341	111,97,983	10,17,190	36,993
Foreign	23,636	26,450	32,217	38,958	33,159	1603
Total	4,75,505	5,73,884	8,98,558	12,36,941	10,51,349	38, 596

Source: JKTDC, <https://www.jktdc.co.in/>

During this time, there was a spectacular rise in the number of people visiting the Shri Mata Vaishnov Devi Shrine. Effective steps were implemented to control the Shri Amarnath Ji Yatra in accordance with Supreme Court directives, and as a result, fewer yatry fatalities were reported in 2013 than in 2012 during that year.

Forests: The stability of the environment and the ecological balance are two things that forests help to maintain. 5123 hectares of degraded forest land had been selected for treatment in 2012–13 under the Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management and Planning Authority (CAMPA). In addition, the CAMPA led to the establishment of 143 Forest Nurseries across the state. For the purpose of satisfying the legitimate timber needs of the populace, 801 sale depots were established around the state. By streamlining the requirements for the registration of selling depots, imports of timber were promoted in an effort to close the supply-demand mismatch. The numerous strategies for the defence and administration of forests are precisely specified and recognized under the state's 2011 Forests Policy. It has evolved into one of the nation's most progressive policies. The state's government adopted a forest policy that placed a strong emphasis on preserving biological diversity and natural

habitats, restoring damaged forests, and preventing denudation and soil erosion in catchments. For the purpose of conserving Asia's largest freshwater lake, the Wular Conservation Management Authority was established (Wular Lake).

Ecotourism revival: 23 Gama units were Forests to safeguard the bounty of the forests. Along with a tissue culture lab in Srinagar, research facilities have been developed in Ladakh, Jammu, and Gurez. The Geographic Information System and remote sensing (GIS) Environment parks have been created at Kajipora Kangan, Bhawani Nagar Jammu, Nowshera Rajouri, and Marigam Ganderbal at an estimated cost of 6 crores, while work has already begun on an environment park at Arigutan-Kulgam.

Decentralised Governance: Institutions of the Panchayati Raj in the state: The election for panchayats were conducted in 1998, some 20 years after they had last taken place, and for the first time since the state's 1990s political unrest began. After 23 years, the National Conference government held Panchayat elections in 2001 using a secret ballot rather than the hand-raising method used in previous elections. The Panchayats chosen in 2001 served their terms until May or June 2006. But after 2002, the coalition administration made no attempt to put the Panchayati Raj Act of 1989 into effect. The coalition government repeatedly attempted to dissolve the validly elected Panchayats rather than enhancing the Panchayati Raj system. Despite fierce resistance from the National Conference Party, the coalition government sponsored and approved a law in the legislature. The law sought to give the government the authority to dissolve validly elected Panchayats. The National Conference party succeeded in persuading the Governor to withhold his approval, preventing the bill from becoming a law.

Panchayati elections were agreed upon by the state administration. Elections for the Panchayati Raj were held from 14 March 2011 to 27 June 2011. 4082 Sarpanches and 28, 253 Panches were chosen, with a 77.71% average turnout at the state level. The government established a committee with the Chief Secretary as its head to lay forth a plan for the state's Panchayati Raj Institutions' empowerment and offer advice on other related issues. The committee carefully considered the matter related to its mandate and held numerous meetings and discussions with officials and other specialists, following careful consideration of numerous issues and discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of the Panchayati Raj in Jammu and Kashmir. The State Panchayat Election Commission will be in charge of

supervising, directing, and controlling the creation of the electoral rolls under the terms of this amendment act to the Panchayati Raj institutions. 25 On March 5, 2014, the Panchayat Ombudsmen Bill was sanctioned by state Assembly. The bill that established ombudsmen to look into corruption and poor management in state PRI's. The Minister for Rural Development and Panchayat moved the bill. The purpose of the law was to increase accountability and openness in the way elected Panchayat representatives in Jammu and Kashmir carry out their duties. The government mandated the devolution of the three Fs—Functions, Functionaries, and Finance—to the Panchayats in order to make them effective functional units of democracy at the local level and provide every person a voice in the state's governance and Rural Development and Poor People's Welfare

The coalition administration developed a number of programmes and schemes, including the Villages, to lower the rate of poverty among the ruling masses. The coalition government also took the following measures:

As of September 2009, 208 lakh man days were produced under NREGA, and 58 lakh work cards were distributed. By the end of 2009, 22, 425 of the 28, 473 residences that had been occupied under IAY had been finished at a cost of 45 crores. 119 villages were supported by the Prime Minister's Reconstruction Plan for Rs 142.80 crore.

In an effort to end poverty, a number of social welfare programmes were launched to help the state's poorest citizens, widows, and orphans by providing them with food and cash support. Numerous initiatives were made in an effort to ensure the advancement of the underprivileged and backward segments of society. The Indian government approved 3,094 new Anganwadi Centers as part of the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDSS) Program (AWCs). A total of 7 lakh beneficiaries—children aged 6 months to 72 months, pregnant women, and breastfeeding mothers—received supplemental nourishment. Additionally, 105 prisoners residing in 24 Bal- Ashrams received free boarding and lodging as part of a determined effort to universalize the Integrated Child Development Scheme. 400 inmates who had been registered in the 12 Nari-Niketans of the state received free boarding and lodging. 1,425 inmates received free boarding and accommodation by enrolling in 16 Gujjar and Bakerwal dormitories. Pre-matriculating scholarships had been offered to over 2 lakh members of the Gujjar and Bakerwal communities, and post-matriculating scholarships had been given to about 800 members of the ST community. For inmates of Bal Ashram, Nari Niketan, Blind Homes, Hostels for Gujjar and Bakerwal, and Pahari-speaking

individuals, the state government increased the diet rate fees by 100%. The rate of scholarship has also increased by almost 75%.

Creation of fresh administrative divisions

Given that Jammu and Kashmir has not yet fully recovered from the disruptive and damaging effects of more than two decades of political unrest, decentralisation is essential for structural reform that cannot be undermined by temporary political considerations, circumstances, partnerships, or political myopia. The decentralisation will enable the state administration to concentrate more on four essential conditions for good governance:

Delegating authority to the levels closest to the people; giving local units of government the right duties in providing services through welfare and development programmes;

Building government for the people at the most transparent and local level, guaranteeing stronger local accountability, transparency, and assimilation of local feedback there would be a significant improvement in institutional and organisational capability in the areas of health care, reducing poverty, building agricultural infrastructure, and other sectors.

A committee led by former Chief Secretary S.S. Brila was established by the government in 2007 to gather information on the public's wishes for additional administrative entities. The Bloria Committee report, though, was unresolved in 2009. The committee was reactivated in January 2010 with Mushtaq Ahmad Ganie as its chairman. The committee had delivered its findings to the government on July 14, 2011, and the revenue department was then instructed to draught a proposal after carefully reviewing the committee's suggestions so that the cabinet could make a final decision. In order to get a comprehensive understanding of the whole situation, it was decided to ask the revenue department for more information when the draught was presented to the cabinet in January 2012. It would eventually be necessary to create more administrative divisions in order to further decentralise revenue and expenditure in accordance with regional duties and practical considerations. The idea that fiscal decentralisation will reduce losses in expenditure and a tax collection is supported by hundreds of case studies. The results of localising revenue and expenditure operations can have a big impact on the state government's finances. Comparatively to instances of insufficient decentralisation, decentralising capital expenditures is connected with improved fiscal balances. Fiscal accountability is a basic idea of decentralisation and is largely acknowledged in administrative history to be one of the most positive outcomes of the

creation of new administrative units. Jammu and Kashmir should have around 659 new administrative units created, according to a recommendation that was approved by the state cabinet on February 2, 2014.

Urban Planning: The government became aware of the need to improve urban amenities in both urban centres and rural areas. Under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), the government is conducting numerous projects and rebuilding the local infrastructure in the state capital cities in response to the pressures brought on by people moving from rural to urban areas. Below Urban The state's Infrastructure Development Scheme for Small and Medium Towns (UIDSSMT) has been implemented in a number of other cities. Additionally, Srinagar City's sewerage project, estimated to cost Rs. 132.92 crore, was being carried out by the National Building Construction Corporation (NBCC). Construction of sewerage treatment facilities with a 27 MLD (Million Liters per Day) capacity at Bhagwati Nagar in Jammu and a 60 MLD capacity at Noorbagh in Srinagar was another significant move the coalition administration had done. The coalition of the state for urban development has also taken the following actions:

- The Kashmir division's towns of Anantnag, Baramulla, Sopore, Kupwara, and Ganderbal received funding from UIDSSMT totaling Rs. 401 crore.
- The state implemented an online system for registering births and deaths.
- The application for building permits was made available online.
- A new e-tendering system was launched.

Several laws were passed in the state for urban development, including the Municipalities the Municipal Ombudsmen Act 2010, the Manual of Employment Scavengers and Humane Facilities Act and the Property Right to Slum Dwellers Act.

- The Srinagar/Jammu Municipal Co-operation was informed about the building of byways.
- Talaab Tilo Sewerage Treatment Plant in Jammu was opened at around Rs. 34.28 crores; 20 Community/Town Halls in two major cities and other towns are being built at a cost of approximately Rs. 1.6 billion
- LAWDA put into operation 7 Sewerage Treatment Plants (STPs), providing the Dal Lake neighborhood's homes with a much-needed sewer network.

•The following steps were determined to be necessary to be implemented in order to accomplish the rapid development in the urban sector:

- The state might create elaborate, integrated plans for urban area development, including sectoral, district, and zonal plans and layouts.
- To fulfil the rising demand, the private sector can get involved in the delivery of urban services.
- In order to access the practical element of pricing, the ideas of user-pay, abuser-pay, and polluter-pay could be implemented when establishing the service prices.
- The state administration may launch some initiatives with outside funding to improve sanitation and water supply.
- To address the rising need for housing facilities in metropolitan areas, more emphasis might be placed on the creation of housing cooperatives.
- The state government might give urban transportation the attention it deserves and develop a transportation plan that is reasonably priced, environmentally and fuel-efficient, financially viable, and offers accessible and reasonable mobility to all demographic groups.

Good Governance: The term good governance has gained popularity in recent years and has captured the public's attention. It has also developed become a key tenet in assessing a state's capacity to ratify broadly recognized democratic norms. A crucial prerequisite for progress is good governance. A large part of this is due to standards of governance. Various nations that are relatively comparable in terms of their natural resources and social systems have exhibited remarkably diverse results in enhancing the wellbeing of the people. Development always suffers in nations with high levels of corruption, bad management of public funds, a lack of accountability, violations of human rights, and strong military power. The way in which authority is used to manage a nation's social and economic resources is referred to as governance. The Jammu and Kashmir Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 2010, has been passed to discourage public employees from investing ill-gotten income in Benami Transactions and to strengthen the teeth of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The first state Chief Information Commissioner (CIS) was chosen and appointed by the government in 2009. In order to make the State Accountability Commission an effective instrument for detecting corruption, its duty was redefined on December 13, 2002. The state

vigilance was also being established at the time. Field trips by the police at the local level had become required. To oversee daily operations in Jammu and Kashmir following the Darbar-Move, winter and summer secretariats had been created. They began operating in Jammu and Kashmir, respectively, to listen to complaints and address issues encountered by common people. To ensure that different programmes are completed on schedule, the monitoring mechanisms have been reinforced. The Grievance Redressal Cell (Awaz-e-Awam) of the Chief Minister's office was established with the goal of quickly resolving the problems of the general people. It was a website for tracking complaints. The complaints are sent to the relevant administrative departments for resolution within a set time frame. A change to the Jammu and Kashmir Act was made as another step toward effective administration.

In order to upsurge accountability and clearness in the administration, the Kashmir RTI Act was brought up to par with the Central Act. The modified act gave citizens a legally required way to get information from government agencies. Under the statute, public information officers have also been named. Other actions were being taken to enhance service delivery in a transparent and effective manner. These projects are hoped to make a substantial contribution to the e-government mission's successful execution and the building of good governance in the state.

The Right to Information Act 2009: The freedoms to information act's main goals are to empower citizens, advance transparency and accountability in governmental operations, fight bribery. The Jammu and Kashmir RTI Act 2009 is being acknowledged as a fresh institution that is forceful in promoting transparency and accountability in the state. The RTI organization has given young, educated activists more capacity to monitor government-funded development projects and spot flaws and shortcomings in these initiatives. In actuality, this process had already begun, and the activists were actively requesting information from the RTI and demanding to know the current status of these endeavors. The RTI has been referred to by the youth activists as The Way to Healing. The excitement created by the RTI shows that societal hopelessness and despair have given birth to a fresh and good transformation. In this regard, the RTI Commissioner has been planning campaigns and lectures to inform the general public on the use and effectiveness of RTI in promoting transparency and strengthening governmental operations. However, the increased levels of fervour and knowledge The RTI is certain to bring about radical changes in the state's governance and administrative efficiency.

Research & Development: It is widely acknowledged that science and technology can be a powerful weapon for advancing and bolstering economies and social development. Over the years, Jammu and Kashmir has made major advancements in a variety of scientific and technological fields, and today it can be proud of its extensive network of scientific and technological institutions, skilled labour force, and cutting-edge knowledge base. Some important accomplishments in this area include:

- a. The first-ever Agriculture Science Congress, which took place from July 28 to 30, 2011, at Shar-i-Kashmir University of Agricultural Science & Technology (SKUAST) in Kashmir.
- b. Hosted a variety of scientific-popularization events, including exhibitions, discussions, public lectures, and science competitions, to raise awareness of the value of science and technology.
- c. Kashmir University hosted the 6th Science Congress, which was sponsored by the Department of Science & Technology of the Government of India and has as its main theme Science Technology and Sustainable Development.
- d. The University of Jammu hosted the 7th Science Congress in 2011. There were about 600 delegates present, both from within and beyond the state.
- e. The Innovative Science Teacher Awards new programme was unveiled. Projects for Research and Development approved for starting research programmes in the state.
- g. Scholarships of Rs. 1.71 lakhs (first instalments) were given to 92 deserving students at the 10+2 and PG levels for studying science.
- h. Four experts from various state research and development (R&D) institutions received partial financial support to facilitate for them to travel abroad to national and international scientific conferences and give presentations of their research.
- i. Four degree colleges in the state received Rs. 20.00 Lakhs for the introduction of biotechnology and the upgrading of biotechnology laboratories (two for Kashmir and two for Jammu).
- j. A new programme for upgrading school science labs in underserved areas was launched, and during 2011–12, 18 schools (six from each region) were covered. The Jammu and Kashmir Young Scientist Award's monetary value was raised from \$10,000 to \$ 20,000, and the number of prizes was increased from five to ten.

k. As part of the Skill Up gradation of Biotechnology-Youth programme, Baba Ghulam Shah Badshah University in Rajouri sponsored four-month training programmes in biomedical engineering, which fifteen students attended. Forty students received a year of training in bio-informatics as part of this programme.

E- Governance & IT: The quality of service was improved and the operation of these departments was made more transparent through initiatives like e-tendering and e-procurement. This programme enhanced the Common Service Center Schemes (CSCs), often referred to as Khidmat Centers in the state, and assisted in the expeditious provision of services including ration cards, state-subject certificates, death and birth certificates, driving licences, and revenue papers. Under the National e-Government Plan, the State Wide Area Network (SWAN) Initiative is a significant core infrastructure project (NeGP). SWAN seeks to create a secure network with 174 Points of Presence (Pops) at state, district, and block administrative centres. SWAN will make it possible for departments and offices to communicate vertically and horizontally, doing away with the necessity for e-services or the general public. The state cabinet made a crucial step when it moved a motion to require all companies submitting bids for this significant IT infrastructure project to collaborate with a local company from Jammu and Kashmir. The connectivity partner for this project, which is BSNL, PGCL, etc., was also chosen by the IT department. By 2011, this project had cost Rs. 26 lakhs. The state administration prepared to expedite e-governance efforts within the state. The State Data Center (SDC) was opened in Jammu in April 2014. Under the National e-Government Plan, Community information centres' primary goal is to spread knowledge in rural regions and aid in closing the digital gap at the local level. It is predicated on an independent, revenue-producing model. For the 2011–12 fiscal years, a sum of Rs. 224.40 lakhs was made available for the payment of CIC operators' honoraria. Other information technology programmes and projects were started, advancing e-governance and speeding up the processing of work plans while bringing technology to the people. The UID (Adhar) Project, the Biometric Attendance System (BAS), the creation of IT parks, the local area network (LAN), the computerised personal information system (CPIS), the grievance monitoring cell, e-procurement, and video conferencing facilities are a few of the significant projects the coalition government has undertaken for mass development.

Growth in the Ladakh Region: All 3 regions of the state were intended to experience equitable growth, according to the National Conference-Congress coalition. In order to

support development initiatives in Jammu and Ladakh, the Jammu and Kashmir government approved Rs. 690 crore in money from the state plan for these regions. In addition to Jammu and Kashmir, Ladakh also received Rs. 45 crore from the NC-Congress coalition government's "bad pocket" fund. Up until March 2013, Rs. 690 crore was allocated to the two regions. In order to evaluate the sole evolving desires of the regions, recommend solutions for addressing them, and assess the allocations to the regions in terms of infrastructural demands, the Government of India established two special task teams for Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh in 2010. The Special Task Force teams travelled to Ladakh and Jammu to learn more about the actual conditions and needs in the two regions. They then recommended short-term development initiatives for the two areas totaling Rs. 915 crore. Jammu will cost Rs. 496.63, Ladakh Rs. 189.19, and Kargil Rs. 229.82 crore. There were no distinct financing sources available for these projects, and the whole Special Task Force recommended that money come from the state plan. As a result, Ladakh received a sizable portion of governmental funding during this time. During the NC-Congress era, construction on the 14.1 km tunnel at Zojila and the 6.5 km tunnel at Z-Mohr both began.

Empowerment through Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council (LAHDC): The P.V. Narsimha Rao administration approved a law in 1995 authorising the creation of the LAHDC. The Act gives the state government the authority to choose the number of seats and the jurisdiction of each constituency, as specified in the Act's schedule, pursuant to Section 5. Elections were held, and on September 3, 1995, the first council (for Leh) was sworn in. Regarding the council, these are filled by the representatives selected directly from territorial constituencies using adult suffrage. The council had the authority to allocate, use, and occupy land (including all waste land, but excluding land designated as forest), to create and review progress and development programmes for the district, to promote the languages and cultures of the region, and to manage unmarked forested land. The council has a wide range of tax payment and collection rights, including those for grazing, commerce, transportation, entertainment, and roads. The coalition government of the state made an effort to give the council additional authority and make it a more autonomous body. By creating the LAHDC and the Leh District in 1995, the state government was able to address the requirements of the area, greatly enabling it to allow the Ladakhi people to determine the region's course of development, which has long been a concern of theirs. Additionally, the LAHDC received increased authority from the Mufti government. The council was given increased authority over finances and administration. Although the Darjeeling Hill Development Council was

where the idea for a hill council was originally realised, it was introduced in Kargil in 2003. The Kargil District was brought under the jurisdiction of the Autonomous Hill Development Council for the area's substantial development thanks in large part to the efforts of the then-coalition administration led by Mufti. In July 2003, the Kargil Hill Council was established. By promoting transparency and accountability in the district administration, the Hill Council is working to ensure rapid monitoring of the construction projects.

Policy on Rehabilitation: Rehabilitating migrants from Kashmir, providing them with housing, jobs, and scholarships. Due to armed strife, some 55,000 pandit households have been forced to abandon their homes since 1989. Since that time, they have made their homes in Delhi (19,338 households), Jammu (34,878 families), and various other states or regions of India. Instead of providing the Kashmiri migrants with long-term rehabilitation outside the valley, the administration has chosen to create the conditions that would make it easier for them to come back to Kashmir. As a result, the state government has been offering relief to 15,045 qualified households living in the Jammu region by distributing dry rations and monetary assistance. Families in need received financial assistance from the National Capital Territory of Delhi's administration as well. The Indian Prime Minister announced the building of 5,242 two-room tenements during his visit to the state in November 2004 in an effort to better the living circumstances of families in the Jammu region. In Jammu's Parkhoo, Muthi, and Nagrota neighbourhoods, 1, 024 flats had been built and were now occupied by households. Dr. Manmohan Singh unveiled a Rs. 1,618.40 crore package during his visit to the state on April 25–26, 2008, with the intention of helping the repatriation and rehabilitation of Kashmiri migrants. The principal elements of the bundle were as follows:

For the restoration and reconstruction of entirely or partially destroyed homes, each family would receive assistance of Rs. 5 lakh. Assistance of Rs. 2 lakh per family is given for abandoned and decaying homes. The qualified students received assistance for professional studies under the Rehabilitation Council of Jammu and Kashmir's programme. It had been agreed to offer positions in state government services to educated migrant youth as well as financial aid (grants and loans) to the unemployed to help them start their own businesses after receiving vocational training.

They were saved by the Jammu and Kashmir administration, which offered job benefits to Kashmiri Pandits who remained in the valley and did not leave. The suggestion to increase incentives included in the prime minister's package for the repatriation and

rehabilitation of Kashmiri migrants was recommended by the state cabinet. The Prime Minister's package also included additional agricultural holdings and orchard restoration.

Rehabilitation Guidelines for Militancy-Affected Individuals and Compensation for Victims
Both the state and federal governments had previously implemented a number of measures, the costs of which were covered by the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme of the federal government, to provide ex-gratia compensation. Announcement also includes the following clauses in an effort to offer victims of militant-related violence more comprehensive relief:

- a) a one-time payment of Rs. 5 lakhs in cash in lieu of employment to the victims' relatives.
- b) Increasing the widows' pension from 500 to 750 per month.
- c) All orphans without parental support are given financial aid for their schooling.

The Rehabilitation Policy, which the state cabinet authorised in November 2010 after receiving approval from the federal government, was created to make it easier for ex-militants from Jammu and Kashmir who crossed into Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to come home. About 4.5 crore rupees were donated by the state. With a particular focus on widows, orphans, and the disabled, the Rehabilitation Council works toward the physical, and mental disorders and financial rehabilitation of militant victims. People with disabilities, and the elderly whose primary breadwinners were killed or rendered incapable as a result of militancy. Under the rehabilitation policy introduced in 2010, the state government only cleared 12 cases of former militants who were prepared to return to Kashmir from across the LOC. The administration did not plan for widespread amnesty but rather for rehabilitation, and youth who return under this programme will not be entitled to any of the special advantages and rewards. Victims were advised by the state government that once the pertinent parts of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were modified, the Victim Compensation Schemes 2013 would take effect. The programme aimed to give money to crime victims for their treatment, follow-up care, rehabilitation, etc. In September 2013, changes were made to the amount of compensation that would be paid to victims or their dependents under the scheme.

Strengthening Weaker Sections: By establishing its policies in the framework of a government of, by, and for the people, the coalition administration went out to the grassroots. For the improvement and welfare of the tribal populations and the state's oppressed citizens, various steps were taken. Various scholarship programmes are being implemented to

encourage education among kids from the weaker groups, including SC, ST, OBC, physically challenged people, and minorities. In accordance with the pre-matric scholarship programme, Rs. 1.54 crore had been invested. Under the programme, scholarships totaling Rs 6.78 crore were awarded to 17, 200 students and 79, 000 Pahari-speaking pupils. 2 lakh students from various minorities received more than 32 crore rupees in funding. The post-matric scholarship programme gave 2, 000 physically challenged students, as well as those who fell into the OBC and SC categories, a total of Rs. 9.9 crore. The advisory council for the development of Gujjar and Bakerwals ran 19 hostels with a total capacity of 1,575 guests. Six boys' hostels are operated by the state's advisory body for the development of Pahari-speaking people. At the pre- and post-matric levels, scholarships were awarded to 1,500 members of the Pahari community must attend to the unique requirements for the state's development of SCs and STs. To create the SC/ST plans for 2012–2013, the government hired consultants. Additionally, a specific cell had been running to keep tabs on the execution of the SC and ST plans.

Amnesty offered to stone pelters: According to the Amnesty Scheme for Youth Involved in Stone-Peling Occurrences, which was announced in August 2010 for such incidents, 1,811 people involved in 230 such cases between 2010 and 2011 received amnesty. Of these cases, 228 had been dropped, while the remaining 02 were still in the legal process. The plan's goals were to provide amnesty to people who had pelted stones during the summer unrest starting in March 2010 while excluding those who had regularly set fire to public property and engaged in arson. This was done to make it easier for these young people to pursue further education, get their backgrounds checked for passports and jobs, and get loans for both their study and employment.

Measures to Build Cross-LOC Confidence and the Peace Process: The 72 CBMs between India and Pakistan were intended to include trade and transit across the Line of Control as essential components. In order to move forward with this proposal, India put forth a proposal for the meeting or reunion of families in Kashmir at five locations over designated periods of time under Joint Security Arrangements, according to an announcement made by Shyam Saran on December 28, 2004. This was done in response to the humanitarian issues affecting either side of LOC. A number of confidence-building initiatives were started as part of the dialogue process with the intention of fostering people-to-people contacts between the two nations. These initiatives include the launch of bus services between Poonch and Rawalakote

on June 20, 2006, and Srinagar and Muzaffarabad on April 7, 2005. Additionally, it was decided to make it easier for people to go across the LOC on the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad and Poonch-Rawalakote routes and to start doing so duty-free. The increase of people-to-people ties, especially through trade and commerce, would provide an effective platform to promote and strengthen bilateral relations, then-Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee said in Parliament. The procedure had been successful in bridging the confidence gap that had existed between India and Pakistan and between the Indian administration and the residents of Jammu & Kashmir. Person-to-person communication across LOCs proven to be a crucial step in reunifying the estranged families and fostering a great deal of good will toward the state and both the central governments of India and Pakistan. The advantages of cross-LOC CBMs for India definitely exceed the disadvantages. There was no question that they had a beneficial effect on how those who have been divided by secure borders for many years perceive these as modest moves, albeit in the right direction. On March 6, 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said, the path of peace must be on a step-by-step basis, but the road must be traversed, during the launch of the Amritsar-Lahore bus service. The trip has only just begun; long-term improvements to current processes and expanding chances for additional cross-LOC connections could produce even better outcomes.

After a resolution was made at a roundtable session held in May 2006 in Srinagar, the peace effort was given a new direction. Five working groups were established as a result of the conference the prime minister hosted to advance the peace process. Being the first of its kind, the Srinagar Round Table Conference significantly aided in laying the foundation for the future. The Prime Minister of India unveiled a comprehensive plan under its auspices in Jammu & Kashmir on April 6, 2006. The Prime Minister's Package paid good attention to the Cross-LOC Confidence Building Measures. In attempt to find a solution to the tensions between the two nations, both India and Pakistan adopted a variety of confidence-boosting initiatives over the past 10 years. However, the Mumbai terrorist attacks on November 26, 2008 had a significant negative impact on the Composite Dialogue. These CBMs are directly affected by the hostilities between India and Pakistan, and these tensions have occasionally resulted in the abrupt suspension of trade and travel, most notably in January 2013. When their stay was finished, several travellers who had crossed the LOC were still on the incorrect side. In August 2013, when tensions rose once more, the Indian Ministry of Finance issued an order restricting trade over the LOC to only products coming from Pakistan-administered Kashmir, leaving very few permissible goods. Trade limitations imposed by another order

fundamentally undercut the entire procedure.

Trade and Travel across LOCs: Beginning with two bus services crossing the LOC, the cross-LOC bus service resumed traffic across the demarcation line. In the period from April 2005 to October 2013, more than 22, 000 persons crossed the line. Over 700 from Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan and almost 1500 from Kashmir ruled by Pakistan. However, applying for a permit is a tiresome and drawn-out process. Because of this, a big number of people are unable to move forward. When cross-trade first started, it consisted of 21 primary commodities. In 2011, the number of trading days per week was extended from two to four, and the maximum number of trucks from each side was raised from 25 to 200. It is a zero-tariff transaction that is duty- and customs-free. The trade's modalities were defined by a Joint Working Group on Cross-Loc CBMs. Basic issues, such as a lack of banking facilities and financial arrangements, communication, and market access, however, had caused this trade to suffer from the start. It is reduced to "blind trading" in the absence of a suitable communication channel and without access to market information. The quality of the items being requested cannot be accessed by traders who want to cross the LOC to investigate markets on the other side. This trade relationship was a zero-sum game since the trading communities on each side were interdependent. Without banks, it evolved into barter trading in the 18th century, which brought with it issues including delays in money recovery, vulnerability to market validity, and uneven trade. Officials also have the authority to impose trade restrictions on any of the 21 goods on the list, frequently without warning or explanation. So far, eight goods have been prohibited.

Institutionalizing communication within Kashmir: Following the visit to Jammu and Kashmir by the All Party Parliamentary Delegation from September 20 to 22, 2010, and the announcement made by the Home Minister on September 25, 2010, the Union appointed a group of interlocutors, including Radha Kumar and M.M. Ansari, for this significant development on October 13, 2010. Following the Kashmir uprising in 2010 and the Amarnath Land-Row movement in 2008, the Indian government saw fit to make a strong effort. The task of engaging in an ongoing conversation with all stakeholders to comprehend their issues and determine a plan of action was given to the interlocutors. The All Party Delegation (as established by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh) visited the valley and gathered information from various groups of the population, including separatist groups and mainstream political parties and groups, due to the ongoing unrest, turmoil, and disturbance

in the Kashmir valley for the past four months. The Cabinet Committee on Security's eight-point formula was the result of their report, which was presented in Delhi (CCS). The ADP's conclusion was that it was past due for India to take action to address the Kashmir issue. Some members believed that it was time to acknowledge the political aspirations of the J&K state's residents. The fact that inter-regional ties in J&K are too complicated to be handled swiftly by a task group was also accepted. It is the primary cause of the so-called Kashmir crisis. In order to begin a continuous discussion with all segments of the Jammu and Kashmiri population, including political parties, groups, civil society organisations, youth and student organisations, and other stakeholder groups, CCS advised designating a group of interlocutors. In order to protect and uphold the unity and integrity of the Indian Union, efforts are being made to bring peace and harmony to the state. The opinions of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh will be represented by the three members of the committee of interlocutors. It is a step towards beginning the process of ongoing, continuous conversation to address the Kashmir issue. The committee will make recommendations for actions that should stop the conflict and resolve the issue. The Indian government has also established task forces in Leh, Kargil, and Jammu to investigate the areas' developmental requirements, with a focus on infrastructure gaps, and to offer appropriate recommendations. As part of an eight-point plan to put a stop to the turmoil in Kashmir, Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram announced the creation of task teams for Jammu, Leh, and Ladakh on September 25, 2010. The Interlocutors Committee's Terms and References for the State are:

1. To begin a meaningful and extensive discourse in Jammu and Kashmir with all viewpoint groups.
2. To assist in bringing calm and harmony back to the condition.
3. To draught a plan for putting an end to unrest and lowering tensions in the state.
4. To set a route for resolving the Kashmir conflict on a political level.
5. To include the opinions of political parties, groups, secessionist organisations, members of civil society, young people and students, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and other stakeholders.

During their four-day tour to the State, the interlocutor's team spoke with a number of Jammu and Kashmiri groups (24-29 September 2010). All of the lawmakers agreed to their requests, with the exception of the opposition groups based in Jammu. The following statements sum up the beliefs of various significant political parties and ideologies:

1. National Conference (NC):

The NC is dedicated to the cause of J&K regaining autonomy. N.C. President Farooq Abdullah said, "Autonomy, not azadi, is a feasible notion for the solution of Kashmir." This was in reference to the APD's visit to Kashmir. Farooq Abdullah said the state will encounter challenges as he took part in a Lok Sabha discussion on the situation in Kashmir the issues it would face if it were independent, such as those caused by groups like the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan. He argued that granting the state authority would strengthen and federalize India. He made it clear that NC wants to resolve issue within the Indian Constitution. The Kashmir and Northern regions, which are ruled by Pakistan, must be reunited with the rest of the state as they were prior to 1947, according to the National Conference. Clearly stating that the entirety of Jammu and Kashmir, including the Northern and Kashmir ruled by Pakistan, would remain a part of India, National Conference leader made a strong appeal to political parties, particularly BJP, to comprehend the emotions of the people of the state. National Conference believes that Kashmir did not join the Indian Union because of the threat of any force, but rather because the ideas of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru had an influence on the decision. The National Conference makes it apparent that without the resolution on autonomy adopted by the J&K assembly in 2002, India would not have a truly federal structure. Recently, Omar Abdullah restricted his demands to the restoration of autonomy as promised and guaranteed in the 1952 Delhi Agreement.

Nazir sheikh of NC believes that the state's citizens have already approved of internal autonomy, and his party will make its final efforts to bring it back. He firmly believes that internal autonomy is the Indian Union's best choice for resolving the Kashmir issue. He acknowledges Omar Abdullah's claim that Kashmir joined India in order to protect its identity while stating that Kashmir joined India for the same reason. In the Legislative Assembly, Omar Abdullah held a lengthy discussion on the Kashmir issue on October 6. He claimed that J&K was a persistent issue between Pakistan and India that had gained international attention. Omar Abdullah stressed the need for a two-track negotiation approach between India and Pakistan and India and the Separatists to resolve the Kashmir dispute as the Legislative Assembly's discussion on the ongoing unrest in the valley came to a close. He advised the Separatists to use the media to reply, back channels, and not take advantage of the circumstance. Omar Abdullah clarified that the National Conference's desire for autonomy was not something that was being sought outside the bounds of the Indian Constitution. He said that Kashmir's accession to India was a result of the ideas of Gandhi

and Nehru and that J&K's unique constitutional status shouldn't be disregarded; rather, it should be honoured and maintained. Omar Abdullah said that it was India's duty to assemble the team of interlocutors and launch a sustained discussion process about Kashmir, emphasising that it should be headed in the correct way. National Conference advocated increased autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir while meeting with APD. In 1953, the Center began to undermine the state's unique status, and the National Conference is in favour of regaining it. The National Conference believes in implementing the instrument of accession in text and spirit, which grants the state complete autonomy, Abdul Rahim Rather made plain to the All Party Delegation. While defence is the responsibility of the exterior government, external relations and communication are their responsibility. In order to protect the state's integrity, the National Conference also called for fostering a discussion process among all 3 divisions.

2. Jammu Kashmir National Panthers Party (JKNPP):

JKNPP Chairman Bhim Singh harshly condemned the eight-point package to Kashmir and termed it as a consolation prize for the coalition government led by the National Conference, which has lost its appeal to the general populace. The JKNPP disapproved of the interlocutors' visit and called it biased. The JKNPP is dedicated to finding a workable solution for Kashmir within the boundaries of the Indian federal system while appreciating and embracing the state's diversity. According to Bhim Singh, the Gujjars, Bakerwals, who have their own culture, civilization, and identity, and the displaced Kashmiri Pandits, who have been a major part of Kashmiriyat, cannot be ignored by the state. JKNPP demanded the honourable and dignified relocation and rehabilitation of Kashmiri Pandits in the valley.

3. Congress Party: The Congress Party praised the Indian Union's eight-point plan for putting an end to the violence in Jammu and Kashmir. The Separatists and other political groups and organisations were urged by Congress to react favourably. The eight-point plan for Kashmir was seen by Congress as a historic chance to put an end to the unrest there. Congress asked the Indian Union to engage in a thorough political discussion with representatives from all major parties, separatist organisations, and other groups and ideas. The integration of various points of view will contribute to peace and advancement in the state. The Kashmir Interlocutors Committee (KIC), which the Prime Minister appointed on September 25 with the goal of holding meetings with the people of state to obtain a concise outline or summary of the state's residents' aspirations, was also warmly welcomed by the

Congress party.

4. The Awami National Conference (ANC): The party hailed the creation of the Kashmir Interlocutors Committee (KIC), which will begin talks with all Jammu and Kashmir stakeholders. The Kashmir issue could not be ignored, according to ANC President Khalida Shah, and steps should be taken to settle it. She also emphasised the need for constructive discussion. Additionally, she asked the Indian government to seriously consider its response to the current political crisis in Kashmir. According to the ANC, Kashmir is a pressing problem that should be resolved politically. One cannot ignore the regional and intra-regional relationships in Kashmir, which should be handled by negotiators with patience and seriousness.

5. CPI-M: M.Y. Tarigami, state secretary of the CPI (M), welcomed the ideas of the Union and asked centre to take additional steps to foster an atmosphere of peace and confidence. For a prolonged discourse with various perspectives in Jammu and Kashmir, the CPI (M) urged assembling a panel of prominent lawmakers. Tarigami recommended taking action to guarantee that the new policies are executed in text and spirit. He also made it clear that in order to engage in frank conversation and engagement with political organisations and ideologies, one must consider and talk about a range of problems relating to autonomy, self-rule, and different points of view in the state.

Prakash Karat, the general secretary of the CPI (M) and a member of the APD, pleaded with the Indian leadership to take decisive action to open a political dialogue with all factions in J&K without any conditions. According to him, a resolution can only be reached by acknowledging the state's unique status and guaranteeing the Kashmiri people of their identity. According to him, this calls for the creation of a new political system with full autonomy as its cornerstone. He thinks that a political solution is necessary to address the Kashmir conflict. According to M.Y. Tarigami, the instability in Kashmir has wider political ramifications. He thinks that the key to making the peace process goal-oriented is to start a genuine process of deliberate communication amongst various regions, sub-regions, ethnic groups, and communities. He is adamant that separating from each other will never lead to the discovery of solutions to the long-standing issue. Future success depends on shared resolve and mutual trust. Jammu & Kashmir's diversity offers better prospects for a better future, and currently, diversity is seen as an asset.

6. APSCC, All Party Sikh Coordination Committee:

The eight-point plan and the creation of the Interlocutors Committee for Kashmir to hold talks with the residents of state were praised by the APSCC. Jagmohan Singh, Chairman of the APSCC, believes that the announcement should be put into practise as soon as possible. He asked the local and federal governments to seriously consider the ambitions of the state's minority community. He added that Sikhs in particular have played a significant role in Kashmiri society for many years. He asked the residents of the state to uphold their long-standing bonds of fraternity, love, and understanding.

Recommendations of the Committee of Interlocutors

- A continuous, serious, sincere, and inclusive process of engagement with all stakeholders, including separatists, civil society, etc., will lead to a political settlement. It will be necessary to maintain unity and geographical integrity.
- In accord with Article 370, the state must be given the authority it requires, which must be determined through extensive talks among the 3 expanses of the state, including the separatists.
- The state's population's diversity in political, social, economic, and cultural concerns, interests, and aspirations must be acknowledged and taken into account.
- The dialogue between India and Pakistan needs to be developed and continued.
- Jammu and Kashmir's political settlement must be viewed as a single entity; the state cannot be divided into two or three parts.
- Ensuring prompt punishment for anyone found guilty of human rights breaches.
- Ensuring prompt punishment for anyone found guilty of human rights breaches.
- Without delay, the instruments established for this purpose—in particular, the State Human Rights Commission—must be strengthened.

Ceasefire: The ceasefire has generally been upheld since 2003. From 2003 through 2005, there were no firings across the LOC, and only three infractions occurred in 2006. The number of LOC violations started to climb as the India-Pakistan peace process slowed down, and there has been a continuous rise since 2008. ALC has seen an upsurge in tensions since 2013. The survival of all cross-LOC CBMs depends on the consolidation of the ceasefire, and

attempts to do so reinforce one another. Trust and confidence would rise on all sides if CBMs were consolidated and an atmosphere of consistency and predictability surrounded them. Additionally, CBMs go beyond only fostering confidence. Events in August 2012 highlight the possibility that tensions on the international border could spread over the LOC. The possibility of a spillover from Afghanistan following the withdrawal of multinational forces in 2014 heightens this threat. An unofficial ceasefire that is prone to breaking down raises immediate security concerns, such as an increase in military violence, and it also has an impact on more general diplomatic relations between the two nations. Breakdowns in the ceasefire not only end diplomatic relations but also stall progress in economic and political ties, including a holdup in Pakistan's decision to grant India the most-favorable nation status.

The Amarnath agitation ended well before the 2008 elections. Therefore, this agitation's unparalleled regional and communal divisiveness in the state was bound to have an impact on this election. Separatist politics in Kashmir were the focal point of the protests. The leadership of the separatist movement had regained confidence that those who had taken part in the large protests against the Indian state during the agitation would not show up to vote, making the election process once more a farce. Nevertheless, the boycott demand was disregarded, and a sizable number of voters turned out for the Assembly election. Voter turnout in the 2008 election was 51.64 percent, compared to 29.64 percent in the 2002 Assembly election. The percentage of voters turned out in the Valley's districts and constituencies in greater numbers than in the Assembly elections in 2002.

The National Conference-Congress partnership, which was formed after the 2008 elections, was the state's third attempt at coalition politics. To begin a new coalition experience in the state, National Conference joined forces with the state Congress. Due to their shared ancestry, National Conference and the Congress party had no trouble developing a framework for power sharing. Their friendship and similar ideologies date back to the Nehru-Sheikh Abdullah era, when the two stalwarts had a harmonious relationship.

4.9. 2014 Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly election

From November 25 to December 20, 2014, five phases of the Legislative Assembly election were held in the state. The state Assembly, which voters chose 87 members for, will thorough its six-year term on January 19, 2015. On December 23, 2014, the results were announced. In 3 out of 87 assembly seats in the state elections, voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPAT)

and EVMs were used.

The genesis and campaigning: The INC took off its partnership with the JKNC prior to the election and ran candidates for every assembly seat. Before the elections, there was vigorous and active campaigning. The Bharatiya Janata Party focused on J&K after achieving a resounding victory in the Indian legislative election and ran a campaign there promising development.

Calls for Boycott: Geelani, the leader of the hard-line pro-independence APHC, had urged the people of Valley to completely stay away from voting; stating that the activity is illegal since India was previously conducting polls in the Valley with the use of lethal force. The sacrifices made by the people must be safeguarded, thus my request is to the youth, and in particular, that they should under no circumstances vote during elections, he continued.

Separatists used networking in social domain and mobile interfaces like Facebook and WhatsApp to spread the campaign to boycott the elections. On social media, a four-minute video clip featuring statements from Asiya Andrabi, and the leaders of the hardline and moderate Hurriyat Conference groups has gone viral. People were urged to boycott the next elections in a video message posted on Facebook and Twitter and transmitted over WhatsApp. Speaking to a crowd over the phone and pleading with young people not to undercut the goals of martyrs. In a photo Mirwaiz also made calls for an en masse boycott of the elections. The voting percentage climbed by 4% to 65% from 61% in 2008 elections.

Voting: Five steps made up the polling process. The elections saw the largest voter turnout in the previous 25 years despite repeated boycott calls from hurriyat leaders. The voting rate was greater than 65%. The European Parliament applauded the seamless operation of the state legislature elections on behalf of the European Union. According to the EU's statement, India's substantial voter participation rate is evidence that democracy is well-established in that country. The European Union commends India and its system of democracy for holding elections without violence in the territory of Jammu and Kashmir. The European Parliament also acknowledges that a sizable proportion of Kashmiris cast ballots despite appeals from some separatist forces for a boycott. They (Pakistan) also permitted the holding of these elections. Mehbooba Mufti, the leader of the ruling party, also backed Mufti's comments. The opposition leader in the Rajya Sabha and a former chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir,

Ghulam Nabi Azad responded to the Mufti's statement by saying, In fact, Pakistan and militant groups tried their utmost to destabilise the democratic process in the state. With 28 seats, PDP surpassed all other parties as the largest. BJP gained 25 seats, moving up to the second-largest position. On December 24, 2014, Chief Minister Omar Abdullah submitted his resignation. The JKNC sought the BJP for a meeting three days after the results in an effort to establish a government. Ali Mohammad Sagar, a JKNC MLA, was to serve as Nirmal Kumar Singh's deputy as per the agreement. After a rebellion inside the JKNC, the agreement collapsed. The BJP also disapproved of this agreement, citing ethical concerns.

After the talks with the BJP broke down, the JKNC also said in the days that followed that it would back the PDP externally by sending a letter to the governor Narinder Nath Vohra. The PDP objected. Following the results, the PDP and the BJP formally began negotiations. A two-person committee from each side was assembled to create the Common Minimum Programme (CMP). Ram Madhav and Nirmal Kumar Singh represented the BJP, while Naeem Akhtar and Haseeb Drabu represented the PDP. Jitendra Singh, a minister of state in the PMO, oversaw the discussion.

Omar Abdullah resigned as chief minister on Dec.24, while accepting his resignation, the Governor urged him to serve in an provisional role until a new administration was formed. On January 1, 2015, president's rule was put into effect. Both parties focused on the cabinet's makeup after dealing with the issues at hand. Rotation of 3 years for each party head as CM was first opposed by the PDP, but it eventually accepted. Additionally, there were problems with Sajjad Lone, a former separatist who is now a politician. He visited with Prime Minister Narendra Modi before the election and referred to him as his "big brother" while praising him. Lone won the Handwara seat from which he was initially elected to the legislature, and the BJP responded by not fielding a candidate to challenge him. Amit Shah, the national president of the BJP, and Mehbooba Mufti, the president of the PDP, convened a joint news conference on February 25 and both parties declared that the CMP was nearly complete.

The "common minimum programme" (CMP) from the PDP and the BJP for managing the coalition administration in Jammu & Kashmir was made public. Here are the CMP's 15 standout features:

- 1) It's critical to establish an atmosphere of peace, predictability, and stability in order to achieve the political and economic goals of the partnership.

- 2) The government will undergo a smart government transformation, becoming more proactive, open, and accountable.
- 3) The goal of the government is to turn the nation from the most unethical to the most moral state in the world.
- 4) Jammu and Kashmir's economic structure will be in line with its own resources, abilities, and society thanks to the overall economic policy.
- 5) The government will make sure that institutions of probity, such as the state accountability commission, the vigilance commission, which will now be known as the transparency commission, and a group that works with the Right to Information Act, have true autonomy.
- 6) In accordance with the Insaniyat, Kashmiriyat, and Jamhooriyat principles of the earlier NDA government led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The goal of the discussion will be to reach broad agreement on how to handle the state's unresolved concerns.
- 7) The government will assess whether it is necessary to de-notify troubled areas, allowing the union government to make a call on the extension and curtailment of AFSPA.
- 8) Article 370: The current stance on all constitutional provisions, including special status, will be upheld.
- 9) Communication with the Hurriyat Conference: The coalition government would encourage on going communication with all parties, regardless of their ideologies.
- 10) All land must be restored to its lawful owners, with the exception of any land granted to the security forces on the basis of leases, licences, or purchases made in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act, unless doing so is absolutely necessary due to a specific security requirement.
- 11) The administration will negotiate a one-time agreement for those who fled Pakistan's occupation of Kashmir in 1947, 1965, and 1971.
- 12) The government would take action to ensure the refugees from West Pakistan have a means of subsistence.
- 13) It will offer to those residing along the international border the benefits available to those residing along the Line of Control (LoC).
- 14) It would ensure that the state government receives a portion of NHPC's income from the waters of Jammu and Kashmir.

15) It will annul all contracts for royalties with NHPC.

They added that the parties were now focusing on creating a cabinet after the ideological differences had been ironed out. A press conference followed the release of the CMP. The CMP presented a vision of Jammu and Kashmir's overall development and Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas (development for all). A high level committee with participation from all walks will be tasked with handling contentious matters like Article 370 and AFSPA. The PDP also pledged to support the Modi administration. On Tuesday, June 19, the BJP left its partnership with the PDP, leading to the collapse of the three-year-old Jammu and Kashmir government, which had been plagued by savage political rivalries and escalating security issues. This opened the door for yet another period of governor's rule.

The news caught everyone off guard. After the BJP's top leaders summoned the party's ministers for Jammu and Kashmir to New Delhi for urgent meetings, Ram Madhav, the general secretary of the party, made the statement. Here is a look back at their three-year relationship as well as a timeline of political changes that have occurred in Jammu and Kashmir since the Assembly elections in 2014, which resulted in the PDP-BJP coalition taking office. On December 28, 2014, the results were declared, and the outcome was undetermined. In the 87-member assembly, the PDP wins 28 seats, the BJP wins 25, the NC wins 15, and the Congress wins 12.

- On December 28, 2014, J&K established a governor's rule. The PDP and BJP are in talks about joining forces. The Alliance's Agenda—the common minimum program—is finalised after two months of consultations.
- On March 1, 2015, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed took the oath of office as the second chief minister. The governor's reign is over.
- On January 7, 2016, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed passed away at the AIIMS in New Delhi due to illness.
- On January 8, 2016, the governor's authority was reinstated after the PDP and BJP were unable to agree on a plan to keep their coalition going. The PDP expresses doubts about the alliance's plans and a reluctance to serve as prime minister. The governor is still in charge. Mehbooba Mufti and Prime Minister Narendra Modi met.
- on March 22 in New Delhi. She says she is pleased with the center's assurances after the meeting. Mehbooba Mufti takes the oath of office on April 4, 2016, becoming the state's first female chief minister. The governor's reign is over. After an India-Pakistan cricket match, on

April 5, 2016, local and foreign students start fighting at the National Institute of Technology Srinagar.

- On July 8, 2016, in the Kokernag region of south Kashmir's Anantnag district, a security force encounter resulted in the death of Burhan Wani, a Hizbul Mujahideen commander. The assassination of Wani, which provoked deadly demonstrations that claimed over 85 lives, has divided the PDP and the BJP. Mehbooba Mufti convenes an all-party meeting on May 9 in response to an increase in the number of civilian deaths during clashes close to encounter locations. After the meeting, the chief minister requests a Ramzan truce similar to the one that was declared in 2003 by the prime minister at the time, A.B. Vajpayee. Kavinder Gupta, a BJP leader and deputy chief minister, is opposed to the notion.
- On May 17, 2018, Rajnath Singh, the Union Home Minister, announced a one-month pause of operations in Jammu and Kashmir. The unilateral ceasefire will not be extended, the Center has decided, according to Rajnath Singh, who also announced that counterterrorism operations will begin in the valley as a result of an increase in militancy-related occurrences over the course of the ceasefire. The BJP high leadership called every minister to Delhi on June 18, 2018.
- On June 19, 2018, the BJP left the PDP's coalition government. Mehbooba Mufti, the chief minister, offers her resignation. Once more, the state is moving toward governors' rule.

Jammu and Kashmir's 2014 parliamentary elections

After the 2010 general uprising, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) held parliamentary elections in 2014. All political parties nominated their top candidates to run in the elections, which were seen as a semi-final before the 2018 Assembly elections. iii. The contest in Jammu and Ladakh was directly between the Congress and the BJP due to the National Conference's (hereinafter NC) and Congress' pre-election agreement, and in Kashmir it was between the NC and PDP due to the NC. All of the incumbent MPs lost their seats, and the National Conference and Congress were replaced by the Bhartiya Janata Party (hereafter referred to as the BJP and the People's Democratic Party, respectively) in the six parliamentary constituencies, which included three in the Kashmir valley (Anantnag, Baramulla, and Srinagar), two in Jammu (Jammu and Udhampur), and one in Ladakh. The elections were held in five phases (PDP). The three parliamentary districts in the Kashmir valley were previously represented by the National Conference, two by the Congress in Jammu, and one by an independent in Ladakh. A pre-election agreement between Congress

and the National Conference was in place for this election. The Congress received the Jammu-Poonch, Kathua-Udhampur-Doda, and Ladakh parliamentary seats under this seat-sharing agreement, while the National Conference (NC), the other coalition partner, ran in Srinagar, Anantnag, and Baramulla, respectively.

Analysis of issues and campaign tactics for the 2014 parliamentary elections

Political parties tried to sway voters in their favor by focusing on a variety of topics, from local to more universal in scope. The Narendra Modi and his party's agenda, which they referred to as communal and divisive, were the focus of the governing coalition partners' (Congress-National Conference) mobilisation campaign. They also asked for votes from the populace based on the excellent work done throughout their mandate at the same time. There is no Modi wave in the nation, especially in the state, declared Chief Minister Omar Abdullah while speaking at election rallies in several locations in the Poonch and Rajouri districts. Every claim made in this respect and spread by the BJP was a mere fabrication. Omar Abdullah, a BJP candidate for prime minister, attacked Narendra Modi, claiming that a guy (Modi) who likened the slaughter of Muslims in the Gujarat riots of 2002 cannot provide justice. He is not equipped to lead a pluralistic nation like India. He urged voters to support the coalition candidate because the UPA administration owes a great deal to the all-around growth, enormous economic upliftment, and peace that have taken place in the state over the last five years. Ghulam Nabi Azad, the contender for the Congress in the Udhampur-Doda parliamentary seat, charged the BJP with promoting the divide and rule strategy. The UPA introduced the Food Security Bill, which ensures two meals for every citizen of the country. He stated this at election rallies in the Kathua district: The Congress party is connected to people at the grassroots, which is evident after the incorporation of the 73rd Amendment in the J&K Panchayati Raj Act, 1989. He made fun of the BJP and other parties, saying that they only know how to divide and control, inciting on religious grounds.

However, the bulk of the opposition political parties brought up the subject of mismanagement and corruption in both the NC-Congress alliance in the state and the UPA government at the federal level. The inability of the NC-Congress alliance to establish a development council for Jammu, offer a one-time rehabilitation payment to three lakh refugees, and grant citizenship rights to West Pakistani refugees in Jammu were a few of the major problems that the BJP brought up. In addition, the BJP pledged that once the BJP-led

NDA came into power in New Delhi; eliminating regional disparities in the state would be its top priority. The party also pledged to foster a constructive national discussion on the question of whether Article 370 has benefited or hurt the state. The PDP and the No. contested the election in the Kashmir area. The PDP made the decision to bring up issues like the hanging of Afzal Guru, who was convicted of the Parliament attack, the uprisings, the 2009 and 2011 killings of civilians, and the misgovernance of the NC-Congress administration in order to capitalise on the anti-incumbency sentiment. Additionally, it criticised the coalition administration for failing to address the public's concerns. Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, the then-PDP President, spoke at election rallies in several areas of the Baramulla seat and promoted Indo-Pak peace, arguing that security and stability depended on regional peace. He made fun of the National Conference, claiming that the party has not learnt any lessons from the tragedy of the 2010 turmoil; the NC has contributed to the aggravation of the situation by misgovernance and denial of justice (ibid.). Contrarily, the leaders of the coalition government rallied support for the people-centered policies of the Manmohan Singh-led UPA government at the centre, of which the NC was an alliance partner, as well as the containment of Modi or what they refer to as communal or divisive forces. Both the NC and the Congress leaders attacked the BJP's contender, Narendra Modi, during their speeches to joint election rallies in various parts of the Anantnag constituency. Saifuddin Soz, the leader of the Congress party's J&K branch, for instance, claimed that Modi symbolises a Nazi mindset, and his vision of India is suffocating; he represents a mindset that was common in Germany where Jews were killed and where only Christians were secure. The coalition's shared objective, according to Dr. Farooq Abdullah, is to keep Modi out of power, and he accused Modi of killing Muslims in Gujarat during the same rally.

Analysis of the J&K election's overall result

All of the sitting MPs lost their seats in the six parliamentary divisions—three in the Kashmir division (Anantnag, Baramulla, and Srinagar), two in Jammu (Jammu and Udhampur), and one in Ladakh—and the National Conference (NC) and the Congress party were replaced by the BJP and the PDP. Elections were held in five phases. The three parliamentary seats in the Kashmir valley were previously represented by the National Conference, while the Congress was in charge of the two seats in Jammu, and an independent was in charge of the seat in Ladakh. The voting percentage in the 2014 elections was significantly higher than it was in the Parliamentary elections in 2009.

Voter turnout in Jammu and Udhampur constituencies, where votes were consolidated in favour of the BJP and the Modi factor played a significant role, increased as compared to 2009, accounting for the increase. Voter turnout in the Kashmir region was nearly unchanged in each district compared to the 2009 elections, however it was somewhat higher in the Anantnag constituency, slightly lower in the Baramulla Parliamentary district, and nearly unchanged in the Srinagar constituency. However, compared to the 2009 elections, voter turnout was significantly higher in Jammu and Udhampur. Compared to the 2009 elections, Ladakh's parliamentary districts witnessed a somewhat lower voter turnout. When compared to the Parliamentary elections in 2009, the coalition partners' vote shares, particularly the NC's, not only declined dramatically but they also suffered losses.

The party's total share fell from 19.1% to 11.1%, and the Congress received 22.9 percent of the vote as opposed to 24.7 percent in 2009. The PDP maintained its 20.5 percent vote share, while Bjp gained 18.6 percent in 2009 to 32.4 percent. The BJP's significant victories over the Congress in the Jammu region are largely to blame for the sharp increase in its support. With more than 2.5 lakh votes, the party handily won the Jammu seat. According to the CSDS post-election survey, Hindu voters in the Jammu area have consolidated behind the BJP on matters like repealing Article 370 and adequately representing the region's ambitions.

Evaluation of the decision in the Jammu Region

Four districts—Jammu, Poonch, Samba, and Rajouri—as well as twenty Assembly districts make up the Jammu-Poonch Parliamentary Constituency. There were four serving ministers in the region, Tara Chand, Raman Bhalla, Sham Lal Sharma, and Shabir Ahmad Khan, who were all part of the NC-Congress coalition's total of thirteen MLAs. Through its "excellent work" over the previous twelve years, the Congress party attempted to fight the Modi wave (since 2002). Out of seventeen Assembly seats, the Congress party had eleven MLAs in the Kathua-Udhampur-Doda Parliamentary constituency, whereas its coalition partner NC only had one MLA from this Parliamentary constituency. This area was known as the Congress party's stronghold. Additionally, the party was counting on Ghulam Nabi Azad, who is a well-known and highly respected individual due to the tremendous growth that this region underwent during his stint as the state's chief minister. Azad is their candidate for the constituency (2006–2008). As a result, it was thought that Azad's persona and his development efforts would help him win. However, the anti-incumbency and Modi wave

forces seemed to be too powerful to overcome, which is why his BJP competitor, Dr. Jitender Singh, changed into capable of win the seat. Voting was brisk in the two parliamentary districts of the Jammu area. Compared to the 2009 Parliamentary election, which had a voting rate of 49.03 percent, the Jammu-Poonch Parliamentary seat witnessed a turnout of 70.6 percent, an increase of 21 percent. Samba (73.99), Vijaypur (76.21), Nagrota (74.92), Gandhi Nagar (66.30), Jammu East (64.35), and Jammu East continue to have the highest percentages in the Assembly (64.23). In the Samba and Jammu districts, Bishnah (74.92), RS Pura (76.10), Suchetgarh (75.92), Marh (80), Raipur Domana (75.11), Akhnoor (79.62), and Chhamb (77.21); in the Rajouri district, Nowshera (73.15), Darhal (62.12), Rajouri (60.75), and Kalakote (61.65); and in the A high turnout of 72 percent was recorded in the Kathua-Udhampur seat, up 27.12 percent over the 2009 parliamentary elections, when just 44.82 percent of voters had cast their ballots. Banihal, 61.48; Gulabgarh, 81.53; Reasi, 79.25; Gool Arnas, 76.72; Udhampur, 75.19; Chenani, 70.51; Ramnagar, 66. Kishtwar, 65.34; Inderwal, 69.25; Doda, 71.48; Bhaderwah, 69.31; Ramban, 67.26. The outcomes, however, turned out to be different from what coalition members had anticipated. The BJP candidates in both of the parliamentary races in the Jammu region destroyed the Congress. Jugal Kishore of the BJP defeated his Congress Party competitor by a significant majority of 257,282 votes in the Jammu-Poonch Parliamentary Constituency. In comparison to Madan Lal Sharma of the Congress, who received 362,715 votes, Kishore received 619,995 votes, or 45 percent of the total number of votes cast. PDP candidate Yashpal Sharma received 168,554 votes, placing him in third place. Twenty assembly segments make up this parliamentary district; the BJP gained the majority in fifteen of these, including all of the ones held by Congress Ministers. Only two portions were won by the Congress.

Ghulam Nabi Azad, a member of the Congress party & lost in his first attempt to represent his home state in the Lok Sabha from the Udhampur-Doda Parliamentary district. By 60,976 votes, the BJP's formidable but inexperienced political rival Dr. Jitendera Singh defeated him. Azad received 426,393 votes, while Dr. Singh received 487,369 votes. The Congress won eight of the seventeen Assembly segments in this parliamentary constituency after receiving a sizable amount of votes from Chenab Valley, as was predicted. In Kishtwar, Inderwal, Doda, Bhaderwah, Ramban, Banihal, Gool Arnas, and Gulabgarh, the Congress won the majority (Muslim majority-populous constituencies). However, the number of votes cast in these eight seats was significantly lower than in the nine constituencies of Hiranagar, Billawar, Basholi, Bani, Ramnagar, Chenani, and Reasi (which are primarily populated by

Hindus), where the BJP earned a commanding advantage over Congress and the Panthers Party.

Deputy Chief Minister Tara Chand, Minister for Public Health, Irrigation, and Flood Control Sham Lal Sharma, Minister for Housing Raman Bhalla (Gandhi Nagar), Minister for Urban Development RigzinJora (Leh), and Minister for Cooperatives Dr. Manohar Lal Sharma were among the prominent Congress Ministers who performed poorly in their Assembly districts (Billawar). Ajay Sadhotra, the NC's planning and development minister is from the Marh constituency, which is likewise held by the BJP but where the Congress was soundly trounced. The BJP held leads in twenty-four of the thirty-seven Assembly segments in the Jammu region, which included the two Lok Sabha seats (Jammu-Poonch and Udhampur-Doda), while the Congress only managed to gain leads in eight Of the Udhampur segments (broadly speaking with inside the Ramban, Kishtwar, and Reasi districts) and 3 of the Jammu Evaluation of the Kashmir Valley judgment. Election politics have changed significantly since the PDP entered the state's political landscape, particularly in the Valley. After gaining sixteen seats in the 2002 Assembly elections, PDP was able to establish a government in coalition with Congress. Since that time, PDP has been a serious rival and a dominant force in Kashmir. The PDP, however, was only able to secure one seat in the last two parliamentary elections that it ran in. On the other hand, the National Conference has always held sway in the Kashmir valley during parliamentary elections. The incumbent coalition government (NC-Congress) was defeated in the 2014 parliamentary elections. The NC turned into defeated with inside the Kashmir area via way of means of the PDP, and its alliance partner, the Congress party, suffered a similar fate in the Jammu and Ladakh regions at the hands of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

After thirty years, the National Conference lost its parliamentary seat in Srinagar. The NC only managed to garner 37.6% of the vote in Srinagar, compared to the PDP's 50.6%. This is significant given that Srinagar has always served as the National Conference's stronghold. Additionally, the PDP won a commanding 53.4% of the vote in Anantnag, compared to the NC's 36%. Out of the forty-six Assembly seats up for election in Kashmir valley, the PDP won thirty-eight. In the Anantnag Constituency, the PDP won each of the sixteen Assembly seats, defeating the incumbent NC MP Mehboob Beg by a margin of 65,417 votes. Additionally, in Baramulla, the party was in the lead in eleven out of the fifteen constituency parts. It's vital to note that the alliance members, especially the NC, not only lost, but their vote share also fell significantly from the 2009 Parliamentary elections. The

share decreased from 19.1% to 11.1%. The historical party of the state should be concerned that its vote share has been steadily dropping since the 1998 Parliamentary election. The percentage has decreased from 36.4% in 1998 to 11.1% in 2014. This is a sign that the state's election competition has gotten fiercer.

Political parties learned a vital lesson from this election: they could no longer take voters for granted. The survival of underperforming parties and politicians has been more difficult as election competition has increased because voters are becoming more informed and have more options. The NC-Congress combination did very poorly because they are judging political parties and leaders based on their performance and contribution. The Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) and post-election National Election Survey (NES) 2014 in Kashmir truly tested voter discontent against the coalition due to the government's failure to control inflation, corruption, as well as poor health care, pitiful road conditions, and other issues. When asked to compare the performance of the current NC-Congress administration with that of the outgoing PDP-Congress administration, voters chose the latter option by a margin of 40% to 18%. The hanging of Afzal Guru and the deaths of over 100 youth during the 2010 protests were two other significant factors that contributed to the failure of the NC, as noted by Chief Minister Omar Abdullah. In fact, Omar Abdullah asked people on the internet why they chose to vote against the NC in the parliamentary elections. The idea of a traditional vote bank was destroyed by the election outcomes in the Kashmir valley. The NC experienced one of its biggest shocks from this election when its usual vote bank in the districts of Ganderbal's Kangan Assembly seat and Budgam's Charar-e-Sharif Assembly constituency broke down. Since 1957, when the first Assembly election in the state took place, the NC candidates have always represented these two constituencies. Based on the presumption that it would secure commanding leads in Kangan and Charar-e-Sharif, the NC's own pre-election projection that it would win the Srinagar seat predicted this outcome (represented by two most prominent leaders of NC). But it didn't take place.

The exact cause of this is that voters in these places, particularly young people, stopped supporting the NC after their forefathers did. People in these places are no longer honoring the political party loyalties of their forebears, which are causing a shift in the political socialization of the population (particularly youth). For instance, the Gujjars were Mian Altaf's staunchest supporters historically. But over time, the PDP has significantly increased its share of the National Conference's Gujjar voter base. Mian Altaf faced stiff battle from PDP candidate Bashir Ahmad Mir in the 2008 Assembly elections. The NC's traditional

support base appears to be sliding away from them, which is an issue for them. Illustrates some of the places where the alliance surprisingly lost momentum in Kashmir, which are represented by important NC and Congress MPs. 4.24 Analysis of election verdict in Ladakh the BJP won the Ladakh seat by a very slim margin. Ladakh, the largest parliamentary district in terms of territory, reported Thupstan Chhewang, a candidate for the BJP, narrowly defeated Ghulam Raza, a Congress renegade running as an Independent, in the Lok Sabha elections by just 36 votes, one of the smallest victory margins in the country. Chhewang, who had previously won the Ladakh parliamentary seat in 2004 as an independent, received 31,111 more votes than his closest rival. A Congress renegade running as an Independent candidate, Ghulam Raza, received 31,075 votes. With 28,234 votes, Syed Mohammad Kazim Sabri, another Independent candidate, came in third. Tsering Samphel, a candidate for the Congress, came in last with 26,402 votes. Raza had the help of the influential Imam Khomeini Memorial Trust (IKMT), whereas Sabri got the backing of Islamiya School Kargil, a significant religious organisation (ISK). The BJP received the Ladakh Parliamentary seat for the primary time in Jammu and Kashmir's history. Strong ideological divisions amongst Buddhists and Shia Muslims with inside the Ladakh region, the Modi wave, the BJP's vow to granting Ladakh the status of a Union Territory, and extreme factionalism within the Congress may all have contributed to the party's success. In Ladakh, it was clear that the NC-Congress pre-poll partnership had failed. The NC was anticipated to support its alliance partner candidate because of the pre-election agreement between the NC and Congress that gave Congress the Ladakh Parliamentary seat. In actuality, though, Aga Syed Kazim Sabri, an Independent candidate, received open support from both NC workers and several notable NC leaders from the Ladakh region.

The BJP was anticipating success in the Assembly elections after performing admirably in the 2014 Parliamentary elections, winning both of Jammu's seats and the sole seat of Ladakh. The BJP also led in twenty-four of the region of Jammu's thirty-seven Assembly segments during the 2014 Parliamentary elections. After Kashmir was devastated by catastrophic floods in September 2014, the election was held across five days from November 25 to December 17, 2015. Elections were slated to take place, but there were concerns because the environment in the wake of the flood was seen to be unsuitable for such a process. All significant political parties, with the exception of the National Conference—the National Conference's coalition partner—pleaded for the timely scheduling of elections. But despite NC concerns and in spite of all rumors, the Election Commission made two official

trips to the state. A team from the Election Commission of India visited the state on October 7, 2014, under the leadership of deputy election commissioner Vinod Zutshi. On October 18, 2014, the Election Commission of India paid a second full team visit and had in-depth meetings with members of all political parties as well as the civil and police administrations. The Commission said that the elections would be held on schedule after holding extensive discussions regarding the poll's readiness with the civil and police administrations. The decision was well received by major political parties, and after some hesitation, NC also chose to take part in the elections. Election boycott calls have long been central to separatist movements. Separatist politics and their impact persisted even after the democratic system was restored, especially after the 2002 elections.

Elections have never been a replacement for the right to self-determination that separatists are fighting for, according to almost all of the major separatist leaders, who consider them as a ridiculous exercise used by the Indian government to deflect attention from Kashmir's real problem. Between 2002 and 2014, mainstream politics expanded from the prior situation, in which mainstream political parties were unable to organise electoral rallies and reach the people because of militants' threats and assassinations of party leaders. Since the 2002 Assembly elections, voter turnout has risen in the state with each subsequent election, and the populace, particularly in the Valley, has demonstrated some level of confidence in the electoral system. The separatist space in Kashmir is still intact despite the electoral space expanding without harming separatist politics or sentiment. The two are viewed as representing two distinct political domains, one dealing with governance-related concerns and the other with conflict resolution. Even while mainstream politics has grown and partially made up the ground it lost after the 2002 elections, separatist politics still exist. Separatism still has a place in society as a result of the protracted and unresolved Kashmir conflict, alienation, and mistrust on the one hand, and the rigging of elections on the other. Election boycotts are fundamentally justified because, contrary to what the Indian government says, they cannot be seen as a replacement for plebiscites and other forms of self-determination. The separatists declared a complete boycott of the 2014 Parliamentary elections. Chairman of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front Muhammad Yasin Malik even urged voters to abstain from voting to protect the sacrifices. We want to make it clear that the right to self-determination is the only solution to the Kashmir problem, and no other election or selection process is any alternative to that, the Hurriyat Conference (G), led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani, said in a statement. The separatist stance remains unchanged with

regard to the Assembly elections in 2014. The Chairman of the Hurriyat Conference (G), Syed Ali Shah Geelani, characterised the enthusiasm for elections in Kashmir as the result of the harsh policies of Indian policymakers and the selfish politics of mainstream Kashmiri leaders. Even talking about elections at a time when destructive floods have stolen everything from the Kashmiri people and when they are living in misery is sorrowful, he said. It proves that governments in New Delhi and Srinagar have nothing to do with the miseries of the people and are only concerned with their benefits. The major political parties have agreed to elections at a time when the Kashmiri people are in desperate need of relief and rehabilitation, according to Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, chairman of Hurriyat (M).

It is an intentional ploy to highlight Kashmir's apparent return to normalcy. Elections are not a substitute to the resolution of the long-pending problem in Kashmir, he continued. No elections have any importance in the valley unless the matter is settled in accordance with the wishes of its people. There was no pre-election alliance between any political parties, and all parties fought the elections on their own. However, the BJP had some understanding with Sajad Gani Lone, the chairman of the People's Conference, a former separatist who is now a prominent politician (the party is well-established in the Kupwara district of North Kashmir). On November 10, 2014, Mr. Lone met with Prime Minister Narendra Modi to express his support for him. The two talked about Sajad's potential for joining forces with the BJP following the Jammu and Kashmir assembly elections. Lone praised the PM, saying, Modi was so kind-hearted that it was difficult to tell whether I was seeing the Indian PM or my older brother. Examining the important issues in the Assembly elections. All of the major political parties released their election manifestos quickly after the election was called. Relief and restoration had been prioritized by all parties. The Congress party platform called for two powerful regional councils. However, the BJP's "Vision Document for Jammu and Kashmir" agenda had some starkly contrasting statements. The party was vocal about Article 370, but it also promised to rename the state Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh if elected to power, giving it a full identity. According to the party platform, renaming the state Jammu-Kashmir and Ladakh will give it a full sense of identity. If elected to power, the party would do this as soon as possible.

The celebration pledged to order 3 of the forty-six Assembly seats installation for the Kashmir valley for displaced Kashmiris (Kashmiri Pundits who left the valley when militancy broke out in 1989-1990). Additionally, it pledged to reserve five of the twenty-four seats left vacant for Kashmir under Pakistani administration for refugees (PAK). The party

refers to development as its *TIME* model and has made it the centrepiece of its electoral platform. Tourism, infrastructure, modernization, and empowerment are all abbreviated as “TIME”. Considerations regarding the BJP's electoral strategy The BJP sought to carefully develop a strategy, but it seemed desperate in its attempt to win its first Assembly seat in the Kashmir valley. First, the party employed a policy that can be called a "sectarian division" or polarisation. The party's election campaign focused on wooing the votes of Shia voters in the state, as well as Hindu voters in Jammu, Kashmiri Pandits, Sikhs, Pabaris, and Gujjars. the party is developing a plan to win over the Gujjars, Shias, the Sikh community, and the valley's Pahari-speakers. These communities have already responded positively to us. The party's core team, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and party president Amit Shah, deployed a team of 150 IT experts, poll strategists, party organizational members from various wings, and other experts with a successful track record in all three regions of the state to conduct background research on each and every constituency and the murky areas therein to assist the party in completing its task of forming its government. The BJP concentrated on themes including the repeal of Article 370, the relocation of west Pakistani refugees, and improving conditions for Jammu and Ladakh in order to mobilise its supporters. Political parties ran aggressive campaigns throughout the election.

The BJP and the PDP expected to repeat their strong performance, but the ruling NC-Congress coalition decided not to establish a pre-election alliance after being completely defeated in the recently held legislative elections. The BJP maintained leads in twenty-four of the thirty-seven assembly segments in the Jammu area during the recently ended parliamentary elections, while the PDP held a lead in forty-two of the forty-six assembly segments in the Kashmir region. The BJP, meanwhile, was keen to connect with Kashmiris (especially Kashmiri Pandits, who were in good numbers in some constituencies in Srinagar and, if the boycott prevailed, they were the deciders). It did everything possible to achieve that. The BJP set itself the goal of a Mission 44+ plan during the just ended legislative elections while riding the Modi wave—the number of votes a party needs to be able to establish a government on its own. Narendra modi, Amit shah & Rajnath singh addressed the election rallies in Kashmir to inspire voters in support of their Mission 44+ in order to accomplish this goal. Prime Minister Modi spoke at a public gathering in Vijapur, Jammu, and said: Since 1947, the state's successive governments have treated Jammu unfairly and have never shown concern for this community's residents. To gain control of Jammu and Kashmir, the Congress party has deftly switched sides with the NC and PDP. He added that

the state had experienced both father-son and father-daughter governance throughout the years. They have encouraged nepotism and made the state the most corrupt. The Prime Minister spoke at an election rally that same day in Srinagar at the Sheri Kashmir Cricket Stadium and said: Regarding armed insurrection, many people have taken numerous ways over the past 30 years, but nothing has worked; nothing has been successful. I want to advise them to eschew those routes and take the vikas route instead (development). Sab ka saath, sab ka vikaas (everyone's development, everyone's assistance) is my mission statement. The only remedy is to develop.

The only thing that can help the people of Kashmir escape all of their problems is this. Further, he claimed that J&K has been destroyed by three families: the Congress, the father-son party (National Conference), and the father-daughter party (Peoples Democratic Party). They made sure of everything for themselves while allowing others to suffer. I implore you to expel all three families from the state so that I may assist you. To advance JK's growth, I will make use of my entire government. The mainstream parties NC, PDP, and Congress started an intensive campaign against Modi and the BJP on the one hand while pleading with the separatists to reconsider their boycott call since it would benefit the BJP out of their fear of the growth of a Modi-led BJP in the Kashmir. The separatists themselves even encouraged people to be alert of the BJP and its Hard-core separatist Syed Ali Shah Geelani made a passionate plea to all religious leaders and clerics to inform people about the wicked plans of the BJP and their anti-Islamic. They are working diligently to gain access into the state with all of their resources, including power, money, and material, and in order to do this, they are running their election campaign with the assistance of certain stooges from Kashmir and elsewhere. We caution our people against their wicked intentions and implore them to exercise caution and wariness around the BJP, which is ruthlessly intent on exploiting religious sensitivities while feigning sympathy for the Muslim majority. The BJP uses religion as a tool. Other separatist leaders did not respond negatively to the statement, thus it was interpreted as a sign of softness in their call for an election boycott. This led to the generally held belief that the BJP needed to be restrained, which implied that people should vote. The masses of Jammu and Kashmir might supply a befitting respond to any tries at communalizing the situation, undermining the state's authority, or diluting the constitutional stance, PDP patron Mufti Mohammad Sayeed said while addressing a rally in Pulwama. PDP will thwart plans to weaken the state's distinctive identity with the help of the populace. Sonia Gandhi, the head of the UPA and the president of the Congress, spoke at an election

rally in Kashmir's Bandipora area and urged, Save the state's secular and unified cultural character. By supporting the Congress, you can stop the communal forces from erasing the nation's social and cultural identity. Analysis of the outcome a hung assembly resulted from the elections. The PDP won the most seats, with twenty-eight, followed by the BJP with twenty-five, the NC with fifteen, and the Congress with twelve. It is significant to note that the PDP won numerous seats that the NC previously held, while the BJP gained seats at the expense of the Congress in Jammu.

All of the twenty-five seats gained by the BJP come from the Jammu region, and nineteen of those seats came from Jammu's predominantly Hindu neighbourhood's. The result demonstrated the growth of the Hindu vote and the influence of Modi's charm in the area. In the Chenab Valley and Pir-Panchal regions, in which Muslim votes had been cut up among the NC, the PDP, and the Congress party while the Hindu vote concentrated in favour of the BJP, the BJP made significant gains by capturing six out of thirteen seats. However, the fact that it failed to take even one seat in the Kashmir Valley was a serious political loss. The Modi wave was to blame for the Congress' whitewash in the Jammu region, according to Taj Mohi-ud Din, a senior minister in the NC-Congress coalition government. Call it division, the Modi wave, the Hindutva wave, or whatever you want; it was the primary cause of the Congress's humiliation in Jammu. The loss of both the major and little guns in J&K politics was hampered by the anti-incumbency sentiment in the Valley. There were frantic negotiations to establish a government because no political party was able to do so on its own. Both the NC and Congress provided the PDP with unqualified backing in order to fend off the BJP. While declaring his intention to assist PDP, Omar Abdullah, the working president of the National Conference, said, I do not rule out or rule in anything, but it is for PDP to contact me. A Grand Alliance of the PDP, NC, and Congress was proposed by Ghulam Nabi Azad, a former chief minister of the state from the Congress party. A grand alliance was initially suggested by the PDP, but it was eventually rejected on the grounds that the mandate was hostile to both parties. Additionally, the PDP made it clear that it respects the will of the Jammu and Kashmiri people. Arun Jaitley, the union finance minister, claimed that the BJP has the first right to form the government in J&K because it received the biggest vote share in the assembly elections. In addition, the BJP officially stated that to keep it out of power would be to violate Jammu's mandate. Additionally, it stated that it is in contact with both the NC and PDP and is eager to work with them. Amit Shah, the president

of the BJP, stated that his organization has been in talks with the PDP and NC regarding the formation of a government in Jammu and Kashmir.

It should be noted that creating a coalition with the BJP, a party whose ideologies are completely at odds with those of the NC and PDP, was not simple. The NC was compelled to drop the plan due to internal conflict about joining the BJP, which made room for the PDP. Despite this, it took two months for the PDP-BJP alliance to come into being as both parties participated in negotiations to resolve their disagreements on divisive topics. After reaching a settlement, the Common Minimum Programme (CPM), commonly known as the Agenda of the Alliance, was developed. It excludes divisive topics and focuses on inclusive governance and state development. The PDP, for its part, modified its stance on the repeal of AFSPA as the BJP did with regard to a rotational chief minister (agreeing to have Mufti Mohammed Sayeed serve a full term), the abrogation of Article 370, and the settlement of West Pakistani refugees. Finally, PDP supporter Mufti Mohammad Sayeed assumed the position of state's chief minister for the full six years on March 1, 2015. It has been abundantly obvious since the start of this administration that the BJP's staunchly Hindutva agenda has endeavoured to racially polarize every topic.

The BJP opposed the alliance from the day of the oath-taking on instead of acting as a responsible coalition partner. The issue of the AFSPA's revocation was the first contentious point that brought the disagreements to the fore. Two suicide strikes by militants against security forces in Jammu occurred in March. After some time, a second assault on police occurred in Kashmir's Shopian area. The attacks happened at a time when the AFSPA's cancellation was a hot topic. Following these assaults, the state's chief minister, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, reaffirmed his intention to get the contentious law removed from various parts of the state. The Jammu BJP lawmakers, however, disputed the CM's declaration in the Assembly the very following day. With anti-Pakistani chants and woven posters reading No to AFSPA repeal, they stormed into the House's well.

The return and resettling of Kashmiri Pandits is another divisive topic that caused coalition partners to clash (who migrated en masse in the 1990s following the insurgency). The central government has instructed the chief minister to expedite the process of finding land for KP townships in response to the BJP's demand for a separate homeland. As reported in the media, the state administration concurred. However, the idea has received harsh criticism and has been dubbed a conspiracy, not only by mainstream and separatist parties but also by some Kashmir Pandit organizations (especially those who did not move out of

Kashmir). Worried about unrest in Kashmir While denying any Israeli-style settlement for Pandits, Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed said on the state Assembly floor: I want to emphasize that there is no proposal for a separate homeland (for Kashmiri Pandits). There shouldn't be any commotion or rumors that separate immigrant communities are being built. We won't make any decisions in a hurry. In order to implement the return of KPs, we will involve all parties. The BJP expressed its disagreement with the claims by stating that the party formally favors a separate homeland and adequate protection for KPs. After meeting with the CM about the matter, Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh declared that the centre will not abandon separate settlements for KPs (ibid.). Sunil Sethi, the top spokesperson for the BJP, said: Clusters are temporarily required in the valley because you cannot send KPs to their houses to get them killed.

The third issue that has led to major unrest in Kashmir and the loss of hundreds of lives is Masrat Alam's release and subsequent re-arrest. Masrat was jailed in 2010 on suspicion of organizing pro-freedom agitation and igniting the anti-government protests that year, which led to the deaths of 110 civilians. After his release, coalition partners PDP and BJP got into a heated argument, with the PDP arguing that the Supreme Court had contested his continuing imprisonment as justification for the release. The BJP saw it as showing weakness to anti-nationals. Amit Shah, the party president, even threatened to leave the coalition if the country's security was jeopardized. It was utterly absurd on the part of the BJP to criticize the PDP and not accept the judgment, given that he was released on the Supreme Court's instruction and that the orders for his release were issued during the governor's administration.

Ironically, the BJP very carefully joins the jingoistic national media to mock the PDP by assigning all the responsibility to it, protecting its (communal) reputation in the rest of India. Being forced to vouch for their allegiance to India, the PDP being referred to as a separatist party, and Mufti Mohammad Sayeed being called to as a pro-Pakistan and pro-separatist Chief Minister are all worrying. Additionally, the BJP politicians were supporting agitators, vehemently rejecting the policies of the government they are a part of, and even grilling their PDP counterparts to see how loyal they were. Although it is too soon to anticipate how this coalition will develop, the PDP needs to go back to the drawing board and reconsider their approach. It appears that hardline Hindutva is exerting pressure on soft separatism, making it impossible for it to survive. The coalition members currently appear to lack enough trust and to hold divergent ideologies on state-related matters. The situation

between the two coalition members has gotten worse with the passing of Mufti Mohammad Sayed, and maintaining this partnership for another six years will be a tremendous job. Soon after Mufti Sayed's passing, there was a resumption of communication inside and between parties. The coalition was in a terrible state of crisis, and immediately after Mufti Sayed's passing, the PDP embarked on a process to map out the partnership's future course of action because little progress had been made on the agenda of alliance during his leadership. Even though an assessment of the coalition's objectives revealed little, power politics won out, and Mehbooba Mufti's PDP decided to keep the collaboration going.

The state leadership of the BJP and its cadre has grown increasingly adamant throughout this time. This was most apparent during the 2016 summer uprising, when the BJP refused to hold talks with the Hurriyat despite widespread protests, killings, blind cases due to pellet gun use, and months of lockdown and even distanced and mocked the PDP and Mehbooba Mufti for sending an invitation to Hurriyat leaders during a visit by a parliamentary delegation led by the home minister to break the impasse. The BJP's attempt to impose its agenda on the state and the divisions amongst the coalition partners peaked during the Assembly session in January 2017. On January 30, 2017, Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti said that anyone attempting to weaken Article 370, which affords the state special status, are committing the most heinous anti-national act, despite numerous BJP politicians asking for its abolition. She went on to say that this is part of a conspiracy against our state and culture. BJP officials like Ravinder Raina stirred up controversy in the Assembly over the chief minister's assertion that Article 370 is scamming the people of state and that the party's basic philosophy is to repeal it. They even demanded that the speech be struck from Assembly records. The PDP is currently finding it extremely difficult to oppose the BJP's aggressive attempts to impose its communal agenda on state politics. It is causing a significant rift and a mood of suspension throughout the state. In reality, a lot of critics have linked the BJP's attempts to impose a sectarian agenda on the state with the surge in militancy and popular uprisings.

4.10. Recent Developments since 2019

Revocation Article 370 and its aftermath: The distinct status provided to state under Article 370 of Constitution was removed by the union government on August 5, 2019, through a number of significant actions. Virtual lockdown was imposed on the Kashmir Valley, with all lines of contact shut off and leaders being placed in preventive detention at

home. Under the authority of Article 370, Indian President Ram Nath Kovind signed an order that repealed the previous Presidential Order. The Jammu and Kashmir Union Territory would have a unicameral legislature (only legislature assembly), whereas Ladakh would have no legislature, according to the Reorganisation Bill that Home Minister Amit in the Indian Parliament. The Rajya Sabha, being the upper house of union legislature, debated and approved the motion calling for the repeal of the special status via bill for the state's reorganization on August 5, 2019, with 125 (67%) votes in favour and 61 (33%) votes against.

The Lok Sabha discussed and approved the reorganization bill on August 6 with 370 (86%) votes in favor and 70 (14%) votes in contradiction of, and the resolve requesting its cancellation received 351 votes in favor and 72 votes in contradiction of. The BBC states that Article 370 of the constitution may only be changed with the approval of the state. "But Jammu and Kashmir hasn't had share of administration for over a year at this point. The legality of the revocation is a topic of disagreement among constitutional experts. The revocation resolution was criticized by some international human rights organizations. Many nationalists, on the other hand, rejoiced, saying that this might bring peace and investment" to this region. Numerous significant regional parties, which often opposed the BJP, endorsed the action as well. The Ladakh Buddhist community applauded the decision as well, saying that after years of being disregarded, they may now be "owners of our own future.

Historical Context: The Article 370 grants state a distinct status. The clause granted state autonomy over the state's internal administration, a distinct constitution, and a state flag. After the state was founded, following discussions in the state's Constituent Assembly, the 1954 Presidential Order, which identified the parts of the Indian Constitution which applied to the state, was issued. The Constituent Assembly dissolved itself without adopting the removal of Article 370, which was believed to have been incorporated permanently into the Indian Constitution.

In accordance with this and Article 35A, citizens of the Jammu and Kashmir state are subject to different laws than citizens of other Indian states, including laws governing citizenship, property ownership, and fundamental rights. Between 1954 and 2011, India extended the Indian constitution to Jammu and Kashmir despite the support of the state administration and reduced the autonomy of the state by issuing presidential decrees under the terms of Article 370. These directives were issued by locally chosen governments in states, such as the ones from the National Conference, and many federal administrations presided over by the Indian National Congress party.

The Kashmir dispute also involves these earlier presidential decrees made in accordance with Article 370. The 1954 Presidential decree and following orders, in the words of Sumantra Bose, a political science expert well-known for his research on Kashmir, signaled the beginning of the end for Article 370, and it has essentially been dead in letter and spirit since that time. The Jan Sangh organizations in India have claimed that Jammu and Kashmir is an essential, inseparable component of India ever since India and Pakistan were divided along religious lines. The merger of Jammu and Kashmir was one of the Bharatiya Janata Party's election manifesto commitments for the 2019 Indian general election. A resounding majority in the Lok Sabha was obtained by the BJP and its allies.

India's president issued an order on August 5, 2019, repealing the one from 1954 that applied the Indian Constitution's full text to Jammu and Kashmir. After the resolutions were approved by both houses of the legislature, the President of India issued another decree on August 6 declaring all of Article 370's clauses—except for section 1—ineffective elements of law. On October 17, 1949, a temporary clause called Article 370 was added to the Indian Constitution, giving the state of Jammu and Kashmir exceptional constitutional authority.

As a result, the state was only subject to the requirements of Article 1 and Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Therefore, the state government's concurrence was required for the central government to extend the coverage of a central legislation to the state on topics covered by the Instrument of Accession (IoA), but not for the extension of the coverage of laws on other topics. In a similar vein, Article 35A of the Indian Constitution, which was established by constitutional decree in 1954, gave state legislatures the power to designate permanent inhabitants. The state provided property rights, work opportunities, scholarships, and other social benefits to those who were considered permanent residents.

The government's chosen course of action: The Indian Supreme Court determined in April 2018 that Article 370 had become permanent as a result of the dissolution of the state constituent assembly. Despite the fact that Article 370 is still a part of the constitution, the Indian government decided to make it inoperative in order to get around this legal problem. The Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 2019, which replaced the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954, was issued by the president on August 5. Following the 1954 order, 47 presidential orders between February 11, 1956, and February 19, 1994 were issued, which made a number of other parts of the Indian

Constitution applicable to Jammu and Kashmir. Without a Constituent Assembly, all of these directives were issued with the concurrence of the executive of the state.

According to Jill Cottrell, some of these presidential directives were sent when the president was in charge of the state and there was no Kashmir administration at all. The state of Jammu and Kashmir now has access to 260 of the 395 articles of the Indian Constitution and 94 of the 97 subjects listed in the Union List, according to presidential orders made between 1954 and 1994. According to the presidential decree from August 2019, Jammu & Kashmir was subject to all of the Indian Constitution's clauses. The two constitutions of Jammu and Kashmir were virtually annulled, while all Indian states were granted access to the single text. The President gave the order with the support of the state government of Jammu and Kashmir. Due to the fact that Jammu and Kashmir remained then under President's Rule, this effectively indicated that the governor had granted his or her approval. The choice was taken in line with Article 370's third clause, which gave the Indian President the power to declare the article inoperative with modifications and exclusions following a recommendation by the state constituent assembly, which didn't exist. In order to circumvent the legal issue of the absent state constituent assembly, the president cited Clause (I) of Article 370, which gives him the power to change the Indian Constitution with reference to subjects related to Jammu and Kashmir. In order to start, he changed Article 367, which is concerned with constitutional interpretation. The State Constituent Assembly was replaced with the State Legislative Assembly. The judgment notes that since the state legislative assembly has been suspended, all references to it should be understood as referrals to the governor of Jammu and Kashmir. The governor is chosen by the federal government. The state legislature has become the Indian Parliament as a result.

In response, the Home Minister suggested a Rajya Sabha resolution that would grant the President the necessary consent to abolish Article 370. The bill for the state's reorganization and the statutory resolution calling for the withdrawal of its special status within Article 370 were considered and adopted by the Rajya Sabha on August 5, 2019, with 125 (67%) votes in favor and 61 (33%) votes against. On August 6, the Lok Sabha debated and passed the reorganization bill with 370 (86%) votes in support and 70 (14%) voted against it, while 351 votes were cast in favor of and 72 against the motion calling for its repeal.

Limitations put in place by the government: The Ministry of Home Affairs gave authorization for sending 1000's soldiers into the state prior to the status's revocation, claiming the need to preserve the region's law and order. The Pakistani Army and terrorists were planned to escalate violence, according to the Indian Army, on August 2. They were also targeting the Yatra. Foreign and domestic visitors as well as students were asked to leave Jammu & Kashmir by the Indian government. Suspicions that India might soon withdraw special status were aroused by these acts. Omar Abdullah, however, said on August 3 that Governor S. P. Malik assured him there was no movement in progress to amend Article 35A of the Constitution, initiate delimitation, or trifurcate. The security troops in central, north, and south Kashmir received satellite phones on August 4. Following that, the authorities imposed a complete blackout on all forms of communication, including cable TV, landlines, smartphones, and the internet. An effective curfew was reported by numerous news sources. Administrators of the district and medical professionals were advised to wait on call.

A Section 144 curfew was in place before the 5 August announcement of the revocation throughout the Buddhist- and Hindu-dominated Ladakh region, the Kashmir Valley, and Jammu region. According to The Guardian, residents are used to curfews and living under a heavy security presence in the Srinagar, where the current lockdown was even more severe. Roads were blocked by concrete blocks every few hundred meters. All businesses, clinics, and educational institutions were shut down, and Jammu and Kashmir was placed on red alert. On August 10, 2019, the government lifted the Section 144 curfew and resumed regular school hours in various areas of the Jammu region. Numerous Indian media agencies claimed they lacked any incoming news from valley were unable to even determine whether or not their reporters were safe. Curfew passes weren't given to journalists. Though as of August 5, 2019, it was unclear whether he was still in custody. Many journalists said that military had stopped them, while others claimed that they had to send images via USB drives outside of the state. I fear that they will arrest journalists, especially those who will report what is happening, a local journalist told CPJ. At least two journalists were later reported to have been detained amid the unrest in Jammu & Kashmir by CPJ.

Other than a few blocks in Srinagar's metropolis, publishing supervisor of many publications and television stations also expressed concern that their staff had not been able to bring in dispatches from the Valley. But according to Navika Kumar, managing editor Times Now English, her channel had not experienced much limitation transmitting from

Kashmir, and correspondents were submitting feeds through satellite-linked external distribution vans. K. Duha, a has criticised The Times Now and other media organisations in India for being conformist and acting like they are terrified of the government. To stop any protest or breakout of violence, it was reported that more than 4,000 Kashmiri demonstrators, including numerous leaders, had been detained by August 18. By August 9, this amount was approximately 500. many politicians including ex-chief ministers were among other booked under preventive detention.

Attempts to Bring Services Back: B. V. R. Subrahmanyam, the chief secretary for Jammu and Kashmir, declared on August 16 that the government would gradually ease the lockdown and some restrictions in the Kashmir Valley. Reuters reports that on August 16, 2019, phone service was restored in several areas of Srinagar. Subrahmanyam stated that landline phone service would return to majority of Srinagar by August 18, 2019. Schools in the valley will resume classes the week of August 19, 2019. However, some media outlets claimed that kids didn't even go to school when several schools in the valley opened. In accordance with Subrahmanyam, twelve of the 22 districts had been functioning smoothly, and precautions had been taken to guarantee that no one was killed or seriously injured on either side. Keeping in mind the on-going threat from extremist organisations, the statement reads, telecom connectivity will be relaxed and restored in a staggered way. In most areas of the Kashmir Valley as of August 25, 2019, landline lines have been reinstated.

Criticism: The blackest day of Indian democracy, according to Mehbooba Mufti, the chief minister of state. She believed that the Jammu and Kashmiri people had everything taken away by the Indian Parliament. On August 4, 2019, she claimed in a tweet that the leadership of Jammu and Kashmir's decision to go with India rather than the two-nation theory in 1947 had backfired. Omar Abdullah, a former chief minister, referred to the government's decision regarding Article 370 as unilateral and disturbing. When Jammu and Kashmir joined India in 1947, he saw it as a complete violation of the faith that the people of Jammu and Kashmir had reposed in it.

Shah Faesal, a politician from Kashmir, criticised the action, referring to it as the Indian state's worst betrayal in the previous 70 years. Omar Abdullah, Mehbooba Mufti, and Sajjad Gani Lone could not be reached or messaged. Curfew is stricter in other districts. You may claim that the eight million people are more incarcerated than ever before, additionally,

she called the withdrawal of Jammu and Kashmir's special status an insult to the people's dignity in an interview with *The Guardian*. It will have an impact both now and afterwards, in my opinion. In the following days, there will be a ground mobilisation, and over time, the feeling of alienation will grow and eventually explode. The recurring theme is that everything is over. We have had everything taken from us. These are the lines that nowadays can be seen on the lips of any Kashmiri. We are left with no option except to fight back. On August 14, 2019, Faesal was reportedly taken into custody by security forces, prompting a statement from over 100 alumni of Harvard University.

Support: Jamyang Tsering Namgyal, the Lok Sabha representative for the Ladakh seat, applauded the repeal of Article 370 and the proposal to create a distinct Ladakh union territory in the hopes that these actions will promote economic growth and job creation. In Kashmir, he continued, If our progress, political aspirations, identity, or language were lost, it was due to Article 370, and the Congress party is to blame for that. Namgyal added that all of Ladakh, including Kargil, supported the action. The Ladakh Buddhist Association applauded the decision to repeal Article 370 and create a union territory in Ladakh. The revocation and reorganisation will enable the Buddhist population in Leh and Ladakh to take control of their own destiny, which they claim has long been overlooked. According to the reports, there had been celebrations throughout Jammu, with people giving out sweets, dancing, and playing drums. Representatives of the Kashmiri Hindu community, which numbers between 300,000 and 400,000 individuals, applauded the move and expressed hope that members of their group, who were forced to leave the Kashmir Valley because of persistent violence. Ladakh declared August 15 to be its first independence day. In appreciation of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and in remembrance of the four young activists who lost their lives while advocating for union territory status, banners have been raised. The Gujjar Bakarwals, Sikhs, Valmikis, and West Pakistani refugees—all of whom were affected by discriminatory laws—also observed similar celebrations in Jammu. Residents of Jammu believed that their city was consistently overlooked when it came to funding and resources, thus they anticipated that the restructuring would result in progress. Refugee Kashmiri Pandits in Jammu longed for recovery.

Responses within India and Criticism: The Indian President appeared to have acted hastily, according to historian Ramachandra Guha, and his resignation constituted a arbitrary misuse of state power. The Indian government's controversial decision to repeal Article 370 was

utterly and palpably unlawful, even fraudulent, according to constitutional scholar G. Noorani. A "showdown at India's Supreme Court" is imminent.

Amartya Sen, a Nobel Prize winner, criticised the administration and declared that he was not proud to be an Indian. The biggest opposition party in India, the Indian National Congress, has differing opinions on repealing Article 370. A few Congressmen, including Rajasthan's Chief Minister Ashok Gehlot, denounced the government's decision to detain Mehbooba Mufti and Omar Abdullah. The revocation was praised by Gehlot's cabinet and other Rajasthan Congress leaders.

Amarinder Singh, the chief minister of Punjab, claims that the repeal of Article 370 is absolutely unconstitutional and would establish a negative precedent since it would mean that the Center may reorganise any state in the country just by imposing the President's authority. The chief minister of Punjab also imposed a ban on all forms of celebration and protest in his state in relation to Article 370 and issued an order to beef up security for the roughly 8,000 Kashmiri students who attend Punjabi universities.

Rahul Gandhi called the detentions unconstitutional and undemocratic and criticised the Indian government for detaining the political leaders from Kashmir. Numerous protestors in New Delhi gathered to voice their opposition to decision, which they dubbed the death of Indian democracy. The protestors requested that the revisit its decision. The decision by the Indian government was referred to as an assault on the Indian constitution by Raja, Communist party leader.

Derek O'Brien and M. K. Stalin, leaders of the provincial Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam party in West Bengal and Tamil Nadu, respectively, opposed the revocation. O'Brien described the action as procedural harakiri, while Stalin saw it as the death of democracy.

Support for the revocation: In the BBC News, the withdrawal was constitutionally sound and no legal or constitutional problem can be discovered in it, according to constitutional expert Subhash C. Kashyap. In the Indian parliament, the repeal of Article 370 had overwhelming majority approval. It has gained backing from numerous other Indian political parties, many of which traditionally oppose the BJP, in addition to Hindu nationalist parties like the BJP. Senior members of the Congress openly endorsed the action. Former Haryana Chief Minister Bhupinder Singh Hooda endorsed the government's choice, claiming that the Congress party had lost its path.

Jyotiraditya Scindia, the deputy chief minister of Madhya Pradesh, agreed with the decision to repeal article 370. I support the decision to fully integrate Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh into India, he wrote on Twitter. In response to the party's stance on removing Jammu and Kashmir's special status, Bhubaneswar Kalita, the top whip for the Congress in the Rajya Sabha, resigned, stating, "The philosophy of Congress now seems like it is committing suicide and I do not want to be a part of it." The elimination of the limitations imposed by Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir was praised by Congressman Janardan Dwivedi, who asserted that notwithstanding its slowness, a historical error had been corrected. The head of the Bahujan Samaj Party, Mayawati, and Arvind Kejriwal, the leader of the Aam Aadmi Party and Delhi's chief executive, all backed the repeal of Article 370.

Mayawati gave a justification for her choice to back the revocation, claiming that now minorities can also get a breather from the abrogation. She claimed that Ambedkar's Buddhist adherents were joyful. Vijayasai Reddy, the parliamentary party leader of the YSR Congress Party, which has offices throughout Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, praised Amit Shah's decision to repeal Article 370 and called it courageous and bold. I must applaud the Home Minister & the Prime Minister because, with a firm execution of this, the citizens of J&K should be freed from all of this stress, able to live peacefully and integrate into the nation. The Jammu and Kashmir special status was also backed by the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam party, which has offices in Tamil Nadu and Odisha respectively.

Pakistan's Reaction against the Abrogation: The Foreign Office immediately released a testimonial saying, as a party to this international issue, Pakistan would take every legal action against the parliament's decision to overturn Article 370 of its constitution, which accords the Kashmir territory's unique privileges. It referred to the cancellation as a unilateral step and claimed that it went against previous UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. On August 6, 2019, following a conference of army commanders, and that it would continue to support them throughout their rightful battle. In order to discuss the situation, Pakistani President Arif Alvi called a joint emergency session of the National Assembly and the Senate. In a joint parliamentary session on August 7, a resolution was voted denouncing India's action as an illegal, unilateral, careless, and forceful endeavour to change Kashmir's disputed status as it is represented in UNSC resolutions.

Pakistan formally cut off trade ties with India on August 9 and forbade all exports and imports to/from India.

Imran Khan, the prime minister of Pakistan, compared the Indian government to Nazis on August 11, 2019, and said that silence on Kashmir would be equivalent to appeasing Hitler. He claimed that India was trying to employ ethnic cleansing to alter Kashmir's demographics, which are dominated by Muslims. He questioned whether, like it had done with Hitler, the world would watch and appease. In a statement released on Tuesday, August 13, 2019, Pakistan's foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi stated that he had written a letter to the head of the UN Security Council requesting the calling of an urgent council meeting to talk about India's unlawful acts that go against the UN's resolutions on Kashmir. The letter should be distributed to Security Council members, the foreign minister also demanded. The matter will be brought before the International Court of Justice, Pakistan said on August 20. It added that the focus of its case will be on alleged human rights breaches by India.

Meeting of the UN Security Council: At China's request, UNSC held a private discussion on Kashmir on August 16, 2019. Despite making presentations, Pakistan and India did not attend the meeting. Instead of convening an urgent conference, the Security Council instructed bilateral settlement on the issue. . From an Indian perspective, everything is starting over. The Chinese envoy said that the participants were concerned over India's "unilateral action," that would escalate tensions. The US even claimed that it was an internal affair of India, according to other diplomats, while the other permanent members of the Security Council, excluding China, continued to insist that it was a bilateral issue between Pakistan and India.

Australia: According to the Indian government, that issue is a domestic one, and we agree with them, according to Australia's high commissioner to India, Harinder Sidhu. Australia has always argued that the dispute over Kashmir should be settled bilaterally between India and Pakistan.

Canada: Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland stated that Canada is worried about the potential for an escalation, human rights breaches, and allegations of detentions.

China: Hua Chunying, a spokeswoman for the foreign ministry, was against the inclusion of the Ladakh Union Territory under Indian administrative control because it challenged

China's territorial sovereignty. In reference to disputed area along the China-India border, she continued, the action taken by India is unwelcome and will have no legal repercussions. Regarding Kashmir in general, Hua said, "The Kashmir dispute is a problem left over since the past between India and Pakistan. On August 9, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke with Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi. Following their conversation, Wang Yi stated that China is extremely worried about the ongoing violence and escalating tensions in Kashmir and that it continues to stand by the Pakistani side in defending its legal rights.

Germany: Maria Adebahr, a spokeswoman for the foreign ministry, said Germany was closely monitoring events in the area during a news briefing in Berlin. She asked the government to respect the civil rights guaranteed by the law and stated, We think that all further moves of the government must comply with India's Constitution. Adebahr continued, We are requesting that the Indian government engage in discourse with the populace that is concerned about its plans and objectives. Imran Khan, the prime minister of Pakistan, spoke with Angela Merkel, the chancellor of Germany, on August 24 regarding the situation in Kashmir. He emphasised his apprehensions for peace and security and urged the worldwide community to turn urgently.

Iran: According to Abbas Mousavi, a spokesperson for the foreign ministry, Iran is closely observing the recent acts of the Indian government towards Jammu and Kashmir and is paying great attention to the justifications offered by the Indian and Pakistani governments for the present occurrences. He made the remarks that were conveyed in quotations. Iran wants India and Pakistan to behave effectively to protect the interests of the local population by embracing peaceful means and dialogue, he added, as its regional allies and partners. On August 8, 2019, several Iranian students protested India's move to revoke the special status by demonstrating in front of the Indian embassy in Tehran.

Malaysia: According to a statement from the Foreign Ministry. Malaysia maintains cordial ties with both Pakistan and India. In order to de-escalate the current crisis and find a peaceful resolution, Malaysia invites the two close neighbours to resume discussion and negotiations.

The Maldives: According to a notarized statement by the state of Maldives, the decision made by the Government of India on Article 370 of the Indian Constitution is an internal affair. We think that each sovereign state has the authority to change its laws as needed. The Maldives also conveyed their position to Pakistan.

Poland: Poland, which was in charge of the UNSC presently, has suggested that both nations work bilaterally to resolve the contentious Kashmir problem. Adam Burakowski, the ambassador of Poland to India, said in a Monday interview with The Indian Express that "Poland believes that both countries can work out a mutually beneficial settlement bilaterally."

The Russian Federation: We anticipate that the differences between them will be addressed through bilateral political and diplomatic channels in accordance with the tenets of the Simla Agreement of 1972 and the Lahore Declaration of 1999, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The option was endorsed by Nikolay Kudashev, the Russian ambassador to India, who said that it was a sovereign choice made in line with the Constitution by India over Jammu and Kashmir. Our stance on the matter is exactly the same as India's stance.

The island nation of Sri Lanka: The abolition of Article 370 and the creation of the Ladakh into a union territory were hailed by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, who added, "I understand Ladakh will finally become a union territory." Thus becoming the first state in country with a Buddhist population of above 70%.

Thailand: Chutintorn Sam Gongsakdi, Thailand's ambassador to India, claimed that India's decision to abolish Article 370 and revoke Jammu and Kashmir's special status was a internal problem. Gongsakdi stated, Thailand does not meddle in the internal problems of our friendly countries, in an interview with ETV Bharat. We have consistently maintained that we sincerely hope the parties involved can work out any differences amicably and peacefully. We respect India's domestic issues; He claimed that he had given his capital the finest explanation possible position on the problems of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh.

United Arab Emirates' Emirates: Ahmed al-Banna, the UAE ambassador to India, supported the Indian government and declared we anticipate that the adjustments will promote greater stability and peace and strengthen social justice, security, and trust in the people's local government.

British Response: The Foreign and Commonwealth Office released the following statement, calling for peace in the area: We are closely monitoring developments and encourage appeals for the situation to stay peaceful both UN judgments and the fundamental freedoms of the Kashmiri people need to be upheld. Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn tweeted. Despite India's claim that Kashmir is an internal affair, US State Department.

Morgan Ortagus claimed that the US view has not changed and that Kashmir is still seen as a region that is subject to dispute. Additionally, she said, we are worried by allegations of detentions and urge respect for individual rights and discussion with those in impacted areas. She emphasised the necessity of bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan. According to US policy, Kashmir is a matter of bilateral concern between Pakistan and India, and it is left to these two nations to determine the scope and pace of negotiations. President Donald Trump promised to arbitrate the Pakistan-India Kashmir conflict, during the US visit of Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan in July 2019. Before attempting to eliminate the unique constitutional status of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian administration did not consult with or tell the US government.

Other World Organizations: European Union: The situation in the area is being closely watched by the European Union. Carlos Martn Ruiz de Gordejuela, the EU's foreign affairs spokesperson, said during a press conference that it was crucial to prevent any tension in Kashmir and the surrounding area from rising.

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC): The OIC's Contact Group on Jammu and Kashmir expressed serious concern over the local events and further criticised India's move as being illegitimate and unilateral.

United Nations : António Guterres, secretary-general of the UN, emphasized his concern over state limitations and added that they might worsen the human rights issues in the area. The secretary-general reminded stake holders of the Shimla Agreement from 1972, which called for the ultimate status to be resolved peacefully, and urged them to refrain from adopting acts that could undermine the status of Jammu and Kashmir. He advocated caution from both India and Pakistan.

Amnesty International: The Union government's decision, according to Amnesty International, is likely to inflame tensions in the area and heighten the likelihood of more human rights crimes, they said in response. The Indian Supreme Court's refusal to ease the limitations on Jammu and Kashmir was also noted, along with the statement that usage of pellet guns and other weapons is in defiance of international human rights principles.

Non-state parties: Taliban: The Taliban has reportedly warned Pakistan against intervening with US-Afghanistan negotiations and connecting them to the Kashmir situation, The New York Times. The Taliban assert that linking the Afghan and Kashmiri issues would not help

to resolve the current crisis since there is no connection between them and Afghanistan should not be used as a venue for international rivalry. According to a statement made by Zabiullah Mujahid for the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the Taliban also expressed their profound sadness regarding the revocation of Kashmir's autonomous status and urged both India and Pakistan to refrain from taking any actions that might lead to conflict and complications in the area as well as usurp Kashmiris' rights.

Series of Demonstrations and widespread protests

Valley of Kashmir: Over 10, 0000 persons demonstrated against the decision to withdraw Article 370 in Srinagar on August 9, according to a Reuter's report, with some demonstrators pelting stones at government security officers. Police responded by firing tear gas and pellets at the protesters to scatter them. On Friday, protests were reported. There were clashes between the demonstrators and Indian forces, which were accompanied by pellet gun assaults and the Indian army firing tear gas shells. According to some reports, bystanders have been severely injured and lacerated in the pellet gun attacks.

The Indian government described the Reuters article as totally false and wrong, but it did admit that a few sporadic protests in Srinagar and Baramulla, and none involved a throng of more than 20 individuals, took place after the Friday mosque services. The BBC's images, according to The Wire, contradict the official government claims. After Friday prayers, on August 9, 2019, the police opened fire and used tear gas to disperse protestors, according to the BBC. The Indian government's claim that the protest never took place is refuted by this witness report. According to Dilbag Singh, the DGP-JK, who spoke to Reuterson August 11, On Friday, while around 1,000 and 1,500 people arrived home from mosque prayers, several miscreants began throwing stones at security personnel. In response, security personnel fired back, striking the assailants, pump-action gun rounds were fired, injuring a few people. Reuter's reports that numerous people demonstrated in Srinagar on August 11 after the city's limitations were loosened over the weekend to allow residents to prepare for the Islamic holiday of Eid al-Adha by purchasing food and medications.

Regions of Jammu and Ladakh: According to India Today, people in the Jammu region, which has a majority of Hindus, organised widespread huge joyful demonstrations over a number of days, which included giving out candy, lighting firecrackers, and dancing.

Buddhist organizations in Ladakh applauded the repeal of Article 370's limitations and the designation of the Ladakh region as a distinct Union Territory. Residents of Leh and Matho delighted in their new status as Union Territories and commemorated August 15 as their day of independence from Kashmir. Demonstrations against the Union's decision to turn the predominantly Muslim Kargil district into a union territory.

World: violent protest erupted outside the Indian High Commission in London on Tuesday, September 3, 2019, when pro-Pakistan demonstrators threw eggs and stones at the embassy, causing property damage. I absolutely condemn this reprehensible behaviour and have raised this incident with the Metropolitan Police to take action, tweeted Sadiq Khan, the mayor of London, in response to the event. Following the incident, the UK's Metropolitan Police detained two people for causing criminal damage at the Indian High Commission.

On August 11, 2019, a sizable group of demonstrators marched through Toronto, Canada, in solidarity of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Protesters waved signs and screamed anti-government slogans. The event description claimed that Kashmiris are against India's unlawful rule or unilateral colonial encroachments. Indigenous people of Kashmir are sovereign and have the right to self-government.

On August 8, 2019, protesters in Calgary, Canada, gathered in front of the city hall to voice their opposition to the crackdown and solidarity for the residents of state. The protestors claimed that there were 800,000 military soldiers stationed in Kashmir, that communications and the Internet were down, and that they had no idea what was happening to their families.

On August 10, protesters assembled in front of the White House and encouraged the government to take further action to assist diffuses the situation. One of the Virginia demonstrators, who was born and raised in Srinagar, emphasised that the moment for mediation was now. He warned that India's revocation of Kashmir's autonomous status would change the region's demographics.

There have reportedly been numerous protests in Bangladesh over the modification of Jammu and Kashmir's autonomous status. Numerous demonstrations against the Indian action took place in Dhaka on August 6, according to Pakistan's Ab Takk News channel. Another demonstration against Narendra Modi and his repeal of Jammu and Kashmir's autonomy took place in Dhaka on August 7, 2019. On Thursday, August 8, 2019, a number of Kashmiri students from various educational institutions demonstrated at the University of Dhaka. After

Friday prayers, there were additional rallies on August 9, 2019, which were organised by the Kashmir Solidarity Council Bangladesh.

Bahrain, after Eid al-Adha prayers, an illegal demonstration was held in Bahrain. The nation's Interior Ministry's official Twitter account posted updates on the protestors' containment by the local police as well as the legal actions being taken against them. Religious meetings should not be used for political ends, according to Bahraini authorities. On August 9, 2019, demonstrations were staged in Paris, France, to protest the Indian government's decision to revoke Jammu and Kashmir's status as an autonomous region. The demonstrators claimed that India was planning to drive Kashmiris out of their homes and replace them with Hindu settlers from other regions of India in order to alter Kashmir's demographics.

In Melbourne, Australia, demonstrators in favour of and against India squared off. Despite the Pakistani community in Australia expressing great worry about the situation in Kashmir, Kashmiri Pandit groups applauded India's move. India has done this internally, according to Indian groups in Australia. On August 11, 2019, a crowd gathered outside Berlin's historic Pariser Platz near the Brandenburg Gate, waving Kashmiri flags and intonation, We demand freedom and Indian Army, go back demonstrators in Seoul, South Korea, who were holding Pakistani flags and yelling anti-Indian chants as well as insults to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, were confronted by a delegation from India, which included activist Shazia Ilmi. Shazia Ilmi and her companions were led away from the scene by the local police when the Indian delegation began to disperse the demonstrators.

4.11. Recent Developments in state since revocation of Article 370:

Delimitation Commission: What is delimitation? For electoral purposes, it is the act or process of establishing the borders of geographical constituencies in a nation or province with a legislative body. The Delimitation Commission or a Boundary Commission is tasked with delimitation. In India, the Delimitation Commission is a strong organisation whose decisions are binding. Its decisions cannot be contested in front of any court. On a date to be determined in this regard by the President of India, these orders take effect. Copies of its orders are presented to the relevant State and the House of the People, but no amendments are allowed.

Constitutional Provisions: In accordance with Article 82, the Parliament has the power to pass a delimitation act following each census. Article 170: This stipulates that following each census, the states will bifurcated into geographical areas in accordance with the Delimitation Act.

Functions: To set up constituency sizes and boundaries so that, to the greatest extent possible, the populations of all seats are equal. When their population is very large, seats for SC's & ST's are designated. When members of the Commission disagree, the decision of the majority is followed.

Composition: The following individuals make up the Delimitation Commission, which is selected by the President: former chief justice Supreme Court, chief electoral officer, responsible state election officials

Such delimitation commissions were established 4 times in India:

Delimitation Commission Act of 1952, enacted in 1952,

The Delimitation Commission Act of 1962, the 1972 Delimitation Act, and the 2002 Delimitation Act were all passed in 1963, 1973, and 2002, respectively.

- The Delimitation Commission, which includes Sh. Sushil Chandra, the Chief Election Commissioner,
- Sh. K. K. Sharma, the State Election Commissioner for JK-UT, as Ex-Officio members, met today to finalise the Delimitation Order for the Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir.
- The Delimitation Commission is headed by Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai, a retired Supreme Court of India judge.

Background Facts: To fully grasp the criticisms leveled at the Delimitation Commission and the delimitation exercise it undertook in relation to the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, it is necessary to examine the Commission's recent past and background information.. The State of Jammu and Kashmir was released from its treaty responsibilities to the British on August 15, 1947, and was granted the status of an independent state (it is being reduced to a UT through a bill that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional). According to the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution Act of 1939, the Maharaja, the country's ruler, was the keeper of

all legislative, executive, and judicial authority. The Ruler chose to remain independent while maintaining cordial ties with both of the two dominions that established on August 15, 1947, rather than joining either of them. On October 27, 1947, he made the decision to retain control over all other matters while acceding to the Dominion of India in three areas: communications, foreign affairs, and defence. Both the accession and the conditions outlined in the Instrument of Accession were accepted. As India's Constitution was being drafted, it was agreed to include a clause promising Jammu and Kashmir limited sovereignty, as pledged before accepting accession. The Constitution's Article 370 served as the constitutional guarantee. The Indian Constitution was only accepted by the Ruler inasmuch as it applied to the state on November 17, 1949. It is important to remember that on this date, only Article 370 of the Constitution was in effect, and as a result, the state was covered by Article 1. While establishing a system for dividing authority between the Union and state governments, Article 370 also authorised a constituent assembly to draught a separate constitution for the state that would, among other things, outline the Union and state governments' respective spheres of influence.

In April 1951, the State Constituent Assembly met. However, some pressing constitutional issues, including as citizenship, the monarchy, fundamental rights, and residuary powers, could not wait for the state constitution to be written and put into effect and needed to be resolved right away. In 1952, the Union Government and State Government accordingly reached a compromise known as the Delhi Agreement that covered all of these crucial issues. While expanding citizenship, fundamental rights, Supreme Court jurisdiction, emergency powers, etc., the Agreement also safeguarded the state's residual sovereignty or internal autonomy. The state was given the right to pass laws on any issues that had not been given to the union. Thus, Article 370 by itself did not grant Jammu and Kashmir special constitutional status; nevertheless, the Delhi Agreement of 1952 also guaranteed Jammu and Kashmir's special status or internal autonomy, which was separate from Article 370. On November 26, 1956, the State Constitution was approved by the Constituent Assembly. The law went into force on January 26, 1957. Senior politicians from all political parties praised the start of the state constitution. The state constitution reaffirmed and outlined Jammu and Kashmir's internal autonomy, commonly known as its special constitutional status.

The establishment of assembly constituencies fell under the sole purview of the state under the mechanism developed to control constitutional ties between the Union and state.

The State Legislature — State Legislature Composition is covered in Part VI of the State Constitution.

The Jammu and Kashmir Representation of Peoples Act 1957 was passed by the State Legislature in accordance with its authority under Section 47 of the State Constitution. After each census was completed, the Act called for the establishment of a Delimitation Commission to draw the boundaries of the territorial constituencies. The JK's Representation of Peoples Act gave the Delimitation Commission the authority to delimit Assembly seats in 1963, 1973, and 1995. After the change to Article 170 and the inclusion of the provision that the demarcation of assembly seats should wait until the numbers for the first census conducted after the year 2026 had been released, a similar revision was made to the state constitution. As a result, Section 3 of the Jammu and Kashmir Representation Act, 1957, was revised. Thus, the delimitation effort was comparable to that for the rest of the nation and was scheduled to be completed once the census data for 2031 was available.

As many as 10 petitions, the majority of which were submitted to the Hon. Supreme Court in August 2019 itself, have questioned all of the actions taken on August 5 and 6, 2019, namely C.O. 272, C.O. 273, and the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, alleging that they are flagrantly unconstitutional, and thus violates against the soul of the constitution, and cannot withstand judicial scrutiny.

The petitioners have questioned the constitutionality of the CO 272 and CO 273 Orders as well as the Reorganisation Act 2019 based on strong and convincing arguments. It has been a pleasure for the Honorable Supreme Court to consider, admit, and refer the petitions to the five-judge Constitutional Bench of the Honorable Court. The COVID-19 Pandemic prevented and delayed the hearing after the Hon'ble Five Judge Constitutional Bench ordered the clubbing of all these petitions. The bench has heard the subject a few times. The physical hearing has been resumed, and it is anticipated that the matters will be available and heard soon.

Threshold objections: The Hon'ble Delimitation Commission must keep in mind that the laws that govern its formation, its application, and the source of its authority are all suspect from a constitutional standpoint. The country's highest constitutional court is currently reviewing these laws to determine whether they are constitutional or not.

The fundamental principles of constitutional ethics, morality, and propriety in a constitutional rule of law are basic, such as ours, demand that all branches of government, all

state functionaries, government and semi-government statutory bodies and institutions, including this Hon'ble Commission, refrain from implementing, acting upon, or exercising powers under a law that is being subject to judicial scrutiny, the constitutional validity and vires of which are being examined by the Hon'ble Commission. The Hon'ble Chairperson of the Commission is well aware of the fundamental rule that implementation of laws on the grounds of ultra vires and unconstitutionality and are being examined by the Constitution Bench should be avoided because doing so could amount to disregard and could foreshadow the outcome of the case. She also loves the Bench. Therefore, in our humble opinion, the Honourable Commission should postpone the current delimitation effort and wait for the Honourable Supreme Court's decision.

The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, requires that the Hon'ble Commission, established under the Delimitation Act, 2002, delimit the constituencies of the UT of JK. The Honorable Commission would appreciate it if the following inquiries in petitions currently before the Honorable Supreme Court were addressed: We must keep in mind that we are federal under the Constitution of India, so it is unclear whether downgrading a state and dividing it into two or more Union Territories is permitted. Dismembering a state would be illegal and unconstitutional since it would undermine the federal character of the nation, which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has deemed to be the foundation of the Constitution. This is a much more severe matter. Was it legal for the President to suspend Article 3 provisos 1 and 2 in the exercise of his or her exceptional and emergency powers under Article 356 when the suspended provisions had nothing to do with maintaining a smooth administration under the presidential rule? The split and downgrading of the state is presumed but not acknowledged to be feasible, regardless of whether or not the constitutional safeguards and procedures involved in the exercise of powers under Article 3 were adhered to and carefully implemented, if at all. Whether or not the Delimitation Act of 2002 is applicable to JK legally as well.

The Hon'ble Commission must immediately halt its proceedings until a ruling on the group of applications contesting the Chief Minister's Order (C.O.) 272 of 2019-08-05 and the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act. The aforementioned problems, and any others like them that may arise while the petitions are being heard by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, are fundamental jurisdictional questions at the heart of the matter. The Constitution cannot be changed by either Parliament or any other governing body. As at this moment; the State Constitution is in effect. After the first census results after 2026 are released, delimitation is provided. The Jammu and

Kashmir Representation of Peoples Act of 1957 also allows for delimitation following the release of the census results in 2031. After the first census after 2026 is published, the country's Assembly and Parliamentary Constituencies will be established. Therefore, from all perspectives, the delimitation procedure must be postponed until the census results for 2031 are released. There is no justification for deferring a delimitation exercise to the release of the 2031 census results for Jammu and Kashmir when the underlying rationale and all pertinent criteria support doing so. Jammu & Kashmir must benefit from what is good for the entire nation. This truth needs to be acknowledged by the Commission, especially since it has postponed the Assam delimitation exercise itself.

The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act 2019 called for increasing numbers, and since additional seats had to be assigned, it was necessary to conduct the delimitation process more than ten years ahead of the rest of the country. The reasoning is, to put it mildly, flawed. In accordance with the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act of 2014, there will be an increase of 50 Assembly seats in Andhra Pradesh and 34 Assembly seats in Telangana. The increase had little impact on redistricting, and the Assembly elections were held without a further round of redistricting. There is no intention to carry out any delimitation exercises prior to the nation's delimitation once the results of the 2031 census have been made available. Elections in Assam were held without delimitations, despite the fact that the process had begun with the creation of the Delimitation Commission. In this light, per Article 170 of the State Constitution and Section 47's foresight, it would be prudent to halt the delimitation exercise and resume it simultaneously with a similar procedure in the nation adhering to the announcement of the outcomes of the first census after 2026. The present delimitation suggests that Jammu and Kashmir's Assembly election might be conducted in a manner analogous to that used in Andhra Pradesh, Assam, and Telangana. The forthcoming appeal of the Fifth and Sixth decisions before the Honorable Supreme Court would further justify, if not strongly suggest, the approach. The Parliament, in its wisdom, chose to postpone delimitation across the board until the publication of the 2031 census results. The decision was not changed, even though there were good reasons, as in the cases of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, to do so. Therefore, in the case of Jammu and Kashmir, the same standards must be observed.

Detailed Objections: The objections are made without affecting our steadfast stance that the current delineation process would amount to the execution of a law that is subject to judicial

review because the constitutional validity of the JKR Act 2019, C.O. 272, C.O. 273, and other measures taken in August 2019 is being contested and is being examined by the Judicial bench of the Honorable apex Court. The Draft Proposal has merely undergone cosmetic revisions, and the comments to Papers 1 and 2 through 6 have not been addressed. Therefore, in addition to the new response, the previously submitted objections must be restated.

Assembly Constituencies: Democracy is a system in which territorial constituencies are defined at regular intervals. Equal involvement in decision-making and governance through their representatives, as well as equal representation for the people in institutions that make laws, are the cornerstones of democracy. Given its significance in enhancing democracy, the delimitation process must be neutral, impartial, and fair. It is essential to closely adhere to the legal framework and defined standards in order to ensure justice, objectivity, and impartiality. Criteria should be developed in accordance with existing principles where none are stated, and the criteria should be implemented evenly and without bias after they have been prescribed or established. It is painful to point out that the current delimitation exercise is not in line with the Constitution or the law. The criteria, whether it be for allocating 7 more Assembly districts, defining districts and drawing district boundaries, are determined arbitrarily and applied only to certain districts.

Any delimitation exercise is based on the fundamental idea that each constituency should have a population that is as equitable as possible. Population consequently serves as the determining factor, with contiguity, connectedness, communication, convenience, and compact area serving as additional factors. This is the stance that the Constitution and law emphasise; a specific reference to these documents has been made in response to Papers 1-6, and it is suggested that these objections or dissents be read in conjunction with them. However, these criteria have been very conveniently disregarded, whether it is in the distribution of extra seats or the enlargement of Assembly constituencies. Instead of the current entitlement of four members—one each for Anantnag, Budgam, Kupwara, and Srinagar—one of the seven new Assembly seats would be given to Kashmir. This would result in unfairness and discord amongst the regions.

The statistics mentioned in the prior response must be reviewed again. 1,22,673,481 people called Jammu and Kashmir home as of the 2011 Census. According to Census data, Jammu Division has a population of 53,785,194 and Kashmir Division has a population of 68,888,829. 1, 36,304 people make up each assembly district on average. The number of

Based on the average headcount per Assembly Constituency from the 2011 Census, the required number of Assembly Constituencies for the Kashmir Divisions is 51 (50.54), while the required number for the Jammu Division is 39 (39.45). Jammu Division is planned to get 43 assembly populations, which is 4 more than it deserves to receive, while Kashmir Division is suggested to receive 47 assembly populations, which is 4 fewer than it needs to have allotted. The Jammu Division has 43.84 percent of the population but only gets 47.77 percent of the Assembly Constituencies, whereas the Kashmir Division gets 52.22 percent. In essence, the people living in the Kashmir Division have no legal protections. Despite Paper I's recommendation that Assembly Constituencies be divided into three categories with +10%, average, and -10% variance in population, the actual value is 136304, a +/- deviation of 10%. The draught suggestion introduces up to 67% of a deviation.

Only two of the ten districts in Jammu Division have been designated as plus 10%, compared to five of the ten in Kashmir Division. This indicates that, in five of the ten Kashmir Division districts, as opposed to two in Jammu Division, the average population per assembly constituency is 149935, as opposed to the divisional average of 136304. In Jammu Division 4, four districts have been designated as negative 10%, but just one district in Kashmir Division has received such designation. This indicates that geographical areas in Jammu Division 4 receive Assembly constituencies despite having a population below average. The device is employed in the plan to have fewer assembly districts in Kashmir Division and more in Jammu Division. At this point, a close examination of the suggested parameters is required.

The idea for the Samba and Kulgam districts is completely unjustifiable and deserves further examination. Three assembly constituencies with an average population of 105344, or 31,000 fewer than the average and even 22,000 fewer than the -10% category, are proposed for the Samba district, which has an estimated population of 3,16,031 and a total area of 915 sq. km. Surprisingly, Paper 1 classifies the Samba district as a 10% category district even though the actual criteria utilized deviate significantly from the prescribed norms. It is suggested that the 4, 24,484-person Kulgam district be divided into 3 assembly constituencies, each of which would have an average population of 1,41,495 (i.e., 5,191 over the average) and a typical size of 1003 sqkm. Many people live in the challenging terrain parts of the Kund, Waltengo Naar—

Avalanche-prone area—by, and upper areas of D.H. Pora. Kulgam district was appropriately included in the 10% category as a result of all these considerations. Instead of this, there are now only three Assembly constituencies, which is a great disservice to the district.

The Hon'ble Commission compromised the fundamental principle of population as the principal criterion when it first arbitrarily created some unknown criteria when allocating and identifying the enlarged 7 seats. It then used the criteria selectively such that seats were fixed and then allotted. Even though it violates the average criteria that were set and announced in Paper 1 by -10% and +10%, the extra seats were arbitrarily assigned. According to the criterion, although 136304 persons made up an assembly segment's average population, a -10% adjustment would be made for rough terrain, poor connection, and other challenges experienced by residents. In these situations, a district with an assembly would be chosen for a population that is 10% below the national average. The associate members were not informed of the dimensions or indicators of the criteria. However, the decision about the enhanced distribution of 7 seats in a 1:6 ratio was made unilaterally and in defiance of our objections before Paper-1 was disseminated and associate members' replies were requested. Despite being strong and convincing, the comments and objections sent on December 31, 2021, were disregarded. Unavoidable violations of the core values of a delimitation exercise have been caused by the arbitrary distribution of additional seats for reasons other than those allowed by law and logic.

The population continues to be disregarded in the draught and not given the importance it merits despite serving as the primary criterion for defining the constituencies. The population deviation ranges from 85025 less than the average in the instance of 50-Padder to 56077 higher than the average of 136304 in the case of 41-Dooru. Six of the assembly segments have a population of under 100,000 (or one lac) persons and they are nevertheless disregarded and not given the attention they merit. The population deviation ranges from 85025 less than the average in the instance of 50-Padder to 56077 higher than the average of 136304 in the case of 41-Dooru. While there are just three such constituencies in Jammu Province, six assembly segments (Paddar, Inderwal, Shri Mata Vaishnav Devi, Bani, Basohli, and Kishtwar) have less than 100,000 residents (or one lac population) (Gurez, Karnah, and Kunzer). The Hon'ble Commission determined that 24 seats in Kashmir Province had a population more than the average of 136304, whereas just 8 constituencies in Jammu Province have. Bani, Paddar, and Shri Mata Vaishnav Devi are the three constituencies of Jammu.

have populations that are nearly equivalent to that of Dooru. A population of about identical size from the aforementioned three constituencies would have three representatives in the Assembly, compared to Dooru, which has a population of just less than 2 lac. As a result, the Dooru people are unable to participate in government or be equal partners in decision-making. The Working Papers 1-6 paint a picture of powerlessness and disenfranchisement in Jammu and Kashmir's remote, uninhabited regions. These egregious inconsistencies are not at all addressed in the new draught.

The comments to Papers 1-6, which were received on February 14, 2022, are not taken into consideration by the Draft Proposal, which was made available on February 26. Anantnag, Budgam, Kupwara, and Srinagar districts deserve to receive one additional Assembly segment each out of the seven increased seats when a district, rather than a state as defined in Article 81(2)(b), is taken into consideration. Rajouri, Poonch, and Doda in the Jammu province are to receive one Assembly segment each. Without giving a reason, the Honorable Commission disregarded the legitimate claims of Anantnag, Budgam, Srinagar, and Poonch, and unfairly distributed one of the additional seats to each of Reasi, Kathua, Samba, Udhampur, and Kishtwar when the districts did not meet the requirements for an increase. Baramulla, with its 100 km-long LoC, does not receive an additional Assembly segment due to the difficulties faced by the population living there, whereas a suburban industrialised district with a total area of 900 sq km receives an additional Assembly segment in recognition of its close proximity to the International Border.

While the 88-year-old Poonch Haveli, the 90-year-old Mendhar, and the 85-year-old Rajouri were used as ready examples to demonstrate departure from the law and the deviations pointed out were corrected, a closer look at Working Papers 2-6 reveals that in the majority of cases, the geographical compactness, communication facilities, and public convenience outlined in Section 60 (supra) have not been taken into consideration.

With little consideration for these elements and for other than the legitimate reasons allowed by established norms, the constituencies have been divided, areas combined, and territories annexed. To be clear, Imoh PC and Sahib Aabad, which were previously a part of the now-fragmented Shangus-Anantnag Constituency and are situated some 40 kilometres from the 43-Anantnag West HQ, have been absorbed by Anantnag West. The same is true for Kishtwar, where 49-Kishtwar has annexed Muchater PC and Balgran PC, which are closer to Inderwal. 5 Another example is Handwara. Drugmulla Tehsil, which was formerly a part of 3-Kupwara, is merged with 5-Handwara, while Handwara Tehsil is divided and joined with

another assembly section. The 74-RS Pora, Jammu South, and 22-Sonawar assembly segments, where PCs from the middle of other assembly segments have been selected and connected with other assembly segments, receive a similar treatment. The constituency with the most residents (192381) and the greatest area is the 41st District. The assembly segment is eligible to represent a further constituency. The same story is told in the majority of the assembly segments. The Assembly segments are simply brought up to highlight the variance from the established rules. The Hon'ble Commission has broken the law by carving out islands within and from the middle of Assembly segments and annexing distant Assembly segments with no nearby neighbours or connectivity. The information provided here is not intended to cover all of the segments, but rather to highlight the pattern of deviation from accepted practises and accepted norms.

The powerful Pir Panjal Range and other mountains in the Lesser Himalayas separate the two provinces or divisions of Jammu and Kashmir, which are adjacent. Both divisions contain roughly equal amounts of mostly mountainous and challenging terrain, as well as similar geography and terrain. It is not acceptable to use the steep and challenging locations to favour one division and boost its representation at the risk of undermining and excluding the other division. Similar difficulties, such as inadequate communication and connectivity, are experienced by those living on the opposite side of the Lesser Himalayas as well as in the smaller valleys within the range. As an example, the residents of MatiGawran, AhlanGadole, Kapran, Hapatnar, Lidroo, Frislan, Lehendajan, Chimran, Kachiwan, Chaugam, and numerous other isolated areas of Anantanag suffer from extreme hardship in terms of access to civic amenities and means of communication, making the district eligible to be designated as a "district of extreme hardship" or district of extreme hardship. It is unfair and discriminatory to place the entire Shopian district in the +10% category because it has the hardest terrain, the most difficult and remote areas, and areas with little to no communication, including Devpora, Heerpora, Kirchapathri, Dachnoo, Gorsinar Jampathri, Saimarg, Chakhrinoori Kathhalan, and other areas. The district is also overshadowed by the powerful Pir Panjal. The same can be said about Baramulla. The Baramulla district deserved to be classified in the -10% category due to the 100-km-long LoC, remote areas like HawaMarkoot and Kitri Dajan, interior areas like Rafiabad, Bijhama, Kamal Kot, Nambla, and Uri, and interior areas like Boniyaar, Kandi, and Kakawthal, which have little to no communication and hardships for a sizable portion of the population living close to the Lo

The Paper-1 proposals also did not provide the Budgam district a fair deal. The Honourable Commission is unaware that the majority of the district is made up of rocky and hilly terrain, including the isolated regions of Khag, Beerwah, Khan Saheb, and GogjiPathri as well as places beneath and around Tosmaidan. When it should have been in the "minus" category or at least in the average category, the district has unexpectedly been assigned to the plus category. Because of this, the categories and standards listed in Paper 1 that were applied to develop this exercise are arbitrary, unjust, and biased. Injustice will be done greatly to the Kashmir Division if corrective action is not taken. In the meeting on December 20, 2021, we expressed our concern and claimed that the proposal contradicts the keystandards followed in such an exercise.

Parliamentary Constituencies: There may be no precedent in history for the proposed drafting proposal and the delimitation of the Anantnag parliamentary constituency. Nowhere in such an exercise is it necessary to combine two geographically separate regions into one constituency, disregarding the fundamental legal principles of congruity, connectivity, convenience, and compact area, and separated by one of the highest mountain ranges that is inaccessible for the majority of the year. The Draft disregards the fundamental delimitation principles in reference to the other two parliamentary districts, Baramulla and Srinagar.

What more stunning example of a parliamentary constituency's boundaries being unrealistic, unreasonable, and nonsensical can there be than the 3-Anantnag constituency? Without taking into account the topography, geography, communication, accessibility, or general situation, the Honorable Commission combined Poonch and Rajouri Districts with Anantnag, Kulgam, and Zainapora from the Shopian District. The massive Pir Panchal Range separates Anantnag, Kulgam, and Zainpora, and the places are inaccessible for half the year due to heavy snowfall. The Hon'ble Commission has not in the least taken this into account. In any case, the draught idea is absurd. The only outcome would be severe misery for the residents of Rajouri, Poonch, and remote regions of south Kashmir. Similar disdain for the guiding concepts of compactness, contiguity, and connectedness while making delimitation decisions can be seen in the redrawing of the boundaries of Srinagar and Baramulla. To the great displeasure of the populace and in violation of established guiding principles, Shopian, Budgam, and Beerwah in Baramulla have all been added to the Srinagar Constituency.

Some names with enormous historical significance have been restored by the illustrious Commission. Working Papers 1-6 dramatically eliminate a number of historical

constituencies. Amirakadal, Zadibal, Sangrama, Gulmarg, HomShaliBugh, Batmaloo, and Gandhi Nagar, which were compelled to vanish and entirely annihilated, disregarding their emotional value and significance, still need to receive justice. Governor Amir Khan, who has significantly contributed to architecture and urban development, is brought to mind by Amira Kadal. It is disturbing to see efforts being made to restore the historic names of towns and cities across the nation while deliberate efforts are being made to erase and eliminate Jammu & Kashmir's history and culture. Place names, town names, and city names are symbols of history and culture and should be honoured. The constituencies must be reinstated as a result.

The Honorable Commission created the exercise ostensibly based on the examination of maps without travelling to different regions of Pir Panchal, Kathua, north Kashmir, south Kashmir, or central Kashmir. The drafting does not represent the aspirations and opinions of the general public because the Hon'ble Commission did not meet and converse with a representative cross-section of people and civil society organisations throughout Jammu and Kashmir.

The above arguments should make it abundantly clear that the lack of thought put into the proposals is consistent with the criticisms levelled in the aforementioned responses to Working Papers 1 through 6, and that the papers should be withdrawn and, to the extent permitted by the Constitution, reexamined after more widespread public input has been gathered.

That the suggestions in Working Paper 1-6 are unacceptable and should not be implemented for the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs and any additional reasons that may be submitted in the future, as doing so would cause grave injustice to every group of the population and violate the fundamental principles that should guide the delimitation process and be upheld by the Honourable Commission. That we reserve the right to add to the aforementioned submissions, both orally and in writing. That the draught plan be made public along with these dissident ideas, memos, and objections, as well as any annexures.

4.12. Conclusion

In 1945, Maharaja Hari Singh welcomed the National Conference to send one representative to join his cabinet, continuing a tradition that went back to Jammu and Kashmir's feudal rule. This event marked the beginning of the current form of government in Jammu and Kashmir. Additionally, a single delegate from the Hindu community was asked to attend. As a direct result of this, Shri Ganga Ram and Mirza Afzal.

The State Prime Minister, Shri Ram Chandra Kak, appointed the Beig to serve in his Cabinet. This agreement lasted until 1946 after the National Conference launched the Quit Kashmir campaign to protest the oppressive Dogra administration in Kashmir.

As a result of this struggle, Mirza Afzal Beig resigned from his position as Power Development Minister in the Cabinet. Sheikh Abdullah was taken into custody not long after that and held there till the partition of India and the establishment of Pakistan. Despite this, the state operated under a coalition administration in the late 1980s, during the time period immediately following independence. As a result of the National Conference's one-party domination, Jammu and Kashmir, along with the other states in India, lacked experience working in coalitions. However, coalition politics began to emerge as a phenomenon in Jammu and Kashmir at the same time as coalition governments began to form in other parts of India. On the other hand, Jammu and Kashmir has had governments in the past that received backing from parties located outside the region, such as in 1947. As a consequence of this, the state is now included in the group of states that have successfully established coalition governments.

The negotiations between Rajiv Gandhi and Dr. Farooq Abdullah began in the latter half of 1986. On November 7, 1986, the two came to an agreement that came to be known as the Rajiv-Farooq Accord. This resulted in the creation of the National Conference and Congress (I) coalition government, which was led by Dr. Farooq Abdullah. Following the signing of the Rajiv-Farooq Accord on March 23, 1987, elections were held throughout the state. A political coalition consisting of the National Conference and Congress was created. On March 26, 1987, Farooq Abdullah took the oath of office as head of the coalition government that was led by the National Conference and Congress. This coalition government, on the other hand, fell apart as a result of a change in the administration in charge of the centre.

As a direct consequence of the misinformation campaign over the development accord, the coalition was unable to do anything much. On both the economic and political fronts, a vacuum was created as a result of the myriad complaints and issues that arose. During the elections that took place in 1987, problems such as election rigging prompted all of the opposition parties to assume that both parties had formed a deal to comprehensively rig the polls. In spite of this, several developmental steps were taken across a variety of industries, including agriculture, handicrafts, sericulture, irrigation, forestry, etc. In addition

to forming a coalition government, it established a committee of economists to make recommendations regarding methods for accelerating the process of industrialization. It also initiated the development of specialised area studies for industrialization and the establishment of a service selection board to rationalise the recruitment process. To ensure that the people had a voice in the decisions that were made and the formation of plans, a process that included democratic decentralisation and planning at the grassroots level was put into place.

During Sheikh Abdullah's reign, the Single-Line Administration method was both resurrected and initiated for the first time. The District Level Development Boards were reconstituted after the coalition administration took office (DDB). However, there was a significant difference between the actual performance in the developmental field and the high expectations that were stoked by the Accord, which was sure to produce a great deal of frustration. Even Farooq Abdullah, in his role as Chief Minister, acknowledged the fact that what had been accepted on paper but voided in the promises, particularly in regard to the provision of funds for development, was still need to be carried through. In addition to this, he brought up the issue of the extremely low share of Muslims from the state working in the central government departments, which gives less ground for the real integration of the state with the rest of India. Since a positive attitude is the key to the development of the state, this is an issue that needs to be addressed. The reestablishment of Article 370 and the sovereignty of individual states was also an essential requirement for the alliance. At the grassroots level, however, they did not have the support of the middle and lower leadership levels inside either of the two parties. As a direct result of this, the existing disagreements between the coalition partners made it difficult for the state government to perform its duties effectively. In the end, the stress and strain that was present throughout the partnership at various levels caused chaos.

After the elections for the state Assembly in 2002, the state saw the beginning of its second attempt at forming a coalition administration. The People's Democratic Party and Congress, both of whom are participants in the coalition, came to the first-ever agreement with smaller parties such as the People's Democratic Front, the Panther Party, and the Communist Party of India-Marxist to share power. It has been decided that Mufti Sayed and Ghulam Nabi Azad will take turns serving as Chief Minister for the next three years. Both parties reached a consensus on the Common Minimum Programme (CMP), which aims to improve the way the state is governed. It was the first time that the coalition of the two

regional parties, which was to operate within the same paradigm of progeny and prodigy in terms of the same ideology and political ethos of Kashmiriyat, used the same secular political space with a focus on the issue of political identity and dignity. The coalition was to operate within the same paradigm of progeny and prodigy in terms of the same ideology and political ethos of Kashmiriyat. Both of the partners placed a significant amount of focus on the problem of state autonomy in Jammu and Kashmir. Because of the parallel similarities and competitiveness that exist between this alliance and the National Conference, the politics of Kashmir have already been brought to the forefront of the Indian Union.

The rise of the People's Democratic Party as a regional alternative to the National Conference can also be ascribed to the National Conference's increased political weight in the years following the 1996 Assembly Elections, when it won a majority of two-thirds of the seats available. The previous NDA government regarded the National Conference's resolution on more autonomy to be confronting and demanding. The resolution was passed after the National Conference took a larger bargaining position. The Healing Touch Policy was responsible for establishing a new psychological climate in the state as well as a new way of thinking about policy. The coalition administration was led by Mufti Sayed as it moved forward with its objectives to heal and restore long-awaited tranquilly and peace in the state, as well as to develop trust among the people in order to win the hearts and minds of the people. He described the Healing Touch Policy as putting an end to custodial killings, the release of innocent people from jails and investigation centres, the redemption of people who had been involved in fake encounters, and the establishment of interrogation centres both inside and outside of the state in order to put an end to the anarchy that was prevalent in the state. He exerted a great deal of effort toward the goal of incorporating these assurances and procedures into the Healing Touch Policy.

The coalition took a number of significant steps, one of the most crucial of which was to initiate both a peace process within the state and negotiations with Pakistan. His well-known catchphrase Goli Nahi Boli was adopted as the official motto of the coalition. The visit of Parvaiz Musharraf to India, his Four-Point Formula for the resolution of the troublesome Kashmir conflict, and Mufti Syed's Self-Rule Proposal are all certain practical moves towards the building of peace in the state and towards repairing the ruptured Indo-Pak relations. These initiatives were wonderful examples of diplomacy since they allowed persons from the state to be led into the darkness while also providing a point of access into

the camps occupied by separatist parties. A glimmer of optimism appeared within and beyond the state. When compared to what had occurred in the past, many breathed a sigh of relief.

As a consequence of the implementation of such policies, there has been a growth in mutual comprehension not only between the Indian Union and the state, but also between India and Pakistan, two countries located in Asia. PDP and Congress came together to form a coalition government that was responsible for several significant advancements in a variety of fields, including agriculture, industries, commerce, education, tourism, health, employment, electricity, and rural development, amongst others. There were additional domains in which the administration was successful in gaining the people's trust, such as the elimination of corruption, the promotion of human rights, the announcement of relief, and the rehabilitation of victims of violence. During the time of the Muftis, the tourism industry, which is the backbone of the national economy, was given a boost to a certain extent.

After Mufti Sayed, Ghulam Nabi Azad became the new head of government, concluding the power transfer from the PDP to the Congress Party of the State, which had taken place over the course of three years. A new catchphrase in the language of state politics, he framed the goals of the administration within the perspective of Khushal Kashmir, which translates to a prosperous Kashmir. A government that is free from corruption, one that is transparent and accountable to its citizens, and one that is actively working toward overall improvement of the state was the overarching goals of this strategy. The government that was run by the Congress party also made efforts to remove politics from the state bureaucracy. The transfer policy was modified to make it more efficient. Even during Azad's tenure, it was not possible to reconstitute the State Accountability Commission, the State Human Rights Commission, or the State Women's Commission because fractures in the coalition had a negative effect on accountability and the rule of law. The state was plagued with rampant corruption in its many guises, and punitive laws like as the Disturbed Areas Act and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act took a significant toll on the civilian population there. During this time period, the Prime Minister established five different working groups with the purpose of including the general populace in the peace process. They visited with representatives from the three areas of the state, but no progress was made, and trade across the state's LOCs has not been as robust as it should have been.

After the elections for the Assembly in 2008, the state of Jammu and Kashmir went through another round of coalition building. It was the national conference that collaborated with the state congress to form a new coalition government in the state. This collaboration

took place in the state. Keeping in view the fact that the National Conference and the Congress Party had historical political ties dating back to 1947, the National Conference did not have any trouble developing a framework for power sharing with the Congress Party. In their respective election manifestos for the year 2008, the partners in the coalition government made a commitment to eliminate unemployment, poverty, and electricity shortages in the state. In addition, they stated that they would finish the developmental works and revitalise all of the state's most important industries. This was the point of departure for the coalition partners as they began their adventure in the political sphere. The coalition government took a number of steps to improve the quality of delivery, delivery-mechanisms for the proper execution of schemes, and reviving institutions to promote transparency and accountability in the functioning of the government. These steps were taken during the course of the current administration.

The reestablishment of the Accountability Commission and the elections for the Constitutional Assembly in 2008 both took place. It was the national conference that collaborated with the state congress to form a new coalition government in the state, and it was the state congress that initiated the process. Due to the fact that the National Conference and the Congress Party had historical political ties dating back to 1947, the National Conference did not have any trouble developing a framework for power sharing with the Congress Party. In their respective election manifestos for the year 2008, the partners in the coalition government made a commitment to eliminate unemployment, poverty, and electricity shortages in the state. In addition, they stated that they would finish the developmental works and revitalise all of the state's most important industries. This was the point of departure for the coalition partners as they began their adventure in the political sphere. The coalition government revived institutions to promote transparency and accountability in government operations and put in place mechanisms to ensure that programmes were carried out in an appropriate manner. These are just two of the many steps that were taken to improve the overall level of service provided by the government. Important initiatives were taken to encourage honesty and integrity in public life, including the reconstitution of the Accountability Commission and the establishment of the Vigilance Commission.

E-tendering and e-purchasing were both implemented as game-changing measures in state contracts in an effort to put an end to the pervasive culture of corruption in the state. Third-party monitoring of projects on Android gave real-time information regarding their

progression, which has significantly contributed to the timely execution of the tasks while staying within the parameters of the budget. The administration had high hopes that in the next years, they will be able to significantly bolster the monitoring system by making greater use of information technology. The Right to Information Act (RTI) and the Public Service Guarantee Act (PSGA) powerful tools that tipped the scales in the direction of the average citizen by reducing bureaucratic laziness, improving access to services over time, and making decision-making more open and accountable to the public. Both of these acts were signed into law in 2005. The models of governance and development were modified by the government to ensure that the people would become the true benefactors of these efforts.

The introduction of the Results-Framework Document (RFD) into the daily operations of a number of different departments by the NC-Congress coalition ignited a competitive environment that was beneficial to all of the departments. Each department strives toward the achievement of its own goals, and at the same time, the goals of each department have been made quantifiable, so doing away with the obscurity and uncertainty that surrounds the functioning of the department. Another significant accomplishment of the NC-Congress coalition administration is the holding of elections for Panchayati Raj institutions and seeing them through to a successful conclusion over a protracted period of time. The coalition government's commitment to strengthening the idea of grass-roots democracy was made clear by the devolution of powers to PRIs. Another remarkable and commendable action taken by the coalition government in the state is the establishment of administrative units throughout the state. It is, without a doubt, a step in the right direction toward bringing the administrative offices closer to the homes of those who live in remote places. Innovative programmes such as SKEWPY and UDAAN were implemented by the coalition administration in an effort to combat the issue of high unemployment. Concerning the tourism industry, it is estimated that tourism alone was responsible for the creation of 80,000 employments during the time that the NC-Congress coalition agreement was in effect. The holy sites of Shri Amarnath Ji, Shri Mata Vaishno Devi, and others saw an unprecedented number of visitors. In addition, the coalition government started work on 87 different tourism projects.

Because of its extensive network of regional, sub-regional, and religious links, Jammu and Kashmir presents a challenge not just to the coalition but also to the managers who oversee it. The people do not yet have positive memories associated with the coalition government that administered the state. It has come to people's attention that coalitions are

synonymous with regional disregard and administrative incompetence. It is not natural for the economic bases and support structures of the major political parties to be located in different regions and sub-regions. Because of this, the major political parties have a responsibility to cultivate a coalition culture, institutional partnerships, and a clear perspective towards their respective states in order to ensure that the coalition government does not appear disenchanted, dishonest, and disoriented. At the state level, the administration is not able to do much, but one cannot ignore the situation on the ground in any of the three regions that make up the state of Jammu and Kashmir. It is a fact that the coalition government brought tighter contacts between the centre and the state and strengthened trust. This might assist the state in getting a decent reimbursement of the national purse in terms of assisting the people, and the hyphenated desire became de-hyphenated as a result.

In order to draw a conclusion from all of this, we may argue that the coalition administration in Jammu and Kashmir needs to have robust support from the central government, and that successful coalition governance needs to be accepted by everyone. The moment has come for new coalitions to demonstrate their effectiveness, as the situation has evolved. In the field of economics, there can be no room for merit instead; more innovative approaches to demonstrating growth while maintaining redistributive fairness ought to be explored.

CHAPTER 5
SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE AND WORKING OF COALITION
GOVERNMENTS IN STUDY AREA: AN ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 5

SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE AND WORKING OF COALITION GOVERNMENTS IN STUDY AREA: AN ANALYSIS

5.1. Introduction


Previous chapter has presented an insight into the coalition politics in the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir. The subject matter has revealed that Jammu and Kashmir has witnessed an influx of coalition governments since 1990's. There are many reasons that left the uncertain political vacuum in J&K. In this context, the present chapter will analyze the coalition politics from public perspective. All the subject matter presented in this chapter is based on primary data collected by means of questionnaire from four constituent assemblies of J&K. The data has been presented under appropriate tables and themes that fulfill the objectives of the study and answered the pre-defined set of research questions.

5.2. Sample Size of the Study and Socio-Economic Profile of Respondents

Table 5.1: Sample Size

S. No.	Sampling Area	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Uri	100	25%
2	Nagrota	100	25%
3	Habbakadal	100	25%
4	Jammu East	100	25%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.1: Sample Size



Sample size means the number of participants included in study or a part of population chosen for a survey or experiment. For administering the questionnaire a sample size of 400 respondents was chosen by means of simple random technique. Out of 400 respondents, (100) 25% were selected from Uri and (100) 25% from Nagrota. While as (100) 25% respondents were selected from Habbakadal and (100) 25% from the Jammu East. In this context the sample size was selected based on the analysis and interpretation of the 2008 & 2014 Assembly elections in the UT of JK. The Union territory being divided into two administrative divisions shows a varying degree of electoral participation at every constituency. Out of the 87 constituencies wherein the elections were conducted, there was varying degree of voting percentage and voting turnout. Some of the constituencies reported higher participation while as some of them shows a lesser percentage of voting. For selecting the sample size and administering the questionnaire to obtain data, the constituencies with the highest voting turn out and the lowest voting turnout were shortlisted from both the divisions of the UT.

From Kashmir Division Uri constituency has the highest percentage (82.85%) of voting and the Habbakadal has the lowest percentage (21.30%) of voting. While in the Jammu Division Nagrota has the highest percentage (83.22%) of voter turnout and Jammu East has the lowest (64.09%) voter turnout respectively. Both the divisions were considered in order to find out the varying degrees of voting patterns and voting behavior, as is evident from the 2014 elections that both the divisions have shown different trends in voting and participation levels. In context of the above the size of 400 were chosen from amongst the two divisions of the state, wherein from Kashmir Division Uri (with highest voter turnout 82.07%) & Habbakadal Constituency (with the lowest voter turnout 11.62%). From Jammu Division Nagrota (with highest voter turnout 79.36%) and Jammu East (with the lowest voter turnout 60.82%) were chosen. With an attempt to administer the sample at the very grassroot level within each shortlisted constituency the questionnaire was administered at the Ward/ Village level. In this perspective sampling was devised in the following manner:


Kashmir Division: From Uri Constituency no. 06: Uri town (50 respondents) & from Ramgal (50 respondents). From Habbakadal Constituency no. 22: Munawarabad (50 respondents) & from Fateh Kadal (50 respondents).

Jammu Division: From Nagrota Constituency no. 70: Nagrota Town (50 respondents) & from Jagti (50 respondents). From Jammu East Constituency no. 72: Kachi Chowni A (50 respondents) & from Gujjar Nagar A (50 respondents).

Table 5.2: Respondents Gender

S. No.	Respondents Gender	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Male	372	93%
2	Female	28	07%
3	Other	00	00%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.2: Respondents Gender




The respondents were divided on the basis of gender-male comprising 93% of the total population while 07% of the respondents were Female. While as there are no respondents from LGBT community. The males were taken in higher number given the socio-political set up the UT; it is not feasible to access the majority of the women. Keeping in view the limitation in the collection of data from the respondents the numbers of men were taken in major proportion. As per the ECI reports the women take less participation in the elections as compared to the men. Majority of the men have a greater experience of participatory democracy. The male population is clearer about the choices that they make about the elections and are aware about various political developments that take place in the UT. Therefore, it can be inferred from the above data that 93% of the male population participated in being respondents for the administration of the questionnaire while only 7% were women. Thus the findings here reflect the problem from the conservative nature of the society and shyness to contact thus limiting the responses from the women.

Table 5.3: Respondents Age Group

S. No.	Respondents age group	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	18-30 years	84	21%
2	31-42 years	136	34%
3	43-54 years	152	38%
4	>55 years	28	07%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.3: Respondents Age Group




Age defines how old the respondents are, by age we can determine their experience in a particular field. Respondents in the age group of 18-35 years are 21%, where as 34% of the population comprises the respondents in the age group of 31-42 years. In the age group of 43-54 years the respondents comprise 38% of the population. While the age group greater than 55 years are 7%. The age group ranging from 18 years onwards were taken into account because adult franchise in Indian constitution is granted to all those who attain the age of 18 years. The respondents were divided into different age groups keeping in view inculcating the different level of exposures in these age groups. This will help in obtaining the data from different age groups who have a different degree of understanding of the political developments taking place; thus can share their experiences from the previous elections. They will help us obtain data that will suffice the need of having a insight into the different age perspectives and lead us to attain a varying degree of responses. From the above data it

can be concluded that age played an important role in the administration of the questionnaire, thus a very careful attempt was made regarding the age, experience, exposure and political culture of the respondents.

Table 5.4: Respondents Educational Qualification

S. No.	Respondents Educational Qualification	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	10 th	48	12%
2	12 th	168	42%
3	Graduate	112	28%
4	PG/Technical	72	18%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.4: Respondents Educational Qualification




Respondent's educational qualification plays an important role in determining and interpreting the data collected. While administering the questionnaire the population was divided as 10th pass at 48%, with 12th pass respondents at 42%. The graduate population comprises the 28% of the population and 18% of the respondents were post graduate and technical graduates. The data collected shows a varying degree of difference because the sample administered to the population had a different educational qualification varying from class 10th in the lower strata whereas the higher post graduate and technical graduate. These

all groups gave a different perspective based on their own experiences and exposure to the political developments that take place in their day to day life. While respondents from different educational backgrounds will help us understand their perspective towards the questionnaire making our data analysis and interpretation more vibrant.

Table 5.5: Respondents Occupation

S. No.	Respondents Occupation	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Student	36	09%
2	Farmers	88	22%
3	Business	248	62%
4	Employees	28	07%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.5: Respondents Occupation



In arriving at an enriched and a balanced response utmost care was taken to make sure that respondents are taken from mixed occupations to make the study inclusive. Respondent's occupation plays an important role in analyzing and interpreting the data collected. While administering the questionnaire the population was taken as 62% involved in business, 22% as farmers, 9% as students and 7% as Employees. So whole inferring the above data the biggest limitation during collection of data was that most of the government employees were


hesitant in being the respondents. The reasons for that being that they don't want to speak openly about the government policies or government formations, thus maintaining a neutral stance of the issues concerning the public policy making and to some extent the political scenario in the state also limits the participation of the respondent's in the data collection. Wherein the from the business class the respondents were able to speak openly about the questions asked , this shows that business class has a close understanding of their political happenings in the state .The farmers and the students were too open in being the respondents and speaking about the questions being asked. They showed readiness both at the Junior College level, college level and at the university level to enthusiastically participate in the questionnaire. The responses were overwhelming and helped arrive at a result oriented finding and also helped to gain the public perception regarding the overall understanding of the political events in the state. Their approach was more political as compared to the government employees who responded more apolitical and at some instances as naïve.

5.3. Coalition Politics: Public Perception Table

5.6: Coalition politics: Public Perception

S. No.	Do you Participate in Elections?	Yes		No		Total	
		Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
1	Uri	69	69%	31	31%	100	100%
2	Nagrota	72	72%	28	28%	100	100%
3	Habbakadal	16	16%	84	84%	100	100%
4	Jammu East	38	38%	62	62%	100	100%
Total		195		205		400	

Chart 5.6: Coalition politics: Public Perception




Among all the four constituencies that were identified for administering the questionnaire, in response to the first question asked the respondents from the Uri constituency that had the highest voting turnout in the previously held elections shows that 69% of the respondents have participated in the elections while 31% of the respondents said that they have never participated in any election whether for Lok Sabha, State Assemblies or block level or panchayat elections. In the area of Jammu Division Nagrota with the highest turnout in previous elections about 72% of the respondents said that they participate in the elections while 28% population responded that they did not participate in the elections. In the Habbakadal Constituency only 16% respondents said that they have participated in the elections whether at the state level or lok sabha elections. In the Jammu East 38% of the respondents said yes while 62% responded as no.

Thus from the above it can be inferred that India immediately after attaining independence adopted the universal adult franchise/ suffrage to give every citizen the right to vote. Election commission of India is empowered to conduct elections under Article 324 to make sure that every adult citizen of India shall enjoy the right of political participation both at the national ta the level and at the state level. But from the above data it can be summed that a larger majority does not participate in the elections. This leads to a candidate being selected who does not represent the people properly and is not able to implement the policy formulations. The data reveals that 84%, 62%, 31% & 28% of the voters from the selected constituencies do not participate in the elections, thereby mocking the very idea of participative democracy.

Table 5.7: Respondents Participation in Politics

S. No.	Participates as:	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	As Voter	186	95%
2	As contestant	09	05%
Total		195	100%

Chart 5.7: Respondents Participation in Politics




In response to the above question, those who said ‘YES’ to the participation in the elections only 195 respondents claimed to have participate in the election process. While 186 respondents totaling to 95% of those who said yes have participated as voters and only 09 respondents constituting to 05% have participated as contestants in all these constituencies. From the above it can be inferred that a majority of the respondents participate as voters and a small number of respondents as contestants. The inferences from the above data state that though India being a democratic country not much of the population is involved in the practice of being voters or the contestants, there by leading to the selection of the leaders that are elected by a small percentage of population and it lessens the idea of accountability of the politicians towards the masses or the voters because they were given a choice to participate in the elections process and they decided to refrain from the same .In conclusion the data set reveals that a lesser number of respondents as well as voters are involved in the process of electing a candidate or themselves being elected as one.

Table 5.8: Followers of Political Happening

S. No.	Following Political Happenings	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Yes	168 (92K & 76J)	42%
2	No	192 (83K & 109J)	48%
3	Can't say	40 (26 K & 14 J)	10%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.8: Followers of Political Happening



In response to the above question whether they follow the political happenings in the state the 42% respondents said yes that they are interested in following the political happenings, out of the 400 respondents 168 (42%) said on being asked about it. Both the regions showed a bit contrast as 92 respondents in the Kashmir Division said yes and only 76 respondents from Jammu Division said that yes to the question. This shows that people in the valley are more interested in political affairs as compared to Jammu. On being asked 192 (48%) respondents said no, in which 83 from Kashmir and 109 from Jammu said no. while 40(10%) respondents from both divisions responded to can't say having 26 from Kashmir & 14 from Jammu .


The inferences from the above data state that in the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir 42% people are following the political happenings in the state. Among both the divisions the Kashmir Division shows better political knowledge and culture than the Jammu. While those said no comprised of 48% (192) respondents said no in following the political

happenings on the state, here again Jammu region was leading in saying no (109 respondents) & Kashmir division has 83 respondents in the said category. 40% respondents have cited no as an option to the given fact. The lack of political knowledge happening around people seems to inculcate the idea that people at large are lacking the political culture; this is not good for the health of the electoral politics in the country or at the state level.

Table 5.9: Preference of Political Party

S. No.	Preference of Political Party	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	National Political Party	144 (68K & 76J)	36%
2	Local/ Regional Parties	232 (128K & 104J)	58%
3	Independent Candidate	24 (18K & 6J)	06%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.9: Preference of Political Party




While responding to the question about the preference of political party as given above .The questionnaire received a mix response from the respondents. Out of the total 400 respondents 144 that comprise 36% of the respondents 68 from the Kashmir preferred the national political party where as Jammu 76 respondents also preferred national political

party.58% had tendency towards local/ regional parties. Out of 400 respondent's 232 in which 128 from Kashmir and 104 from Jammu made their choice about the local parties. 06% choose independent candidates out of 400. From the above data it can be inferred that in the politics local /regional political are preferred 58% of the respondents indicated their choices. From the given data it's clear that to be successful in carrying the government to full term, regional parties have a greater role. Also one more positive from the respondents was that 06% of them preferred that independent candidates should be given chance. So it can be concluded that in the electoral politics of the state number one choice is the local / regional part followed by a choice out of National party.

Table 5.9: If National Political Party .Specify the reasons for opting.

S. No.	If National Political Party. Specify the reasons for opting.	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Ideological Similarity	37 (22 K & 15J)	26%
2	Developmental Orientation	83 (57K & 26J)	58%
3	Overcoming Hegemony of Local Political Parties	06 (2K & 4J)	04%
4	Other Reason	18 (11K & 7J)	12%
Total		144	100%

Chart 5.9: If National Political Party .Specify the reasons for opting




In the above question the respondents were asked, if they prefer the national political party over the regional/ local political parties – specifying the reasons out of the 144 respondents that expressed yes 26% favored the national party because of ideological similarity out of which 22 from Kashmir and 15 from Jammu preferred that national party because of ideological similarity. 58% respondents chose developmental orientation over ideological similarities amongst them were 83 respondents out of which 57 from Kashmir and 26 were from Jammu. While 04% respondents indicated that they selected the national political party to overcome the hegemony of the local political parties. 12% of the respondents numbering to 18 showed their response in indicating the other reasons. Therefore, it can be inferred from the above data that 58% of the respondent’s preferred developmental orientation, meaning that the masses vote for the national party for development as compared to the regional political party. If they choose a National political party the state has better chances to develop as compared to the local/ regional political party whose leaders lack ability and charisma to represent the local issues at the national level. Also 4 % of the respondents believe that it will end the hegemonic control of the regional/ local parties in the state.

Table 5.10: If Local Regional Political Party .Specify the reasons for opting.

S. No.	If Local Regional Political Party .Specify the reasons for opting.	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Understanding Local Issues	88 (38K & 50J)	38%
2	Respect Regional Aspirations	67 (46K & 21J)	29%
3	Inclusiveness in Their Political Approach	49 (22K & 27J)	21%
4	Can't Say	28 (19K & 9J)	12%
Total		232	100%

Chart 5.10: If Local Regional Political Party .Specify the reasons for opting.




In response to the above asked question the respondents who preferred the regional political party they were asked to specify the reasons for opting the same. 38% of the respondents amounting to 88 in which there were 38 from the Kashmir Division and 50 from the Jammu division believe that regional political parties understand the local issues better as compared to the national political parties. Wherein 29% of the respondents believe that they respect the regional aspirations of the people, in whom 45 from Kashmir and 21 from Jammu Division responded for the same. 21% of the respondents believe that the regional political parties have inclusiveness in their approach, in this regard 22 from Kashmir & 27 from Jammu marked their choices for the same. 12% of the respondents marked can't say in which 19 from Kashmir and 09 from Jammu. Therefore, it can be inferred from the above that the people from both divisions of the state firmly believe that regional political parties are better in understanding local issues as compared to the National political parties. Thus it can be concluded that in elections a state based/ regional political party will be given preference.

Table 5.11: Do You Know what is Coalition Government.

S. No.	Do You Know What Coalition Government is?	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Yes	208 (141K & 67J)	52%
2	No	128 (52K & 76J)	32%
3	Can't say	64 (27K & 37J)	16%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.11:: Do You Know What is Coalition Government.




In the above question the respondents were asked about their knowledge of coalition politics. In response out of the 400 respondents 52% of the respondents said yes, a total of 208 (141 from Kashmir and 67 from Jammu). The number of the respondents who said NO in their response comprised of 32% of the population. A total of 128 respondents (52 from Kashmir & 76 from Jammu). 16 % of the respondents numbering to 64(27 from Kashmir & 37 from Jammu) opted for 'can't say'. Thus from the above it can be inferred a majority of the respondents (52%) have a good knowledge about the coalition government and the processes involved in it and the reason why coalition governments are formed . 32 % of the respondents had no idea about the coalition government . It can be concluded that the masses need to know about the idea of coalitions which will further enhance the political culture among the masses.

Table 5.12: If yes: Then Specify Inclination towards Coalition Government

S. No.	If yes: Then Specify Inclination Towards Coalition Government	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Positive	98 (42K & 56J)	47%
2	Negative	81 (14K & 67J)	39%
3	Neutral	29 (18K & 11J)	14%
Total		208	100%

Chart 5.12: If yes: Then Specify Inclination towards Coalition Government




In response to the previous question, this particular question was in continuation asking if they know about the coalition politics, what the nature of their inclination towards it is. 47% of the respondents (98 in total, 42 from Kashmir & 56 from Jammu) have shown a positive inclination towards the coalition politics. 39% of the respondents (81 in number- 14 from Kashmir & 67 from Jammu) have shown Negative response to the question. Only 14% of the respondents (29 in number- 18 from Kashmir & 11 from Jammu) have remained Neutral in their responses. Thus from the above it can be inferred that 47% of the respondents have a positive inclination towards the coalition government. This shall be considered a good for the health of the upcoming elections in the state, as India has adopted for representative form of Democracy thereby a large number of people, interests or groups will try to represent people in upcoming elections. This is good for the democratic institutions as it will provide more and choice to the people.

Table 5.13: What are the reasons for making coalition governments?

S. No.	What are the reasons for making coalition governments	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Failure to mobilize masses	128 (67K & 61J)	32%
2	Failure to promote Political interest	112 (63K & 49J)	28%
3	Lack of ability to garner more voters	54 (22K & 32J)	14%
4	Fractured mandate	104 (47K & 57J)	26%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.13: what are the reasons for making coalition governments?




In the above question, the 400 respondents were asked what are the reasons for making the coalition governments are. In response 32% of the respondents (128- 67 from Kashmir & 61 from Jammu) indicated that the political parties fail to mobilize the masses. 28% (112 respondents 63 from Kashmir & 49 from Jammu) specify that these parties have failed to promote political interests among the people.14% of the population (54 respondents- 22 from Kashmir & 32 from Jammu) responded that the political parties lack in their ability to garner more voters. 26% (104 respondents- 47 from Kashmir division & 57 from Jammu) belie that a fractured mandate was responsible for making coalition governments in the state. From the above it can be inferred that the political parties have failed to mobilize the masses thereby failing to promote the political interests among the people. The respondents have also indicated that the political parties also lack in their ability to garner the voters to vote during election, this results in the fractured mandate during elections. This leads to the formation of coalition government's.

Table 5.14: Coalition Government brings more development as compared to single party government?

S. No.	Coalition Government brings more development as compared to single party government	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Agree	48 (19K & 29J)	12%
2	Strongly Agree	176 (54K & 122J)	44%
3	Neutral	112 (64K & 48J)	28%
4	Disagree	64 (38K & 26J)	16%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.14: Coalition Government brings more development as compared to single party government?




The above question regarding whether coalition government brings more development as compared to a single party government the respondents choices reflected as 12% of the respondents agreed (48 respondents- 19 from Kashmir & 29 from Jammu) have agreed to the question that coalitions bring more development as compared to the single party government. 44% of the respondents (176- 54 from Kashmir & 122 from the Jammu region) have strongly agreed to the question. 28% of the respondents having 112 participants (64 from Kashmir & 48 from Jammu) remained neutral to the question. While as 16% of the respondent's numbering 64 in total (38 from Kashmir & 26 from Jammu) have disagreed to the question. From the above it can be inferred that a majority of the respondents have strongly agreed to the question that coalition government brings more development as compared to the single party government, showing that the majority of the people in the state prefer coalition political because of its vibrancies to represent mixed ideological groups and paves a way for the acceptance of the coalition government at the state level.

Table 5.15: Which type of coalition government is better?

S. No.	Which type of coalition Government is better?	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Local political parties	152 (87K & 65J)	38%
2	National political parties	104 (31K & 73J)	26%
3	Local and National political parties	92 (37K & 55J)	23%
4	Can't say	52 (18K & 34J)	13%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.15: Which type of coalition government is better?




The question regarding which the type of coalition is better, the respondents from the overall population in the state from the demarcated constituencies 38% of the respondents (152- 87 from Kashmir & 65 from the Jammu division) have expressed that they prefer the coalition government of the local parties as compared to national political parties or local and national political parties. 26% of the respondents (104- 31 from Kashmir & 73 from the Jammu) have reflected that they prefer the national political party for heading a coalition government.23% of the respondents (92-37from Kashmir &55 from Jammu) reflected that they prefer the coalition of the local and national political parties .13% of the respondents (52- 18 from Kashmir & 34 from Jammu) have opted for Can't say out of the given options. Thus from the above it can be inferred that a majority of the respondents prefer a local political party in power for forming a coalition government. Thus the results reflect that in the state there is a ground for coalition politics to exist equally amongst the local political parties, national political parties as well as both national and local political parties.

Table 5.16: Party ideology is prime reasons for making coalition governments

S. No.	Party ideology is prime reasons for making coalition governments	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Agree	116 (72K &44J)	29%
2	Strongly Agree	52 (28K &24J)	13%
3	Neutral	168 (73K & 95J)	42%
4	Disagree	64 (36K & 28J)	16%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.16: Party ideology is prime reasons for making coalition governments




In response to the above question whether party ideology is prime reason for making the coalition governments out of 400, 29% of the respondents (116-72 from Kashmir & 44 from Jammu) have agreed that party ideology is the prime reason. 13% of the respondents (52-28 from Kashmir & 24 from Jammu) have strongly agreed that party ideology plays a dominant role in forming the coalition government. 42% of the respondents (168- 73 from Kashmir & 95 from Jammu Division) remained neutral on being asked about the ideological perspective in coalition formations.16% of the respondents have shown disagreement to the question (64- 36 from Kashmir & 28 from Jammu). Thus from the above it can be inferred that the agreements regarding party ideology in being the prime reason for coalition governments.

A mixed response from both the regions represents that Kashmir being Muslim population dominated area and Jammu being a Hindu dominated area have shown tendency in choosing an ideologically similar political party, but the other promising factor being that 42% of the respondents have remained neutral showing a good sign for the secular and composite culture of the society. India being a secular country, this trend shows positives for the same as neutrality from the religious issues is good for the social fabric of the society also.

Table 5.17: In coalition government, what is the possibility of having good governance?

S. No.	In coalition government, what is the possibility of having good governance	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Strong	64 (36K & 28J)	16%
2	Fair	164 (69K & 95J)	41%
3	Negligible	68 (41K & 27J)	17%
4	Can't Say	104 (48K & 56J)	26%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.17: In coalition government, what is the possibility of having good governance?




In the above question the respondents were asked about the possibility of good governance in coalition government. Out of the 400 respondents 16% responded agreed (64-36 from Kashmir & 28 from Jammu) that the possibility is strong, whereas 41% (164-69 from Kashmir & 95 from Jammu) chose a fair possibility of good governance in the coalition government. 17% of the respondents (68-41 from Kashmir & 27 from Jammu) believe that the possibility is almost negligible in having a good governance. 26% (104-48 from Kashmir & 56 from Jammu) remained neutral to the question in their response to the above asked. Thus from the above it can be inferred that from the governance perspective the coalition governments are preferred in the state as they may be ideal in bringing the good

governance. In a democratic setup it's very important to have good governance which ultimately leads to the prosperity and development in the region.

Table 5.18: Is transparency maintained by coalition governments regarding policy formulation?

S. No.	Is transparency maintained by coalition governments regarding policy formulation?	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Yes	88 (38K & 50J)	22%
2	No	152 (73K & 79J)	38%
3	Can't Say	160 (71K & 89J)	40%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.18: Is transparency maintained by coalition governments regarding policy formulation?




In the above question the respondents were asked about the transparency maintained by the coalition governments regarding the policy formulations. In response to the question, 22% respondents (88-38 from Kashmir & 50 from Jammu) said 'Yes' that transparency is maintained in policy formulations, where as 38% of the respondents said 'NO' in response to the question being asked. 40% of the respondents (160-71from Kashmir & 89 from Jammu) had no opinion about the same. From the responses of the respondents it's evident that

majority believes that no transparency is being maintained during policy formulation in the coalition governments. This develops a sense of skepticism that amongst the people there is a belief that transparency is not maintained by the coalition partners. That is why the study has strongly suggested that CMP's should be discussed and devised in advance before making an agreement for establishing a coalition government.

Table 5.19: What is your appropriate choice while exercising your Right to Vote?

S. No.	What is your appropriate choice while exercising your Right to Vote	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	National political party	88 (27K & 61J)	22%
2	Regional political party	152 (93K & 59J)	38%
3	Independent candidates	56 (37K & 19J)	14%
4	Can't say	104 (42K & 62J)	26%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.19: What is your appropriate choice while exercising your Right to Vote?




In response to the above question about the appropriate choice given to the voters at the time of exercising their right to vote, 22% of the respondents (88- 27 from Kashmir & 61 from Jammu) have chosen National political party. While as 38% of the respondents (152-93 from Kashmir &59 from Jammu) have opted for the regional political party as their

appropriate choice while exercising the right to vote. 14% of the respondents (56-37 from Kashmir & 19 from Jammu) have chosen independent candidates as their choice. 26% of the respondents have indicated ‘can’t’ say (104- 42 from Kashmir & 62 from Jammu). Thus from the above it can be inferred that majority of the respondents have preferred the regional party(38%) over the national party while exercising the right to vote, the independent candidates stood with about 14% of the respondents in being the appropriate choice for the same.

Table 5.20: Do you think coalition government brings stability in the region?

S. No.	Do you think coalition government brings stability in the region?	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Agree	72 (47 K & 25J)	18%
2	Strongly Agree	48 (26K & 22J)	12%
3	Neutral	156 (92K & 64J)	39%
4	Disagree	124 (57K & 67J)	31%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.20: Do you think coalition government brings stability in the region?




With reference to the above asked question regarding the role of coalition government in bringing stability in the region. 18% of the respondents (72-47 from Kashmir & 25 from Jammu) agreed, while as 12% of the respondents (48-26 from Kashmir & 22 from Jammu) strongly agreed to the question of regional stability through coalition governments. 39% of the respondents (156-92 from Kashmir & 64 from Jammu) remained neutral to the question. 31% of the population (124-57 from Kashmir & 67Jammu) totally disagreed to the question. Thus from the above data it can be inferred that 30% of the respondents were agreeing/strongly agreeing that coalition governments can bring stability in the region. Every democratically elected government aims at bringing the stability in the region. Regional stability is the basic ingredient of the development in the state.

Table 5.21: Coalition government formed in 2008 was stable

S. No.	Coalition government formed in 2008 was stable	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Yes	168 (122K & 46J)	42%
2	No	112 (42K & 70J)	28%
3	Can't Say	120 (46K & 74J)	30%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.21: Coalition government formed in 2008 was stable




In the above questions the respondents were asked about the stability of the coalition government in the state that was formed between NC & INC, 42% of the respondents (168-122 Kashmir & 46 from Jammu) were prompt ion choosing the option 'Yes' indicating their choice in favour of the 2008 coalition government being stable as it was able to complete it

full tenure. 28% of the respondents (112-42 Kashmir & 70 from Jammu) said no on being asked about the same. Whereas 30% of the respondents (120- 46 from Kashmir & 74Jammu) opted ‘can’t say ‘in response to the above question. Thus from the above it can be inferred that the Coalition Government under the chief minister ship of the Omar Abdullah was successful and stable. The public perception regarding the same stood at 42% in favour of it being stable. In a politically sensitive state like the Jammu and Kashmir it becomes very important to have a lasting coalition, as a stable coalition will bring peace to the developmental perspectives and policy formulation. The idea behind the coalition formation at any level is that the alliance partners must be able to complete the term and the tenure should be completed in a smooth manner.

Table 5.22: If yes: Specify your satisfaction towards that Coalition Government.

S. No.	If yes: Specify your satisfaction towards that Coalition Government.	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Highly satisfied	87 (33K & 54J)	52%
2	Satisfied	44 (17K & 27J)	26%
3	Neutral	27 (15K & 12J)	16%
4	Dissatisfied	10 (8K & 2J)	06
Total		168	100%

Chart 5.22: If yes: Specify your satisfaction towards that Coalition Government.




In response to this particular question out of the 168 respondents who opted yes for 2008 coalition being stable , 52% of the respondents(87- 33 from Kashmir & 54 from Jammu) were highly satisfied with the working of the coalition government.26%(44-17 from Kashmir & 27 from Jammu) were satisfied with the working of the 2008 coalition government.16%(27-15from Kashmir &12 from Jammu) of the respondents remained neutral to the fact in specifying their satisfaction towards the coalition government. 06% (10 -8 from Kashmir & 2 from Jammu) of the respondents were dissatisfied with the coalition of 2008. Thus from the following it can be inferred that 52% respondents were highly satisfied with the coalition government of 2008.it goes in proving that a stable coalition is must, it must complete its full tenure and remain stable. 26% being satisfied with the coalition governments indicates that people too are satisfied with the coalition structures that remain smooth from the policy and ideological similarity in the long run. People seem to dislike the coalitions that are not stable and are ideologically opposite on developmental issues.

Table 5.23: Policy decisions undertaken during the coalition government of 2008 have fulfilled the demands of public at large.

S. No.	Policy decisions undertaken during the coalition government of 2008 have fulfilled the demands of public at large.	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Agree	168 (73K & 95J)	42%
2	Strongly Agree	92 (36 K & 56J)	23%
3	Neutral	76 (51K & 25J)	19%
4	Disagree	64 (38K & 28J)	16%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.23: Policy decisions undertaken during the coalition government of 2008 have fulfilled the demands of public at large.




In the above question on whether the policy decisions undertaken during the coalition government of 2008 have fulfilled the demands of the public at large the 42% respondents (168- 73 from Kashmir & 95 from Jammu) have agreed to the question. While 23% of the respondents (92-36 from Kashmir & 56 from Jammu) have strongly agreed to the question. 19% (76-51 from Kashmir & 25 from Jammu) have remained neutral to the question .whereas 16% (64- 38 from Kashmir & 28 from Jammu) have shown disagreement for the same.

So from the above it can be inferred that majority of the respondents held the opinion that the mandate of the people was fulfilled by the coalition of 2008. The basic idea behind the representative democracy is that the government should be able to meet the demands of the people and fulfill its mandate. The coalition government led by Omar Abdullah was successful in delivering the same. Agreements of strong nature of almost 65% of the respondents reflect that Policy decisions undertaken during the coalition government of 2008 have fulfilled the demands of public at large. This gives a positive impetus among the masses to opt for coalition partners who ally to form stable govenenemt, which in turn will formulate the policies at large to benefit the masses.

Table 5.24: RTI Act of 2009 has brought transparency and accountability in Administrative setup.

S. No.	RTI Act of 2009 has brought transparency and accountability in Administrative setup.	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Agree	108 (37K & 71J)	27%
2	Strongly Agree	36 (14K & 22J)	09%
3	Neutral	192 (123K & 69J)	48%
4	Disagree	64 (25K & 39J)	16%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.24: RTI Act of 2009 has brought transparency and accountability in Administrative setup.




While responding to the question given above whether RTI Act of 2009 has brought transparency and accountability in the Administrative setup, 27% of the respondents agreed to the question that the act was able to bring accountability. 09% of the respondents strongly agreed to the question. 48% of the respondents remained neutral and 16% disagreed to the question that they have witnessed accountability. From the above it can be inferred that the RTI act 2009 introduced by the coalition government of 2008 was successful in bringing the transparency in administrative setup. 27% agreed and 09% strongly agreed to the fact that the government's policy measures and initiatives are at large welcomed by the masses. The respondents made it clear that if there is a stable government formed even though it being a

coalition government it can bring the policies and reforms that can ease the life of the masses, in turn it can be referred as respecting the mandate by the people in power.

Table 5.25: UDAAN Scheme of 2009 was successful in generating the employment avenues for the Unemployed Youth of J&K.

S. No.	UDAAN Scheme of 2009 was successful in generating the employment avenues for the Unemployed Youth of J&K.	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Agree	128 (73K & 55J)	32%
2	Strongly Agree	48 (31K & 17J)	12%
3	Neutral	152 (61K & 91J)	38%
4	Disagree	72 (33K & 39J)	18%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.25: UDAAN Scheme of 2009 was successful in generating the employment avenues for the Unemployed Youth of J&K.




In response to the above cited question whether UDAAN scheme of 2009 was successful in generating the employment avenues for the unemployed youth of the J&K, the 32% of the respondents agreed to the fact that the scheme helped the youth to gain access to employment avenues. While 12% of the respondents strongly agreed to the question of the success of UDAAN scheme. 38% of the respondents remained neutral to the above cited question, whereas 18% of the respondents disagreed to the fact of the scheme being

successful. From the above it can be inferred that 44% of the respondents have agreed/strongly agreed to the fact that the UDAAN scheme initiated by the 2008 coalition government helped the unemployed youth to find employment avenues. This shows that the biggest of the government formation is to introduce the policies that benefit the public at large and help the youth to find employment generating avenues. Employment being one of the major issues surrounding the masses these days. Initiatives like UDAAN were one of us kind in helping youth find better employment avenues.

Table 5.26: There was huge Socio Economic vacuum left in 2008 Coalition Government in J&K.

S. No.	There was huge Socio Economic vacuum left in 2008 Coalition Government in J&K.	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Yes	112 (48K & 64J)	28%
2	No	104 (73K & 31J)	26%
3	Can't Say	184 (123K & 61J)	46%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.26: There was huge Socio Economic vacuum left in 2008 Coalition Government in J&K.




The socio economic issues are vital to the overall development in the governance of the modern representative democracies. The success of a government can be assessed based on its policy formulations to bring about the development from all aspects of the political life

of the state. In this regard the respondents were give a question regarding the huge socio economic vacuum left in 2008 coalition government in J&K. 28 % of the respondents said 'yes' to the question, while 26% of the respondents said 'No'.46% of the respondents opted for 'Can't say'. Thus from the above it can be inferred that the coalition government of 2008 was not able to fulfill the socio economic vaccum.The perception of the 46% of the respondents was that they were mostly unaware about the same , while as 28% of the respondents believed that same was done at large.

Table 5.27: If Yes: specify the alternative to fill the Socio Economic & Political Vacuum left in 2008 Coalition Government.

S. No.	If Yes: specify the alternative to fill the Socio Economic & Political Vacuum left in 2008 Coalition Government.	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Adequate representation of depressed classes	29 (9K & 20J)	26%
2	Inclusive policy for minorities	16 (6K & 10J)	14%
3	Progressive Economic Policies	43 (14K & 29J)	38%
4	Can't say	24 (9K & 15J)	22%
Total		112	100%

Chart 5.27: If Yes: specify the alternative to fill the Socio Economic & Political Vacuum left in 2008 Coalition Government




The government's main responsibility is to fulfill the socio economic and political vacuum. On being asked to specify their choice. 26% of the respondents said that adequate representation of the depressed classed is needed. 14% replied that Inclusive policy for minorities is needed. 38% of the respondents believe that Progressive Economic Policies should be initiated by the government in the state. While 22% of the respondents marked 'Can't say' in their responses. This from the above it can be inferred that the coalition government that is formed should adequately try to be a perfect blend of adequate representation of the depressed classes , also it should strive to bring inclusive policies for the minorities. The coalition must ensure that it employs the progressive economic policies.

Table 5.28: Coalition Government in 2014 was a flawless alternative to 2008 Coalition Government.

S. No.	Coalition Government in 2014 was a flawless alternative to 2008 Coalition Government.	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Agree	104 (21K & 83 J)	26%
2	Strongly Agree	76 (23 K & J53)	19%
3	Neutral	128 (78K & 50J)	32%
4	Disagree	92 (41K & 51J)	23%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.28: Coalition Government in 2014 was a flawless alternative to 2008 Coalition Government.




In response to the above question, the respondents were asked about the coalition government of 2014, an alliance between the ideologically opposite political parties BJP & PDP. 26% of the respondents agreed that it was a flawless alternative. 19% of the respondents strongly agreed that Coalition Government in 2014 was a flawless alternative to 2008 Coalition Government. 32% remained neutral to the question asked & 23% disagreed to the question. Thus from the above it can be inferred that 55% of the respondents have disagreed that the coalition government of the 2014 was a flawless alternative to 2008 Coalition Government because this coalition remained fragile throughout also being most unstable of all the coalition governments in the state.

Table 5.29: Coalition Government of 2014 was ideologically balanced as compared to the Coalition Government of 2008.

S. No.	Coalition Government of 2014 was ideologically balanced as compared to the Coalition Government of 2008	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Agree	76 (56K & 20J)	19%
2	Strongly Agree	32 (28K & 4J)	08%
3	Neutral	124 (38K & 86J)	31%
4	Disagree	168 (73K & 95J)	42%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.29: Coalition Government of 2014 was ideologically balanced as compared to the Coalition Government of 2008.




To form a coalition government it's important that all the alliance partners must be ideologically balanced. While the respondents were asked that Coalition Government of 2014 was ideologically balanced as compared to the Coalition Government of 2008, 19% of the respondents agreed, while 08% of the respondents had a strong agreement with the same. 31% of the respondents remained neutral to the question whereas 42% of the respondents disagreed to the question. Thus it can be inferred from the above data that 42% of the respondents have shown disagreement with the question that there was ideological balance between the BJP-PDP alliances of 2014. Thus it becomes important to form alliance or coalitions with the ideologically balanced partners.

Table 5.30: How you assess the functioning and Policy Formulation of 2014 Coalition Government.

S. No.	How you assess the functioning and Policy Formulation of 2014 Coalition Government	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Good	88 (16K & 72J)	22%
2	Excellent	32 (9K & 23J)	08%
3	Bad	112 (78K & 34J)	38%
4	Can't say	168 (83K & 85J)	42%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.30: How you assess the functioning and Policy Formulation of 2014 Coalition Government.




In the above question the respondents were asked to assess the functioning and Policy Formulation of 2014 Coalition Government of BJP-PDP. 22% of the respondents said it was good. 08% said it was excellent. 33% of the respondents marked as ‘Bad’ while 42% opted for ‘Can’t say’. From the above it can be inferred that 38% of the respondents had a bad overview of the coalition of 2014. It shows that when the coalitions are unstable, ideologically opposite they may lack in policy formulation also.

Table 5.31: Coalition Government of 2014 was ineffective in respecting the mandate of the People.

S. No.	Coalition Government of 2014 was ineffective in respecting the mandate of the People	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Agree	128 (83K & 45J)	32%
2	Strongly Agree	92 (56K & 36J)	23%
3	Neutral	148 (57K & 91J)	37%
4	Disagree	32 (7K & 25J)	08%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.31: Coalition Government of 2014 was ineffective in respecting the mandate of the People.




The prime responsibility with the any government is that it has to respect the mandate of the people. In this regard the respondents were asked whether Coalition Government of 2014 was ineffective in respecting the mandate of the People. 32% of the people agreed that

the coalition government of 2014 was ineffective. 23% of the respondents strongly agreed that it was ineffective. 37% of the respondents remained neutral while as 08% of them disagreed. So, it can be inferred from the above that Coalition Government of 2014 was ineffective in respecting the mandate of the People. The government could not complete its full tenure thereby it failed to respect the mandate of the people.

Table 5.32: Reasons responsible for ineffectiveness of 2014 coalition government

S. No.	Reasons responsible for ineffectiveness of 2014 coalition government	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Regional differences	128 (79K & 49J)	32%
2	Coalition partners backed off	92 (48K & 44J)	23%
3	Ideological differences surfaced among Coalition Partners	148 (84K & 64J)	37%
4	It Failed to abide by its Common Minimum Programme	32 (17K & 15J)	08%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.32: Reasons responsible for ineffectiveness of 2014 coalition government




In the above question, the respondents were asked about the reasons responsible for the ineffectiveness of the 2014 coalition government. 32% of the respondents said that regional differences between the alliance partners were responsible for the downfall. 23 percent of the respondents were of the opinion that the coalition partner backed off. 37% of

them chose ideological differences that surfaced among them. While 8% of the respondents were of the opinion that it failed to abide by the CMP. Thus, from the above, it can be inferred that the success of the coalition government revolves around certain factors like avoiding regional differences and having an alliance partner that will not back off in the middle of the term. Ideological differences should be sorted out at the very beginning, and finally, it should be able to devise and abide by a CMP.

Table 5.33: Should there be another Coalition Government in next General Elections

S. No.	Should there be another Coalition Government in next General Elections	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Yes	96 (23K & 73J)	32%
2	No	168 (97K & 71J)	23%
3	Can't say	136 (59K & 77J)	37%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.33: Should there be another Coalition Government in next General Elections




In the above question the respondents were asked should there be another Coalition Government in next General Elections. 23% of the respondents said yes. 23% of the respondents said no. while those who opted for 'Can't say' comprised of 37% of the respondents. Thus from the above it can be inferred that due to the failure of the previous coalition government, the voters get confused about their choice of government that may be

formed in the upcoming elections. As a government that fails to deliver as per the expectation of the masses, in future the voters want that the election mandate be respected and a government for the full tenure be formed.

Table 5.34: Ideological differences were the prime reason for breakdown of the 2014 Coalition Government.

S. No.	Ideological differences were the prime reason for breakdown of the 2014 Coalition Government.	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Agree	148 (75K& 73J)	37%
2	Strongly Agree	112 (52K & 60J)	28%
3	Neutral	104 (71K & 33J)	26%
4	Disagree	36 (9K & 27J)	09%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.34: Ideological differences were the prime reason for breakdown of the 2014 Coalition Government.




It has been observed that ideology plays an important role in the coalition formation at any level. In this context the respondents were asked whether Ideological differences were the prime reason for breakdown of the 2014 Coalition Government. 37% of the respondents agreed that ideological differences are the prime reason. 28% strongly agreed. 26% of

the respondents remained neutral, while 09% of them disagreed. So from the above it can be inferred that ideological differences between the BJP –PDP alliance were prime reasons for the breakdown of the alliance. That is why this alliance was also referred to as the alliance of the unequals.

Table 5.35: The Failure of 2014 Coalition partners was responsible for Governor’s rule in the State.

S. No.	The Failure of 2014 Coalition partners was responsible for Governor’s rule in the State	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Agree	208 (95K & 113J)	52%
2	Strongly Agree	116 (51K & 65J)	29%
3	Neutral	60 (22K & 38J)	15%
4	Disagree	16 (5K & 11J)	04%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.35: The Failure of 2014 Coalition partners was responsible for Governor’s rule in the State.




For the above data the respondents were asked about the Failure of 2014 Coalition partners was responsible for Governor’s rule in the State , in response 52% of the respondents (208- 95 from Kashmir & 113 from Jammu) agreed that the failure of the 2014 coalition was responsible for the imposition of the Governor’s rule . 29% strongly agreed (116-51 from Kashmir & 65 from Jammu) responded that they strongly agree to the asked question.15% of

the respondents (60- 22 from Kashmir & 38 from Jammu) remained neutral on the question asked. Only 4% (16- 5 from Kashmir & 11from Jammu) of the respondents here have disagreed. From the given data it can be inferred that imposition of the Governors rule in the state was due to the failure of the coalition government between PDP-BJP ending in 2018. 81% of the respondents agreed in total that the coalition government failed to abide by the mandate and it was because of the failure that the coalition that it ended in dissolution of the legislature and imposition of the Governors rule.

Table 5.36: Abrogation of Special Status of the State of Jammu & Kashmir was the failure of the coalition partners of 2014 Alliance.

S. No.	Abrogation of Special Status of the State of Jammu & Kashmir was the failure of the coalition partners of 2014 Alliance.	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Agree	216 (132K & 84J)	54%
2	Strongly Agree	108 (63K & 45J)	27%
3	Neutral	48 (18K & 30J)	12%
4	Disagree	28 (19K & 9J)	07%
Total		400	100%

Chart 5.36: Abrogation of Special Status of the State of Jammu & Kashmir was the failure of the coalition partners of 2014 Alliance.



In the last question from the questionnaire the respondents were asked whether Abrogation of Special Status of the State of Jammu & Kashmir was the failure of the coalition partners of 2014 Alliance. 54% of the respondents (216- 132 from Kashmir & 84 from Jammu) agreed that the special status of the state was abolished because of the failure of the coalition partners of 2014 alliance. 27 % (108-632 from Kashmir & 84 from Jammu) strongly agreed that same was the case. 12% of the respondents (48- 18 from Kashmir & 30 from Jammu) remained neutral while 07% (28- 19 from Kashmir & 09 from the Jammu) disagreed to the question asked. From the above it can be inferred that the abrogation resulted as a result of failure of the coalition partners. 81% of the respondents were of the opinion that if the coalition of the 2014 would have continues there was a lesser chance of Article 370 would not have been abrogated.

5.4. Conclusion

From the above it can be concluded that there has been a varying degree of perception among the people regarding the working of the coalition government in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The responses from the respondents reflect that the voters want the mandate to be respected in a manner that even if a coalition government is formed, whether between ideologically different alliance partners. The respondents want the coalition governments to last full term. When the coalition governments lack trust among the alliance partners thus leading to the downfall of the coalition governments leading to mid-term elections or governors rule. The alliance partners need to have CMP to have a straight path and bump free years of smooth administration. Lack of trust and failure to launch joint implementation of said programmes has somehow been considered as the breach of the trust of the electorates. The state of Jammu and Kashmir witnessed the same, when PDP & BJP formed alliance in the year 2014 which ultimately failed to follow their own agenda of the alliance. Later on the developments like the abrogation of Article 370 & 35A is also considered to be the outcomes of the failure of the government.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

6.1 Introduction

Coalition governments first emerged in countries with parliamentary democracy and a multi-party system. It is not rare in a parliamentary system when more than two parties contest for parliamentary seats for none of the parties to be able to gain a majority on their own. Political parties in such situations have the option of forming a coalition government. Political parties must work together to share power in a coalition government, but smaller parties must also check the dominance of any one party inside that alliance. Typically, the larger party provides leadership and plays an active and effective role in ensuring the coalition's success. The prospect of coalition instability remains high in the absence of a larger or leading party in the alliance. This potential has become the standard in the majority of the world's parliamentary systems, including India. Despite this possibility, coalition governance has become a requirement in modern Indian politics.

India has seen the development of coalition governments in numerous states and at the Centre in recent decades. The last nearly three decades of Indian politics (from 1989 to 2014) have seen a period of coalition alliance at the union level. Earlier than 1999, coalition formation in India was an insecure occurrence; however, with the founding of the NDA in 1999, a more settled chapter of coalition government caught the very heart of Indian politics. The new pattern in Indian politics brings in light many perplexing issues, such as why coalition administrations became needed after 1989. In the above background, the union territory of Jammu and Kashmir is no exception in terms of coalition government formation. The UT of Jammu and Kashmir has witnessed the political turmoil and demographic variance between the two administrative divisions.

In the recent times, the cultural and ethnic variations have taken a lead role to establish the governments at state level. Religion as well as ethnicity has acted as dominant factors during the electoral campaigning and voting. In this context, the present chapter will analyze and summarize the findings of the study that have been inferred from the primary cum secondary data sources. All the findings have been arranged in the particular thematic bases that are in line with the research objectives. The findings have also set the tune for validating/invalidating the proposed hypothesis as set in chapter one.

6.2. Summary of Findings

It is unclear if the current multiparty and cooperation system, known as coalition politics, will last. A coalition regime is created by various political parties joins to develop a suitable agreement in order to form a government. Coalition politics is an alliance formed when two or more political parties share a common objective and work together to achieve it. Coalition politics is a sign of shared rule form of governing where number of tiny parties united to operate the government. To put it simply, a democratically elected government will always result in a coalition government. The representative system is the current democratic style of governance strongly associated with the multi-party system. In a democratic environment, a functioning government requires the existence of many political parties. If a democracy is to function properly and smoothly, it must have a multi-party system of coalition rule. Only with an effective system of multi-party alliance can collaboration and management be developed and carried out among the many governmental agencies.

The culture of coalition politics is the growth and promotion of democratic institutions such as democracy, rule of law, etc. The coalition government is fundamentally an agreed plan of groupings of diverse or identical parties for the nonspecific length during which they collaborate in mutual action and every element of the coalition, in their specified self-interest, combine together on behalf of a common goal. The coalition system is created on the basis of the purpose of particular payment, and this collaboration may or may not be temporary in character or contain an element of opportunism. The fundamental coalition framework rests on the shaky reasoning of the short-term accumulation of special advantages. It is not stationary but lively matter as coalition players and political parties have the potential to divide into a new shape. Changing a coalition's makeup is driven by the desire to seize power. A system of political irregularity and succession crisis will be a recurring feature if *power grabs* are the sole objective behind the establishment of a coalition or agreement. No coalition or organization has long-term allies or foes; but they only come together, indefinitely or temporarily, for a single interest.

In light of the political disintegration of the Indian social order, the coalition government's diverse cast of political players has attempted to reassure party members and the wider public that it has formed as predicted. They had been encouraging the cultivation of a coalition culture by teaching people to negotiate in order to get their desired distribution of authority. Many findings were made throughout the course of this study, and they are

discussed here . The transition from a dominating one-party system to a multi-party system in India makes a study of "Coalition politics in India with specific reference to Jammu and Kashmir (2018-2020)" extremely important.

In Jammu and Kashmir, power shifted from the National Conference to the Congress and back to the National Conference. The rise of political divides has been detrimental to the National Conference & the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In this worry the different numbers of political parties were developed from time to time. Before the recent unrest, just a handful of political parties have been in power throughout Jammu and Kashmir State's developing practice of politics. The few regional political groups are said to have either merged with the larger parties or to be completely in sync with Praja Parishad. The few minor parties emerged as a result of National Conference's monopoly on politics. However, a few more political parties appear to have quietly finalized the state's coalition arrangement. The inclusion of several minor regional political parties of the Jammu and Kashmir state in procedures of sharing is anticipated to the growth of this coalition process. Almost all of the regional political parties with seats in the state legislature have forged coalitions and participated in power sharing at one time or another, with varying degrees of success depending on the nature of the parties' political philosophies and socioeconomic interests. The practice of unhurried procedure in creating a stable government system has been a desired aim of the alliance partners 'observance of the specific socio- political culture of the Jammu and Kashmir state throughout the years.

01. It is generally accepted that Jammu and Kashmir's first coalition administration was established in the late post-independence era, around the turn of the twentieth century. Jammu & Kashmir lacked the coalition experience of other Indian states since the National Conference was the only major political party in the state. Jammu & Kashmir was not the only area of India to have a coalition administration at the time. In the meanwhile, since 1986, Jammu and Kashmir has been ruled by a coalition government made up of several political groups. However, coalition politics in Jammu and Kashmir began with the Rajiv-Farooq pact on November 7, 1986. The coalition government of National Conference and Congress (I) was formed before the election and is led by Dr. Farooq Abdullah. As a result of the Rajiv-Farooq deal, elections were expected to be held in Jammu & Kashmir on March 23, 1987. A democratic coalition was formed by Congress (I) and the National Conference. Farooq Abdullah was inaugurated as head of the coalition government including the Congress and National Conference on March 26th, 1987. However,

the change in central government caused the coalition government to fall apart. The collaboration may not reach the target regarding the deal on development. As a result of all the problems and complaints, the political and economic climate became depressing.

The difficulties like the deal notably suggested the development of coalition government. The National Conference had previously promised that in the 1987 elections, they would assist Congress candidates who ran for seats in the Kashmir valley. Despite this, several initiatives were done to improve the state's economy and the lives of its citizens in areas like as agriculture, handicrafts, education, irrigation, and more. Moreover, the coalition government formed the Service Selection Board to streamline the recruiting structure. Assumptions were made that widespread citizen input into policymaking would be secured through a transparent and democratic decentralization process. During its time in office, the coalition administration reinstated District Level Development Boards (DDB). But the broad fracture amid the actual performance in the developmental area and the huge aspirations spurred by the pact were unavoidable to significant discontent. One further crucial concern for alliance partners was reinstatement of Article 370 and state autonomy. While middle- and lower-level leaders in the two partners' alliance did not back each other, at the grassroots level, cooperation was lacking. Consequently, common disparities between the coalition members worried the smooth running of the administration in the Jammu and Kashmir. Finally, the tension and anxiety caused by the coalition partners' differences broke them.

In practice, the Rajiv-Farooq agreement was shown to be inadequate. The agreement was deemed unsuccessful since it did not contribute to addressing the state's problems, such as reducing corruption and fostering a more efficient bureaucracy, expanding citizens' rights, and encouraging more participation. The agreement chunks the secular and nationalist viewpoint of prevalent dissatisfaction in the political entity of the state. The Kashmiri Common People have become estranged from the Centre as a result of the government's determined strategy of opposing Kashmir's right to democracy, which was the special biggest component to the practise of Kashmir's expressive and political assimilation with the rest of India.

Conflict in Kashmir's political environment wasn't the only place where party politics had to adapt. With the fracturing of Kashmiri's mainstream politics, the power equilibrium within the state was also radically transformed. There was political imbalance in the context of power positions, but Jammu region was sufficiently represented in these since the National Conference headquartered in Kashmir previously established power politics. With their

recent victories, this party has gained the majority of assembly seats. It might form the government with token representation from Jammu area. Jammu's lack of political influence has given rise to political unrest, which has taken on a number of different manifestations. In a number of agitations, the topic of regional imbalance on subjects pertaining to development, resource allocation and neglect of Jammu has been highlighted. The political disparity between the two areas has been a major factor in all of these problems. The democratic politics which had been entirely delegitimized in the first phase and the development of PDP as a competitor party to the National Conference has transformed the dominant charisma of National Conference which launched a competitive power politics in the state political affairs. While the National Conference's loss of statewide dominance and one-party rule became increasingly common after 2002, that year was rather typical. It was the year that altered the fate of state politics. Multi-party system established and coalition politics became predictable for J&K political system. The coalition politics and governance has varying importance in the state political entity.

The second attempt of coalition governance in the state was observed following 2002 assembly elections. In the 2002 elections for the Assembly, the National Conference won the most votes and ended up with 28 MLA's, but it refused to form a government. Then, it was a post-alliance between PDP and Congress I to create a coalition government. Congress (I) and the People's Democratic Party formed a partnership with the Communist Party of India, the Panthers Party, and the People's Democratic Front to form a government with shared authority. For a total of six years, Mufti Mohammed Sayeed and Ghulam Nabi Azad would take turns as chief minister. The coalition partners planned for the Common Minimum Programme (CMP) for the responsible governance of the state. It was the priority of the two regional coalition partners which was to function under the same model, in terms of same ideology, political views of Kashmiriyat, and the comparable secular political space via tension on the question of political difference. The coalition partners also set importance on the state autonomy issue of Jammu and Kashmir. The Healing Touch Policy instituted by the People's Democratic Party improved the state's emotional climate and served as a model of progressive policy sensitivity. The coalition administration led by Mufti Mohammed Sayeed maintained on the ideals to heal and re-establish visibly anticipated peace and harmony in the state, making anticipation among the peoples to win over their support. The Healing Touch Policy, as stated by Mufti's administration, involves the release of innocent people from prison and the elimination of false coincidences and the disarray that

Interrogation centres inside and outside the state. To include all of these assurances into the Healing Touch plan, he exerted much effort.

Another crucial step was taken by the coalition administration of the People's Democratic Party and the Congress, which has achieved remarkable strides in many areas, including agriculture, education, tourism, health, employment, power, road connections, and so on. There were various additional areas where government excelled in developing anticipation amongst the population that integrated elimination of corruption, promotion of human rights, and proclamation of assistance and rehabilitation of violence victims. Under Mufti's leadership, the country's tourism industry — the industry's main source of revenue — was revived to a point of confidence. At the end of Mufti Mohammed Sayeed's three-year term, Ghulam Nabi Azad took control of the administration, transferring power from the People's Democratic Party to the Congress party. The Azad-led coalition government structured its policies from the perspective of "Khushal Jammu and Kashmir" (A Prosperous Jammu and Kashmir). Corruption-free government, openness, accountability, and full development of Jammu and Kashmir were stated goals of this strategy. The Ghulam Nabi Azad led Congress government also aimed to de-politicize the bureaucratic style administration of the state. The transfer strategy was rationalized. The State Human Rights Commission and the State Women's Commission could not be resurrected even throughout Azad term, since crashes in the coalition had an adversative effect on responsibility and rule of law. The Congress-led coalition government in India collapsed after the People's Democratic Party withdrew its support over the Amaranth land transfer decision. After losing the backing of the People's Democratic Party on July 7, 2008, Ghulam Nabi Azad resigned the same day without facing a vote of confidence from the Assembly.

02. Since 2002, there have been substantial changes in the character of political history in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Many concerns of socioeconomic, geopolitical, religious, geographical, and ideological divergence had previously been hidden from view, but were brought to light as a result. The 2002 polls for the State Assembly were important to a lesser but still noticeable extent since they aided in the expansion of democratic development in the region. The Assembly Election of 2002 in the state saw the first alliance venture, which had key elements, overthrow the monopoly of one party rule of the National conference party. A coalition administration led by the People's Democratic Party was formed for the first time in Jammu and Kashmir State's history, and

for the second time, Ghulam Nabi Azad, a member of the Congress party from the Jammu area, became the state's chief executive.

Though, during the 2002, there has been an extraordinary change in the power composition of the Jammu and Kashmir state. In addition to introducing a new level of disagreement to Kashmir valley's regional politics, the People's Democratic Party's entry into state politics has stoked tensions across the whole state. The National Conference's dominant strategy and over electoral institutions of Kashmir allowed it to dominate political affairs until 2002. Having the largest number of seats in the Kashmir, it may build the government irrespective of the election turnout in Jammu division. Both halves of the state felt despondent as a result of this power dynamic. For a long time, it seemed as if Kashmiri politicians held all the cards in the game of power, with Jammu only playing the role of silent observer. While the People's Democratic Party and the National Conference fought it out for control of Kashmir's regional politics, neither of them could win enough votes to secure a majority in the state legislature. This allowed the Congress, whose headquarters are in neighboring Jammu, to play a pivotal role in the coalition that has characterised the state's politics since 2002. Congress has been a significant partner in the coalition administration from 2002 to 2008 of People's Democratic Party and from 2008 onwards of the National Conference. Coalition politics brought to a dramatic shift in the regional power dynamic. However, pre-2002 period when power politics was primarily controlled in the valley due to the enticing existence of the Kashmir-centric regional political forces, the power politics at this time characterised a feeling of equilibrium in the regional parties. For the Kashmir-focused regional political parties to establish an arrangement of government either National Conference or People's Democratic Party observed the assistance of Jammu centric Congress, Panthers Party and Bharatiya Janta Party. This was because the Congress party was at the heart of the power dynamics in both areas.

With Jammu region, its presence fruitfully represented in the administration, there were more arrangements that demonstrate the regional parity in the power dynamics. From 2002 to 2008, the state of Jammu and Kashmir used a rotating system for its Chief Minister, with Mufti Mohammad Sayeed of the People's Democratic Party serving as its leader for the first three years and then giving way to Ghulam Nabi Azad of the Congress for the next three. It just so happened that Ghulam Nabi Azad was the first Chief Minister to emerge from the Jammu area. During this time, there was also a practice run in which the Deputy Chief Minister (Dy. CM) would come from the opposing party and region if the Chief Minister

(CM) came from the same party and territory. To practice having a Deputy Chief Minister from the other region and the other Party, while the Chief Minister belongs to the Kashmir-centric National Conference party, the Deputy Chief Minister is representing the Jammu-centric Congress party. This coalition has been in place since 2008, but has not followed the practice of rotating the Chief Minister ship. The People's Democratic Party and its allies in the governing coalition in the Jammu and Kashmir States won all three seats in Jammu and Ladakh in the 2014 Lok-Sabha elections, despite the fact that none of the candidates for those seats were qualified to do so.

Jammu and Kashmir returned to a coalition administration following the 2008 Assembly elections. After the National Conference gained the highest number of votes and the majority of seats in the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly election of 2008, Congress considered establishing an alliance that included the National Conference or the People's Democratic Party. Thus a coalition government was established by National Conference and Congress in which Omar Abdullah swore in as new and young Chief-Minister of Jammu and Kashmir State for its complete tenure. The Congress Party's National command did not have a hard time developing a plan for dividing up political power because the two coalition partners had a common political history. Each member of the coalition administration made promises in their election platforms in 2008 to reduce corruption, unemployment, and poverty in the state. Further to strengthen the developmental mechanism and also revitalize all the key sectors of the state. That's the mindset from which the coalition's two major players set out on their political mission.

The coalition government of the National Conference and the People's Democratic Party has taken steps to improve the quality of delivery-mechanisms for the proper implementation of schemes, as well as to revitalise institutions in order to promote transparency and responsibility within the administrative system of governance. E-tendering and e-purchasing were announced in state indentures as a novel way to combat corruption. The coalition government strongly supported future IT-based system-wide monitoring infrastructure development. The Right to Information Act (RTI) is an effective mechanism that tipped the scales of power in favour of the average citizen and facilitated greater openness and accountability in the policymaking process. To ensure that the true beneficiaries are the people, the government upgraded models of governance and development. Another major victory for the NC-Congress coalition administration is the successful completion of elections for Panchayati Raj Bodies after a lengthy period of

inaction. The coalition government's pledge to strengthen the paradigm of grass-root democracy through the transfer of powers to PRIs has been fulfilled. A further noteworthy and commendable action taken by the coalition administration is the installation of organisation amenities in the state. New policies and initiatives, such as **SKEWPY** (*Sher-e-Kashmir employment welfare programe for youth*) and **UDAAN**, were implemented by the coalition administration to combat the high rate of unemployment. Shri Amaranth Ji, Shri Mata Vaisnov Devi, etc., had a record number of visitors.

03. The state's third experience with coalition politics came with the formation of the National Conference-Congress following the 2008 elections. It was the National Conference that worked with the state Congress to establish this new kind of coalition government in the state. Considering their shared ancestry, the National Conference and the Congress party quickly settled on a framework for dividing up political power. Their mutual respect and common ideology can be traced back to the time of Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah, when their friendship was at its healthiest. The coalition between the National Conference and the Congress is a well-executed example of a tightrope correspondence, which links collaboration between two or more disassociated or even opposing viewpoints. Since each coalition member would prefer greater gains for themselves at the expense of their coalition partner, the parties in the middle stand to benefit the most when striking a compromise. Unlike the people of Jammu and Ladakh, who were deceived into believing they did not receive their fair share and are instead distinguished on numerous fronts, the people of Kashmir have had to fight hard for the state administration to regain their trust. The citizens of Kashmir are quite critical of their government. Because of this, the current alliance has embarked on its journey with the words all equal and inclusive growth for all three areas prominently displayed from the get-go in an effort to mitigate any premature judgments or misinterpretations. After the 2008 Assembly elections, the Congress formed an alliance with the National Conference, forcing the People's Democratic Party, its former coalition partner, to become the main opposition in the legislature. Powerlessness has grown weary in the valley because of this isolation and disregard. For the first five years of its existence, between 2008 and 2014, they were incredibly successful in spreading these ideas throughout the state's many areas. The pre-poll coalition between the National Conference and the Congress did not materialise in the 2014 state assembly elections.

Jammu & Kashmir is an experiment for the alliance and its leaders because of the many different regional, sub-regional, and religious groups that call the state home.

Nevertheless, the public do not have positive impressions of the coalition government in the state. Coalitions are being compared to regional waste and inefficient administration. In order to avoid seeming dishonest, confused, or dissatisfied, a coalition administration must have the backing of the major political parties, which have their economic bases and bases of support in different areas and sub-regions. There is little that can be done by the state administration to improve the situation in any of Jammu and Kashmir's three autonomous areas; yet ignoring the reality on the ground would be irresponsible. The coalition government's description of greater ties to the center and higher expectations bode well for the state's ability to secure a fair share of the national prize of funds for social welfare programmes.

04. The Bharatiya Janata Party and the People's Democratic Party put together an alliance of more than two or more parties with drastically divergent beliefs, but it was not a single front. In the 2014 elections that were held for the state legislature, the People's Democratic Party, headed by Mehbooba Mufti, won 28 seats, with the Bharatiya Janta Party finishing in second with 25 seats. The Kashmir Valley was a stronghold for the People's Democratic Party, whereas the Jammu and Kashmir region voted overwhelmingly for the Bharatiya Janata Party. After no one party gained a majority of seats, it was widely expected that a government made up of coalition parties would be established. Given the present political context, a coalition government consisting of the People's Democratic Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party has been formed. A coalition government between two ideologically opposing parties was formed despite overwhelming resistance. Jammu and Kashmir's first-ever coalition administration is made up of the People's Democratic Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party. It was hailed as the meeting of the "North Pole and the South Pole" by newly sworn-in Deputy Chief Minister Dr. Nirmal Singh of the Jammu area and Chief Minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed of the Kashmir valley.

In addition, Mufti Mohammed Sayeed administered oaths of office to the thirteen members of the People's Democratic Party and eleven members of the Bharatiya Janata Party. Sajjad Gani Lone, a former separatist turned legislator, met with Prime Minister Modi in Delhi before the elections and was subsequently appointed minister of science and technology and agriculture. It occurred because of the malicious responses of many groups to the impending coalition of the two rival parties in the government formation process. As a result of the constitutional emergency created by the unexpected passing of Chief Minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed on January 7, 2016, On January 08 Governor Rule was imposed for 3 months in Jammu and Kashmir as a state. On April 1, 2016, shortly after the demise of

former Chief Minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, Mehbooba Mufti became the very first female Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir.

Even though the Bharatiya Janata Party and the People's Democratic Party were able to sew out a power-sharing agreement, they quickly severed their opportunistic partnership. The coalition partner Bharatiya Janata Party has been silently moving further away from their programme of politics for much more than two and a half years, while the People's Democratic Party has been fading away inside its struggle, making the political ups and downs of 2014–2018 relevant to refer to now. They failed to deliver on their political promise to the people of Kashmir, which they refer to as their Agenda of Alliance. Given the prominence of the Bharatiya Janata Policy platform in the state, it's possible that the BJP rendered the People's Democratic Party a challenge and a damaged political creature in Kashmir. Both coalition partners are put to the test by the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which serves as a regional, sub-regional, and religious haven for many people. However, the people do not have access to reliable records on the coalition's administration of the state. Coalition politics are characterised by regional disengagement and bureaucratic inefficiency. If the coalition government isn't to emerge disillusioned, dishonest, and confused, it's important that the major political parties have a behavior of coalition background, institutional organisation, and clear perception in the direction of their state's economy and politics. At the state level, the administration has little power, but in all three of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh's regions, the situation at the grassroots level is dire.

It is true that coalition government specifies closer and better expectations between the Centre and state, which may help the state, receive good national reward of financing in the needs of aid to the people. Thus, the emergence of new political parties on the third front in the state is characterized by intense rivalry and a fragmented electoral field. Because the major political parties' economic bases and support networks are dispersed across unpredictable regions and sub-regions, it's crucial that they develop behavior of coalition background, institutional association, and clear insight into the trend of their state. Only then can the coalition government avoid emerging dissatisfied, deceitful, and disorganized. The administration cannot do to a considerable degree at the state level but one cannot overlook on the ground condition of affairs in the three areas of Jammu Kashmir and Ladakh. It is true that coalition governments define Centre-State matters more closely and with higher quality, which may help the state acquire adequate recompense of the national

payment of financing in requirements of assistance to the people. *The study's central claim is that the People's Democratic Party, which takes a more moderate approach to separatism, and the Bharatiya Janata Party, which takes a more radical one, share little in common other than their desire to exercise control over Jammu and Kashmir. People's Democratic Party joined the Bharatiya Janata Party's alliance despite having significant policy disagreements with the BJP. However, the coalition presented the People of Jammu and Kashmir with some very serious proposals for the future.*

The untimely passing of Mufti Mohammed Sayeed was a major obstacle for the People's Democratic Party and Bharatiya Janata Party coalition in the state. BJP and PDP talks stalled for a long period since the two coalition partners couldn't agree on anything, leading to the imposition of governor's rule in each state. Despite the late hour, the alliance partners decided to stick to the Common Minimum Program they had already signed and maintain their coalition government. Little the partnership between the Bharatiya Janata Party and the People's Democratic Party kept Mehbooba Mufti in office for a while longer, the growing gulf between the two parties eventually led to the BJP switching back to the PDP in June 2018, which in turn led to the installation of governor's rule. The situation of Jammu and Kashmir State transitioning into Union Territories created greater dispute to political affluences of the regional parties acting in Jammu and Kashmir. It will be interesting to observe how these political groups re-enter the future of the political process. After a period of Governor Rule, the former State of Jammu and Kashmir was split into the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh by the Central Government on August 5, 2019. The political fortunes of the regional parties functioning in Jammu and Kashmir were further disrupted by the change in status from State to Union Territories. Observing how these parties react to the developing political process in the future will be fascinating.

05. Since the National Conference and People's Democratic Politics split the Jammu and Kashmir assembly seats in 2002, no one party has been able to win a majority of seats at the state level. Because of the need for support from Jammu to form the government by either of the two Kashmir-based parties, the region of Jammu is now at the centre of power politics. The PDP and Congress established a partnership following the 2002 elections, while the PDP and the BJP formed a government from 2014 till 2018. Each time, it was the Congress and the BJP, with their stronghold in Jammu that tipped the scales in their favour. Jammu has been well-represented in the cabinet, both in terms of the number of ministers hailing from the area and the number of top-level officials hailing from the region. In

addition, Jammu and Kashmir's own Ghulam Nabi Azad, a member of the Congress party. Jammu-based ministers have often been promoted to the position of deputy chief minister when a chief minister headquartered in Kashmir has been selected to lead the government.

By looking at the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) alliance of 2014–2018 and its subsequent sharing of power with the vehemently opposed People's Democratic Party (PDP), we may gain insight into the complexities of the state's internal politics in the dual backdrop of separatism and regional political difference. However, the inter-regional difference has remained a key obstacle in the internal politics of the state despite the fact that the regions are about on equal with one another in terms of authority. There has been no concerted attempt to bridge this divide, thus regional politics have become highly divisive. Everything having to do with state politics is viewed through a regional lens, and that includes governance, infrastructure improvement, the economy, jobs, and everything else. This leads to regional politics that is often dichotomous, pitting one region's interests against those of another. It was in the Jammu area, first and foremost, that politics of regional resentment were first expressed. From 2002 to now, the three coalition government partners have solved their problems with strong leadership and concrete action on jobs, food security, health care policy, and infrastructure. However, the government's ability to move forward has been hampered by regional pulls and pushes. Therefore, the partnership agenda is still on paper for the time being, and pursuing it appears like a very daunting challenge for the coalition partner in the very near future. Jammu and Kashmiri politics is marked by competing identities and competing claims. Its religious and cultural -regional differences work together to create a picture of complexity. In light of the current political climate, it is of particular scholarly interest to examine Jammu and Kashmir's coalition politics due to the region's rich cultural, religious, linguistic, and socioeconomic diversity. India's demographic makeup provides a rich environment for researchers interested in coalition politics.

06. Only by guaranteeing balanced regional growth and progress can democratic principles and a sense of national pride be sustained. Jammu and Kashmir's political parties have failed miserably in promoting economic growth and social justice. Senators are preoccupied with the growth of their own districts instead of the state as a whole, instead serving the interests of their party instead of the citizens of the state they are sworn to serve. That's why there's so much dissatisfaction among the left overs of both society and the state, and why sectarian politics can't seem to care for them or even promote the core role of state. The only motivation is the need to hold or wield political power. A lack of balanced

productivity expansion, selectivity in the recruiting process, and unequal distribution of resources are among the rarest kinds of gap, but they contribute to a rising sense of unease about globalization's effects. Kashmir's young and rural populaces are confused since regional political parties have been unable to reach consensus on the issue. This is where the state's coalition as a whole really has to step up and play a part. The partnership was necessary to ensure balanced growth across the board and to foster a more hospitable political and social climate for public input into decision and execution. In a transparent and inclusive process, coalition governments formulate plans and initiatives to improve the lives of all residents. Coalition government should prioritise development. Each area should be given the chance to grow to the fullest extent of its capabilities. This doesn't necessitate a shift in the structure of the several major political parties; rather, what has shifted is the focus from the individual to the group. Wide-ranging encompasses the rising tide of nationalism, corruption, joblessness, poverty, and illiteracy. The goal of regionalist movements at the state, national, and international levels is often unclear. In reality, these localised political parties are much more interested in voter turnout than they are in governing. Jammu and Kashmir's state politics are deeply rooted in communalism, which reveals that regionalism first germinated in Kashmir-centric political parties. The state's political elite and its inhabitants continue to struggle with the effects of regionalism and dynastic control. Many times the problem of provincialism is considered as expected outcome of the unequal socio-economic development in the provinces of Jammu and Ladakh.

07. A serious problem with governance existed even before the militancy period, but it was made much worse by the latter. The early stage of violence resulted in the destruction of infrastructures and the loss of "normalcy." Much of the energy of the various administrations that came into power in the post-1996 period was consequently wasted in restoring the infrastructure rather than investing in new initiatives. In recent years, popular separatist uprising has frequently paralysed the entire political process. Massive protests that went on for months had a significant influence on the process of government throughout the years 2008-2010. Another protracted uprising nearly brought the entire process of governance to a halt in 2016. The contentious scenario has caused the institutional backlog in the long run. As a result of being mired in situations where ensuring law and order and exerting the authority

of the state take precedence over governance, institutionalizing governance remains a pressing problem.

Therefore, the state is vulnerable due to the weakness of its institutions, especially those that serve as a system of checks and balances for government. Some of the state's problems have become embedded in the system as a result of the prolonged effects of the conflict. For example, the state's accountability and employment and corruption and economic backwardness issues have been so deeply established that they have persisted through many administrations. Since 2014, the situation in J&K has mirrored both the status of democratic and competitive politics and the state of separatist politics. While these two trends have been developing independently since 2002, they have also frequently intersected with one another. As we have seen in the preceding chapters, the democratic politics of Kashmir have grown in the shadow of separatism, which has not been static but has instead been shifting shape. Separatism, militancy and post-militancy stages, as well as its new-age militancy, have each presented unique difficulties to democratic politics. While the current phase of separatist is marked by eulogization of militancy comparable to that of the previous phase, the challenge to democracy has been thrown not by violence and militarization but by the shifting popular response to secession. In the years after 2014, separatist feelings in the valley experienced a new upsurge.

The encounter of Hizbul Mujahedeen militant Burhaan Wani only served to inflame the separatist movement. At least in South Kashmir, where young people turned to street politics and militancy as a result of the situation, democracy suffered a setback. Large crowds showed support for militants and militancy at their funerals and other encounter points. The situation has been rather dismal, especially given that people began withdrawing their support for the militancy and its fall was connected to its delegitimization barely a decade ago. It has been an entirely different picture since the militants became heroes, inspiring an increasing number of young people to join militancy. In this case, democratic politics have been faltering. It took time for the most troubled forms of governance to recover from the summer of 2016. Normalcy didn't return until the year's conclusion. However, democratic politics, which suffered the most hit during the uprising era, has been reluctant to regain its political space. There has also been a crisis within separatist politics. Kashmir has been growing increasingly skeptical over the last decade; yet, the way anger, hatred, and resentment have been expressed over the past several years suggests a sense of siege, which has been compounded by the absence of political impetus on any level.

It's not just that the state's political reaction has been inadequate; it's also that the separatist leadership has been unable to take any effective action. Since young people are now responsible for maintaining separatist politics, the older generation has been compelled to follow the feeling of the people. There are periodic internal debates over the future of separatist politics and the effectiveness of the current leadership. Some disputes in the local press Centre on the price of the separatist statements, especially in light of the rising death toll among young people. As a new wave of separatist assertions emerges on the streets, however, these concerns are often pushed to the sidelines. When the PDP became the dominant coalition partner in 2002, it made these concerns a priority, using the phrase "healing touch" to do so. Because of its actions, a noticeable improvement in the situation on the ground was seen, and civilians reported feeling less threatened by the police. However, the process did not result in the primary hopes of the people, such as the end of human rights violations by the security forces and the withdrawal or repeal of restrictive laws like the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), the Disturbed Areas Act (DAA), and the Public Security Act (PSA).

Poor human rights protection is only one of several governance problems that have arisen as a result of the ongoing conflict. While other parts of India have made great strides toward more open and transparent government and decentralized systems, J&K has lagged far behind. Some of these structures and procedures have not been institutionalized because the ruling political class has leveraged the war environment and the state's unique constitutional position to delay their implementation. Because of this, the state is well behind others in instituting reforms like the Panchayati Raj, the Right to Information, and an ombudsman commission. It has been said that the state's entrenched higher bureaucracy is to blame for its inability to decentralise its power structure or institutionalise the authority of autonomous entities. Due to the instability of the political structure, the bureaucracy has gained influence, and as a result, the political class has been hampered. A national power system has emerged in the dearth of a robust civil community and social movements.

08. The state of Jammu and Kashmir presents difficulties for coalition managers and members due to its numerous regional, sub-regional, and religious ties. Until now, the citizens of the state had no positive associations with the coalition government that was in power. Coalitions are becoming seen as a synonym for regional waste and incompetent management. So that the coalition government doesn't come across as disenchanting, dishonest, and aimless, the major political parties, whose economic bases and support

structures are located in different regions, sub-regions, which is not natural, need to cultivate a behavior of coalition culture, institutional partnership, and clear perspective towards their state. While the state administration is powerless to change the situation on the ground in all three of Jammu and Kashmir's regions, it would be foolish to ignore them. The people of Jammu and Kashmir are becoming increasingly conscious of the need of establishing stability in their war-torn region. As well as causing economic hardship, the conflict has had a devastating effect on the population's social and psychological well-being. Kashmir's slow progress is blamed solely on the region's violent history. There has been widespread relocation of homes as a result of the continuous wars in Jammu and Kashmir, which has a profound impact on the state's socioeconomic structure. Many buildings have been damaged, and yearly economic development has fallen behind the national average. The tourism industry, which is crucial to the economy of countries with large populations, was hit quite hard. The development scenario in the state of J&K has been affected by the violence, which has discouraged private investment and hampered the implementation of governmental authorities' developmental plans. However, the current situation is not showing any signs of improving, either within Jammu and Kashmir or along its borders, anytime soon.

09. The study came to the conclusion that every coalition government in Jammu and Kashmir from 2002 to 2018 suffered from inherent weaknesses in governance. The reason was that only a single coalition, National Conference and Indian National Congress (2008- 14), lasted the entire length of two terms in power before collapsing. At the beginning of the 21st century, it's obvious that we've moved on from the past. The state has come a long way from the hegemonic and dominant politics of a single party to a multiparty system, with the major parties based on significant geographic areas (NC, PDP, INC, BJP, and numerous smaller parties). The most recent BJP-PDP cooperation (2014-2018) lasted for around 3.5 years. Only when political parties are able to unite broad or symmetrical allocation of resources into an integrated whole without special regional interest does a state move toward social realism. Coalition governance issues can be resolved if all major parties, not just the national coalition, actively participate in creating the future of the state's population. In order to move forward, we must create a genuine democracy. This places decision-making back where it belongs, with the people as a whole, in a democratic system. Successful democracies also exhibit good governance. Reducing inequality, illiteracy, poverty, corruption, and the influence of religion and caste-based identities, while also improving bureaucratic efficacy, are all possible outcomes of responsible and accountable leadership. It seems to reason that

people would be better able to manage developmental plans if they had a hand in creating and implementing the regulations governing them. This would eliminate the shady intermediary. Our democracy will be strengthened by effective leadership.

10. The four big political parties in the state of Jammu and Kashmir's had ideological dogma operation and election achievement. While each of these groups insists that its beliefs are fundamentally different from those of the others, it is the socioeconomic and demographic support of its constituents that ultimately determines how it operates. Both the Congress and the BJP, two major national parties, have significant constituencies in the Jammu area, making them especially attuned to the wishes and concerns of its residents. State provincial governments NC and PDP have deep political roots in the Kashmir valley and are thus attuned to the needs of valley residents. Since 2002, coalition administrations have included members who represented both areas. This has made them better able to strike a happy medium between regional interests and those of the entire state, leading to more broadly shared prosperity. It would be fascinating to see how the different political parties in Union Territory react to the new situation. The aggressiveness with which the phenomenon of coalition politics has come to infiltrate the democracies for both developed and developing nations reflects allowing for the formation of power and presents new difficulties and opportunities. This research makes some little steps in clarifying the nature of coalitions and how they function in Jammu & Kashmir. It is often believed that Jammu and Kashmir's regionalism, religion, and caste-based political policies are the result of the state's multi - party system or coalition administration.

Coalition government was unavoidable at the state for several years to come due to the politicisation of different social groups and their battle for sharing power, strong desire to maintain social and regional identities, formation of strong and autonomous regional leadership, etc. The societal differences in Jammu and Kashmir have made it extremely difficult for any one political group to establish a stable administration. All social groups' hopes and dreams have not been raised by the modernization, politicisation, and economic growth processes, and the National Conference or the People's Democratic Party or the Congress nor could the Bharatiya Janata Party meet them. The alliances are, thus, crucial for this function. As researchers examine Jammu and Kashmir's state-level coalition politics, they are faced with the question of why the state's leadership keeps collapsing due to unstable alliances and the constant rebranding of defectors. Equally important is the effort towards establishing some principles that might serve as helpful guidance for the future establishment,

maintenance, and dissolution of coalition governments. The purpose of the proposed study is to look into these specific areas of concern. In coalition politics and provide some suggestions for pragmatic solutions.

There is little doubt that the coalition government improved ties between the federal government and individual states, fostering an atmosphere of mutual trust that bodes well for the state's ability to recoup its expenditures on behalf of the people and realise its previously hyphenated aspirations. *The present research shows that a successful coalition administration in Jammu and Kashmir requires the backing of the federal government.* Now is the moment for new coalitions to prove their worth. *There can be no room for trickery in economics, and instead, novel approaches of demonstrating growth while also ensuring redistributive fairness must be explored. Loss of faith in past governance's ability to meet people's demands or resolve issues at the grassroots level throughout all of Jammu and Kashmir may explain the emergence of coalition politics after 2002.* The state of Jammu and Kashmir's political system underwent dramatic shifts from one-party rule to multi-party coalitions after 1986. After 2002 and up to 2014, Jammu and Kashmir has had three different coalitions, with two of them experiencing instability and the other two seeing four different Chief Ministers who have yet to finish their terms in office. Uncertain political leadership is the state's most pressing issue right now. There has been a sea change in the political landscape of Jammu & Kashmir. Mainstream political parties including the NC, PDP, INC, BJP, and Panther's Party have dominated state politics. The state's diverse population and political ambitions have spawned a multitier system of regional and sub-regional politics. The politicisation of a variety of identities is a defining feature of this political era.

11. Finally, the exploitation of Article 370 by the political leadership of the state in Kashmir is a symptom of the crisis of coalition politics. They have been exploiting this article to halt all national-level autonomous institutions and procedures that aim to ensure accountability, transparency, and the welfare of people in order to maintain their own authority at the expense of denying empowerment to the most disadvantaged members of society. Because of this, the state has fallen behind in implementing progressive laws like the Right to Information Act and the Panchayati Raj. In contrast to the rest of India, where democratic procedures got more robust and democratic institutions became more entrenched over time, the opposite trend was observed in Jammu and Kashmir. Voter turnout decreases the credibility of the democratic space while expanding the separatist space. People were estranged from their government because democratic procedures fell short. The militancy that

surfaced in 1989 was a direct outcome of people's hopelessness with regard to the efficacy of democratic institutions.

6.3. Limitations of the Study

Limitations of a study are defined as its shortcomings or flaws that are outcomes of non-availability of wherewithal, sample size, and blemished methodology. No study or research project is completely inclusive or flawless. The representation of limitations demonstrates the honesty and integrity of a researcher and shows the researcher has a complete understanding of the content or topic. The researcher cannot examine and comment in depth on all facets of the research work. In the analysis work, there is thus a vacuum. Any personal, physical, or geographical factors impede study work. A lot of work has been done in the field of coalition politics in India at the national and local level. However, in the Indian specifically in the state of Jammu and Kashmir there is lesser number of studies conducted on the emergence and working of coalition politics thereby the area is unexplored. As a result, the limitations are inherent in any research project. The latest research study has also faced the following constraints:

- Qualitative sample (politicians) is zero because of non-availability of political leaders/ politicians (due to security reasons) and other political activists.
- Covid-19 pandemic has restricted the field survey to only eight ward/Villages.
- There is limited number of female respondents due to the conservative nature of the society and shyness to contact.
- There is no cross cultural relationship between the respondents of the two administrative regions based on cultural cum ethnic differences.
- Due to the prevailing political uncertainty in the state wherein the respondents due to the fears of being identified or their names being included in the data the information submitted by many respondents was not authentic, true, and genuine. Furthermore, respondents have not given their opinion on the exact picture neither original names nor mobile numbers. The opinions and suggestions provided by the respondents were subjected to bias, and there was a clear demarcation of political bias in these suggestions.

- The accessibility of data from the key respondents was limited. All the key informants were unable to provide precise and timely information in the present context. This delay in the timely collection of data resulted in the extension of the deadline for completing this research work.
- The sample size of the study is only 400 because data from the maximum number of respondents was not easy to obtain. The sample size only includes: from Kashmir Division URI (Ramgal-50, Uri town-50) and from Habba Kadal (Munawarabad-50 & Fateh Kadal-50) and from Jammu Division Nagrota (Nagrotra Town-50, Jagti-50) & Jammu East (Kachi Chowni-50, Gujjar Nagar-50)..
- Due to the condition of COVID-19 worldwide, the collection of data from other Districts was not available. COVID-19 has restricted the means to collect the data from diverse communities and sections of the population. As a result, in the present context, precise and timely data analysis has taken more than stipulated time.

6.4. Future Scope of the Study

In the modern era, the survival of democracy is based upon the participation of democratic institutions and other stakeholders. Political parties being integral to democracy are playing a lead role in the governance mechanism of the country that upholds the democratic fabric of the country. Institutions such as the Election Commission of India, political parties, the media, etc. are important stakeholders in a democracy. Thus, their survival and active presence are important for the smooth functioning of a democracy. In this context, the present study has highlighted the role and importance of the Coalition government at the national and state levels, its impact, success and shortcomings with assessment of the impact of the same on the regional politics, wherein the central theme was circling around the Assembly elections of 2008, 2014 & also a study of Abrogation of Article 370 was made. An assessment of impact of the Abrogation of Article 370 & 35A was also done with. *As a part of the recent development that surfaced in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the introduction of the report of the Delimitation Commission was also included in the later context of the research.*

- In the above context, the present study will be a model for future researchers in the field and act as a catalyst to guide them in the proper direction. Considering the dearth of studies on the topic, the present work will highlight the loopholes that undermine

the proper functioning of democratic institutions and the role accountable and ideologically balanced coalition's important governance mechanism and lasting Coalitions.

- The focus of this work involves the role and functioning of Coalition government in the State. The primary goal of the study is to investigate the evolution, working, formation, success and the role played by the coalition government in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in governance. Instruments of evaluation and review were used to expose gaps in democratic mechanisms that impede the success of coalition politics.
- Thus, to unearth and explore these aspects, the present study will act as a suitable mechanism to monitor the proceedings and functions of Coalition Governments. Also, there is a dearth of studies Thus, in this context, the present study will be helpful to craft the awareness about the emergence of coalition politics at the state level by bringing inclusivity and objectivity by studying the Primary and Secondary Data including mixed method approach.
- Loopholes are inherent to the functions of an institution such as democracy or a political party in a coalition. Thus, to rectify those loopholes, the present study has attempted to gauge the performance of these Coalitions in a democracy, and it has also made an attempt to suggest the appropriate measures for bringing transparency and inclusivity to the functions and structures of political parties and government institutions after parties decide to form a coalition.
- The research would continue to increase people's consciousness about the functions of coalition government and issues of political instability caused due to unstable coalitions based on the assessment of NC-INC & BJP-PDP alliance after 2008 and 2014 elections in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. It is anticipated that the outcome of the analysis and the recommendations will strengthen the operation of coalition politics a long time.

6.5. Conclusion

Establishment of joint agendas or programmes, as well as the formation of steering committees to mediate divergences between members of an alliance, was two of the most important contributing factors to the successfully completing of the terms of both the NDA

and the UPA governments. As a result, the establishment of such common agendas and advisory boards has to be pursued so that coalition administrations can function sensibly and last for an adequate amount of time. The political parties have learned through experience that governing a ruling coalition effectively involves cooperation rather than antagonism between the various parties. Changes that are necessary and suitable to our constitution could be made if it is possible to do so in order to enable a powerful governing coalition with clear guidelines. In the event that nobody agrees on any of the ideas, there need to be some kind of national discussion. It is likely that this will continue until one, two, or even more of these are integrated into our representative democracy in some way, be it through an amendment to the Constitution, through judgments handed down by the Courts, or through lasting assemblies by making laws for the same.

As a result, the age of coalitions has shed light on both positive and negative tendencies. Positive signs such as cooperation and communication between local and national political allies, common minimum programming, coordinating groups, consensual politics, coalition politics culture, and the like, among other things, should be grasped upon. If we give in to the deteriorating forces that have been unleashed by the era of coalition politics, such as blackmail, intimidation, horse trading, the crime of politicians, misuse of power for both personal and political gain, casteism, and identity politics, both the democracy of the country and the survivorship of our constitutional system will be in jeopardy. Our state apparatus is being analyzed as a result of this. The fact that coalitional regimes have been able to endure and thrive for the past 20 years can be attributed, without even a shadow of a doubt, to the overall success of both the NDA and UPA regimes and some at the state level (the NC-INC coalition of 2008) thus giving all positive vibes to continue with the coalition politics in a broader sense by inculcating the sense of common but differentiated responsibility by the politicians involved.

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APPENDICES

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR RESPONDENTS

Dear Respondent:

I am a Ph.D. scholar conducting research on “**Coalition Politics in India with Special reference to Jammu and Kashmir (2008-2020)**” in Lovely Professional University Phagwara Punjab. The information being sought from you is for research purpose only. So you are requested to express your views freely and frankly in a neutral and unbiased manner. The information supplied by you shall be kept confidential.

Personal Profile

- I. Name:
- II. Age:
- III. Gender:
- IV. Employment Status:
- V. Educational Qualification (Please Tick)
10th
12th
Graduation
Post-Graduation
Technical
- VI. Age Category
18-30 Years
31-42 Years
42-54 Years
Above 55 Years

- 1) Do you participate in Elections?
 - a) Yes
 - b) No

- 2) If Yes; Specify Your Participation?
 - a) As a Voter
 - b) As a Contestant

- 3) Do You Follow the Political Happenings in J&K?
 - a) Yes
 - b) No
 - c) Can't say

- 4) Which Political Party You Prefer?
 - a) National Political Party
 - b) Local Political Parties
 - c) Independent Candidates

- 5) If National Political Party: Specify the Reasons for Opting?
 - a) Ideological Similarity
 - b) Developmental Orientation
 - c) Overcoming Hegemony of Local Political Parties
 - d) Other Reason

- 6) If Local/regional Political Party: Specify the Reasons for Opting?
 - a) Understanding Local issues
 - b) Respect for regional aspirations
 - c) Inclusiveness in their political approach
 - d) Can't say..... ?

- 7) Do you know, what is Coalition government?
 - a) Yes
 - b) No
 - c) Can't say

- 8) If yes: then specify your inclination towards coalition government?
 - a) Positive (Progressive)

- b) Negative
 - c) Neutral
- 9) What are the reasons for making coalition governments?
- a) Failure to mobilize masses
 - b) Failure to promote Political interest
 - c) Lack of ability to garner more voters
 - d) Fractured mandate
- 10) Coalition Government brings more development as compared to single party government?
- a) Agree
 - b) Strongly Agree
 - c) Neutral
 - d) Disagree
- 11) Which type of coalition government is better?
- a) Local political parties
 - b) National political parties
 - c) Local and National political parties
 - d) Can't say
- 12) Party ideology is prime reasons for making coalition governments?
- a) Agree
 - b) Strongly Agree
 - c) Neutral
 - d) Disagree
- 13) In coalition government, what is the possibility of having good governance?
- a) Strong
 - b) Fair
 - c) Negligible
 - d) Can't Say

- 14) Is transparency maintained by coalition governments regarding policy formulation?
- a) Yes
 - b) No
 - c) Can't Say
- 15) What is your appropriate choice while exercising your "Right to Vote"?
- a) National political party
 - b) Regional political party
 - c) Independent candidates
 - d) Can't say
- 16) Do you think coalition government brings stability in the region?
- a) Agree
 - b) Strongly Agree
 - c) Neutral
 - d) Disagree
- 17) Coalition government formed in 2008 was stable?
- a) Yes
 - b) No
 - c) Can't Say
- 18) If yes: Specify your satisfaction towards that Coalition Government.
- a) Highly satisfied
 - b) Satisfied
 - c) Neutral
 - d) Dissatisfied
- 19) Policy decisions undertaken during the coalition government of 2008 have fulfilled the demands of public at large.
- a) Agree
 - b) Strongly Agree

- c) Neutral
- d) Disagree

20) RTI Act of 2009 has brought transparency and accountability in Administrative setup.

- a) Agree
- b) Strongly Agree
- c) Neutral
- d) Disagree

21) UDAAN Scheme of 2009 was successful in generating the employment avenues for the Unemployed Youth of J&K.

- a) Agree
- b) Strongly Agree
- c) Neutral
- d) Disagree

22) There was huge Socio Economic vacuum left in 2008 Coalition Government in J&K.

- a) Yes
- b) No
- c) Can't Say

23) If Yes: specify the alternative to fill the Socio Economic & Political Vacuum left in 2008 Coalition Government.

- a) Adequate representation of depressed classes
- b) Inclusive policy for minorities
- c) Progressive Economic Policies
- d) Can't say

24) Coalition Government in 2014 was a flawless alternative to 2008 Coalition Government.

- a) Agree

- b) Strongly Agree
- c) Neutral
- d) Disagree

25) Coalition Government of 2014 was ideologically balanced as compared to the Coalition Government of 2008

- a) Agree
- b) Strongly Agree
- c) Neutral
- d) Disagree

26) How you assess the functioning and Policy Formulation of 2014 Coalition Government.

- a) Good
- b) Excellent
- c) Bad
- d) Can't say

27) Coalition Government of 2014 was ineffective in respecting the mandate of the People

- a) Agree
- b) Strongly Agree
- c) Neutral
- d) Disagree

28) Reasons responsible for ineffectiveness of 2014 coalition government

- a) Regional differences
- b) Coalition partners backed off
- c) Ideological differences surfaced among Coalition Partners
- d) If Failed to abide by its Common Minimum Programme

29) Should there be another Coalition Government in next General Elections

- a) Yes

- b) No
- c) Can't say

30) Ideological differences were the prime reason for breakdown of the 2014 Coalition Government.

- a) Agree
- b) Strongly Agree
- c) Neutral
- d) Disagree

31) The Failure of 2014 Coalition partners was responsible for Governor's rule in the State.

- a) Agree
- b) Strongly Agree
- c) Neutral
- d) Disagree

32) Abrogation of Special Status of the State of Jammu & Kashmir was the failure of the coalition partners of 2014 Alliance.

- a) Agree
- b) Strongly Agree
- c) Neutral
- d) Disagree

Please suggest some measures for improving the working of coalition governments.

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Changing Perception of Electoral Politics in Jammu and Kashmir: A Study of BJP Dominance in Assembly Elections of 2014

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Abstract

The present study is an exploration into the Jammu and Kashmir's party politics, with a focus on the Bharatiya Janata Party. The study is analytical in nature and has adopted the qualitative approach to delve deep into the party politics in the UT of Jammu and Kashmir and the emergence of BJP in the helm of governance. To fulfil the objectives of the study and draw the precise inferences with regard to subject matter, secondary data sources have been used. In this background, the findings of the study have revealed that in the backdrop of the one-party system that dominated in political stage of the politics in the erstwhile state of Jammu & Kashmir, wherein the only political choice or option with the masses was the National Conference predominantly a Muslim party. The emergence of the BJP had highly favourable effects on the democratic politics of this region. Prior to its advent in the state, voters lacked a different ideological option which could support the minority sentiment in state and echoed around being more democratic option to overthrow the so called dynastic rule particularly in Kashmir's mainstream politics having it influence even in the Hindu dominant region of Jammu. With BJP in place, there was tremendous competition in the democratic arena. In this context BJP arrived setting up the environment for the competitive politics; therefore a concrete effort is made to explore and analyze the BJP's performance in the 2014 election & its ideological dominance in the Muslim majority state and emergence as a political contender.

Keywords: Democratic, Dominance, Governance, Ideology, Politics.

1. INTRODUCTION

The constitution of independent India has envisioned a pool of governance institutions to administer the socio-economic and political facets of social existence at large. However, in a democratic setting, copious institutions that are vital to the governing process continue to decline for one cause or another (Khurshid, 2016). The government's commitment to these institutions was low, as evidenced by the fact that a significant number of them are either improperly constituted or inadequately supported by the state. In this milieu, after the repeal of Article 370 on 5th August 2019 in the erstwhile state of J&K, all political leaders including Mehbooba Mufti were jailed and the state experienced a complete political collapse. She referred to the revocation of Article 370 as a "theft and an insult" and labeled it "a heist." black day. She has become a vocal opponent of the BJP government's plan to repeal Article 370 (Ahmed, A. 2019). The party's stance on Jammu and Kashmir's special status and Mehbooba Mufti's willingness to fight for the reinstatement of Article 370 gave the party an opportunity to rebuild and recover its image, which had been damaged by its alliance with the BJP (Kumar, 2015). The party joined the "People's Alliance Gupkaar Declaration" for this aim. Through the Gupkaar Declaration, the party has highlighted the subject of Article 370 and proclaimed its determination to fight for the restoration of the status prior to August 5. How does this party maintain its commitment to this cause? How does the party use this forum to reevaluate itself and reestablish its place in the mainstream politics of Jammu and Kashmir? In the above background, the present study is an exploration into the dominance of BJP in 2014 assembly elections and the challenges thereby.

2. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The present study is an exploration into the success of the BJP predominantly (a Hindu Nationalist) party in the Muslim dominated erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir. The paper further looks in to the aspects of the state politics wherein a majority of the dominant political parties have Muslim leadership base, in the mildest of all these the BJP managed

2/2/2023

Rafiq
07/07/23

**SPECIAL STATUS OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR IN THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: AN
EXPLORATORY STUDY OF ABROGATION OF ARTICLE 370**

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the abrogation of Article 370 alongside Article 35A by the Narendra Modi-led Government, On 5 August 2019 by a majority vote in the Parliament. The abrogation of Article 370 turned out to be against the very spirit of the Indian Constitution, as it was passed in absence of the State Legislature thus lacks rectification. The mission of the abrogation of article 370 was mentioned in the manifesto of BJP since 1980. After the partition of Indo-Pak in 1947, J&K was a provincially independent state which was earlier sold by the British Govt. to Maharaja Gulab Singh for an amount of 75 lakh rupees. After partition, unfortunately, on 20 August 1947, Pakistani tribal invaded Kashmir backed by the army. In its defense, Maharaja Hari Singh sought help from India which was denied initially as Maharaja was not the signatory of the Instrument of Accession (IOA), introduced by the British in the Government of India Act 1935 and then acceded to the Indian Union by signing the "Instrument of Accession". So this paper will critically analyze the role of political parties and analyze to understand the actual reality behind the abrogation of Article 370 & 35A of the Indian Constitution.

Keywords: Article 370, Jammu and Kashmir, Instrument of Accession, BJP, and Political Parties.

Introduction

The state of Jammu and Kashmir was the last Princely state to join the Union of India and its rulers were enjoying nearly despotic powers like the rulers of other princely states. The state was divided into four provinces - Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh, and Gilgit. The first two contained over ninety percent of the state's population and more than two-thirds of it was Muslim. Maharaja Hari Singh introduced the law for 'Hereditary state subject' under which outsiders were debarred from entering the state services and holding immovable property. How According to the Instrument of Accession, the center could not touch Art. 370 but to fulfill BJP's agenda and the RSS's dream of making India a Hindu Rashtra, it used the special and unconstitutional process to destroy the special status of Kashmir.

History of Jammu and Kashmir

In 1846, Maharaja Gulab Singh, a Dogra ruler, offered the area of Jammu & Kashmir from the East India Company after signing the Treaty of Amritsar. In August 1947, after India was given independence from the British Empire, Pakistan become created as Muslim-majority united states of America. India's princely states, the ones now no longer formally with India or Pakistan, have been given 3 choices—to live unbiased or be part of both India and Pakistan. Three of such states have been unsure. They have been Junagadh, Hyderabad, and J&K. The Indian Home Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel² attempted to persuade the unsure princely states to sign up for India and Maharaja Hari Singh signed a standstill settlement with Pakistan, correctly choosing a standing quo.³ In October 1947; armed tribesmen from Pakistan infiltrated J&K and Hari Singh found out that he wanted Indian assistance. He reached out to the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the Home Minister Patel who agreed to ship troops at the circumstance that the Maharaja symptoms and symptoms a tool of accession (IOA) in desire of India, turning in manage of its defense, overseas affairs, and communication. Hari Singh signed the IOA, and Indian troops moved in. The armed conflict, however, maintains until nowadays. After the independence of India, the 'Instrument of Accession' with the Indian Union become signed through Maharaja Hari Singh on October 26, 1947, and the unique popularity in the Indian Union



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
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