Electoral System, Role of Political Parties and Public Engagement in Election of Afghanistan

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By

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DECLARATION

I, hereby, declare that the presented work in the thesis entitled *"Electoral System, Role of Political Parties and Public Engagement in Election of Afghanistan."* in fulfilment of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy (Ph. D.)** is the outcome of research work carried out by me under the supervision **of Dr. Zahoor Ahmad Wani,** working as Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences and Languages, Lovely Professional University, Phagwara India. In keeping with the general practice of reporting scientific observations, due acknowledgements have been made whenever the work described here has been based on the findings of another investigator. This work has not been submitted in part or whole to any other University or Institute for the award of any degree.

**Name of the scholar:** Adeebullah Nawim

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the work reported in the Ph. D. thesis entitled *"**Electoral System, Role of Political Parties and Public Engagement in Election of Afghanistan**"* submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the reward of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)** in the Department of Political Science, Lovely Professional University, Phagwara, India, is a research work carried out by **Adeebullah Nawim** is a bonafide record of his original work carried out under my supervision and that no part of the thesis has been submitted for any other degree, diploma or equivalent course.

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Abstract

This thesis examines the democratization process in post-Taliban Afghanistan, focusing on elections, political participation, and the role of political parties. Despite initial optimism and the adoption of a democratic constitution in 2003, the study reveals that democratic values and institutions face significant challenges. The research aims to provide a realistic understanding of the democratization process, identify obstacles to institutionalizing elections, and propose scientific solutions to strengthen democracy.

The analysis explores the impact of the Afghan government's weaknesses, security issues, rule of law deficiencies, and the influence of incompatible groups on democratic values. The study underscores the vital role of the government in safeguarding democracy and highlights the shortcomings, inefficiencies, and corruption within Afghan governance that threaten the stability of democratic institutions.

Additionally, the lack of inclusive and national political parties is identified as a significant hurdle. Traditional and tribal political culture, characterized by personal animosities, ethnic considerations, and a lack of political programs, hinders the development of genuine political parties. The thesis argues that the existence of tribal thinking poses a severe challenge to democratization, emphasizing the need for cultural transformation to replace traditional values that oppose legalism and democracy. The research concludes by addressing the broader issues of tribal political culture, stressing the need for a shift towards legalism, the rule of law, and cultural transformation to ensure successful democratization. It also highlights the current socio-political challenges, including poverty, inequality, and the risk of ethnicization of politics, urging a reconsideration of policies to move towards establishing a stable democracy in Afghanistan.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Afghanistan is considered an enigma wrapped in a South Asian cocoon of romance and fascination with its landscape and resources. The democratic organization of Afghans has been struggling to advance over the last three decades of constant struggle. Out of 189 countries, Afghanistan ranks as low as 179th on the development scale in the world. As far as per capita GDP is concerned, it hovers around 520.897 US$, according to data provided by the [International Monetary Fund](). According to the World Peace Index, Afghanistan holds 158th rank compared to other countries and is the least peaceful country ([statista.com]()). Elections play an essential role in the political system of every country and determine countries' development in terms of democracy, the rule of law, and justice. Public Participation in these processes is vital as it legitimizes the winning political party. Foreign intervention provides indirect evidence that electoral fairness and enhancement in government legitimacy is a challenge to the development of economics.

Alongside this, Afghanistan is one of the countries that have recently 2001 achieved freedom and democracy. (Shepherd, 2006). Across the globe, one of the most critical factors that make the election system functional is the Participation of citizens in various governance processes. This aspect forms the core value of democracy as articulated in the fundamental and elemental definition of "*a system of government by the whole population or all the eligible members of a state, typically through elected representatives.* The existence of traditional political leaders, the legacy of war, and people's distance from political Participation are among the issues that have slowed the process of democracy. Article 21 (1948) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, "Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through a freely chosen representative, etc." (*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, n.d.). According to this theory, the election power is transferred from the people to the government in a political partnership. Therefore, a system based on political Participation and elections is legitimate and robust. This study focuses on public Participation in the democratic process, such as the Afghanistan election, and will analyze the role of agents that amplify this process. This research will attempt to identify solutions advocating for strengthening the people's political Participation in Afghan Society (Goodhand, 2002)

Understanding Public Participation

Public Participation in the formation of the political system and its administration is a matter of course and inevitable. Without Participation, a country's development, growth, and excellence are impossible (Day, 1997). From a social point of view, unity and public solidarity play an essential role in the establishment of any social system. Human societies are only in the shadow of social solidarity that can deal with their daily relationships and interactions and understand each other's language and reactions. Predict and plan for the future of their lives. A nation with social solidarity and public participation benefits from unity, solidarity, and empathy, which will quickly achieve its system's lofty goals with its citizens' Public Participation. We seek to research and explore the issue of social solidarity and public

Participation, how it is formed, ways to strengthen and barriers to solidarity and public Participation, as well as the positive and negative role and function of this phenomenon based on sociological and Islamic perspectives (Bazemore & Stinchcomb, 2004).

The French sociologist Auguste Kent considers (1929-1992) the criterion for forming social harmony and solidarity to be the agreement of the human mind and believes that Society does not come into being unless its members have the same beliefs. Thoughts rule the world and change the world. In other words, all social systems are based on ideas, and the political crises of today's societies result from human intellectual chaos. Another French sociologist, Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), believes that social solidarity and national harmony are based on values. Moral rules, the acceptance of these values by the majority of Society, religion's faint role in Society, and individualism in new institutions are a great scourge of harmony (Bennett et al., 2013).

Public Participation can be any process that directly engages the public in decision-making and fully consideration to public input in making that decision. Public Participation is a process, not a single event. It consists of a series of activities and actions by a sponsoring agency over a project's lifespan to inform the public and obtain input from them. Public Participation allows stakeholders (those with an interest or stake in an issue, such as individuals, interest groups, and communities) to influence decisions that affect their lives.

Agencies should not be concerned that seeking public input means doing "what the public wants." Generally speaking, there is no single public. Instead, the public consists of various stakeholders holding various views and concerns on an issue. When conducting meaningful public Participation, an agency will gather input from a broad spectrum of stakeholder interests, resulting in a wide range of views and concerns and providing fair treatment, meaningful involvement, and social inclusion for all people regardless of race, colour, national origin, sexual orientation or income, concerning the development, implementation, and decisions made through the public participation process. The job of the sponsoring agency then is to balance these views and concerns and reflect the decisions so that the public understands how its diverse circumstances were considered.

Importance of Public Participation

The following points can help us understand the importance of public Participation:

• Improved understanding of client expectations and user group needs
• Improved agency understanding of conservation issues
• Improved agency understanding of the role and contribution of the Community
• Greater continuity in knowledge
• Ability to build community support for a project and to improve stakeholder relationships
• Improved public understanding of the agency's responsibilities
• Improved staff and community technical knowledge

• Improved agency credibility within the Community

• Improved quality of decision-making by agencies

• Enhancement of social capital and flow-on social and economic benefits

• Enhanced and informed political process

• Greater compliance through increased ownership of a solution

• Greater community advocacy for biodiversity protection

• Greater access to community skills and knowledge

• Improved community understanding of conservation issues and responsibility for conservation outcomes

Political Participation

The formation of civil Society as a unique social phenomenon is subject to a set of individual objectives and mental conditions that arise as a result of long-term social changes at a particular stage in the history of Society (Altman et al., 1981). Therefore, it is not possible to achieve civil Society at any time and in any social context at will, and the right to be elected, the right to elect, and the right to hold public office should be considered necessary rights to participate in the political life of Society to achieve civil Society. Consider: If a government does not grant citizens the right to participate and does not provide the measured context for their Participation and active presence, it will suffer from political decline and subjugation. But with political involvement, citizens are actively involved in all areas of legislation, arbitration, management, decision-making, elections, referendums, monitoring and criticizing power, reforming government programs, and participating in political parties and groups (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). They show that the necessary condition for the exercise of sovereignty by the people in any system claiming democracy is the political Participation of the citizens. In developing or democratizing societies, increasing citizens' political Participation is one of the crucial measures of the transition to democracy. The active presence of citizens in decision-making processes and their influential role in political and social life are vital indicators. Society is democratic. Living in a democratic society requires people to play an active role in political life. Political Participation in systems claiming to be democratic is crucial for any democratic society, and democracy can only develop through involved and informed citizens. In addition, having citizens ready to take responsibility for changing the reality of today's world is essential (Burnell, 2017).

For two reasons, political Participation is significant to political systems. The first is considering the political participation issue to measure a political system's legitimacy. The second factor in increasing the efficiency of a political system. is that political Participation can be considered a voluntary and conscious action that directly, Legally, and peacefully selects community leaders directly or indirectly and influences decisions related to community governance (March & Olsen, 1983).

The theoretical background of political Participation

Experts have widely discussed one of the essential types of Participation in Political Participation. Political participation and how people are involved in political decision-making and governance are topics seen throughout the history of political thought from centuries B.C. to the present day. It has a long history despite the ups and downs.). Today, it is considered a fundamental issue and is closely connected to the political development of nations. This type of Participation is one of the crucial examples of human rights and active Participation of people in various levels of decision-making and policymaking about determining their destiny. Due to the importance and primary outcomes of political participation, its quantity and quality have always interested sociologists and political thinkers (Eubanks, 2009).

Critical Perspectives on the Dynamics of Political Processes in Post-Taliban Afghanistan

Barnett R. Rubin's article, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (2002), offers an essential basis for comprehending the political dynamics of Afghanistan in the post-Taliban period. Rubin emphasizes that the nation's fractured tribal and ethnic identities, together with weak governmental institutions, have obstructed the formation of a cohesive political structure. He examines the influence of multinational entities, including the United States, NATO, and the United Nations, in constructing Afghanistan's political structure after the Bonn Agreement of 2001. Although the accord established a foundation for constitutional democracy, Rubin criticizes its failure to confront the profound differences within Afghan society. Furthermore, he examines how the reliance on external funding has perpetuated institutional weaknesses, complicating efforts to create a legitimate and inclusive democratic process.

In Derailing Democracy in Afghanistan: Elections in an Unstable Political Landscape (2014), Noah Coburn and Anna Larson critically analyze Afghanistan's electoral processes from 2004 to 2014. They contend that the nation's Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system has significantly impeded authentic political representation. The authors provide empirical data demonstrating how election fraud, vote-buying, and ethno-political coalitions have compromised the credibility of Afghanistan's democratic institutions. They also highlight the pervasive mistrust between Afghan citizens and the state, exacerbated by the manipulation of elections by political elites and the violence orchestrated by the Taliban to delegitimize the process. Their study highlights the difficulties of establishing public confidence in elections, which is crucial for the legitimacy of any democratic government.

Astri Suhrke's When More Is Less: The International Project in Afghanistan (2011) questions the international community's methodology regarding state-building and democratization in Afghanistan. Suhrke contends that the rapid implementation of Western democratic structures often conflicted with Afghanistan's conventional tribal institutions, resulting in untenable political practices. She emphasizes that the global impetus for elections favoured expediency over meticulous preparation, leading to deficient systems that inadequately included local people. Suhrke underscores the limited efficacy of foreign help in establishing robust, autonomous Afghan institutions, contending that the focus on external remedies compromised

Afghanistan's ability for self-governance. Her study offers essential insights into the structural obstacles that have impeded the establishment of a stable democratic regime in Afghanistan.

Collectively, these studies provide a sophisticated comprehension of the dynamics of political processes in post-Taliban Afghanistan. They emphasize the convergence of local sociopolitical conditions, foreign interventions, and institutional deficiencies, offering a comprehensive framework for examining popular involvement and the legitimacy of election systems in Afghanistan. Integrating these viewpoints enhances the dissertation's literature evaluation by examining the historical, institutional, and external influences on Afghanistan's democratic evolution.

Public Participation in Elections

Cogan (1986) analyzed citizens' Public Participation and decision-making process towards the government. According to him, all those affected by the decisions have the right to participate in the democratic decision-making process. The main reason behind citizens' Participation is that it gives every individual an opportunity to have their say and influence decision-making. Participation in decision-making is direct in classical democracy or through representatives in a pluralist republican (Cogan, 1986). Another critical thinker on the subject, Jocob Mapuva (2015), in his article, defined public participation as a type of bond between the government and the people. According to him, the word citizen has a deep political meaning. It is the bond, relationship, correlation, etc., between people and the government. Citizens constitute a set of fundamental rights and responsibilities that include the right to participate in the decisions that influence public welfare. The Participation of citizens in decision-making empowers citizens socio-economically and democratically (Mapuva, 2015). Many countries across the globe have gained experience with the referendum, collaborative governance, citizen juries, etc. The Participation of citizens is considered an essential aspect of democratic citizenship and democratic decision-making. According to Elechi and Emordi (2017), the involvement of citizens has a positive and progressive effect on the quality of democracy. This stems from the way that it isn't sufficient to stir just by setting up democratic organizations and procedures. To a great extent, these organizations and strategies open doors for citizens to lead sound and prosperous lives. Natives must, in this way, comprehend thoughts regarding citizenship, legislative issues, and government (Elechi & Emordi, 2017).

In many developing vote-based democracies, financial variables of democratic conduct have turned into a developing discussion among researchers Mindzie et al. (2015) (cite the reference). In his article, Andres Bullocket (2014) narrated that citizens' Participation is an essential and fundamental component of a thriving and well-defined democracy. Mindzie et al. (2015) argued that Africa is going for several high levels of elections. The citizens of Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Central African Republic, Sudan, Nigeria, and South Sudan can play a crucial role in promoting the consensual and comprehensive process of the election that will make ensure a fair, peaceful, and convening elections. In broad terminology, citizen participation in democratic governance is the process by which people can take part in decisions and influence decisions that affect citizens' lives. This comprises a direct and indirect approach for the people to put their influence into effect as individuals, members of networks, and through diverse political institutions.

Leduc, Beck, Dalton, and Flanagan (1984) eagerly dissented that the financial factor is certainly not the main impetus of democratic conduct. However, most scholars have found that socioeconomic characteristics are essential forecasters and predictors of voting selection and elections, particularly in democratic governance (Bickerton, Gagno, Smith, 1999). Blaydes (2006) and Ihonvbere and Shaw (1989) contend that the foundation, records, and good character of candidates don't have all the earmarks of being significant contemplations while pursuing the open position; instead, it gives the idea that up to an applicant has the financial fortitude to run his crusade, it doesn't make a difference how he got it, he is allowed to challenge for any office. From this point of view, it can be contended that voter conduct and support can be decided or affected by various variables. Numerous investigations have been utilized to help the different hypothetical viewpoints since democratic behaviour is unpredictable to the point that no model is methodical. This investigation, consequently, considers the voter to be a fundamental fixing in a law-based setting since the activities or inactions of the voter decide the decision results. The studies are anchored on rational choice theory; the central hypothesis of rational choice theory is that the behaviour of citizens in societies reveals the interests of the individuals as every individual tries to maximize their benefits and minimize their costs. Milton (1953), in his article, reported the theory that people in Society make decisions about how to act by differentiating the costs vs. benefits at various courses of action. Such an approach, according to Milton, allows choice and preference to be represented as a practical function and presents a compact that makes valuable predictions possible.

Moreover, the flexibility of rational choice ensures that it would be an essential part of economic and political analysis. Universal advancement offices are intensely involved in establishments working in delicate states, including costly intercessions to help popularity-based decisions. However, little proof exists on whether decisions improve the household authenticity of governments (Berman, 2014). According to a report by SIGAR- (March 28, 2019), auxiliary issues, including fraud, ethno-etymological voting, and the Single Non-Transferable Vote, have impacted the advancement of Afghan democracy. The precarious exercise in careful control of encouraging an all-encompassing national personality without being seen as privileging specific characters requires solid administration and an eagerness to challenge conventional ethnic, phonetic, and religious standards. Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani administrations have genuinely failed concerning this dynamic. After confronting worldwide resistance from the administration during disagreements about the 2009 political decision, President Karzai rejected universal examination from the appointive procedure. Maybe the main reason this bombing framework has not separated is that its deficiencies are covered up due to American donations (Barnett R. Rubin, 2020). Concentrating on the failings of a Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) may sound wonkish, and this is some portion of the issue with verifying the significant change. Olivier Roy (1986) has made a clear statement that there has never been a deliberate endeavour to give agent majority rule government, with assessment raising forces, a job for political parties, and a significant and practical discretionary framework; none of these were available in the post-9/11 settlement.

Hans Ruttig (2013) has mentioned corruption as the downfall of the Afghanistan elections. Indeed, even before the Taliban, there was, for instance, lost control by conventional focuses of Afghan Sufi intuition and Sharia-based Islamic way of dealing with life.

Conversely, there are, to some degree, blushing-tinted perspectives on the traditional Afghan basic leadership limit. The absence of party identity on polling form papers led to the building of a working party framework that was changed in 2009; few applicants distinguished their party status on the polling paper. Besides, President Karzai outmaneuvered the 2009 change with a pronouncement that forced stricter conditions on enlistment. The outcome was that only 5 of the 110 parties that had recently enrolled had the opportunity to experience the procedure again in time for the 2010 election.

Furthermore, the parties included had no status inside the Wolesi Jirga (parliament), even though there was a procedure to enlist purported "parties" requiring 21 members as a base. With 249 members from the house, this was under 10% of the chamber. To empower alliances of intrigue, those in the parties couldn't be an isolated tribe, gender, or ethnic personality, obstructing the old *mujahidin* parties from enlisting. Most enlisted parties had little life or importance in a chamber with people where everybody needed to lead. However, one party of left-inclining pioneers, driven by Shukria Barakzai, survived (Coburn & Larson, 2018).

N. Coburn and A. Larson (2007) suggest that by 2014, the Afghans considered decisions to be giving force for support purposes and not to cherish liberal qualities. The Tanzims, the collusions of commanders who had battled the war, enrolled as political parties, and the framework that developed was both current and conventional, with the benefits of none. Without modern political parties, powerful elites would have co-picked the framework so that elections did not prevail concerning supplanting daily warlord power bases.

Background of Afghan election

C. Cogan (2015) explained the importance of democracy for the country's development. Taliban governed Afghanistan for about five years, from 1996 to 2001. On September 11, 2001, the United States invasion led to the fall of the Taliban. International armed forces helped to form a constitutional democracy after decades of internecine conflict, civil war, and Taliban rule. On October 9 (2004), Hamid Karzai was elected President with 55.4 per cent votes. In (2005) elections were held in parliament and the provincial council, and Afghans voted for the lower house of parliament for the first time. Still, the result was delayed due to fraud accusations. Still, later on, Karzai and his followers were declared the winner since they gained the majority of seats in both lower and provincial (Callen et al., 2015).

T. Sharan (2011) studied the role of the Taliban in disengaging voting processes of various presidential elections. In (2009), Karzai was re-elected because his main rival no longer wanted to participate in the election. His demand regarding a change in the election commission was not met, and others claimed the election was a fraud. The U.S. and its allies forced Karzai and the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan to cancel the runoff voting system to get a better government. In September 2010, during election time, the Taliban intimidated villagers from vote, which led to the disqualification of eighteen winning candidates for parliament (Sharan et al., 2011). Initially, 27 candidates were contending; however, in 2014, the number was left to eight, with Abdullah and Ghani at the top. In the end, with the majority of votes, Ashraf Ghani was declared President. The 2018 elections were delayed to 2019 due to the Taliban attack and were focused on the debate over reforming new electoral law. At last,

the Chief of the Independent Election Commission, Hawa Alam Nuristani, announced a Preliminary President. Dornlof (2019) attempted to examine people's perceptions of elections and their experience with democracy. Afghanistan's fledgling democratic experience in the last two decades has not yielded any results vis-à-vis true democracy. Three rounds of Presidential Elections and three rounds of Parliamentary elections after 2001 turned into a crisis. People's non-participation in political and civil affairs shows their disbelief in the government. This research will address such aspects by identifying the reasons for people's non-participation in political and civil matters.

Figure 1.1 - State-wise total Presidential voting turnout 2004, 2009, and 2014.

Source- Afghanistanelectiondata.org

Figure 1.2- State-wise total Parliament voting turnout in 2004, 2009 and 2014

State-wise Afghanistan Parliament Voting Turnout Since 2005

Source- Afghanistanelectiondata.org

Figure 3- Voting Turnout in Kabul (Capital of Afghanistan) in different elections since 2004

Voting Turnout in Kabul 2004-2018

Source- Afghanistanelectiondata.org

Figure 1 and Figure 2 indicate that there has been a continuous decrease in voting turnout. People are keeping themselves above election boots. Their interest in a democratic government is declining continuously.

Electoral Institute of Afghanistan

T. Murry (2007) examined the electoral institution in Afghanistan, which, according to him, is still at an initial stage of development. After the end of the Taliban era, different Afghan groups met in the Bonn Agreement, Germany (2001). According to this agreement, a new constitution was to be made, and Afghanistan was transformed into a democratic nation. According to Article 04 of the Bonn Agreement, the government should hold elections after the ratification of the Taliban government (Emarat-e-Islami), and for the first time constitution was promulgated in 2003 and ratified in January 2004. Elections were to be held in July 2004 (T Murry, 2007). According to article 61 of the Afghanistan constitution, a candidate elected as President must receive a majority or more than 50% of votes through direct and free elections. The stage-wise setup given by the election commission includes registration for an election, nomination, campaigning, Participation on the polling day, counting, and final announcement. Each step has its own rules designed by the country's electoral system.

Abel Lyon (2019) studied the election process in Afghanistan. The main job of the electoral system is counting and observing the misuse of rules. Afghan elections are mainly based on a runoff system (two-round), also known as the Single Non-Transferable vote (SNTV), in which independent and non-independent candidates take part, and voters cast a vote to choose a candidate if one candidate receives the highest vote he is declared as a winner. However, if no one gets enough in the first round, a second round is held for the top two candidates, and the electoral system determines to whom power is given (Lyon, 2019).

1.1.Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV)

The Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan enshrined a Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system for the Afghan Society. In this system, every person has the right to cast one non-transferable vote. Out of multiple candidates, one getting the highest vote wins the same. In this system, there is no proportionality between votes and seats. One can win by single additional voting. There is less growth of political parties in the game of power in this system, and some political parties have called for a change in the electoral system (Lyon, 2019).

Krick Hummel (2014) studied the presidential election process and found that Afghanistan's electoral process is still at its initial stage and needs to be developed. Election forecasting has become a thriving industry in many countries. It gives party elites and voters information about the outcome of elections. This approach has been successful over the years. The earliest methods include a survey of the eligible population before the election, regression analysis examining government popularity from the past outcome, and exchange price, where an individual bets on the candidate's success. In the runoff, one individual with the highest vote becomes the winner. If the second phase is held, the remaining candidates are considered, and whoever receives the highest votes is declared the winner (Hummel et al., 2014).

U.S Strategy Boon or Ban

Mirza et al. (2019), in their study about U.S. and Taliban involvement in Afghanistan, observed that there is a need for a flexible approach between the U.S. and the Taliban, and the

future of Afghanistan is reliant on it. After a victory in 2001, then-American President G. W Bush decided to keep the light force of the U.S. troops in Afghanistan to hunt terrorists. By the time Obama took office in 2009, al-Qaeda had almost vanished from the scene, but the Taliban made a comeback. Obama imposed strict deadlines to bring home all the U.S. troops by the end of the presidency, but Obama's strategy failed. In America (2016), after Donald Trump defeated Hillary Clinton, the people of Afghanistan were in fear because of his anti-Afghanistan and pro-US policies. Disregarding his predecessor's plan, President Trump contemplated a new strategy in Afghanistan and announced it in front of U.S. troops at Fort Mayer within six months. He branded it as micro-mismanagement and opted for the same option of withdrawal forecasting (Mirza & Malik, n.d.). He also mentioned Pakistan's involvement in providing a haven to the terrorists. Compared to Obama's time, 2018 witnessed around a 43% increase in strikes compared to 2017.

According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, from January to September (2018), 2,798 civilians were killed, and 5,252 were injured in the attack across the country (Al-jazeera, 2018). Afghanistan faced grave repercussions due to the American President's selective policy options and rising airstrikes. Compared to 2017, the situation worsened, and poverty reached a high level. Kabul's government suffered from internal power-sharing with no immediate solution.

In 2019, the Afghanistan National Unity Government went entirely to the mercy of the U.S. The U.S. military presence is justified because, in restructured Afghanistan, the country must not become a breeding ground for terrorists. However, the U.S. remains reluctant to frame inclusive arrangements like intelligence sharing and other support mechanisms. The Trump-led government neither provided any effective strategy nor empowered Afghanistan's institutions like its predecessors. Kabul was never authorized to meet the sustained challenge of strengthening the frail institution. According to some reports, the U.S. should abandon the deadline and focus on providing Afghani forces with the required airpower and financial power. Out of 175 countries, Afghanistan is currently ranked 172nd according to the 2018 Corruption Perception Index (*Afghanistan - Transparency.Org*, n.d.). According to the Global Witness think-tank (2019) report, corruption deeply undermines the effectiveness of Afghan forces and government legitimacy. This is a significant obstacle in the development of Afghanistan (*Corruption and Conflict in Afghanistan | Global Witness | Global Witness*, n.d.).

Electoral Violence

Taliban are Sunni Islamic fundamentalist groups with roots in the Pashtun Heartland of Afghanistan. The group controlled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 and returned to power in 2021. After the U.S.-led intervention, the country removed them from power and established a government led by Hamid Karzai. The elections have been a violent affair since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. The first election took place in 2004. From then until now, six national elections have been held, each serving as a focal point for Taliban violence. Electoral violence impacted Society and limited the extent of legitimacy and accountability for the elected government. The violence led to the loss of trust among citizens vis-a-vis government and democracy. For many years, the Taliban has opposed the Afghan government's legitimacy and

authority to govern the people and rejects the country's democratic political process. The main motive is to disrupt the electoral process and influence the outcome (Rasmussen et al.,2019).

Economic Influence

According to the World Bank Report, Afghanistan is still at its initial stage of development compared to others. In the education area, the Afghan government faces the main challenge of literacy rate, which was 31% (2015-16) and has increased by 3% only by 2018 (*Afghanistan Overview*, n.d.-a). About 23.9% of the population is unemployed, which drives youth towards terrorism. This is one of the main reasons for the failure of Afghanistan against terrorism. The agriculture sector is an advantage to the Afghan people, but snow and climate can become a hurdle and create uncertainty. Currently, Afghanistan has a considerable amount of debt. To boost the economy, self-dependency is needed, as well as expanding other sectors such as foreign investment, education, etc. All these factors directly distress elections, and if the government does not act, citizens will lose faith in the state and have faulty electoral systems (World Bank Report, 2019).

According to the World Economic Outlook, more than 2.5 million people are jobless, out of which 45 per cent are high school graduates and hold university diplomas. In the business sector, Afghanistan's rank is also 167th (2019), which further deteriorated to 173rd rank (2020). However, foreign industries are not attracted much due to international fluctuation and instability in politics and economics (World Economic Outlook Database, 2019).

Electoral fairness

Since the first elections, the people of Afghanistan have lost faith in and cooperation with the government. This attitude comes against evidence of election fraud, such as sharing information with rebel parties and security issues, which is critical to the government's survival.

Berman et al. (2019) surveyed fraud reduction during elections of the lower house (WolesiJigra, 2010) by visiting 471 polling stations and measuring the attitude of the people of Afghanistan. They observed a lack of trust in the electoral institute and disorganization in the electoral process. Still, the areas where security was provided at the highest rate compared to rural areas showed a positive attitude. Parliament elections held in 2010 were considered unfair, and the International Community blamed the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan(IECA) for failing and manipulating the election race. Some believed that the Karzai government controlled a large part of the country. One main factor influencing the election process was the U.S. withdrawing its troops, resulting in increased Taliban attacks, especially during election times. This directly affected the election, and hardly five million people cast their ballots. SNTV is also a reason for election fraud in this system as a candidate struggles for a small margin, and even minor manipulation may lead to victory or defeat of the party.

Institution and Regulations

According to Bruce Darnolf (2019), the 'Institute' (government)should be stable and valued by the people. As Afghan President Karzai said, 'Rules are the resource,' the institute should focus on limiting violence, providing justice, and delivering good services to every

Citizen (Darnolf et al., 2019). For a voter's face appearing on the ballot with proper identification proof, changing the election to the weekend will make voting more accessible for people or causing election day to be a holiday, voting through the mail by sending mail to a local voting office can turn out to be a cheap and safer method; however, it may increase the illicit means.

Taylor et al. (2019) have proposed that the institute organize some campaign programs to know people's views and gain people's trust to support the institution because lack of confidence in the institute will directly lead to violence. There is a need to change the organizational environment so that the objective of the institute is adequately reached. There is a lack of satisfaction in people, so institutes should focus on how people evaluate democratic performance in their country.

Scope of Study

Democracy is not limited to its universal definition in the modern world, but its area or scope has been widened under the influence of global concepts and socioeconomic changes. Democratic rights are not limited to political rights like voting, standing in elections, and forming political organizations. A democracy should grant some social and economic rights to its citizens. Power-sharing in democracy extends to the power-sharing between government and social groups. Modern democracy cannot value only the voice of the majority, but it respects the voice of the minority as well. However, democracy has extended its scope from government and its activities to eliminate discrimination based on caste, religion, and gender. The study addresses how public engagement and Participation in an election affect the democratic process. This research seeks to propose and provide solutions to the crises that exist in the Afghan political Community.

Objectives:

1. To examine the existing electoral system and electoral legal framework of Afghanistan
2. To explore the perception and reasons for citizens' lack of interest in participating in elections and democracy
3. To critically review and evaluate the last three rounds of elections by the use of official election database record sources
4. To analyze and perceive a strategic plan to motivate people to the election process and to help election authorities administer elections

Hypothesis:

Since 2004, when the first elections were contested in Afghanistan after the Taliban regime, there has been a lack of public Participation. This will work on the following hypotheses.

1. The people of Afghanistan do not prefer to vote because of a lack of interest in democracy, security issues, fear of Taliban attacks, and unfair means of elections.

2. The political and patronal elites use elections in Afghanistan to maintain power and protect their interests using manipulative practices, leading to swaying away ordinary people from electoral institutions.
3. The election commission of Afghanistan has failed to make its influence the people. The current SNTV system of the electoral process has made it possible to manipulate votes, making people lose faith in the election.

<u>Methodology:</u>

This research is blended with different tools using a combined analysis and descriptive research methodology rather than a specific method. This investigation was carried out on the electoral system and public engagement in elections in Afghanistan. Using primary and secondary sources, books and articles on Afghanistan elections were analyzed to review the literature. Using the resources available in the IEC archive and Afghanistan election database, the last three rounds of elections were examined to investigate public Participation in every province of Afghanistan.

This study relies on both primary and secondary sources. Structured questionnaires and in-depth interviews served as primary data collection tools. Consultation with government experts and Authorities was conducted to analyze Afghanistan's current election system. Using the survey method, a questionnaire was prepared for the local public to investigate the perception and main reasons behind locals' non-participation in election processes. All gender and age groups eligible for the vote were studied from various tribes across the country. The study sample will be the eligible voters in the country divided across multiple tribes. Depending on the population share, the universe will be divided into four categories: Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara. The questionnaire was divided into five parts. The first part of the questionnaire was prepared to seek general information about the socioeconomic background of the voters, their general political perception, activities of political parties, and the extent of mobilization and Participation in elections. The second part of the questionnaire was prepared to study the Democratic Beliefs among the people of Afghanistan. The third part of the questionnaire was used to analyze the reasons behind the non-participation of people in elections. In the fourth part of the questionnaire, we seek to find citizens' needs for information. How much data is needed from the government, especially the IEC and election support institutions? In the fifth part of the questionnaire, an attempt was made to discover the current and future challenges that democracy in Afghanistan faces.

The samples were collected from Kabul, Khandhar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharief, and Nangarhar. These are the four major provinces of Afghanistan, and people living in these provinces are from different ethnic groups. A total of 247 samples were collected. The samples were analyzed using various tools of IBM SPSS Statistics v.28.0.

An in-depth interview of six politicians, Election Authority members, and social Activists was conducted using a structured questionnaire. The interview was performed to seek out information regarding the democratic processes in Afghanistan, challenges that the country is facing, fairness of election processes, the role of various organizations in election processes, and the impact of U.S. withdrawal on democracy. An attempt was also made to gain insight

into democracy in Islam.

Limitations of the study

Elections and Political Participation have been a new phenomenon in Afghanistan in the past two decades. Hence, people do not believe in democratic processes, which has even influenced researchers in this field. The lack of coherent information sources and the provision of academic opinions by experts in this field are other limitations of this research. Whereas Articles Thirty-four and Fifty of the Constitution of Afghanistan mention freedom of expression and access to information, obtaining accurate and credible sources is a significant limitation of this research. Lack of communication from government departments and the lack of government publications are other parts of such restrictions.

Afghanistan people see most of the surveys on social issues as projects from foreign countries and NGOs and do not believe in them; given this, the researcher's perception of impartiality in this research is another problem.

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Chapter 2

A Historical Timeline of Political Events in Afghanistan Before 2001

Introduction

The geography of present-day Afghanistan before the Abdali or Durrani Empire, formed by King Ahmad Abdali in 1747, was part of the territory of the former empires, which included regions in Central Asia, South Asia, and Persia (Iran). The geography of these empires, better known as the families of powerful imperial rulers, was named Khorasan by the Arab conquerors and Arab caliphates (Kenoyer, Jonathan Mark 1998). Creating an independent government in present-day Afghanistan began with Mirwais Khan Hotak, completed by King Ahmad Abdali (Banting, Erinn 2003). There are various narrations about whether Mirwais Khan Hotak had declared a monarchy in Kandahar before King Ahmad. Among them, Sir John Malkum writes about the history of Iran from the words of Hanoi, a contemporary of Mirwais, who said that Mirwais Khan proclaimed a kingdom and ordered coins to be struck in his name.

King Ahmad Abdali, later nicknamed "Ahmad Shah Baba," was born in 1732 in Herat. He was elected King of Afghanistan in October 1747 and died in the mountain of Toba in 1773. King Ahmad Durrani's thoughts and actions have had a significant impact on the political life of the Afghan people and have shifted the course of the country's history from one side to the other. King Ahmad appeared in Afghanistan's political history for two centuries and became the founder of an independent government in Afghanistan. He established a long, comprehensive empire from Khorasan to India (Adamec, Ludwig W. 2011).

King Ahmad was the son of Mohammad Zaman and the younger brother of Zulfiqar Khan Sadozaiee, who was the governor of Herat for a short time during the Abdalian period. His mother was ZarghunaAlKozai, the sister of Abdul Ghani, whom King Nader appointed to rule Kandahar after the conquest. As a young man, he joined King Nader's camp and gradually rose to the deputy commander of the Afghan Guards, which numbered 4,000. Of course, Hotaki and Abdali men in Afghanistan declared independence in Kandahar and Herat before King Ahmad. Still, they failed to establish a cohesive political administration inside the country[1].

After the assassination of King Nader Afshar on one of the nights of June 1747 in the Khobushan region (present-day Quchan), Iran, the Afghan Army, consisting of 4,000 Ghaljaiees, 12,000 Abdaliees, and Uzbeks, they were met with Commander-in-Chief Noor Mohammad Ghaljaiee and Ahmad Khan Abdali. They moved to Kandahar. In Kandahar, Afghanistan's inter-ethnic centre, Noor Mohammad Khan proposed to the Guljaiee, Uzbek, Abdaliee, Hazara, Baluch, and Tajik leaders that a jirga be formed and a monarchy elected (S. Frederick, 2008)

After Ahmad Khan arrived in Kandahar, a jirga was convened with the participation of some Afghan tribal leaders. After lengthy negotiations, Ahmad Khan was elected to the throne at the suggestion of a mystic Sufi named Saber Shah Kabuli. This Sufi installed a wheat spike instead of a crown on Ahmad Khan's hat (Elena E. Kuz'mina 2007). After forming the government,

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[1] Mir Mohammad Siddiq Farhang, Afghanistan in the last five centuries, Volume 1, page 95

the military administration, and the Army's order, he gathered many troops. King Ahmad's Army included all ethnic groups in Afghanistan, including Baluchis, Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Qezelbash, Hazaras, and Tajiks. King Ahmad had won many conquests in India and other countries, and he was a brave, managerial and experienced man in terms of military affairs. He formed a territory that included Kashmir, Lahore, and Sindh, in addition to present-day Afghanistan (Parkes, Aidan 2018). King Ahmad did not pay much attention to the country's cultural, economic, civil, and development issues. During the 25 years of his reign, no action was taken to establish a school, academy, library, education, economic production, or industry (Langer, William L 1972). King Ahmad Abdali formed the last empire in a part of this geography whose central axis was the current geography of Afghanistan, and its borders stretched from the east in South Asia to Delhi. In contrast, Persia (Iran) and the former lands of these empires in Transoxiana were excluded from the territory of this last empire Baxter (Baxter Craig, 1995).

The last empire and the civil war of power

King Ahmad Abdali founded this empire in Kandahar in 1747 AD after the death of Nader Afshar and called himself the King of Khorasan. However, he disliked the land of western and northern Khorasan and expanded the empire to the east. Still, in the Indian subcontinent, despite successive campaigns and victories in war, it remained incapable of forming a stable state belonging to and loyal to the Abdali Empire (E. Herzfeld, 1968).

While riots by rival tribes claiming power in the centre of the empire (Kandahar) during the absence of King Ahmad Durrani, who was on a military offensive on the subcontinent and elsewhere, signalled a civil war for power, but the main and uninterrupted power struggle began after the death of the founder of the Abdali Empire (1772) between his sons and his survivors. The fire of this war not only lasted for about another century (1824) between the King and the princes of the Saduzaiees and until the last heir of this dynasty Family (King Mohammad Zahir and Mohammad Davood) and continued until 1978[2]. After the fall of the Government of the previous ruler of the Mohammadzai dynasty (Sardar Mohammad Daud), the power struggle between the political groups claiming power and the leaders of these groups continued, and the fire of this war is still burning (*Schmitt, Rüdiger 2011*).

Two features of the bloody wars of the last two and a half centuries:

Two features characterize Two and a half centuries of bloody power struggle in Afghanistan:

1- Crossing all red lines:

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[2] Government and society in Afghanistan- Regime of Amir Abdulrahman-by Hasan Kawun Kakar cop. The University of Texas 1070USA p-15

In all the years of the power struggle, many claimants and rulers of power did not respect any red line[3]. Neither very close blood ties prevented war nor ideological and partisan friendships, comradeship, moral standards, and patriotic and national interests. (Fleming 1982).

2- Dependence on the outside and external interference:

The two-and-a-half-century power struggle in Afghanistan is viewed and studied with the rulers' intervention and the parties' dependence on this war, albeit differently with foreign governments and circles. In many power struggles between the claimants to power, from the King and the princes of Saduzaie to the commanders of Mohammadzaie and the leaders of political groups, the hand of foreign intervention is direct and indirect. Suppose part of the cause of this foreign intervention is their interventionist policies in their interests. In that case, the other part is rooted in the interference and dependence of the internal parties on the power struggle (Dupree, Louis 1973). It is noteworthy that the internal parties to the power struggle did not commit themselves to any red line in this foreign interference and dependence, from the signing of treaties that legitimized foreign military aggression to the transfer of land and territory to them and reliance on foreign policy—moreover, even Afghanistan's internal administration to foreigners (Dupree, Louis 1973).

Seven decades of the reign of the Saduzaiees (1772-1838):

After the death of King Ahmad Abdali in 1772, two of his sons, Prince Suleiman in Kandahar and Prince Temur in Herat, proclaimed the kingdom. Invading Kandahar, Temur captured and executed Suleiman, the influential minister of his father's kingdom (King Ahmad Abdali), with his two sons and two nephews and ascended the throne[4].

However, after seizing the monarchy in Kandahar, Temur chose Kabul as his capital. He went to Kabul with several tribal chiefs and princes who claimed the throne to avoid opposition and revolt over the monarchy. Still, rebellion and resistance continued on various occasions until he died in 1793. Thirty-two sons of King Temur fought for power for about a century. Their first sons and grandsons fought for control. Then, his brother Prince Mahmoud, the governor of Herat, raised the flag of revolt in 1797, and he also failed in this revolt (*Doumanis, Door Nicholas 2009)*.

In 1799, King Temur beheaded ten tribal chiefs for their involvement in plotting to overthrow his monarchy, including Sardar Payenda Muhammad, the Barakzai or Mohammadzaie tribe leader. The sons of the slain general then revolted to avenge their father, led by Fathe Mohammad Khan, and in this revolt, they brought Prince Mahmud, the Shah's brother, to the throne. Mahmud became King with their help and in revenge for his objective brother Homayoun; he blinded the eyes of the deposed King (1801) and continued to reign until 1804, despite fighting with his brothers and opponents. Eventually, King Mahmud was overthrown by his brother Shuja al-Mulk and continued to rule until 1809 amid war and strife with his brothers and the sons of Payandeh Mohammad Khan (Lomazoff, Amanda; Ralby, Aaron 2013).

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[3] Article by Academician Abdul Ahmad Jawed, Proceedings of the Seminar on the 200th Anniversary of the Death of Mia FaqirullahJalalabadi, published by the Academy of Sciences of Afghanistan, February 1980, p. 3
[4] Faiz Mohammad Kateb Hazare, Siraj Al-Tawarikh, Vol. 1, Balkh Research and Publications Institute, 1993, p. 12

In 1809, King Mahmud, with the help of the sons of Payandeh Mohammad Khan, took over the throne from King Shuja and remained King until 1818. During this period, he appointed Fathe Mohammad Khan as Minister and, in the sense of today, Prime Minister. Fathe Mohammad Khan appeared in power with more power than the King, left his brothers in the affairs of the provinces, and took control from the King[5]. This situation forced Kamran, the son of King Mahmud, to blind Fatah Khan (1817) and then, together with his father and his allied tribes, brutally killed the blind Fatah Khan. He rolled his eyes and cut off his limbs (*Jakobsson, Jens 2009)*.

The bloody war of the Saduzaiee kings with Mohammadzaie commanders:

The assassination of Minister Fath Mohammad Khan drew his twenty brothers, most of whom ruled the provinces, to fight the King and his son. The minister's brothers ruled over different regions; each named a member of the Saduzaiee royal family named King and took power in his shadow. However, they waged war on the one hand over each other and on the other against the Saduzaiee over the expansion of their sovereignty and domination of the capital (*Aḥmad 'AlīKuhzād, 1972)*. Dost Mohammad Khan Mohammadzaie took control of the money, and King Mahmud, King of Saduzaie, fled to Herat. However, the King fought with his son Kamran over the rule of Herat. The son defeated his father in this war[6].

While the power struggle between the Saduzaiees and the Muhammadzaies claimed power, King ShujaSaduzaiee succeeded to the throne of Kabul in 1833 after signing the Treaty of Lahore with the British and the Sikh King of Punjab under the protection of British forces. He continued to reign until 1838 (Zhang Qian 2015). Dost Mohammad Khan Mohammadzaie, the emir of Kabul, fled to Bukhara. Then, when the armed uprising against the King and the British troops reached its peak, he returned from Bukhara to the north of Kabul in 1840 and surrendered to the British (Yuezhi 2015). The British took him to India but returned him to Kabul after the death of King Shuja, who was assassinated in 1843 and accepted his reign.

After the assassination of King Shuja, the Saduzaiees were no longer fortunate enough to sit on the throne. Conquest of the War, his son, was arrested and imprisoned by Mohammad Akbar Khan, son of Dost Mohammad Khan, after a month of reign in place of his slain father. Safdar Jang, the other son of King Shuja, who had proclaimed the monarchy in Kandahar, was defeated by Sardar Mehrdul Khan Mohammadzaie and fled to India (Muhammad Qasim 2000).

135 years of the reign and rule of Mohammadzaie kings (1838-1978):

Even in the years when their princes and emperors ruled in peace and security, this peace was disturbed by the internal conflict of power. It has been 135 years since the reign of Sardar Dost Mohammad Khan, who ruled Kabul as Emir, to the control of Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan. The power struggle continued between Mohammadzai's commanders (Malleson, George Bruce 1878).

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[5] History of Soltani, p. 147 and history of events and accidents in Afghanistan, authored by Aliqoli Mirza Etezadolsaltaneh, published in 1273 AH, Tehran, pp. 36-37

[6] Mir Abdul Karim Ibn Mir Ismail Bukharaee, History, anecdotes and circumstances of the rulers of Afghanistan, Kabul, Bukhara, Khoywa and Khuqand, compiled in 1246 AH, published by Monsieur Shar, p. 6

Dost Mohammad Khan ruled in Kabul until he died in 1861, while his other brothers in the provinces were at war with each other over the expansion of the government. Many sons survived Dost Mohammad Khan, nine of whom (Mohammad Afzal Khan, Mohammad Azam Khan, Shir Ali Khan, Mohammad Amin Khan, Mohammad Sharif Khan, Wali Mohammad Khan, Faiz Mohammad Khan, Mohammad Aslam Khan, and Mohammad Hassan Khan) each held the governorship of a province. Each had sons and then fought over the region's kingdom and government (Noelle-Karimi et al., 2002).

First, Shir Ali Khan, who seized the Emirate or monarchy in Kabul, defeated his brother Mohammad Azam Khan. Then Abdul Rahman Khan, the son of Mohammad Afzal Khan, the Shah's other brother, escaped from prison to Bukhara and then returned to Kabul, taking his father to the Emirate after winning the war with Shir Ali Khan (Niazi, Shaheer 1970). The new Emir soon died and was succeeded by his brother Mohammad Azam Khan, but he had a dispute with his nephew Abdul Rahman Khan (Dupree, Nancy Hatch 1971). In such a situation, Shir Ali Khan, with the help of the British, who received three hundred thousand rupees and three thousand rifles from Lord Lawrence, the British ruler of India, defeated Abdul Rahman Khan and Mohammad Azam Khan in the war and regained the throne of Kabul[7]. Ten years of calm were created for the Emirate and the rule of Sardar Shir Ali Khan, but then he and his son Mohammad Yaqub Khan were appointed crown princes. Yaqub Khan took Herat from his father and killed his ruler. When he came to his father in Kabul, his father imprisoned him (Malleson, George Bruce 1878).

Amir Shir Ali Khan left Kabul in a great game between Tsarist Russia and Britain in December 1878, and in 1879, his imprisoned son Sardar Yaqub Khan came to the throne. At the beginning of his reign, the British launched a military invasion of Afghanistan and signed a wheat treaty. He then surrendered at the end of this year, and the kingdom passed to Abdul Rahman Khan.

Abdul Rahman Khan, who lived in Bukhara, came to Kabul after intensifying the people's war against the British and their defeat in these wars and was accepted by the British as the new King (Malleson, George Bruce 1878).

British aggression

After the conquest of Afghanistan, the British invaded Afghanistan in November 1838, and King Shoja, one of King Ahmad's grandsons, was appointed King of Afghanistan in August 1838 in Kabul. It was not long before the people of Kabul revolted against the British occupiers in 1840 and drove the British out of Kabul until 1842 (Fromkin, David 1980)

Because of this uprising, Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, from the Mohammadzaie clan, came to the throne for the second time. He also ruled Afghanistan during the British invasion but fled without the slightest resistance and went to Bukhara. The British again invaded Afghanistan in 1878 during the reign of Amir Shir Ali Khan under the pretext of accepting a Russian delegation and signing a treaty with the board (Husain, Farrukh 2018).

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[7]Oliverova, Islam and Political Modernism in Afghanistan, translated by AbolhassanSarvaghad, 1990, p. 31

Shir Ali Khan, like his father Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, fled, and the British, on May 30, 1879, signed the "Gandamak" treaty, by which parts of Afghanistan were separated from the country, with Mohammad Yaqub Khan's son, and successor of Shir Ali Khan (J.A. Norris 2010). The people of Kabul revolted again against the British and assassinated the British ambassador to Kabul, Kew Nari, accompanied by a political delegation. Thus began the Second Afghan-British War, in which the British were defeated, but their political ally, Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, came to power.

During the 21 years of his reign, Abdul Rahman Khan, with vigorous action, actually consolidated the political unity of Afghanistan for the first time within the current borders; however, it renounced the British-occupied territories of Afghanistan with the signing of the Durand Line and did not gain political independence in Afghanistan. After Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, his son Habibullah Khan succeeded him and remained faithful to his father's commitments to the British.

In 1838–42 and 1878–81, the British Empire conquered Afghanistan twice. In both cases, the invasion aimed to deflect Russia's power and stop Russia from gaining a foothold in the region. Afghan people revolted against their invading forces in reaction to both attacks. In 1838, the King of Afghanistan, Shah Dost Muhammad Khan, could not mobilize any major rebellion and soon gave up. The British Army almost quickly captured Ghazni, Kabul, and Jalalabad (Macintyre, 2002). The British assigned Shah Shujah, a marionette emir who promised to support Britain in gaining control over Afghanistan. But most Afghans condemned Shah Shujah for his political betrayal and waged an uprising against the British. The Islamic mullahs started pushing for jihad –a sacred war against non-believers and unfaithful citizens (The Economist 2011).

The British garrison in Kabul was attacked on November 1, 1842, and hundreds of British soldiers were killed. After this, the British decided to withdraw from Kabul, and on January 1, 1842, a regiment of 20,000 left Kabul towns for Jalalabad and Gandamak. The brutal winter's continued attacks and ambush by a local militia led the British to find their way to retreat. On January 12, fewer than 2,000 arrived in Jalalabad, and 350 only had the chance to find shelter in Gandamak. British colonial officials in Calcutta and London were surprised by the destiny of the Kabul Garrison. British Ghazni and Jalalabad garrisons were directed to occupy Kabul and suppress the insurgents. The forts destroyed Kabul and killed thousands of people, but the British understood that Afghanistan would only be invaded at their own risk.

All the British forces returned to India in October 1842 (Ewans, Martin 2002). A similar scenario followed the second British invasion in 1879. Initially, there was little local opposition to the British army expedition, and by January 1869, there was military influence over the Afghan towns of Jalalabad and Qandahar. Afghan Emir Sher Ali Khan passed away on February 20, 1879 (Forbes, Archibald 2014). His son Yakub signed the Gandamak Treaty with the British colonial forces after surrendering, marking the end of Afghan independence. In Kabul, the British mission was set up. During their first invasion of Afghanistan, the strategic disaster was not instructive for the British, who now neglected the swelling of widespread resentment and hatred across the country in the second invasion. In September 1879, as demonstrators destroyed British residences, an insurgency in Kabul took the colonial occupiers

by surprise, and Louis Cavagnari, the chief of the British mission, was killed (Dalrymple, William. 2013). In October 1879, the British recaptured Kabul. Still, even harsh reprisals toward opposition did not deter what was often referred to as a jihad, as rising numbers of Pushtun and Tajik militants threatened the colonial Army. However, there was no single leader who would unite the insurgents. After 11 years of exile in Russian Turkestan, Abdurrahman Khan, grandson of Emir Dost Muhammad, emerged from northern Afghanistan and attempted to drive British citizens out of Kabul (Forbes, Archibald 2014). In July 1880, his challenger, Ayub Khan, an ambitious leader of the western Herat province, initiated a campaign toward Qandahar and inflicted a complete defeat on the British near the Afghan village of Maywand. In ensuing military encounters with the Afghan rebels, although the British did well, the widespread rebellion was not quenched by the British. In 1981, British Queen Victoria formally recognized Abdurrahman Khan as Emir of Kabul and retreated British forces to India, and after a string of military defeats, Ayub Khan went into exile. While the British formed their patrons in 1881, both British military actions in Afghanistan endured a similar fate and were defeated by grassroots guerrilla resistance. In the 1830s, Russia appeared as the predominant colonial competitor in Britain after the defeat of Napoleonic France. The two countries' rivalry to wield power and influence in Central Asia led to war, violence, and espionage in the first decades of the 20th century (Yapp, M.E.1987). India was the jewel inside the Crown of the British Empire and presented its colonial masters with an almost unlimited supply of influence and wealth. Russian penetration into Central Asia and expanded intervention in Iran's foreign policy threatened to open a path southward into British India Dalrymple, William. 2013). Afghanistan has been an essential platform for both nations to ground their roots in Asia. The British did not want to incorporate Afghanistan into their Empire. Instead, Afghanistan was perceived as a buffer zone between its possessions in India and Russia, which is still invasive (Yapp, M.E.1987).

In 1837, an ambassador was sent in the form of William Burnes to the court of the Emir of Afghanistan, Dost Muhammad Khan, to create an alliance with the British. In general, Muhammad acknowledged the coalition, but with the provision that Britain should support Afghans in recovering Peshawar power from the Prince of Lahore. Lahore was one of the most diplomatic allies in the subcontinent at the frontier of India. The British were not prepared to alienate it. The talks with Dost Muhammad had now collapsed. Furthermore, he had to be replaced as far as the British were concerned (Yapp, M.E.1987).

Shah Shuja governed Afghanistan between 1803 and 1809 until Dost Muhammad defeated him. The plan was now to reinstall him on the Afghan throne. Shah Shuja had already assured in 1831 that he would gladly open up Afghanistan's trading routes to the United Kingdom if he were in control. Shuja proposed himself as a marionette king in an English-friendly buffer zone in all sense of purpose. Lord Auckland, the Governor-General of India, made a manifesto explaining the reasons behind British involvement in Afghanistan in October 1838. According to this manifesto, British forces will be in Afghanistan only to assist the Army of Shah Shuja in gaining what legitimately was of his. After his establishment in Kabul, British troops would leave the region.

British Invasion (first Anglo-Afghan war)

In December 1838, a military of 39,000 people left Punjab to invade Afghanistan. William Hay Macnaghten, the U.K.'s Chief Representative, flew with them. The harsh Afghan climate and rugged countryside exposed Anglo-Indian troops as they stepped deeper into the region. After many challenges, they arrived in Kandahar. Kandahar was quickly captured, followed by Ghazni, and the Army of Dost Muhammad was invaded (Husain, Farrukh 2018). Shah Shuja invaded Kabul in August 1839 and became Afghanistan's King again. It ought to have been what seemed to be a remarkable success for Shah Shuja and his British allies. The invaders of Afghanistan were not, for the last time, enchanted by a straightforward initial victory. The stage was set for a disastrous collapse that would destroy the dignity of Britain and drive them out for a century from Afghanistan. The government of Shah Shuja was unpopular straight away. He appointed crooked officials and associated himself with cronies, excluding traditional tribal leaders and refusing them the position and power they thought they deserved for their roles. This was a blunder of critical value. Instead of any central government, the allegiance of the Afghan people was against their tribal relatives (L. W. Adamec 2010).

Shah Shuja, re-emerging from years of exile spent in British India's comparatively cosmopolitan and liberal environment, bought a moral code deeply unpleasant to many Afghans. A foreign army's presence and the evil that came with it did little to help the situation. The assistant ambassador, Sir Alexander Burnes, was of remarkable reputation, whose womanizing and disorderly conduct was legendary in Kabul. Afghanistan seemed calm on the horizon, and the British began to fulfil their pledge that they would return to India. Before the year was out, the first batch of soldiers went off, leaving only 8,000 men to back up the Shah (J.A. Norris 2010). Afghans did not like the involvement of British soldiers in the city; nevertheless, this was meant to be tentative. When Mr Macnaghten allowed the British soldiers' families to join them to raise moral values, the tide of opinion started to turn. The message was plain to the local population: the British were to become a regular fixture. It was as if a little piece of British India had been transplanted into Afghan land in the form of a British cantonment in Kabul (Perry, James 2005). As the locals started an uprising against the invaders, this was a bad situation. The British had no alternative but to go back to India.

The withdrawal from Kabul began on January 1, 1842. The long march to safety started with 4,500 troops and 12,000 camp followers. As Afghans pillaged, they marched into the canton. Panic hit the camp followers and left many stores stamped out and deserted (Macintyre, Ben 2002). The first day of the march was five miles until a disorganized night camp settled. The chain of command was broken from this point. Each man was on his own. As the train stopped, Afghan horseback riders, going through the losing lines on their own, began to assault the column. The column moved on to the TangiTariky pass that the Ghilzais had blocked. Much of the column had been killed by the raiders lying in wait.

The garrison was wiped out just by Elphistone (Major-General of the British Army); his officers made it through. Khan sent Elphistone a message welcoming him to his camp. Elphistone agreed, expecting to negotiate the terms, but upon arrival, he realized that he was now the captive of the warlord. Authority was turned over to Brigadier Anquetil, who hoped to use the cover of darkness to escape past the waiting Ghilzais (Macintyre, Ben 2002). Again,

he found his path blocked and compelled the foot soldiers to stand at Gandamak for the last time.

The British illusion of inventiveness was demolished. On the other hand, the Kabul government of Shah Shuja benefitted from the defeat of his ally. Most of the critical sources of unrest were eliminated after the foreign influence had left. Shuja was assassinated soon afterwards. There followed a power struggle between competing parties. After enormous bloodshed, one of the sons of Shah Shuja was put on the throne, and Akbar Khan as his wazir (Macintyre, Ben 2002)

Ellenborough, then Governor-General of India, decided to see an early end to the war and ordered his complete departure from Afghanistan. People were targeted in settlements and accused of being linked to the rebellion. The prominent market in Kabul was demolished as retaliation for the killing by Macnaughton(Perry, James 2005). The British left Kabul on October 12, pleased with the return of imperial dignity. With Shah Shuja's successor unable to reclaim power, another of his sons was seated on the throne. But Akhbar Khan removed him, allowing his father, Dost Muhammad, to return from exile and retake his throne. (Macintyre, Ben 2002) (Blackburn, Terence R. 2008).

The British interference was an utter failure. The old conservative and self-employed rules were reinstated, and government and citizens were now resolutely anti-British throughout Afghanistan. The war was a diplomatic and military debacle. Can it otherwise have ended? The British helped the wrong guy from the outset. Shah Shuja's loss of his throne was ample evidence that he was an unpopular, dishonest, and inept king (Macintyre, Ben 2002). A profound misconception of the Afghan way of life wholly compromised British policy. Afghanistan was not like India. It wasn't like the vast empires of Mughal and Maratha, central autocracies that crashed to utter ruin in a single war. It could only be governed by the local tribal leaders, and the Shah and its foreign allies could not wholly secure it (Perry, James 2005).

British Invasion (2nd Anglo-British War)

The Second Anglo-Afghan War was a conflict between the British and the Emirate of Afghanistan between 1878 and 1880 when Sher Ali Khan, the son of former Emir Dost Mohammad Khan, governed Afghanistan. The fighting was part of the great game between the powers of Britain and Russia. The war began with the British invasion of Afghanistan in November 1878 (Robson, Brian 2007). The British easily prevailed and compelled Amir-Sher Ali Khan to quit. Mohammad Yaqub Khan, Ali's successor, immediately called for peace, and on May 26, 1879, he signed the Treaty of Gandamak (Chisholm, Hugh, 1911). The British sent an ambassador to Kabul under the leadership of Sir Louis Cavagnari, but on September 3, this delegation was assassinated. Ayub Khan ignited the war, which led to Yaqub's abdication. In September 1880, the British defeated Ayub Khan outside Kandahar, and a new Amir - Abdur Rahman Khan, ratified the Gandamak Treaty (Robson, Brian 2007, Chisholm, Hugh, 1911).). The Afghan citizens decided to let the British meet their strategic aims to establish a barrier between the British Raj and the Russian Empire.

Background- After the conflict between Russia and Britain in Europe ended with the Berlin Congress in June 1878, Russia turned its attention to Central Asia. Russia dispatched a diplomatic delegation to Kabul in the same year. This was a mission. The Amir of Afghanistan,

Sher Ali Khan, attempted to drive them out but failed to do so. On July 22, 1878, the Russian delegation arrived in Kabul, and the British demanded that Sher Ali also consider a British board on August 14. The Amir rejected not only to receive a mission from the British under Neville Bowles Chamberlain but also threatened to avoid it if dispatched. In September 1878, Lord Lytton commissioned a diplomatic delegation to depart for Kabul. Still, the mission was reverted as it reached the east entrance of the Khyber Pass, thus triggering the beginning of the Second Anglo-Afghan War (Henry Bathurst 1904).

The first campaign started with around 50,000 British soldiers, split into three military columns that entered Afghanistan at three distinct points in November 1878. The successes of Britain in the Battle of Ali Masjid and Peiwar-Kotal led to an almost undefended approach to Kabul by Afghan troops. Sher Ali attempted to appeal to the Russian Tsar for help, but they demanded that he should seek provisions of surrender from the British (Macintyre, Ben 2002). He returned to Mazari Sharif and died there on February 21, 1879 (Robson, Brian. 2007).

In May of 1879, the Gandamak Treaty was signed by Mohammad Yaqub Khan, son and successor of Sher Ali, to deter the British invading forces in the rest of the country. Under this Deal, Yaqub gave up power over Afghan foreign relations with Britain in exchange for an annual subsidy and ambiguous promises of support in the event of foreign. In Kabul, as well as other places, British delegates were appointed (Henry Bathurst 1904). British influence extended to passes through Khyber and Michni, and Afghanistan handed over some North-West Frontier Province and Quetta areas to British violence. However, an uprising in Kabul on September 3, 1879, triggered the assassination of the British agent Sir Louis Cavagnari and his guards and his staff, thus provoking the 2nd phase of the British-Afghan War (Ewans, Martin 2002).

Major General Frederick Roberts led Kabul Field Force into central Afghanistan through the Shutargardan Pass and defeated the Afghan Army on October 6, 1879, at Charasiab, invading Kabul in two days (Forbes, Archibald 2014). In December 1879, Ghazi Mohammad Jan Wardak and 10,000 Afghan troops raged against and attacked British forces at the Kabul location (Dalrymple, William. 2013). While the British garrison was under siege there, he refused to enforce the blockade of Sherpur instead of turning his attention to Robert's Army, which led to the revolt's failure. Yaqub Khan was compelled to abdicate, accused of his complicity in the Cavagnari massacre (Forbes, Archibald 2014). The U.K. considered several potential policy settlements, including splitting Afghanistan into several rulers and throningYaqub's brother Ayub Khan, but finally opted to install his cousin Abdur Rahman Khan as Emir. In the Battle of Maiwand in July 1880, Ayub Khan, who had served in the office of Governor of Herat, emerged in revolt and defeated British Roberts. The leading British Army from Kabul defeated Khan on September 1 and halted his uprising later (Macintyre, 2002).

The war formally ended when Ayub Khan was defeated, and the British picked and backed a new Amir — the former Amir Sher Ali's nephew and Muhammad Afzal's son Abdur Rahman Khan. Rahman confirmed the Gandamak Treaty was utilised in return for security and support; the British took possession of the Yaqub Khan territories and Afghanistan's foreign policy (Blackburn, Terence R. 2008). The British withdrew from the area by abandoning the

provocative strategy of retaining a British resident in Kabul but pursuing all other objectives. By April 1881, all British and Indian soldiers departed from Afghanistan, but British Indian agents stayed behind in smooth liaison with the government. During Rahman's rule, there was no additional trouble between Afghanistan and British India, and he was named 'iron Amir (Dalrymple, William 2012).

Third Anglo-Afghan War

The Third Anglo-Afghan War, also known as the Third Afghan War, the British-Afghan War of 1919, and the Independence War of Afghanistan, began with the invasion of British Indians by Afghanistan on May 6, 1919, and concluded with the armistice on August 8, 1919. This war led to Afghans regaining the influence of foreign relations from the British, and the British recognized Afghanistan as an independent republic (Arnold, Anthony 1985). It was also a diplomatic success for the British, according to British author Michael Barthorp, as the Durand Line was reaffirmed as the boundary between Afghanistan and British India, and the Afghans decided not to foster problems on the British side. However, Afghans on the British frontier were concerned because of the revolts (Barthorp, Michael 2002).

Afghanistan was perceived as a threat to the British in India. The British were worried about Russian intentions and that Tsarists might start an invasion of India via Afghanistan (Beadle, Jeremy; Harrison, Ian 2007). The British tried to force their own will on Kabul in various forms to escape the threat and fought two wars in the 19th century: the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842) and the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880). Before the battle began, the root cause of the Third Anglo-Afghan War lay in the geography of Afghanistan. The conclusion of the Second Afghan War in 1880 saw the beginning of nearly 40 years of good relations between Britain and Afghanistan under the leadership of Abdur Rahman Khan and Habibullah Khan. However, the British attempted to control Afghanistan's foreign policy with considerable subsidies (Cavanna, Thomas 2015, Pipes, Richard 1995).

Emir Abdul Rahman's death in 1901 culminated in indirect entry into the war 18 years after the 2nd Anglo-Afghan War. Despite tremendous indignation that the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 (St Petersburg Conventions) was not consulted, Afghanistan was neutral during the First World War (1924-18). Afghan leaders were moderate leaders who favoured the United Kingdom and Russia based on the interests of Afghanistan (Collett, Nigel 2007). Though Habibullah remained neutral in the conflict, he accepted a German-Turkish mission in Kabul. He received military support from the central authorities, attempting to better negotiate with the two sides of the contest (Cooksley, Peter 2000).

In 1916, the Turco-German mission left Kabul. However, at that time, Habibullah was successfully convinced that Afghanistan was an independent nation and that nobody should be bound. With the First World War conclusion, the British government compensated Habibullah for support during the war. He requested a seat in the 1919 Versailles Peace Congress to seek British recognition of Afghanistan's foreign independence (Barthorp, Michael 2002). The Viceroy, Frederic Thesiger, 1st Viscount Chelmsford, rejected this request because the presence of belligerents at the conference had been restricted. Further negotiations were

planned, but before they were allowed to start, Habibullah was assassinated on February 19, 1919 (Hughes, Basil 1992).

This led to a power struggle, as Nasrullah Khan, brother of Habibullah, declared himself as the successor of Habibullah. At the same time, Amanullah, the third son of Habibullah, also proclaimed himself an Amir in Kabul. In his father's death, Amanullah was suspected of complicity by the Afghan Army. When Amanullah took the throne in April 1919, he sought to consolidate his strength as a man with democratic values who had vowed changes in the government structure. Amanullah convicted and sentenced Nasrullah, his Uncle, to life imprisonment for the murder of Habibullah. Nasrullah was the leader in Afghanistan with a more conservative element, and Amanullah's approach as Amir was very tight. By April 1919, he knew that he would be unable to retain his grip on power if he did not find a way to satisfy the conservatives (Cooksley, Peter 2000). Amanullah planned to invade British India in search of a reversal from inner struggles and sensing benefit during the rising public unrest in India following the Amritsar massacre. The fighting began on May 3, 1919, when Afghan forces crossed the border on the western side of Khyber Pass and seized the town of Bagh. Bagh played a strategic role in taking water to LandiKotal, which was occupied by two companies of the British Indian Army. This alerted the British Chief Commissar of the Northwest Frontier, Sir George Roos-Keppel. He convinced Lord Chelmsford that there was a need to intervene in the occupation before it led to further instability in Peshawar (Lansford, Tom 2017).

As a result, the British Indian government declared war against Afghanistan on May 6, directing the overall mobilization of British and Indian forces. In the meantime, a cordon was thrown down Peshawar, and civilians were asked to hand over the insurgency's leaders. The citizens complied with the threats to the city's water supply, and by dawn on May 8, the city situation was stabilized, and the chances of the uprising were abated. The British and Indian forces launched an attack on May 9 against the Afghans that had taken Bagh the week before. However, the assault failed when the Brigade Commander decided to break up and unleash nearly half of his resources to secure the Brigade's flank. Therefore, he could not meet the concentration of force required to capture all of his objectives. Following this, three BE2c Royal Air Force aircraft targeted a group of tribesmen in a bombing attack on Dacca in Afghanistan (Cooksley, Peter 2000, Hughes, Basil 1992).

British. From Nowshera and Abbottabad, the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades from the 1st Infantry Diversion concentrated in Jamrud and KachaGarhi. All at the same, from Rawalpindi, the Sixth Brigade in the Second Infantry Division moved to Peshawar to help extinguish the unrest. On May 11, the 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigades attacked Bagh two days later and succeeded this time. The tribe members, who otherwise were expected to counterattack to assist the Afghans, opted not to pillage the war grounds and instead capture the arms and explosives left behind by Afghans in recession. The battle was then named the Second Battle of Bagh, and casualties amounted to 100 Afghans killed and 300 injured by the British, while the British lost eight soldiers and 31 were wounded. While Amanullah stayed, confessing that he had no malicious motives, Roos-Keppel determined it was wise to proceed and directed the Army to pursue the Afghans across the border (Loyn, David 2009). British and Indian forces

captured Western Khyber power without resistance on May 13. However, the British defensive camp was poorly positioned, resulting in a highly long-range Afghan artillery blockade until Amanullah targeted them. The assault was defeated, and the next day, the British began a counterattack but could not consolidate their position, which led to the withdrawal of the Afghans, and the region was secured on May 17.

Meanwhile, British and Indian forces attacked 'Stonehenge Hill,' where an Afghan army of 3,000 men with artillery parts and machine guns had established themselves (Molesworth, George 1962). The first attack was launched by the 11th Sikhs with a preliminary bombing to disrupt the Afghan defence. At that time, troops were subjected to day heat; however, after a further barrage was called, the Sikhs attacked the Afghan side amid the heat. The attack caused 22 deaths and 157 wounded in the British and Indian armies, while estimated Afghan casualties were about 200 killed and 400 injured. After the attacks, the Afghans fled the battlefield, leaving many of their equipment, artillery, and standards. Secondary attacks on Quetta, Kurram, Chitral State Baluchistan, and Zhob Valley in the north and the south were planned as part of the attack on Khybers (Loyn, David 2009, Molesworth, George 1962).

On May 27 in Quetta, the British commander planned to attack Baldak, an Afghan stronghold, and captured it, after which they took the initiative in the south. However, the situation around Kurram, in the centre of the war zone, was still very dire for the British. In that area, the Afghan forces were commanded by General Nadir Khan, and he had about 14 battalions of armed force. The British at Thal had four companies under Brigadier General Alexander Eustace. In addition to this, it was the disaffected North Waziristan Militia that was the only force defending the Upper Tochi Valley. The South Waziristan Militia in Wana attacked and opposed their officers. Under the commander Major Russel, the survivors were forced to occupy the North Zhob militia column (Rodger, Alexander 2003).

 Realizing that the situation worsened for the British and an opportunity, Nadir Khan decided to attack Thal. On the night of May 28-29, the Afghans occupied a 500-yard tower from the fort and fired several food dumps (Singer, Andre 1984). This made the situation worse because the supply rate was still poor. Other causes also influenced the British. The force of Eustace was overstated and outcast. His four battalions were inexperienced Indian units, primarily young recruits, and he had not received regular British infantry. After the May 29 attacks, the next day, the garrison was heavily bombed by Afghans (Singer, Andre 1984). The British had then agreed to have the seventeenth Infantry Division, consisting of the 45th and 46th Briga Infantry Divisions (Wilkinson-Latham, Robert 1998).

Though part of the division was segregated to protect Kohat under Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer, it was set out to relieve the strength of Eustace at Thal. Dyer's Army consisted of only one British battalion, the 1st/25th London Regiment, and Dogras, Punjabis, and Gurkhas, and they were compelled to march through extreme heat without transport. Despite circumstances, however, under Dyer's command, the British and Indian troops rose on occasion, covering the last 18 miles (29 km) in less than 12 hours, and ended up running into a group of tribesmen on June 1 that stopped approaches from both north and south. Dyer attacked both ends with artillery and ordered his troops to approach the south. The tribe members could not combat the attack, and the road to Eustace's garrison was cleared. The British had 94 casualties during the

siege, and 82 were injured (Wilkinson-Latham, Robert 1998).On June 2, Dyer's Brigade launched an attack on the Afghan regulars, who were deployed on the West of Thal, and as a result of this attack, Nadir Khan sent a message to the commander of the Brigade. The letter told Dyer that Amir Amanullah had ordered Nadir Khan to end hostilities. Nadir Khan asked Dyer to consider the request for an armistice submitted by Amanullah to the British Indian administration (Barthorp, Michael 2002). On June 3, two platoons from 1st/25th London and the 37th Lancers soldiers, assisted by an 89th Battery, captured the Afghan camp at Yusef Khel and a short time later, the armistice was signed, and a ceasefire was agreed upon on both sides. However, some fights persisted, particularly in Chitra and Northern Baluchistan, and the resolution finally called for a total ceasefire on August 8, 1919, when the Rawalpindi Treaty was signed (Ewans, Martin 2002, Robson, Brian. 2007).

After the end of the Third Anglo-Afghan War in August 1919, Afghanistan declared independence and pursued an independent external policy free of British control. From 1919 until 1929, GhāzīAmānullāhKhān became the first Emir and then, after 1926, King of Afghanistan (Chisholm, Hugh, 1911). His tenure was influenced by drastic political and social reforms, seeking to modernize Afghanistan on Western designs. He failed to succeed because of the opposition to his social reforms by Habibullah Kalakani and his supporters (Alikuzai, Hamid Wahed 2013). On January 14, 1929, as the Afghan Civil War escalated, Amanullah fled and escaped to neighbouring British India. He moved from British India to Europe, where he died in 1960 after 30 years in Exile in Italy (still apparently, according to the British Encyclopedia, Amānullāh Khan would have died in Zurich, Switzerland). His body was taken to Afghanistan, and in Jalalabad, he was buried (Steele, Jonathan, 2011; Robson, Brian. 2007; Kaplan, Robert D. 1990).

The Saur Revolution, also known as the Sowr Revolution or April Revolution, was a self-proclaimed revolution led by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan against President Daoud Khan. The unrest brought about the making of an administration with Nur Muhammad Taraki as President (Rubin, Barnett R. 2002). Daud Khan and most of his family members in this revolution were killed.

Saur or Sower is the term in Dari (Persian) used for the second month of the Persian calendar. This month, the revolt took place. PDPA chief Hafizullah Amin directed the coup, and in June 1978, Amin claimed, at a press conference in New York, that the incident was not a coup but the will of the people's revolution. The coup resulted in heavy fighting and numerous deaths (BBC News 1984, Steele, Jonathan 2012).

In April 1978, Left-Wing Military Officers led by Nur Mohammad Taraki overthrew Afghanistan's centrist Mohammad Daud Khan regime. Power was eventually shared by the People's Party (Khalq) and Parcham Party — who had originated from an association, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan before — and met in an uneasy alliance just before the coup (Rubin, Barnett R. 2002). The new administration, which had little public assistance, forged close relations with the Soviet Union, began brutal purges of all domestic dissent and started wide-ranging land and social reforms, which devoted Muslims bitterly resented and predominantly anti-communist citizensInsurgents emerged from both tribal and urban communities against the government (Dupree, Louis 2014). They were known as the "jihad-

mujahideen." The uprisings, along with internal warfare and government coups between the People's and Parcham forces, led the Soviets to invade the region, deploying some 30,000 troops and toppling Hafizullah Amin's short-lived presidency (Ansary, Tamim 2012). The Soviet operation's goal was to advance its modern but fading client state, led by Parcham leader BabrakKarmal, but Karmal could not gain significant public support. The Mujahideen uprising, backed by the United States, expanded and spread through every part of the country. Initially, the Soviets abandoned the Afghan Army with the rebellion, but it was besieged by mass desertions that were largely ineffective during the whole war (Thompson, Larry Clinton 2012).

Declaration of Independence

Amir Habibullah Khan was assassinated in a coup led by his son Amanullah Khan, and Amanullah Khan became King. He declared independence after coming to power, and the third Afghan-British war began in May 1919, known as the War of Independence (Prashad, Vijay 2001. As a result of this war, negotiations took place between the Afghan and British delegations, and the British recognized Afghanistan's independence within the current borders under the Treaty of August 8, 1919[8].

After coming to power, Amanullah Khan recognized the communist regime in force in the Soviet Union and twice sent letters to Lenin praising his rule. The former Soviet Union was the first country to recognize Afghanistan's independence. On February 28, 1921, the first treaty of so-called neutrality and non-aggression with the government of Amanullah Khan. The communists later considered the treaty a turning point in the history of Afghanistan's relations with the Soviet Union (Adamec, Ludwig W. 2012, Jonathan Steele 2011). Although the Russians violated the treaty by occupying the Muslim cities of Bukhara and Khiva, the Afghan government did not object. The new King wrote letters to the United States, France, Japan, Iran, Turkey, and other countries, recalling his accession to the throne as the independent King of Afghanistan (Chisholm, Hugh, 1911).

Two months after coming to power, Amanullah Khan abrogated the 1879 treaty that had made Afghanistan dependent on British foreign affairs, leading to the Third Afghan-British War (1919)[9]. In 1927, at the official invitation of Italy, Amanullah Khan, while saying goodbye at the Foreign Ministry Palace in the presence of government employees, students, and education officials of Afghanistan, stated the following: Remember to defend your homeland and be a united nation, do not be under the rule of an authoritarian ruler, listen to my instructions and do not believe in superstitions, because some foolish mullahs have made religion a chain for you and the things they tell you are wrong and deceive you, act according to the commands of God and His Prophet, do not believe what the mullahs say, work with women with patience and compassion, you are all from the same country and with you are brothers, women like you have the right and they are human beings, do not take more than one wife and send your children to school "[10]. The statement marks the transformation of the mind of a traditional king into a modern one. This statement was able to create significant differences in the internal and

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[8] History of Afghanistan's Political Relations from the Time of Amir Abdul Rahman Khan to Independence, by Ludwig Adamak, translated by Ali Mohammad Zahma, p. 145

[9] Analysis of Political Events in Afghanistan (1919-1996), Author: Abdul Hamid Mobarez, p. 185

[10] Afghanistan in the 1920s and 1930s, by Viktor GrikovichCargon, translated by Jalaluddin Siddiqui, p. 231

external political developments of Afghanistan and was a kind of political awakening for the citizens of Afghanistan (Barthorp, Michael 2002).

Amanullah Khan returned home on June 20, 1928, after six months and ten days. In Kandahar, the Shah told the people of Kandahar: "I did not go to Europe for luxury and enjoyment, but I went to seek the path of progress and excellence of the country; I sacrifice everything for the improvement and excellence of the country (Wilkinson-Latham, Robert 1998, Barthorp, Michael 2002).

In many cases, Amanullah Khan prepared the means to weaken his government. Although necessary, many of Amanullah's reforms were premature, and the nation was not ready to accept them. Opponents of Amanullah Khan also considered Amanullah Khan's actions a suitable means of overthrowing him and using his untimely moves. The first popular uprising began in Paktia province (Alikuzai, Hamid Wahid 2013. Later, in Scorpio 1307, the people of Shinwar in the east protested and declared opposition to this uprising. It was learned that the ulema issued fatwas of infidelity and revolt against Amanullah Khan, and the revolution spread throughout the country (Robson, Brian. 2007). In the northern provinces, people gathered around Habibullah Kalkani and prepared to attack Kabul, while people were moving towards Kabul from all sides. Habibullah Kalkani was soon able to encircle Kabul. He proclaimed the kingdom in January 1929, and Amanullah Khan fled to Kandahar (Rubin, Barnett R. 2002).

Amanullah Khan, a contemporary of Ataturk in Turki country, and Reza Shah from Iran, like them, became fascinated by the appearance of Western civilization and took a series of actions contrary to Islamic and national rites to civilize Afghan Society. The discovery of the hijab, the forced wearing of European clothes, the raising of hats instead of greetings in everyday encounters, opposition to religious scholars, etc., were the things that led to the uprising of the people and the overthrow of the government of Amanullah Khan (Steele, Jonathan 2012).

King Habibullah Kalkani, known as the "Custodian of the Religion of the Messenger of God," succeeded Amanullah Khan, but his reign did not last more than nine months and three days. Nader Khan, the father of King Zahir, who was Afghanistan's ambassador to France at the time of the fall of Amanullah Khan, entered India with his brothers at the time, which was under British occupation, with the help of Pakistani Pashtuns and British officials (Dupree, Louis 2014). He entered this country and overthrew the government of Habibullah Kalkani by inciting and mobilizing the Pashtuns (Ansary, Tamim 2012). King Nader was assassinated by a student named Abdul Khaliq Hazara after four years in power. Abdul Khaliq supported Ghulam Nabi Khan Charkhi, whom Nader Khan had previously executed[11].

During the reign of King Mohammad Zahir

After King Nader, his son Mohammad Zahir became King of Afghanistan, but due to his young age, power passed to his uncle, Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan, who was in charge. Hashem Khan sought to expand relations with the Western world. At the earliest opportunity, in March 1936, a treaty of friendship was signed between the Government of Afghanistan and the Government of the United States. Subsequently, on September 7 of the same year, the Treaty

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[11] Afghanistan Stage the Great Game, Author: Abdul Jalil Wajdi, Translation: Samiullah Tazeh, p. 220

of Neutrality and Non-Aggression between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union was renewed for the third time. In 1947, after the establishment of Pakistan, Zahir Shah called for the autonomy of the Pashtuns across the Durand Line in Pakistan, which led to a dispute between King Zahir and his uncle Mohammad Hashim Khan. Mohammad Hashim Khan, who opposed the Pashtunistan issue, was removed from the presidency, and his brother, Shah Mahmud Khan, was appointed to the post (Adamec, Ludwig W. 2012). Shah Mahmud Khan also called for the autonomy of the Pakistani Pashtuns, resulting in Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan deteriorating. In the border clashes between the two countries, Pakistan bombed the border areas of Afghanistan. The limited democracy of the press proclaimed during the reign of King Mahmud Khan paved the way for the growth of left-wing and communist political groups. The groups "Wish Zalman" (Awake Youth), Khalq and Vatan were formed during this period. Noor Mohammad Taraki was the first head of the communist regime and a member of the Wish Zalmian group. The Khalq and Watan political groups were led by Dr. Mahmoudi and Mir Gholam Mohammad Ghobar (Clements, Frank 2003).

During the reign of King Mahmud Khan, his nephew Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan worked against him and collaborated with leftist groups. Willingly or unwillingly, he acted as a lever against the monarchy to prevent Afghanistan from approaching the West (Larry P. Goodson 2011). There was also a political rally at Kabul University called the Students' Union, in which the Communists, especially BabrakKarmal and Hassan Sharq, played a significant role.

In addition, there was opposition to the monarchy among the intelligentsia outside the court, which was severely repressed. However, the leftists continued their activities against King Mahmud Khan (Kaplan, Robert D. 1990). The first street demonstrations led by Karmel and other leftists in protest of Mahmoudi and Ghobar's defeat in the eighth parliamentary elections on March 20-1931, in Kabul led to the arrest of Ghobar, Mahmoudi, and several others, and finally, King Mahmud Khan. He was removed from the presidency and was replaced by Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan.

With the coming to power of Mohammad Daud, political unrest reigned again, and the relative freedom of expression and the press disappeared. Still, the organization and growth of leftist and communist groups were not prevented. In his first radio statement, Dawood again raised the issue of Pashtunistan, which had subsided, and demanded its release. Thus, the Cold War between Afghanistan and Pakistan intensified, eventually leading to border clashes between the two countries. Pakistan cut off the transit of goods to Afghanistan, but the Russians seized the opportunity in April 1955 to sign a transport agreement with the Afghan government and rely on the country's foreign trade (Prashad, Vijay 2001).

Excessive Russian influence in Afghanistan's economic, military and political life led King Zahir to seek to improve relations with Pakistan and the United States to maintain a balance in Afghanistan's relations. On December 15, 1956, two Kremlin leaders, Bulganin and Khrushchev, arrived in Kabul and provided a $ 120 million loan to Dawood Khan's government to support Afghanistan's position on the Pashtunistan issue. Afghanistan's five-year economic plan was also implemented under the supervision of Soviet experts and with the help of that country. In 1957, the United States announced its willingness to cooperate with the Afghan government by allocating $ 1.6 million to establish Kabul University. Despite such efforts to

improve relations with Pakistan and the United States, Mohammad Daud Khan again raised the issue of Pashtunistan in 1961, and relations between the two countries soured. Eventually, internal strife and rivalries between the royal family and social and political problems led to the resignation of Dawood Khan (The Guardia, 2011).

After Dawood Khan, Dr Mohammad Yusuf, Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal, Noor Ahmad Etemadi, Dr Abdul Zahir, and Mohammad Musa Shafiq formed the cabinet by order of King Zahir. During Dr. Yusuf's presidency, a new constitution was drafted by order of the King in 1963, which provided freedom of the press and political activity. With the use of the new form, on October 25, 1965, demonstrations were organized in Kabul, where the Communists played a significant role. Demonstrators gathered around parliament to attend a vote of confidence in the cabinet, which was dispersed by security forces, and one person was killed in the clashes. The communists later celebrated that day every year as the "Third Aqrab month." After the third Aqrab incident, Dr Yousef resigned and was replaced by Mohammad Hashem Maiwandwal. But student demonstrations in Kabul continued to provoke the communists, and Maiwandwal resigned due to illness. Noor Ahmad Etemadi returned to Maiwand Wall, and during his time, protests and convulsions continued at Kabul University, and the country's economic situation became critical due to the drought. Etemadi also failed to resolve financial and social crises and withdrew. Dr. Abdul Zahir was appointed to form the cabinet, but he did not do anything and resigned. Eventually, Mohammad Musa Shafiq became the Prime Minister of Afghanistan. Under Shafiq, the internal crisis subsided, and his government sought to improve relations with the West and neighbouring countries. Thus, the issue of Helmand water, which was in dispute between Iran and Afghanistan, was resolved with the visit of the then Iranian Prime Minister Abbas Hoveyda to Kabul, which upset the communists and extremist nationalists (Dupree, Louis 2014).

The coup of Dawood Khan and the establishment of the republic

Less than a year after the rule of Musa Shafiq, Mohammad Daud Khan overthrew the monarchy in a military coup with the help of the communists on July 17, 1973, and declared a republic instead. In Dawood Khan's cabinet, the Communists initially participated more than the People's Democratic Party's flag. Early in Muhammad Daud Khan's presidency, many Soviet dissidents and pro-Moscow communists in Afghanistan were suppressed; The logo of the Afghan flag was changed to an eagle instead of an altar and pulpit (Arnold, Anthony 1985).

The issue of border disputes with Pakistan was also raised again, and the Afghan Foreign Minister declared the Durand Line border between Pakistan and Afghanistan invalid. These moves by Mohammad Daud's government provoked opposition inside and outside Afghanistan to the extent that Pakistan and domestic opposition political groups sought to overthrow his government (Edwards, David 2002). In this regard, several coups were planned, most of which were discovered and thwarted. The most significant open-armed movement was carried out on July 23, 1975, by followers of the Muslim Brotherhood movement led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in Panjshir, Laghman, and Logar, which was severely repressed (Dil, Shaheen 1977).

Communist coup

The extremism and growing demands of Mohammad Daud's communist comrades darkened their relations with him until Daud Khan gradually removed the communists from the cabinet. Under these circumstances, Dawood Khan turned to the West and travelled to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran (Dupree, Louis 2014). In the last days of his rule, he arrested the leaders of the two factions of the Communist Party (Khalq and Parcham) on conspiracy charges against his regime to try them. Still, the Communists did not spare him and staged a bloody coup on May 27, 1978 (Arnold, Anthony 1985). They launched. As a result of this coup, Dawood and his family were killed, and his regime was overthrown. The communists came to power in Kabul. Noor Mohammad Taraki, the leader of the Khalq's Party, was proclaimed head of state, prime minister, secretary-general of the Khalq's Democratic Party, chairman of the Revolutionary Council, and deputy prime minister. The Taraki regime launched a violent and brutal struggle against Islam, Afghanistan's Muslim nation, and all Soviet opposition. It killed many people, including clerics, university professors, students, and scientists (The New York Times, 1973).

On the other hand, internal divisions between the two factions of the party, the People's Party led by Taraki and the Parcham Party led by Karmal, who had formed a coalition under Russian pressure to overthrow Dawood Khan, escalated again. Karmal and her supporters were deported and conspired against The Taraki regime. The opposition of the Afghan people to the communist regime and the internal conflicts of the communists prompted the Russians to take the necessary precautions to protect their interests and influence in Afghanistan. Therefore, to prepare the ground for military intervention, Taraki and Hafizullah Amin were summoned to Moscow, and a treaty was signed with them on December 5, 1978. The Russians were able to intervene militarily in Afghanistan under Article 4 of the treaty (Barfield, Thomas 2012).

The uprising of the Afghan people and the invasion of the Soviet Union

It was not until a few months after the Taraki regime that the people of Afghanistan revolted in different parts of the country (Mukherjee, Dilip 1975). The most critical uprisings were the March 15 uprising in Herat in 1978 and the first uprising in Kabul in 1979 (Marsden, Peter 2009). Thousands were martyred in these uprisings (Adamec, Ludwig W. 2010). The communist regime was in a bad situation under the pressure of popular uprisings. While inside the government, in addition to factional differences (Khalq and the Parcham), Hafizullah Amin and Taraki competed for power. The Russians sought to overthrow Hafizullah Amin in support of Taraki, but Amin succeeded in assassinating Taraki and seizing power (Kamali, Mohammad Hashim 1985). The Russians' relations with Amin soured, but they supported him. At the same time, the United States and Pakistan ignored Amin's green light and left him alone. During the time of Hafizullah Amin, the armed uprising of the people spread, and most of Afghanistan was liberated from the control of the communist regime (Weymouth, Lally 1990). In such a situation, the Russians occupied Afghanistan to overthrow Amin and prevent the fall of the communist government on January 26, 1980. By killing Hafizullah Amin, they brought BabrakKarmal into Afghanistan. Karmal was appointed head of the puppet regime in Kabul and secretary-general of Khalq's Democratic Party, replacing Hafizullah Amin (Goodson, Larry P. 2001). After the occupation of Afghanistan by the invading Soviet Red Army, a

popular uprising spread throughout Afghanistan. The people of Kabul took to the streets on March 24, 1980, chanting "Allah Akbar" and "Death to the Soviet Union," but were brutally shot from the ground and air by the communists, killing hundreds (Hegghammer, Thomas 2011).

The U.N. General Assembly condemned the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the U.N. Security Council, and other international bodies and organizations (Cornwell, Rupert. 2010). The war continued fiercely, with the Russians and their puppet regime trying to suppress the Islamic Resistance and using various military tactics such as the "policy of terror" and chemical weapons using a series of social tricks such as forming the Patriotic National Front. , Forming the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, holding assemblies of tribes and nomads, announcing national reconciliation, etc. (Crile, George 2003). But none of these tricks could strengthen the shaky foundations of the puppet regime.

Due to the failure of the Russians and their puppet regime in Kabul to suppress the Islamic resistance, the indirect Geneva talks that began between the Pakistani government and the Kabul regime on March 25, 1982, under the auspices of the United Nations have been taken seriously by the Russians (Sharma, Raghav 2011). Through which to prepare the ground for the relatively dignified withdrawal of their forces from Afghanistan (Corera, Gordon 2011).

This seriousness arose after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the former Soviet Union. BabrakKarmal was ousted in early 1985 and was replaced by Dr Najib, the head of the Khad (State Security Services Organization). To this end, international negotiations began in Geneva. Finally, after six years and eleven rounds of talks, an agreement was reached on January 16, 1988, between Pakistan and the government of Dr. Najib, and the United States and the former Soviet Union as guarantors and signed fourteen articles. Under Article 4 of the agreement, the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan (Borer, Douglas A. 1999).

Withdrawal of Soviet troops

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988, in Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan and ended on February 6, 1989, after about nine months. Simultaneously with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the interim government of the Seven Mujahideen Alliance was formed in Islamabad under pressure from Pakistani officials. In May 1988, the Mojahedin Advisory Council was formed in Rawalpindi under the auspices of Saudi and Pakistani representatives, appointing Sibghatullah Mujaddedi as head of the interim government. On March 6, 1989, General Shahnavaz Tani, the Minister of Defense of Najib, staged a coup against him, which was defeated. The coup plotters had links with Pakistan and Hezb-e-Islami.

The fall of the communist regime in Afghanistan

The Kabul regime's internal divisions increased daily, and different factions of the Patriotic Party contacted various sections of the Mojahedin. Karmal's supporters pressured Najib to take control of the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif. After Mazar-e-Sharif and Kabul's fall, Dr. Najib announced his readiness to resign and hand over power to an interim government (Nyrop, Richard F.; Seekins, Donald M. 1986). However, Karmal's supporters did not spare him in

cooperation with some jihadist groups. On May 25, 1992, the communist regime fell and prevented Dr. Najib, his rivals in the Patriotic Party, from escaping, and he took refuge on behalf of the United Nations (Isby, David C. (986). The Mujahideen government was formed on February 25, 1992, based on the decision of six leaders of the Seven Alliance: Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan and representative of Saudi Arabia, and Hazrat Sibghatullah Mujaddedi was elected President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan for two months. Mujaddidi stepped down after the deadline, and Mr Rabbani, whose four-month presidency was set, remained in power until the fall of Kabul to the Taliban and the fall of the Taliban in 2001 (Katz, Mark N. March 9, 2011).

The beginning of internal conflicts in Afghanistan

Less than 24 hours after the fall of the communist regime, clashes broke out in Kabul between the forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud, General Dostum, and General Mo'men (two officers of the Parcham party) on one side and Hezb-e-Islami and the Khalq's party of the communist regime on the other. Because of this clash, Hezb-e-Islami and Khalq forces were expelled from Kabul (Goodson, Larry P. 2001). On June 3, 1992, a conflict broke out between Sayyaf's Islamic Union and the Islamic Unity Party, in which Ahmad Shah Massoud (government) forces came to Sayyaf's aid. In January 1992, Rabbani's government formed a council called the "Council of the Settlers." Pro-government council members elected Rabbani as head of the Afghan government for two years (Reuveny, Rafael; Prakash, Aseem 1999). On February 14, 1992, the joint forces of the (Nezar Council), under the command of Ahmad Shah Massoud and the Sayyaf Islamic Union, attacked the Shiite areas of Kabul city like Afshar and Chandawal, massacring people, raping and looting their property. As a result of this rape, about five thousand Shiite families were displaced and homeless (Bennett Andrew 1999).

Clashes between Hezb-e-Islami and Mr. Rabbani's government and between Rabbani's government and Hezb-e-Wahdat-e-Islami continued until a peace agreement between jihadi groups was signed in March 1992 between leaders of rival groups in Islamabad. Under the agreement, Hekmatyar became prime minister; however, the disputes were not resolved. The opponents of Rabbani's government entered the war against the government forces in Kabul in January 1993 with the formation of the "Coordination Council of the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan." The members of the Coordination Council were Hekmatyar's Islamic Party, Dostum National Movement and Vahdat Party (Mazari faction), and the National Salvation Front led by Mr. SebghatullahMojaddedi. The war lasted more than eight days, killed 400 people, wounded 4,000, and displaced more than 80,000 (Burke, Jason 2004, Parker, John W 2009, Bennett Andrew 1999).

The Rise of the Taliban Regime

While the Afghan people, especially the people of Kabul, were on fire between the forces of the Rabbani government and members of the Opposition Coordination Council, the Taliban emerged from the southern Afghan border town of Spin Boldak on October 13, 1994. The group quickly captured Kandahar, south, and Ghazni Afghanistan, as far as Wardak province near Kabul (Zahid Hussain 2007). The Taliban, with which Rabbani's government initially cooperated, occupied Hekmatyar's headquarters in the ChaharAsyab area in February 1994.

After the fall of four mills to the Taliban, the western part of Kabul, controlled by the Shiite forces of Hezb-e Wahdat, came under fire from Ahmad Shah Massoud, Sayyaf, and the Taliban until the Taliban captured Mr. Mazari. Massoud's forces drove the Taliban out of western Kabul and four mills, removing the city from their control. After this victory in Kabul, Ahmad Shah Massoud's forces again turned to Hezb-e-Islami and Hezb-e-Wahdat-e-Islami, fighting Hezb-e-Islami in Sarobi, east of Kabul, and Hezb-e-Wahdat in Bamyan (Ahmed Rashid 2000).

In such a situation, clashes broke out between Herat Governor Ismail Khan and the Taliban in the southwestern region (Graham Usher 2007). After retreating and accepting defeat for the second time, the Taliban advanced rapidly towards the city of Herat and, in September 1995, captured the entire area of southwest Herat. Meanwhile, Bamyan was captured by forces of the Vahdat Party (Khalili faction) (Graham Usher 2007). Rabbani's government, which until then, like the Taliban, had insisted on a military solution, began to negotiate with the opposition after the fall of Herat and Bamyan. These negotiations led to the accession of Hekmatyar's Islamic Party to the Rabbani government in 1996. But Hezb-e-Islami's joining Rabbani's government did not change the balance of power in favour of the government but also paved the way for the Taliban to advance faster. Finally, in September 1996, the city of Kabul fell to the Taliban without resistance, and they went to the Salang Pass and the Panjshir Pass in northern Kabul (Syed Saleem Shahzad 2006).

Opponents of the Taliban felt a serious threat after the fall of Kabul. As a result, three groups of three significant nationalities in Afghanistan came together to form a council called the High Council for the Defense of Afghanistan (Ismail Khan 2004). The members of this council were the Jamiat-e-Islami led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, the National Movement (Junbish Mele) led by Dostum, and the Islamic Unity Party led by Khalili (Ismail Khan and Dilawar Khan Wazir 2004). After the formation of this council, there was some coordination, and the morale of the opposition forces of the Taliban was strengthened (The Daily Telegraph 2006). In October, Massoud's forces ousted Jabal al-Siraj from the Taliban. On the other hand, the people of the northern areas of Kabul revolted against the Taliban, suppressed the Taliban forces, and took more than six hundred captives. But in February 1978, the Taliban again seized the Salang and Ghorband valleys in the Kapisa and Parwan provinces (north of Kabul) (BBC NEWS 2006).

The advancement and defeat of the Taliban in northern Afghanistan

In 1997, significant changes occurred in Afghanistan's political and military arenas. With the joining of General Abdul Malik, one of the commanders and officials of the National Movement, to the Taliban, the northern parts of Afghanistan, from Badghis to Takhar, fell to the Taliban (Rahimullah Yusufzai 2006). The Taliban stationed their forces in Mazar-e-Sharif and cleared the opposition. The people of Mazar-e-Sharif rose against the Taliban, and Abdul Malik, whom the Taliban had unloved, took the opportunity to fight the Taliban (Syed Saleem Shahzad 2007). As a result, 3,000 Taliban forces were routed in northern Afghanistan, and many were captured by various groups (Anwarullah Khan 2007). After the defeat of the Taliban in Mazar-e-Sharif, Ahmad Shah Massoud's forces advanced towards Kabul, capturing the essential military airport of Bagram and the city of Charikar, the capital of Parwan province. This progress was rapid and unexpected, and it was thought that the city of Kabul would fall if

it continued. But Massoud's forces stopped 20 kilometres from the town (Zulfiqar Ghumman 2006).

With the defeat of the Taliban in northern Kabul and their repression in the parts of the north of Afghanistan, the opposition rallied under the "United Islamic and National Front of Afghanistan." It declared Mazar-e-Sharif the interim capital of Mr. Rabbani's government. In the new cabinet headed by Mr. Ghafoorzi, the post of Interior Minister was transferred to the Vahdat Party (Khalili faction), and the seat of Foreign Minister was moved to the National Movement. But it was not long before Mr. Rabbani's prime minister, Ghafoorzi, was killed in a plane crash in Bamyan, along with several high-ranking members of the Islamic Unity Party and the Jamiat-e-Islami (Ihtasham ul Haque.2007). The Taliban again mobilized their dispersed forces in Kunduz with the help of Bashir Baghlani, one of the commanders of Hekmatyar's Islamic Party. In September 1997, they conquered the Khulm district and the Sheberghan Strait area of Mazar-e-Sharif and captured the city's airport. The attacks of the Taliban forces on the town of Mazar-e-Sharif were repulsed by the resistance of the people from any group, and they were forced to retreat (Jacob, Happymon 2006).

Meanwhile, General Dostum, who had fled to Turkey, entered Afghanistan through Uzbekistan. He was instrumental in suppressing the Taliban in the border town of Hairatan and the Balkh and Chamtal districts. It is noteworthy that my general Dostum had taken refuge in Turkey after the conspiracy of Malik and the Taliban and the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif. Dostum's return intensified the differences in the national movement and the united front. Despite his commitment to accept the status quo, under which General Malek was the leader of the national movement and foreign minister, Dostum purged Abdul Malik's supporters and occupied areas under his control (Kamal, Matin-ud-Din. 1991).

Dostum's other problem was with the Interior Ministry Mohaqiq, which controlled the city of Mazar-e-Sharif (Magnus, Ralph, H. Naby, Eden., 1998). Dostum killed Mohaqiq forces in the border town of Hairatan and tried to take control of Mazar-e-Sharif but failed. The Taliban's military failure has hampered the efforts of its delegation sent to the United States and Europe to seek international recognition (Maley, William 2001). The State Department even announced that it had closed the Afghan embassy in Washington to prevent the Taliban from gaining control of the country. However, U.S. diplomats contacted the Taliban, and the US-based company Unicall opened an office in Kandahar to pursue a Central Asian oil and gas pipeline project through Afghanistan (Marsden, Peter. 1999).

Fall to the north and the Hazara areas of Afghanistan.

In April 1998, joint efforts were launched by the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to resolve the Afghan crisis. U.N. Secretary-General's Special Representative Lakhdar Abrahimi travelled to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asia to discuss Afghanistan. The Taliban did not attend a meeting in Turkmenistan with opposition groups. Still, they came under pressure from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to hold talks with representatives of the United Front in Islamabad under the auspices of the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (Matinuddin, Kamal. 1999, Rashid, Ahmed. 2000).

Finally, the talks between the Taliban and United Front representatives were held for the first time in Islamabad on July 2, 1998, but ended after six days. The Taliban launched a heavy offensive in Badghis, northwestern Afghanistan, when members of the United Front were burning amid internal strife. General Dostum's operation against Abdul Malik and the defeat of Abdul Malik severely weakened the national movement. The city of Maimana, the capital of Faryab province, fell on 4/21/1998, and the Taliban continued their advance toward the city of Mazar-e-Sharif. The city of Mazar-e-Sharif fell on 5/17/1998, and the towns of Pul-e-Khumri, Taleqan, and other areas were captured by the Taliban Tanner (Stephen 2002, Zeef, AbdulSalam,2010 Ahady, Anwar-ul-Haq. 1995).

Immediately after the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif, the consulate of the Islamic Republic of Iran in that city was attacked, and ten Iranian diplomats were killed. The Taliban captured 35 Iranian drivers but said they were unaware of the fate of the diplomats. The hostage-taking of Iranian nationals created a severe crisis in the Islamic Republic of Iran's relations with Pakistan and the Taliban (Rashid, Ahmed. 1999). Iran's political and propaganda efforts led international organizations, particularly the U.N. Security Council and most countries worldwide, to condemn incitement to war, genocide, hostage-taking, and the killing of Iranian diplomats by the Taliban (Burnas, F. John 1996).

While the Taliban were being condemned worldwide and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps conducted military exercises near the Afghan border, the Taliban attacked Hazarajat (Hazara area). They captured Bamyan to advance to other places in the provinces (Burnas, F. John., 1995). On the other hand, Pakistan tried to get the Taliban government recognized by the United Nations. Still, contrary to Pakistan's expectations and the Taliban's expectations, a global consensus was reached against the group, so not only did the U.N. not recognize the Taliban government, but also Saudi Arabia expelled one of the Taliban supporters and one of the three countries that recognized them, expelled the Taliban ambassador and recalled its envoy from Kabul (Graham Usher 2007). (Ahmed Rashid 2000).

Eventually, international pressure and political activities were forced to hand over the bodies of Iranian diplomats in two stages after identifying them and gradually releasing Iranian prisoners (Chapman, Graham, P.C.2009).

The fall of the Taliban and the formation of the government of Hamid Karzai

The presence of Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, exposed the Taliban to the international community (Davis, Anthony, 2001). The United States accused bin Laden of plotting to bomb its embassies in Africa in 1998 and the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York. The Taliban's support for Osama bin Laden prompted the United Military movements of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Taliban invaded Afghanistan (Gohari, M. J. 2000). On October 7, 2001, the United States and Britain launched heavy missile and air strikes on Afghanistan. Kabul's city fell with the Taliban's escape on November 14, 2001. With the fall of the Taliban, Mr. Rabbani's government was re-established in Kabul (Dupree, Louis. 1980).

A brief look at the history of elections in Afghanistan before 2001

Elections are of great importance in Islam. At the beginning of Islam, after the death of the Holy Prophet of Islam in the sanctuary of Bani Saadeh, the council appointed Hazrat Abu Bakr Siddiq (R.A.) as the first caliph of the Muslims, which is often compared to today's elections. However, the components of democracy and elections in their new sense are derived from Western political thought and the age of modernity and have become increasingly universal. Today, in many countries, they are considered a reference for governments' political legitimacy. Countries that emphasize religious and religious political legitimacy have succumbed to elections (Griffin, Micheal. 2001).

According to one of the well-known intellectuals and thinkers, the people's election and election of rulers is one of the fruits of European modernity. The age of modernity changed the political thought of Europeans; political legitimacy came down from the sky, government and politics, according to one philosopher, were disenchanted, the concept of citizenship was formed, and politicians were elected. Democracy and elections have become so universal that even the dictators of Central Asia and Latin America now claim to be selected and hold rigged elections. Many religious fundamentalist groups in the Middle East have also embraced electoral democracy. The Muslim Brotherhood (Ekhwan-al-Muslmin) in Egypt has accepted the election. The ruling regime in Iran has elected officials. Turkish religious politicians have come to power through elections and derive their legitimacy from the polls. One of the demands of intellectuals and intellectual and political movements in Afghanistan has been to hold elections and elect high-ranking government officials. The first and second constitutional movements demanded limiting the King's power and establishing parliamentary democracy (Afghanistan Overview, World Bank 2019).

The first constitution, which formalized elections, was adopted during Amanullah Khan's reign, who was also a member of the second constitution. The body was implemented, but Amanullah Khan could not hold elections.[12] The second constitution was approved during the reign of Mohammad Nader Khan in 1922. This law was constitutional, but the country's powers were divided between the King and the clergy. According to Articles 27 to 70 of this constitution, the National Assembly consists of two parliaments. The National Assembly and the House of Lords were formed (Callen, M. and Long, J.D., 2015). The National Assembly had 116 members, elected by male citizens over twenty, one from each province and two from Kabul. Also, in 1930, the principles of a letter were written for the election of members of the National Assembly and Provincial Councils, but the polls were not held in the true sense of the word. With the assassination of King Nader, his son King Zahir came to power, and his period has been called by historians the first democracy or the practice of democracy because the King and Prime Minister Mahmud Dawood Khan, in their statements aimed at establishing democracy, political and civil liberties, elections and the free press. During this period, intellectuals started newspapers, formed political organizations, and held the first relatively democratic elections(Sharan, T. and Heathershaw, J., 2011). Therefore, scholars such as Dr. Abdul Rahman Mahmoudi and Mir Gholam Mohammad Ghobar from Kabul, Gol PachaUlfat

[12]Uruzgani, Masih, "History of National Assembly Elections in Afghanistan", New Discourse, Second Year, Fifth Issue, Spring 2005, p. 66

from Jalalabad, Mohammad Karim Nazihi from Andkhoy, Salahuddin Saljuqi from Herat, Abdul Hai Habibi from Kandahar, Seyyed Mohammad Dehqan from Badakhshan formed a council of provinces. It is said that it was the best period in the history of the country's parliaments[13] (Darnolf, S. and Smith, S.S., 2019).

The members of the eighth parliament were appointed by the government, during which there was no secret or written ballot. The ninth and tenth parliaments were formed during the reign of Dawood Khan. Dawood Khan did not allow elections during his ten years as prime minister. A new constitution was written with the end of Dawood Khan's pre. The form at the time of stridency in 1964 stated that no one from the royal family had the right to become prime minister or run for parliament (Loyn, D., 2019). This paved the way for relatively transparent elections. With the passage of the new constitution in 1964, the twelfth parliament was formed in 1965, and the parliamentary elections that year were pretty evident[14].

Representatives of political parties entered the parliament; for the first time, four women entered parliament: Anahita Ratbzad and Roqayeh Abu Bakr from Kabul, Masoumeh Esmati from Kandahar, and Khadijeh Ahrari from Herat were the female representatives of the then parliament. In late 1969, the thirteenth parliament was formed (Rasmussen, A., Reher, S. and Toshkov, D., 2019). In general, the twelfth and thirteenth terms can be considered the most critical parliaments of the country in terms of the involvement of members of the Wolesi Jirga in the structure of government and power and putting pressure on the Prime Minister and forming cohesive and active forces such as the People's Party and the Flag. The decade of democracy ended with the white coup of Dawood Khan in 1973, and the parliament was dissolved. However, the 1976 constitution of Dawood Khan provided for a parliament called the "National Jirga," a parliament, and this law did not reach the implementation stage at all. In 1988, during Najibullah's rule, the National Assembly reopened after a 14-year hiatus with two houses (the Wolesi Jirga and the Senate), and elections were held to elect members of parliament[15].

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Chapter 3

Afghanistan in Post-Taliban era, Governance, Constitution, and U.S. Policy

Introduction

Afghanistan entered a new phase of governance after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, and the international community, especially the United States, has sought to establish a democratic government in Afghanistan. The transformation of the traditional institution of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan into the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has not been an easy task. It has undergone significant changes over the last two decades. Afghans have always made their most important political decisions outside their capital as an old and bitter tradition. Yaqoob Khan once signed the Treaty of Gandmak with the British envoy Louis Kenari in 1879 in a remote village in northern India. The representatives of Amanullah Khan and the British Empire signed the "Peace Treaty" after winning it (Katzman & Thomas). Afghanistan signed independence in Rawalpindi. The Mujahidin leaders also signed the "Peshawar Agreement" in 1992, which was supposed to be a document for the division of power and a guarantor of peace in Pakistan. Still, before the colour of their signature dried on paper, the smoke of their war rose in Kabul. Disillusioned Afghan politicians finally met in Germany in 2001. They signed the Bonn Agreement to lay the foundations for a country that respects democracy, peace and the rights of women and minorities after decades of violence and war.

On December 13, 2001, after nine days of debate, the participants in the Bonn Summit in Germany signed a two-stage agreement that laid the groundwork for a new system after 20 years of civil war in Afghanistan. Under this historic agreement, key figures and groups involved in Afghanistan agreed to establish a six-month interim government and deploy international peacekeepers to help ensure security in Afghanistan after years of instability. The agreement was signed by various factions participating in the meeting, from the United Northern Front to other jihadist groups and supporters of Mohammad Zahir Shah.

The Bonn Agreement effectively addressed one of the most controversial political issues in Afghanistan over the previous three decades, which included partitioning political power and initiating a new process in Afghanistan by electing Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun jihadi figure, as temporary president. The participants of the UN Conference on Afghanistan in Bonn, Germany, which the UN Secretary-Special General's Representative attended, were committed to putting an end to the tragedy in Afghanistan and achieving long-term peace, stability, national rebuilding, and respect for human rights (Riphenburg, 2005). The provisions of the Bonn agreement are discussed below;

 A) General provisions:

 1. The Provisional Organization shall be constituted at the same time as the formal transfer of power on December 22, 2001.

2. The Provisional Organization shall consist of the Provisional Government, its Chairman, an Independent Commission for the formation of the Emergency Loya Jirga and the Supreme Court of Afghanistan, and other tribunals established by the Provisional Government. In addition, the government's composition, duties, and bylaws are set out in this agreement.

3. The interim government should be the agent of Afghan rule at the same time as the transfer of power. In this interim period, Afghanistan should be represented in foreign relations, and a unique seat should be allocated to Afghanistan in the UN Special Agency and other international institutions and conferences.

4. With the formation of the Transitional Organization by the Loya Jirga, the Provisional Organization is dissolved.

5. The Constitution shall constitute the Loya Jirga within 18 months after establishing the Transitional Organization to create a new constitution for Afghanistan. At the same time, to assist the Loya Jirga in enacting a form, the transitional government must establish a constitutional commission with the assistance of the United Nations within two months of its inauguration (Riphenburg, 2005).

B) Legal framework and judicial system:

1- Until the drafting of a new constitution, the following legal frameworks should be used.- The 1964 Statute to the extent that its provisions do not contradict the provisions of the Bonn Agreement, except the provisions relating to the monarchy, the executive, and the legislature mentioned in the statutes - the existing laws and regulations to the extent that this agreement or the legal regulations of the international organizations to which Afghanistan is a party and the provisions of the 1964 constitution stipulated that the interim Reject or approve these laws and regulations, not contradictory.

2. The judiciary of Afghanistan shall be independent and vested in the Supreme Court of Afghanistan and any other tribunal that the Provisional Government may establish. The interim government should set up a judicial commission with the help of the United Nations to rebuild the domestic judicial system based on Islamic principles, international standards, and Afghans' legal rules and traditions.

C) Provisional Government:

1. Composition - The Provisional Government shall consist of one Chairman, five Vice-Chairmen, and 24 other members. Each of these members, except the chairperson, may assume the chairmanship of one of the departments or organizations of the interim government. A person who is a member of the Provisional Government may not simultaneously serve on the Special Independent Commission responsible for the immediate formation of the Loya Jirga. Participants in the UN Conference on Afghanistan asked former Afghan King Mohammad Zahir to head the interim government. Still, he noted that it would be better for a suitable candidate acceptable to the participants to be the head of the provisional government. The participants in the Bonn Conference elected the chairman, deputies, and other interim government members. These individuals were selected from the list submitted by the participants based on their professional and ethical competencies, taking into account the

ethnic, geographical, and religious context of Afghanistan and the importance of the presence of women.

2. By-laws - The head of the interim government or, during the absence of one of his deputies, must make arrangements for the meetings and their work schedule. The interim government should try to make decisions using a majority of votes. At least 22 members must be present for each decision; if a vote is required, most members must be current and vote. When the votes are equal, the chairperson must make the final decision.

3. The Provisional Government will run the country daily and have the power to govern in Afghanistan's best interests. A leader leads interim governments and, if that leader is unavailable, by one of his deputies. Department heads must adhere to the interim government's policy in their areas of responsibility. - A transitional administration should be given full ability to issue and distribute money and special withdrawal rights from international financial institutions when power is officially transferred. Afghanistan's interim administration should work with the United Nations to set up a central bank that has full authority over the country's monetary reserves. The head of state or his deputies must propose, and the two-thirds majority of the members must approve suspending this individual. With the help of the United Nations, the Interim Government should be able to set up an Independent Municipal Services Commission to offer future Interim and Transitional Organizations shortlists of candidates for critical public office jobs and rulings. Human rights should be overseen and investigated, and the interim government should develop internal human rights institutions with aid from the United Nations. The Interim Government may also set up commissions to deal with issues not covered by the Bonn Agreement with the help of the United Nations. Temporary government officials must follow international norms for ethics. It should be grounds for expulsion if a member of the temporary administration fails to follow these ethical guidelines. As time goes on, the United Nations will help clarify the responsibilities and powers of the members of the Provisional Government. (Goodson, 2005).

D) Independent Commission for the formation of the Emergency Loya Jirga:

1- This commission must be recognized one month after the formation of the interim government. This commission has 21 members, some of whom must have sufficient expertise in the constitution and common law field. These members will be selected from a list presented by participants in the Bonn Summit, Afghan civil society, and professional groups. The United Nations will be assisting in establishing this Commission and its Secretariat.

2. The Commission shall have the absolute authority to determine the number of members of the Emergency Loya Jirga. The commission prepares laws and bills related to the following issues: Criteria for allocating seats to resident and non-indigenous people in Afghanistan; Criteria for giving seats to Afghan refugees of Pakistan and Iran and other parts of the world; Criteria for civil-society organizations and prominent personalities such as Muslim Scholars and Businessmen at home and abroad (Rubin, 2004a). The commission ensures that women and other segments of Afghan society are considered when appointing members of the Loya Jirga.

3. The IndependentCommission is responsible for publishing and distributing the rules and regulations for the formation of the Loya Jirga, together with the date of commencement of its work and location. The applicant prepares and performs in the Loya Jirga. This is done to ensure the accuracy and health of this indirect election. The commission has set up grievance mechanisms and rules for dispute resolution to prevent conflicts between candidates.

4. The Emergency Loya Jirga shall designate the President and approve the proposals for the principal members of the Transitional Government(Rubin, 2004a).

E) Final Provisions:

1-The Afghan Armed Forces and Mujahideen of Afghanistan must come under the supervision of the Provisional Government after the formal transfer of power and operate according to the requirements of the new Afghan Armed Forces and Security Forces.

2- The Afghan Armed Forces and Mujahideen of Afghanistan must come under the supervision of the Provisional Government after the formal transfer of power and operate according to the requirements of the new Afghan Armed Forces and Security Forces. Interim Organization and Emergency Loya Jirga will abide by the fundamental principles and conditions set out in human rights legislation and international humanitarian organizations, of which Afghanistan is a member.

3- Terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime will all be addressed by the Interim Organization in coordination with the international community. Organizations of this kind must aspire to uphold international law while fostering peaceful coexistence with other nations and international organizations.

4- As part of the Provisional Organization and the Special Independent Commission, all Afghan ethnic and religious groups, including women and minorities, would have an equal voice in the Loya Jirga

5- Everything the Interim Organization does must comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1978 (adopted November 14, 2001) and other UN Security Council decisions about Afghanistan. The Provisional Organizations' norms of procedure must be clarified in due time with the aid of the United Nations.

6. With the support of the United Nations, the rules of procedure of the institutions constituted by the Provisional Organizations should be clarified in due time. The Agreement, which is appended as a supplement, was written in English in Bonn on December 5, 2001, and will be preserved as collateral in the United Nations archives. Special Representatives of the Secretary-General will explore translating its official texts into Dari, Pashto, and other languages. (J. A. Thier, 2006).

The basic structures of the Bonn Agreement:

The 2001 Bonn Conference was an institution-building conference for Afghanistan. The text of the Bonn Conference agreement called for establishing basic structures for Afghanistan, creating a stable and inclusive government, and establishing political stability in Afghanistan

(Ponzio, 2007). The Bonn agreement gave the following format for Afghanistan's political system

Interim rule:

Establishing an interim government for Afghanistan's political leadership and organizing the country to transition to stability and democracy was one of the first and most important issues addressed by the participants in the Bonn Conference. In the first paragraph of Article 1 of the General Provisions of the Bonn Agreement, the establishment of an interim government was considered. The participants in the agreement stated that an interim government would be established with official power on December 22, 2001 (Fields & Ahmed, 2001).

The formation of the interim government and the appointment of incumbent President Hamid Karzai were welcomed by various political factions in Afghanistan who understood the people's tiredness of the war. Burhanuddin Rabbani, the then president of the Mojahedin government, whose representatives had signed the Bonn Agreement by attending the conference, established power in the interim government on December 22, 2001, in an official ceremony. Submitted. Burhanuddin Rabbani's handover of power to Hamid Karzai was unparalleled in Afghanistan. This was the first time in the history of Afghanistan that power was transferred - at the highest level - without bloodshed, without coups, without insurgency, and quietly from one authority to another (Simonsen, 2004).

Administrative Reform

In addition to being responsible for concentrating power in Afghanistan, the interim government was mandated under the Bonn Agreement to take on other responsibilities to improve the social and political situation.

Under Article 5 (c) of the Bonn Agreement, the Interim Administration was tasked with establishing a Commission for Administrative Reform with the assistance of the United Nations. The commission was tasked with compiling a list of qualified individuals for critical administrative positions based on their ability and competence, including governors and district governors.

The basis of the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission is the provisions of the Bonn Act. On this basis, President Karzai established this commission in 2003 by issuing a decree. The purpose of establishing this commission is to change the various legal, cultural, managerial, structural, human resources, technical, and capacity dimensions of Afghan civil service organizations to standardize these organizations to provide standard services. Afghanistan's human rights and commitment to it were also one of the issues covered by the Bonn Agreement. Under Article of the Agreement, the Interim Administration was tasked with the assistance of the United Nations to establish the Independent Human Rights Commission, which oversees human rights, investigates human rights abuses, and develops internal human rights associations. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) was established by a decree of the President of Afghanistan in 2003, and it began its work by opening provincial offices in different parts of the country. The result of this commission was decided (Brown, 2005).

The Provisional Government was also required to work for judicial reform. Accordingly, in 2002, the department established the Judicial Reform Commission to work in law drafting, training judicial staff, evaluating the Afghan justice system, and working for reforms in the Afghan justice system. These were some of the tasks of the Afghan government that were performed, at least in appearance and form.

Emergency Loya Jirga

The holding of an emergency Loya Jirga to form the Transitional Authority is the second significant achievement of the 2001 Bonn Conference. The formation of a commission to convene an emergency Loya Jirga and the convening of this jirga to form a transitional government was among the topics committed by the leaders attending the Bonn Conference.

The emergency Loya Jirga, which was held on March 20, 2002, in the Loya Jirga tent hall in Kabul, is one of the most historical events in Afghanistan and one of the positive achievements of Afghanistan. This was because the jirga was valuable. After all, in recent decades, for the first time in Afghanistan's history, more than 1,500 Afghans have been discussing the country's political destiny in a language other than guns (Cottey, 2005).

The number of members of the Emergency Loya Jirga has been announced as one thousand six hundred and fifty-two members who were among the people inside Afghanistan and Afghan immigrants in foreign countries. Of these, 50 were appointed by the head of the interim administration. As the first elected Jirga in Afghanistan, the Emergency Loya Jirga was able to represent different segments of the Afghan nation, including refugees. The presence of Afghan women, in particular, was very significant in this jirga, which also attracted the attention of different countries of the world (A. Thier & Worden, 2017).

Transfer Office

Participants in the Emergency Loya Jirga elected the President of the Transitional Government of Afghanistan. In competition with Dr Masoud Jalal, the head of the interim administration, Hamid Karzai, won more votes in the jirga. The Transitional Administration was the second step toward Afghanistan's transition to democracy and political stability at the Bonn Conference. In the fourth paragraph of Article 1 of the General Provisions of the Bonn Agreement, the Interim Administration was introduced as responsible for the transition of Afghanistan towards stability and democracy. "Within two years of the Loya Jirga being formed, the administration - the transitional administration - will prepare the ground for the establishment of a fully representative government that will be elected as a result of free and fair elections," the section reads. The interim government, designed for six months, aimed to centralize national sovereignty in Afghanistan. Before the establishment of the Provisional Government, Afghanistan witnessed the dispersal of power. Numerous leaders in different parts of Afghanistan could exercise control at their discretion and wage war and peace. The Provisional Government was able to put an end to this problem. The transfer office was to operate on a larger scale. It was responsible for finding ways to achieve peace and stability in Afghanistan. One of the most critical ways could be legitimizing society (Brown, 2007).

Constitution

To achieve the rule of law, the caretaker government was tasked with convening a Loya Jirga to pass a new constitution for Afghanistan. In Article 6 of the General Rules section of the Bonn Agreement, the Transitional Government was required to convene a Loya Jirga within eighteen months of the establishment of the Transitional Authority to ratify the Constitution for Afghanistan. Of course, to avoid facing a legal vacuum in Afghanistan, the 1964 constitution was introduced as the constitution in force in Afghanistan. The strategy envisaged for ratifying the constitution in the Bonn Agreement was for the Transitional Authority to set up a commission to draft the body within two months of its commencement. The United Nations also pledged to assist the Transitional Authority in this regard (J. A. Thier, 2006).

The drafting and adoption of the constitution was an essential step in advancing the nation-building process in Afghanistan, which is one of the critical parts of the Bonn Agreement. The preparation of a joint document as a manifestation of the standard will of all the people of Afghanistan could end the tiredness of the people of the war in Afghanistan.

The Bonn Agreement stipulated that the new constitution would be approved by the Loya Jirga, which would be established within 18 months of the establishment of the Transitional Authority. The same agreement provided for establishing a constitutional commission by the transitional government in cooperation with the United Nations (Rubin, 2004a).

Under these commitments, Hamid Karzai, the head of the transitional government, appointed nine members of the Constitutional Drafting Commission on October 5, 2002. The commission, led by Deputy Prime Minister NematullahShahrani, drafted the initial draft of the constitution and submitted it to the Constitutional Review Commission. The Constitutional Review Commission was formed with 35 members by the head of the Transitional Administration. The commission was tasked with drafting the constitution for submission to the Loya Jirga in consultation with the people. This commission started working in May 2003. The new form was approved in the Loya Jirga, which was held in the severe months of 2003. The protest of Malali Yousafzai, one of the youngest members of the Loya Jirga, over the presence of some past wartime leaders was one of the most controversial debates in the Jirga, which was welcomed and protested by several MPs. Addressing the board, Malali Yousafzai protested the presence of several wartime leaders in the ten-member committee of the Jirga (Sirat, 1968).

The adoption of the constitution was the most critical and final step envisaged for Afghanistan's transition to stability and democracy in the Bonn Agreement. The adoption of the constitution paved the way for holding presidential and parliamentary elections and establishing a sovereign, popular and legitimate government in Afghanistan. In the light of the 2003 constitution, the presidential elections in Afghanistan in 2004 and the parliamentary elections in 2005 were held, and the process of handing over power to the people and nationalizing sovereignty was considered as a ground for achieving stability in the Bonn Agreement, was implemented (Sirat, 1968). Afghanistan witnessed many upheavals during the civil war, one of which was a lack of coordination on a specific issue between jihadi leaders. The question is

why the jihadi leaders, except a few particular people, sat at a negotiating table at the Bonn Conference and reached an agreement on the Bonn Agreement.

Untold Stories of the Bonn Conference

Mohammad Nateqi is a keynote speaker at the December 2001 Bonn Conference. He talks about the Bonn conference, the differences, the debates, the ethnic participation, how Hamid Karzai was elected as the head of the interim administration, and his memories of the conference for the Afghan newspaper HashtSobh (8 am). The Bonn Conference was held in Bonn, Germany, after the fall of the Taliban (1996-2001) to establish an interim administration and form the Afghan government. This conference was one of the most important international conferences on Afghanistan, which was of particular importance to the global community then and was covered by nearly two thousand journalists. During Ramadan, the Bonn meeting was held in one of Germany's oldest and most beautiful hotels, St. Petersburg. They knew that these Afghans were people who ate bread both night and day.

NATO presence in Afghanistan and its remaining problems

Following the 9/11 attacks and the Taliban's disregard for the US request to extradite al-Qaeda leaders to the country, the US military, along with the forces of 11 other countries (mostly NATO members), relied on resolutions in 1973 and 1989 to combat UN Security Council terrorism launched a large-scale invasion of Afghanistan, which resulted in the establishment of the new government of Afghanistan. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Achlas Ben, formed with the presence of political and military forces opposed to the Taliban, was tasked with appointing a successor to the Taliban government. During the transition from the "transitional government" stage to the final stage, when new government structures were built by the new Afghan constitution, the six-month temporary system known as the "Afghanistan Interim Administration" was established. The Bonn Agreement included two annexes: one on security in Afghanistan during the transition phase and another on the United Nations' participation during the interim period. The provisional and transitional administrations until the creation of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and security forces were safeguarded by UN troops according to an annex to the Bonn Agreement. Thus, the party became known as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)(*NATO in Afghanistan 2007*).

In August 2003, NATO effectively took command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Afghanistan is the first to enter NATO outside its traditional territory (Europe and North America). NATO's entry into Afghanistan, although slow and relatively welcomed, continues to face many challenges. From the Americans' point of view (Congressional Research Report), NATO's presence in Afghanistan is a practical test for the organization to test its capabilities in a region outside of Europe and assess its strengths and weaknesses. From the perspective of many countries, NATO's success or failure in Afghanistan is tied to the prestige of the United States and its set of powerful Western nations and their hegemonic system.

The immediate aftermath of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and what was considered a complete defeat for the Taliban. Under the Bonn Agreement, a transitional government was formed in Afghanistan to manage the situation in

the country and establish security. Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement calls on the UN Security Council to deploy an Afghan National Army capable of overseeing the country's security and send troops to Afghanistan to secure Kabul and the surrounding areas. To enable the transitional government to carry out its duties. On December 20, 2001, the Security Council issued Resolution No. 1386, announcing the deployment of multinational forces to Kabul and surrounding areas (Mattelaer, 2011)

Accordingly, in the first phase, ISAF was formed under British command with the help of 18 other countries. Subsequently, on 20 June 2002, by the Security Council resolution, the power of ISAF forces was transferred to Turkey. Then, in February 2003, by UNSC resolution, the leadership of ISAF forces was jointly entrusted to Germany and the Netherlands. Before the transfer of command to Germany and the Netherlands, the two NATO members called on the organization to assist them in carrying out their mission to lead international forces in Afghanistan. To this end, NATO held a conference in support of the two countries, with the approval of Germany and the Netherlands by its Allied Command Europe Headquarters (SHAPE) (Beljan, 2013).

In February 2003, Germany and the Netherlands jointly took over the leadership of ISAF forces, but the problems with the periodic management (six-month periods) of these forces - finding an alternative country that also wanted to lead the troops. ISAF can do so - it has prompted NATO to take command of the staff at the request of the United Nations and the Afghan Transitional Government. On April 16, 2003, the North Atlantic Council approved a plan for NATO support for the International Peacekeeping Force in Afghanistan, allowing the first NATO troops to arrive in Kabul in less than three months. Thus, on August 11, 2003, NATO formally took over the leadership of the ISAF to extend the North Atlantic Treaty Organization beyond its borders.

The NATO-ISAF mission in Afghanistan until October 2003 was limited to Kabul and the surrounding areas. Still, following the talks between Hamid Karzai, the interim President of Afghanistan, and former Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Robertson, and by UN Security Council Resolution 1910, the scope of ISAF's activities extended beyond Kabul to include the whole of Afghanistan. Thus, the mission of NATO forces in the form of ISAF international forces was opened to the entire territory of Afghanistan to cover an area of about 650,000 square kilometres. Strategic control of these forces is the responsibility of NATO's High Command, the European Union Headquarters in Belgium (Morelli, 2009).

 In four phases from 2003 to 2001, NATO expanded its forces throughout Afghanistan and outlined its five-year action plan. The first phase included assessing and preparing troops, which took place during the NATO presence in Kabul. The second phase refers to the NATO deployment throughout Afghanistan, completed in 1996. The final three stages included stabilization, the transfer of power to local authorities, and finally, the withdrawal from the land. (Bowman. S 2010) and the fundamental problems of NATO emerged in the third stage. In a resolution of 1883, September 23, 2008, the Security Council reaffirmed ISAF's leadership of NATO and called on NATO to take steps to ensure security, the rule of law, the promotion of good governance and development, the reform of the judiciary, and the training of police and military forces. And assist local authorities in countering drugs (Morelli, 2009).

Continued insecurity in Afghanistan and its escalation since 2007

Following the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, it was assumed that the situation in the country would lead to political stability. However, subsequent events showed that the Taliban and al-Qaeda were still active in Afghanistan and Pakistan and that terrorism was spreading. In recent years, Taliban attacks have increased in quantity, quantity, quality, and intensity of aggression. Taliban militants have stepped up bombings or suicide bombings. According to a report by the Afghanistan Study Team at the US Presidential Study Center, 2007 was the deadliest year for US and NATO forces (Report of the Afghanistan Study, 2008: 17).

Other reports indicate that the situation is deteriorating. According to a message to the US Congress in 2008, the Taliban's anti-NATO operations have expanded. According to the report, the percentage of terrorist acts against the Afghan people has increased by 30% and against US forces by 40% compared to 2007. The report claims that 2009 was the deadliest year for NATO allies (Morelli, 2009: 2).

At the same time, the existence of different tribes and the gap between them, the dominance of the Pashtun people in the Taliban, the heavy reliance on foreign resources or drugs, and the use of very violent behaviour against civilians, including kidnappings, the use of minors in hostilities, Home searches, etc., have reduced their reputation (2010: 23, Report On Progress Toward). Given that the drug trade is one of the financial sources of insurgent groups, especially the Taliban (about 40% of economic resources and approximately one hundred million dollars) (Morelli, 2009: 14) (subject of counter-narcotics, including job descriptions), ISAF (65: NATO Role) On the other hand since poppy cultivation and opium production are essential sources of income for farmers in some provinces, it must be fought with particular delicacy to cause chaos or unrest. The people did not trust ISAF and the central government, but this issue intensified instead of diminishing.

Given that NATO forces were deployed in Afghanistan after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the goal of ISAF and NATO seemed to be to focus on security stabilization programs and operations and to lay the groundwork for the transfer of power to local elected officials. The deployments of most of the states were commensurate with the security stabilization operation, and they had not received the necessary training for direct combat and field warfare. However, the Taliban and insurgent groups did not leave the battlefield after the initial defeat and, by resorting to terrorist operations, inflicted fatal blows on the US military and then NATO forces. As a result, the war in Afghanistan is not over yet.

The German government emphasized that the deployment of troops from this country should be used in the field of security and training Afghan forces. The British government offered different views. In some cases, he sided with the German government and sometimes agreed to use NATO forces in direct war operations. The French government's statement was in line with the United States. Still, it was also the view of the Socialists that the US government was willing to reduce its forces to move to Iraq in Afghanistan by involving the influences of other states. France has even stated that giving NATO command to US military commanders runs the risk of making NATO a practical tool in US policy (Morelli, 22: 2009).

The US government believed that ISAF forces, like US combat forces, should be involved in offensive operations and combat battles. Still, Canada thought that US combat operations were too violent and resulted in the loss of innocent lives. Therefore, he refused to accompany the American forces. US forces have sometimes attacked villages that are not Taliban strongholds in airstrikes. In July 2007, NATO announced a new policy under which NATO was required to delay operations in areas inhabited by civilians until evacuated, and even in combat operations, even small-scale bombings were possible. Use low destructive power (Financial Times, 2007). In this regard, the US and the Netherlands focused on the rotation of forces in high-risk areas, such as the southern regional command area. Still, other governments were reluctant to move their troops to these areas. Public opinion in all NATO member states was susceptible to the loss of its soldiers in Afghanistan (Morelli, 2009: 21).

Inconsistency between US and ISAF operations

The US military mainly plays the role of attacking the shelters of militant groups and, in some cases, does not have the necessary coordination with the ISAF command. In some cases, this leads to heavy civilian casualties and even disrupts ISAF policies and programs in an area (Ibid, 2005).

Legal restrictions

Many NATO members are sending troops to Afghanistan with restrictions imposed by their legislatures. For example, some government forces are not allowed to move to the south, or some points are restricted from conducting night operations (German forces). Although some states have announced no official restrictions, their powers are traditionally exempted from some missions (Report to Congress: 2009: 30).

At the Riga-Latvia Summit on November 5, the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands, and Canada called on NATO to lift these legal restrictions. The Allies agreed to remove these legal barriers at the Bucharest Summit, but NATO commanded. In Afghanistan, he still suffers from this issue. Countering or attacking Taliban militias promptly requires unity of command and high maneuverability. In practice, it has prevented the execution of successful operations. The French government has taken the lead in removing these restrictions, and Italy and Spain have taken steps (Morelli, 2009: 11). Lack of cooperation of member states in increasing the force.

In every situation and meeting, the NATO Command needed to increase the force of the member states, and the vast majority of governments, due to public pressure, could not adequately respond to this need. Former Secretary of Defense Gates has repeatedly blamed NATO countries for not providing more troops. In December 2007, he announced that 7,500 new troops should be injected into the ISAF body (Morelli, 2009: 18).

As Taliban attacks intensified in 2007 and 2008, NATO Command announced that three times the current size of troops should be sent to Afghanistan. In 2008, Canada threatened to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2009 if other countries did not send troops. Of course, some of the NATO member states have increased their forces, but the vital forces have never been provided. This was the case with former US President Obama's plan to

increase the deployment force with the promise of a complete withdrawal in 2011. The main problem of governments not sending more troops is rooted in the view of the people and NATO member states on the nature of the war in Afghanistan. The sensitivity of governments on the issue of Afghanistan varied. Not all governments are susceptible to the threat of Taliban rule in Afghanistan and the threat of Taliban terrorism to their patriotic security. The conditions for NATO's presence in Kosovo differ from those in Afghanistan. Kosovo was in Europe; the mission was short. It was possible to transfer power to local elected officials in a short time and already had the body and structure of government and governance. Still, Afghanistan is a country the product of at least 20 years of war in West Asia, and consequently, the elimination of the Taliban effectively increases regional power. Iran leads. The fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan must continue in parallel with the construction operation. Support for the Canadian presence in Afghanistan in 2002 was 66 per cent, but in 2007, that figure dropped to 4 per cent (2007 Washington Post). The effort of the George W. Bush administration at the Bucharest Summit was to build a long-term commitment to Afghanistan to NATO allies (2008: 1, strategic Vision ISAF). Although NATO allies have reiterated their long-term commitment to Afghanistan at several meetings, the extent to which this commitment has been adhered to is unclear.

Former US President Barack Obama promised to leave Afghanistan in 2011, which continued until Biden's presidency. We should not forget that the global economic crisis also made NATO countries cautious to avoid getting too involved in issues such as Afghanistan. This situation caused NATO forces in various regions to face a lack of facilities. In some areas, there was a shortage of support helicopters. Route bombing equipment and night-vision devices were among the urgent needs of the NATO-led force throughout Afghanistan, especially in the southern regions, which were in short supply (Morelli, 2009: 34).

Vulnerability of provincial reconstruction teams and failure to deliver on promises

Given that there is no previous model for provincial reconstruction teams, these teams have been formed based on the policy and model of the founding country. There was no clear structure and uniform pattern for these teams' organization and operational activities. Therefore, there was no operational coordination, and the exchange of information between the groups was weak (Report of the Afghanistan Study, 2008: 22).

On August 2, Canada was in charge of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team. Together with Turkey, Germany took over the responsibility of the Northern Region team. On November 7, Turkey established the Wardak Provincial Reconstruction Team and was tasked with carrying out medical, educational, and alternative poppy farming. (Morelli, 2009: 12)

These teams were supposed to establish the foundations of bureaucracy and good governance in different parts of the war-torn country of Afghanistan. Still, the members of the groups were sometimes military and civilian personnel who specialized in one or two areas and could not meet the needs—of diverse backward and primitive regions in all parts of Afghanistan. NATO, on the other hand, is inherently a military organization and was not suitable for performing construction tasks in areas related to industrial and economic infrastructure or cultural and educational institutions, even in the provinces of Afghanistan. These teams comprised military

personnel, civilian personnel from NATO member countries, and Afghan military and administrative forces. Civilians were reluctant to work on military bases because the military was more prone to terrorist attacks. The number of troops of these teams was not enough for the announced goals and programs. NATO civilian personnel were reluctant to be present or provide services in Afghanistan. On September 10, 2008, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates declared that no amount of military force could solve Afghanistan's problems. Afghanistan does not need more boots but more teachers, judges, foreign investment, the rule of law, and good governance. (Statement of Defense Secretary, 2008)

The Afghan police were initially responsible for training the Afghan police. The German trainers claimed that because the Afghan police force was not under the command of German troops, the training was fraught with difficulties. When the Germans failed the police training project, they stated that corruption pervaded the Afghan police force and that the training was useless (International Herald Tribune 1: 2007).

One of ISAF's critical tasks is establishing a proper justice system in Afghanistan. The forces of these teams have not been very successful in developing suitable lawyers for the Afghan social system. The Italian government sought to play a pivotal role in establishing Afghanistan's judicial system. In July 2007, Italy hosted the Rome Conference to organize the judiciary in Afghanistan with the participation of volunteer states. The participating states made many promises, most of which were not fulfilled (2007, Rome Conference on Justice).

Regional system issues and NATO presence in Afghanistan

At the regional level, instability in Pakistan severely overshadowed the ISAF mission (Katzman, 2010). The issue of political instability in Karachi was one of the factors driving the rise of the Taliban in Pakistan's border areas. In July 2008, US forces provided documents to the Pakistani government that Pakistani intelligence and security forces were assisting Afghan militants, particularly the Haqqani sect (Mazzetti, 2008). Since the resignation of Pervez Musharraf, the new Pakistani government has sent troops to the border areas and launched several operations against Taliban forces in its border areas with Afghanistan. In October 2008, the Pakistani government began arming anti-Taliban forces in the north (Washington Post, 2008). Overall, the Pakistani government could not deploy a significant force in the area, as it had to withdraw a substantial portion of its troops from the border with India (2010: 32, Report on Progress). In several joint operations with NATO, the Pakistani government has sought to clear its border areas of militant insurgent groups. In early 2009, the Pakistani government sought to compromise with the Pakistani Taliban so that the Taliban would have the freedom to enforce sharia law in areas under their control (Swat Valley) and instead launch military and terrorist operations against the two Pakistani governments. Afghanistan does not continue. This attempt failed, and the conflict between the Taliban and the Pakistani government continued (Morelli, 2009: 3).

It is impossible to distinguish the Pakistani Taliban from the Afghan Taliban in the current situation. Of course, the geographical conditions of the borders of the two countries and the mountainous areas under the influence of the Taliban eliminated the possibility of complete suppression of these forces. It has even been suggested that the Pakistani government has

virtually no control over the Taliban-held areas. It is noteworthy that the Pakistani Taliban regularly and centrally attacked NATO supply lines in Pakistan. During a decade of NATO presence in Afghanistan, 75% of NATO military and civilian equipment entered Afghanistan through the port of Karachi and after about 900 km from south to north Pakistan, passing through the tribal region and the Khyber Pass. Trucks carrying fuel and ammunition to Afghanistan for food and clothing have always been the target of suicide attacks and bombings. Sabotage on the roads and bridges of these trucks became commonplace and almost irreparable.

In just one attack on a NATO truck convoy in the tribal area alone, about 200 trucks and trailers were set on fire, and their cargo was blown up. The damage to the trucks travelling on this route was such that the Pakistan Truckers Union announced that it would refrain from transporting military goods to Afghanistan. The un-naming of Karachi to the Khyber Pass means that NATO has lost its supply artery in Pakistan and, given the socio-political crisis in Islamabad, is unlikely to be able to provide this vital highway in the medium term. As Pakistan's route became insecure, the Kyrgyz government received $ 100 million in grants, $ 150 million in loans, and $ 300 million in investment opportunities from Moscow, urging the Americans to close Manas Air Base in the north of the country. By leasing its airbase to the Americans for $ 17 million a month, Kazakhstan was the only country that allowed the Americans to use the base to conduct military operations in Afghanistan or supply supplies to Afghanistan without any restrictions. Suppose we consider the deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan today, along with the interruption of two NATO communication lines in the north and south of Afghanistan. In that case, we can understand the coordinates of the challenging situation that NATO, especially the Americans, is facing. It is worth noting that Chek Lala Airport near Islamabad, Dushanbe Airport in Tajikistan, and Karshi Khanabad in Uzbekistan can partially compensate for the lack of Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan. Still, no airbase in Afghanistan's neighbouring countries can replace Pakistan's air routes. For NATO forces in Afghanistan, this massive amount of supplies is four to five times the cost of ground transportation because of the cost of transporting and air. In practice, NATO should have sought a replacement for Pakistan's insecure landlines (www.Tabnak.ir).

In the regional dimension, Iran and NATO had conflicting interests on the one hand and conflicting interests in Afghanistan on the other. Given their Salafi and anti-Shiite leanings, establishing security in Afghanistan and suppressing the Taliban and al-Qaeda was common ground between Iran and NATO. At the same time, it is assumed that insecurity in Afghanistan would cause US and NATO forces to clash in the region and that they would feel threatened by the spread of the conflict to Iran. The strained relations between Iran and the United States, especially regarding Iran's nuclear program, have created conditions that have minimized the scope for cooperation between the two sides in resolving the problems of Afghanistan. Some reports claimed that Iran had provided financial assistance to insurgent groups in Afghanistan since 1996, but no credible evidence was provided.

Secure and standard transportation lines connecting Iran to Afghanistan in three ways could help regulate Afghanistan in the context of new security relations. Currently, there are three routes from Chabahar to Nimroz province, about 600 km, ChahBahar - Bandar Abbas to Birjand and the capital of Farah province of Afghanistan, and Bandar Abbas to Mashhad -

Taybad - Herat Afghanistan. It could be an alternative to Pakistan's insecure routes for international aid to Afghanistan. In comparison, the first route, Chabahar-Nimroz province, which reaches the Afghan border in about 600 km and after about 150 km connects to the ring road in central Afghanistan, is 300 km closer than the 900 km route from Karachi to the Khyber Pass in the east. Is Afghanistan (www. Tabnak.ir).

At the macro level, NATO faced significant challenges in Afghanistan. In its first experience of leaving its traditional region, this organization saw many problems that required fundamental changes in the system and organization of NATO Command. If NATO is to anticipate new spaces in defining its tasks, it must reconsider its recruitment and organizational structure. In this context, NATO cannot remain a mere military organization.

There are currently 2,500 US troops in Afghanistan and about 7,500 from various NATO countries. As of December 2009, the number of foreign forces in Afghanistan was over 100,000. The prospect of a NATO defeat in Afghanistan was clear if the NATO allies wanted to withdraw their troops between 2014 and 2021. Establishing relative security in Afghanistan was possible only based on a long-term presence, gaining the trust of tribal chiefs, and laying the groundwork for strengthening the police and the national army, which is not yet the case, and Afghanistan is becoming increasingly insecure.

The process of nation-building after 2001 in Afghanistan

Extremism and terrorism, especially in the post-Cold War era, were the two main factors that led the United States to pay more attention to the need for reform in the Middle East. The United States sees extremism and terrorism as major threats to its security and interests and has sought to open up the political space and improve economic conditions in countries that are the source of such radical movements in terms of ideology and financial support. Eradicated the roots of extremism; In other words, extremism and terrorism are considered as causes and goals of US regional policies. However, political Islam is sometimes presented as a threat to American security and interests. But after the formation of the Taliban and the operations of al-Qaeda, extremism is considered a more serious threat because it directly targets the West on a cross-border scale and by resorting to violent methods. Hence, the crisis in US-Afghanistan relations and the level of conflict in the relations between these countries increased upwards, and the competition and strengthening of the military aspect in this crisis reached its peak and the relations between these countries in the post-Cold War period (end of the Cold War). Second) underwent a fundamental change. The emergence of excessive weakness in the structure and functioning of the central government turned Afghanistan into a breeding ground for fundamentalist terrorism, which, in a way, became a security threat to all neighbouring countries and then to the region. As uncontrollable internal conditions, porous borders, weak judicial institutions, law enforcement, and security authorities, the presence of a wide range of needy and desperate young people who had found a haven for ethnic and religious protests could become suitable grounds for becoming These countries (Afghanistan) lead to international terrorism and intensify the crisis in the relations between this country and the United States, which according to some researchers is due to the flawed nation-state-building process, which resulted in the formation of a bankrupt state in Afghanistan. Has strengthened the foundations of an incapable state, which was an excuse for US policies after the Cold War,

including the invasion of Afghanistan under the guise of new state-building, which allowed the country to intervene to create a government in line with its vision (Simon & Benjamin, 2001).

Theoretical dimensions

The study of the world system's relations and the role of states in societies' lives is related to the historical period when the concept of nation-states or state-nations first appeared with the conclusion of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 AD. With the expansion of the diversity of political systems, a kind of political system gradually emerged in Europe that became dominant. Of course, it should be noted that the emergence of modern government in Europe is essentially an endogenous process and has been the product of the evolution of the previous system (BabolZehi, Raheleh 2010)

Defining the concept of government

The word government is derived from the word status, meaning position, position, and standing, from which the idea of strength is also used. Nation - Governments or countries are the primary actors in international relations that form the core of the global system and are based on sovereignty and political interactions (BahoushFardaghi, Mahmoud, 2014). The government They are a group of people who have lived inland for a long time and are ruled by a supreme power, Which is composed of a set of elements that together form a single whole called the nation-state. These components mentioned in the above definition can be listed as follows: 1- People, 2- Land, and 3- Sovereignty. The modern state is a product of the nation-state-building process that has developed and expanded in the historical-sociological path in European societies. In fact, the condition can be the legitimate sovereignty of the monopoly of force, which in this definition has several essential elements, which are: a: public institutions, b: authority, c: trust of the use of force, d: neutral bureaucracy (Burnell, Peter Wiki Weekly, 2008),. Power can be divided into two types: 1- legitimate and 2- illegitimate. The state is, in fact, the exclusive use of legitimate authority. Legitimate power has three pillars: legal, traditional, and cultural influence. Thus, this government must have the necessary organizational and regulatory frameworks and functions to facilitate this transformation and its expansion.

Definitions of state-building

Although state-building is a term that has been around for a long time, it has become more common since the 1990s, especially since the end of the Cold War. State-building consists of the words "state" and "construction," which uniquely indicate the state's construction. Government is used in political literature in three senses. It primarily means the country. The country consists of the four components mentioned above. Secondly, it means the cabinet, the executive branch of the government (cabinet). Thirdly, it means the government, which includes all three branches of the judiciary, the executive, and the legislature. Despite the different forms of government, there have been three particular tasks: legislation, executive affairs, and judicial affairs. However, these phenomena are done by one person, which is sometimes referred to as the principle of the dominance of the executive branch in a third-world country (Temna, Faramarz 2008). Barnsley Defines the state as politically organized people in a given land. Burgess describes the state as a particular part of human society that is

seen as organized, and state-building is the strengthening and development of this process. Wilson also considers state-building to be a famous organization in a given land according to the law. State-building can be defined in three general ways: legal, philosophical, and political. Fukuyama sees state-building as the creation of new administrative structures and the strengthening of existing systems, for which state-building is essential.

Meanwhile, Collapsed governments are a severe cause of significant global challenges, ranging from poverty to diseases threatening humanity. The fundamental problem facing the world is the transfer of solid-state structures to countries that lack them. According to some, the concept of state-building is applied to the development of governance institutions, which is an efficient process in the direction of governance (Hafeznia, Mohammad Reza,1996).

State-building is a process in which the state grows not only in terms of economic utility and government coercion but also in terms of institutional and political power. According to some, state-building is the ability of the state to accumulate power, which has three faces: a) power as national capacities, b) power as institutional cohesion. If we look at the history of the formation of the state, we can see the nature of this process, which is entirely based on the components of power (Hatami, Abbas 2011). Emphasizing that the existence of failed and weak governments such as Afghanistan, Haiti, and Liberia threaten global security, the Center for Global Development considers state-building necessary. It is defined as state-building, which means creating and strengthening the institutions essential to support long-term political, economic, and social development. These institutions are the primary governmental institutions that must be established and maintained. The American Rand Institute and the US Council on Foreign Relations also define nation-building as establishing civil order and government functions in countries that have emerged from nine wars or other forms of unrest (Dehshiar, Hossein, 2005).

Governments are formed in different ways, and their expansion does not follow the same path, and there is a difference between them. Therefore, in defining the process of state-nation-building, it should be noted that in the general sense, it alone cannot be reduced to the status of failed or war-torn states or the establishment of new forms. In this sense, the nation-state-building process has not yet reached its peak, even in many Western countries, But they are still involved with some examples (DehghaniFiroozabadi, Seyed Jalal, 2009).

State-building in the Third World: The past three theoretical approaches focused more on the state-building process in Europe and did not consider state-building in the other world. But gradually, from the second half of the 1980s, studies in this field were conducted by people like Yang, etc., who comparatively studied the phenomenon of state-building in the third world through state-building in Europe. As Migdal argues, Third World states evolved after World War II, and these Third World states, unlike modern European states, could not define their borders. Some of these governments are known as failed governments, so they need to pay attention to these countries and strengthen the field of state-building, which has become critical. Although some Third World countries prioritized economic growth, economic growth did not ultimately improve people's living standards and reduce poverty. In other words, economic growth did not precede political development. Theorists proposed the strengthening of political institutions to reduce crises in these countries.

For these theorists, although the nature of political institutions is essential, what is more important is that while providing a democratic context, they can create stability in these countries (Shahram Nia, Seyed Amir Massoud, et al. 2012). The first thing that can be said about the inability of modern governments in the Third World in terms of this approach is that this phenomenon (state-building) was a new emergence of its kind in the West and demands its requirements. Therefore, in many third-world countries, it was necessary to strengthen the lands needed for it (Sajjadpour, Seyed, Mehdizadeh, Ali, 2012). Second, whether the modern state in the West is the result of war, the structure of feudalism, or cultural and theoretical issues, the state has its origins in most world societies. Not native. At the same time, this process in the Third World and these countries has resulted from a top-down approach. Logically, with the end of the Cold War, when the heavy burden of the two superpowers' strategic considerations on the interaction between Third or Developing World actors was minimized, the groundwork was laid for the emergence of a two-sided siege of the global centre and the global periphery. It was also formed to study the internal dynamics of these communities. In this regard, the document issued by the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Petros Ghali, to the Security Council is significant. The publication of this document to redefine the sources of international threat led to a severe weakening of the old (Weberian) approach to the traditional functions of government.

Clinton's policy toward Somalia in 1993 was the first Democratic administration since the Cold War. These actions, based on the slogan of humanitarian intervention following the realization of the process of state-building and the establishment of an efficient and powerful state in that land, became the prelude to new theories on the relationship between the internal conditions of weak or failed states and world peace and security(Shah Karami, Amir, 1383). Based on these new labels, the situation in areas such as Afghanistan, etc., was raised in the nineties. The political conflicts of such governments were rooted in four incidents or crises, namely the undesirable change of the regime, etc., and the governments that do not have a central government and are practically faced with extensive military activities under the command of the warlords can be included in this category. ; Accordingly, 9/11 and the insistence of American leaders on the role of al-Qaeda as a global terrorist network, along with the emphasis on Afghanistan as a land with a collapsed state and prone to supporting terrorist activities, are the first scenes of the Bush administration facing the phenomenon of failed governments. And should be considered weak (Zahrani, Mostafa 2005). Other manifestations of the link between the category of failed or collapsing states and development concepts can be seen in theories of the Third World's position in the international arena.

Theories about the position of the Third World in the international arena can be seen. In the shadow of the insistence of American leaders on failed and fragile governments as a new centre of threat to global security, it led to new approaches (Shafiee, Nozar 2004). In this regard, it is necessary to speak of ideas that emphasize the end of the life of the Third World. According to this approach, the criteria for examining the position of developing or backward countries beyond the Cold War considerations are explained based on how such governments meet the necessary conditions for progress.

New state-building in the second post-Cold War era

Historical features in American foreign policy during and after the Cold War

Different behavioural approaches and approaches were followed from the beginning of the United States' formation in foreign policy. Since World War II, the United States has dramatically expanded its presence and intervention in other parts of the world by adopting a globalist approach. This policy, with the growing power of the United States and two different components, namely, the promotion of the idea of liberal democracy worldwide and institutionalization in various subject areas, has so far formed the axes of US government policy. With the fall of the Soviet Union, these developments marked a significant turning point in understanding American policy and the nature of world order. They brought about relative American hegemony worldwide. Still, following the emergence and existence of issues, components, and developments in the last decade, we have witnessed the challenge and decline of American hegemony (Seyed Ali Asghar 2006).

On the other hand, this strategy has considered Europe a tool in the foreign policy apparatus because, during the 1990s (Clinton era), the issue of the Soviet Union and its satellites was no longer relevant, and the competition gap was felt and American. American politicians with They took a liberal view of international affairs. In particular, the Democrats, who were at the helm at the time and considered themselves supporters of democracy and institutionalism, gave Europe such a place in their foreign policy apparatus. But with the events of September 11, 2001, the ground was created for the United States to change its foreign policy priorities, adopt the process of unilateralism, and reveal its true nature in the field of the international system (Mozhdeh, Vahid 2003), But what brought the neo-conservatives to the surface from the lower layers of American policy were the two events of the end of the Cold War and the events of 9/11 (Mozhdeh, Vahid 2003).

These events show that the historical features after 9/11 are rooted in this period, Although much was different from it. Nuclear weapons solve human rights abuses and terrorist threats when they occur (Kinzer, Aseton 2008). In fact, after the fall of the Soviet Union, several neoconservative writers such as Kratt Hummer, William Christol, and Robert Keegan speculated that the United States might use its extra power to impose some benevolent hegemony on the rest of the world. The US foreign policy discourse saw it as the duty of the United States to lead the world. It legitimized using the highest level of military power at any time and place to achieve this leadership, precisely what the neo-conservatives have been trying to institutionalize since the late 1960s (Mousavi, Sidersul 1982).

Developments in Afghanistan in the stage of state-nation building

Afghanistan's creation resulted from the rivalry between the two kingdoms of Tsarist Russia and Great Britain in Central Asia in the nineteenth century. On the other hand, Russia was trying to counter British power by seizing the way to India (Afghanistan) to defeat British influence in the arena of colonial competition by gaining India Because, at that time, the colonial greed of the country was an inevitable part of their national interests. Hence, Afghanistan was invaded by colonial powers. In terms of historical processes, the state-building process of Afghanistan has five major stages: 1- The secession of Afghanistan from

Iran. 2- The Soviet invasion and the establishment of a communist government. 3. The withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and the establishment of the Mojahedin Islamic government. 4- The establishment of the Taliban government. 5. The establishment of a new government following the US military intervention.

The Nation-State-Building Process in Afghanistan

In any society, the government has a way in which, by self-regulation, it seeks to maintain social order and ensure security. In the meantime, the government is the tool for these acts of sovereignty. In developed societies, the government is the only legitimate and unrivalled institution of government action. The idea that the government is the highest institution of governance has never existed in Afghanistan since the sixteenth century. In Afghanistan, the government not only lacks governance experience; Rather, it has become a bankrupt state that has lost a significant amount of its authority over the territory under its rule. Society in Afghanistan is divided into ethnic groups and has held all the traditional elements of power (i.e., population, independent economy, and land without foreign sovereignty or central government) for centuries. While the government in the country has ethnic roots, warlords are still the biggest threat to destabilizing Afghanistan. Of course, the origins of these factors are rooted in the political and historical tradition of Afghanistan, and to counter this tradition requires a fundamental change in the social structure of Afghanistan, which we mention some of the historical stages of this country (Saei, Ahmad 2010),

The first stage- Afghanistan and its border independence

 To be. The reign of Ahmad Shah Abdali marked a historic beginning for Afghanistan's independence. The date before this incident was the shared history of Afghanistan with some of its neighbouring countries. This stage of the country's history, rather than being born and the result of endogenous changes has resulted from foreign interventions and encroachment, which caused the region to be separated from its original history (which is larger than the current situation). Of course, the demarcation of the borders of this country (Afghanistan) gradually began at the beginning of the nineteenth century, which coincided with the increase of British influence and presence in India.

The second stage- the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

As described in detail in the previous chapter, but due to the presence of the reader's mind, it is mentioned here, a coup d'état (March 16, 1978) with the unification of the two factions of the people and the flag, which, despite much controversy and struggle, under pressure And the Soviet demands were done, they were done (Keyvan Hosseini, Seyed Asghar 2008). The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was informally founded in January 1965 to build a socialist society based on the ideas of Marxism and Leninism. The principal founders of this party were Noor Mohammad Turki, BabrakKarmal, Hafizullah Amin, Sultan Ali Keshtmand, and others. The two parties, the People and the Flag, both of which had communist ideas and were supported by the Soviet Union at the time, seized power (Cogley, Charles W; Eugene R. 2003). Governments after the Marxist coup undeniably made Afghanistan one of the Soviet satellites, even changing the flag, which was the national-patriotic and historical symbol of the country, and finally (December 24, 1979) by order of Leonid Brezhnev, The Soviet leader of

the 40th IRGC entered Afghanistan. The country's socio-political arena became the scene of Soviet beneficial influence.

The third stage- Soviet withdrawal and the formation of the Mojahedin Islamic State

marked the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the US-backed regime in Kabul. Following the failed coup of 19 August 1991, former Soviet Communist Party members who supported the Kabul government lost their former influence. Soviet aid to Afghanistan was cut off after Yeltsin was elected President of the Russian Federation. This accelerated the fall of Dr. Najibullah's government and ultimately led to its complete overthrow. The Mujahideen movement, the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, has grown and strengthened, especially since the time of Dawood Khan. During the Soviet invasion of this country, this movement grew and gained global attention and support. By mobilizing against Islam and confronting the Soviets, this movement rallied the people of Afghanistan and became a nationwide movement in the country. The United States sought to support anti-Soviet currents and movements Because the United States interpreted the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as part of its Cold War and expansionist policies (Lewis, Paul 2009).

The fourth stage- Formation of the Taliban government

During the Taliban era, the weakness of the central government in Afghan society has been a prominent feature of the country's socio-political climate because ethnic loyalty became a principle instead of national patriotism. This process faced new conditions during the Taliban regime, and Afghanistan moved towards the domination of an ethnic group and continued the political instability, the main consequence of which was the lack of peace and the spread of civil war and border insecurity (Held, David 2007). These wars have made security one of the most critical concerns of Afghans. The Taliban were able to bring relative security to Afghanistan after a long period of war, despite intense ethnicism, under the guise of coercion and Islamic law. However, he believed that democracy had no meaning in Islam and said that there would be no elections in Afghanistan. During this period, experts such as Uzbeks, Tajiks, etc., were gradually removed, and more people took over the government who were not very literate (Mojdeh, 2003: 38). Afghanistan's internal governance system was primarily based on vital security and police system.

Afghanistan's position in the post-Cold War era

Afghanistan did not have a strategic and vital position for the United States until 9/11, despite its geopolitical and geostrategic situation in the region. Thus, there are ups and downs in examining the macro axes of the foreign behaviour of American presidents between 1936 and 2001. The US-Afghanistan relationship dates back to the 1920s. Afghanistan was insignificant until World War II: 1. Lack of valuable mineral resources such as oil, 2. Proximity to the Soviet Union, 3. Lack of access to the sea and being on land without the sea. But with Soviet support for two coups, 1. The coup d'état of Sardar Dawood Khan in 1973 (Jalali, 2006).

2. The bloody Thor coup in 1978, Noor Mohammad Turki, paved the way for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During President Reagan's presidency, when the international arena was the scene of the Cold War, much attention was paid to Afghanistan outside of Central

America. Both Reagan and Bush opposed the Soviet military presence and even made it a higher priority than the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The CIA played a crucial role in assisting the Reagan and Bush administrations in policymaking in Afghanistan (Babel Zehi, 2010: 81). What happened in Afghanistan was state-building; That is, the existing political structures in Afghanistan (the form of the failed and bankrupt government) should be destroyed and reorganized by the United States, and the current social arrangements should be redirected (Litman, 2012: 94); Of course, the phenomenon of bankrupt government or the sensation of statelessness, caused the United States to feel threatened from Afghanistan (Keyvan Hosseini, 2006: 75-67). The events of 9/11, as an accelerator of international anarchy, helped the US intervention in Afghanistan and shaped the new state-building. However, the crisis in the country's relations with the military invasion and the use of violence as a crisis management technique by the United States gradually escalated from the beginning of the crisis, and war became the dominant aspect of this crisis; however, with the revelation of the shortcomings of its crisis management techniques (the mere use of military force), the United States gradually tried to integrate liberal elements (which have been and are an integral part of its policies) into its first type of policies (military policies) (Mollazehi, Pir Mohammad 2008). It should be added that its manifestation, as stated, can be seen in the procedure of state-building in Afghanistan. The US liberal approach (in the aftermath of 9/11) to Afghanistan is one of the first steps taken by the Bush administration. During his speech on launching an invasion of Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom, he emphasized the goals of disrupting the country's efficiency as a base for terrorist operations and attacking the Taliban regime's military facilities. Over the next few weeks, Bush reiterated his Christian message that the United States is engaged in a battle between good and evil to promote God-given values and defend freedom and all that is good. Just in the world (Kinzer, 1387: 400). Accordingly, some analysts see the US invasion of Afghanistan as a prelude to the post-9/11 US strategy, the details of which became apparent a year later (after the invasion of Afghanistan) in the US National Security Strategy (2002). (Ghahramanpour, 2003: 25) In the meantime, several variables played a role in completing the incomplete process of state-nation building, which we will discuss in detail below.

Factors and variables affecting the nation-state-building process

Internal variables

Never in the history of Afghanistan since the sixteenth century (since independence) has the issue of the state been the highest institution of sovereignty. In Afghanistan, the government not only lacks long-term governance experience but has also become a bankrupt state. The scope of the central government is limited to the capital and some prominent cities of the country. Some aspects of the Afghan governance tradition have been the weakness of the state vis society. The government has always been weak in this country Because it has not been able to dominate an ethnic social structure and resilient and sometimes dominant state-dominated tribes, which in itself has provided the ground for the failure of the nation-state-building process and the creation of instability. Because, in the presence of a powerful government, the United States could not enter that country so quickly (Sarafraz, 1390: 54). Afghan society, divided into tribal ethnicities, has for centuries possessed all the traditional elements of power:

population, independent economy, and land without foreign sovereignty or central government, While the government in this country has ethnic roots and has not become a pervasive and national element. The phenomenon of warlords in Afghanistan, which is the biggest threat to the destabilization of Afghanistan after terrorism, is rooted in Afghanistan's political and historical traditions (Aliabadi, Alireza,2008). During the Taliban era, the weakness of the Afghan central government was a prominent feature of the country's political climate because ethnic loyalty took precedence over national commitment. These wars have made security and stability one of the most critical concerns of Afghans, Something that the Taliban were very successful in securing (BahoushFardaghi, 2014, 49-47).

Afghanistan has been one of the countries with the characteristics of a crisis, and three decades of emergency, war, and insecurity have diminished the people's belief in resolving the problem and the long-running conflict in the country. During this period, war was a part of people's lives, and peace was and will be presented as the final solution that has always been tried to achieve. Of course, as long as the war is long, the efforts for peace are as old. However, they have faced different problems in different eras. The security crisis in Afghanistan is mainly affected by factors that arise from some within the country, which are primarily: 1- ethnic composition, 2- religious composition, 3- linguistic composition, 4- Spatial composition and distribution of tribes and populations, 5- Power-seeking of group leaders, 6- Illiteracy and illiteracy of the people, 7- Political views and 8- General poverty (Keyvan Hosseini, Seyed Asghar 2009). In the meantime, the combination of the factors mentioned above has found particular special importance and manifestation in this country, As the political arrangement of Afghanistan indicates that its prominent political forces each have a specific ethnic, geographical, linguistic, and religious base and are considered the manifestation of its political will; For example, the former Islamic Jamiat, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, was of Tajik origin and quickly retreated to northern Tajik territory after the fall of Kabul. General Dostum, as a manifestation of the political will of the Uzbek people, established his rule in this territory for many years and was less attacked by other political forces due to the geographical distance and distance from the political rivalry between Kabul and the central part.

Thus, the emergence of excessive weakness in the structure and functioning of the central government turned Afghanistan into a breeding ground for fundamentalist terrorism, which, in a way, became a security threat to all neighbouring countries and then to the region Such as uncontrollable internal conditions, porous borders, weak judicial institutions, law enforcement, and security authorities, the presence of a wide range of poor and desperate youth who found ethnic and religious protests a haven could be suitable grounds for this Countries (Afghanistan) lead to international terrorism, which can be confirmed by the fact that the impact of the domestic variable in the post-Cold War period has become more pronounced. On the other hand, some researchers believe this government is bankrupt and powerless. This has been the bedrock of these new developments, and therefore, at this level, special attention has been paid to the completion of this process under the title of new state-building. However, this trend has been influenced by global and external variables, including middle and macro-level actors, and has reduced the acting of internal elements.

Regional variables

Afghanistan is historically fragmented and has a multi-faceted society, which has always influenced regional and supra-regional countries in terms of internal affairs through contact with domestic groups. Among Afghanistan's neighbours, Iran and Pakistan have the most ties to the country's internal affairs. First, both have cultural homogeneity with a part of the Afghan nation, and therefore, cultural, historical, linguistic, ethnic, and religious solidarity leads to the most interaction and peaceful interaction between the governments of the two countries and second, the largest wave of Afghan overseas migration. I have been to Iran and Pakistan (Keyvan Hosseini, Seyed Asghar 2009).

Pakistan's role in post-Taliban Afghanistan developments

Afghanistan faced significant challenges with the collapse of the Soviet Union and communist rule in 1992. From 1992 until the destruction of the Taliban rule in 2001, Afghanistan became a point of competition for countries in the region. It has become a battleground for regional and extra-regional countries to fight terrorism and restore the stability and security of the country. With 9/11, Pakistan's strategy of dominance and the characterization of Afghanistan as the depth of Pakistan's plan failed, and the problems that Pakistan sought to transfer to Afghanistan and Kashmir returned to normal. Relations between Afghanistan and the United States deteriorated rapidly after President Hamid Karzai took office. The Karzai administration has regularly accused Pakistan of interfering in Afghan domestic matters and helping the Taliban. Pakistan's actual stance toward Afghanistan has remained complicated. On its side, it is committed to assisting the international community and the United States' objectives. On September 12, 2001, it publicly proclaimed its support for the Taliban, after which it gave logistical support to the US in establishing military outposts and post-Taliban bases. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has developed transit routes using these facilities. Pakistan aided terrorist organizations like the Haqqani Network, Hezb-e-Islami, the Afghan Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Taiba, endangering the security of Afghanistan and the region. In other words, if Afghanistan's instability rises, so will the safety of the nations around it. According to this theory, the Pakistani intelligence agency is aiding the instability of Afghanistan with the help of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait. As a result, Pakistan's policies have hurt Afghanistan. Pakistan's political turmoil jeopardizes Afghanistan's and the region's security. Even in its territory, Pakistan's government does not have complete control, including government institutions and counter-extremism efforts.

The Impact of Indian Policies on the Government-Building Process in Afghanistan

 The land and people of Afghanistan have long had close ties to the people of the Indian subcontinent. Afghanistan has been one of the gateways to the Indian subcontinent, which has historically accepted invaders and migrants into the region, creating a long-standing interaction between the people of the area. The withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan marked the beginning of a new era in India-Afghanistan relations. The Government of India, in its interests, considered Najibullah's government in Kabul to be a proper national government. However, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and some other factors, this government could not last more than four years and was overthrown by the Mojahedin (Ezi Mahmoud and

Afifa Abedi 2012). The inability of the Mujahideen government in Afghanistan and its instability paved the way for the Taliban to take office in Afghanistan. Here, it is necessary to examine India's role in the Afghan state-building process during and after the Taliban.

The role of the Indian Afghanistan state-building process during the Taliban era

The important dates of the political developments in Afghanistan have been explained in detail in the last chapter. Here, only the dates related to the title are considered extensively. With the fall of Najibullah's government in April 1992, Mojahedin came to power. Although the Indian government was not very happy with establishing an Islamic-oriented government, it supported the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani. However, this government could not last long because it was composed of different groups with different tendencies. There were difficult conflicts between the jihadi groups with many differences. These differences escalated to the point of destabilizing Afghanistan. For example, Hekmatyar's group in Kabul suffered severe damage from the launch of rockets and shelling. Similarly, there was disagreement among other groups over the division of power, which prevented the formation and survival of a national unity government. Following these developments, the Taliban, which initially controlled parts of southern Afghanistan, gradually expanded its control over the territories and eventually seized power in Afghanistan with the conquest of Kabul. The coming to power of the Taliban government was the direct support of Pakistan, the United States, and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia immediately recognized the government. This culminated in long-standing policies established by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, as well as US financial aid. Under Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan, which had been selected as a distribution and aid channel since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, played an active role in organizing, coordinating, and training the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet Union.These activities were extensive during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States. The support of the West and some Muslim and Arab countries provided the ground for nurturing, organizing, and providing ideological education in religious schools, the number of which had suddenly increased dramatically. With the rise of the Mujahideen government in Kabul and the presence of elements in the government who did not have close ties to Pakistan, the country decided to bring in the Taliban, a group of Pashtun fanatics educated in Deobandi religious schools. They were. Pakistan's goal was to establish a puppet government that would never again raise its territorial issues with Pakistan, pose no threat to the country, and have a strategic depth about Pakistan's rival, India. The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, with the very effective help of the Pakistani military intelligence service (ISI), had adverse security consequences for India. Shortly afterwards, the Indian embassy in Kabul was closed, and political ties with the Taliban government were severed. The Indian government did not recognize the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan. In addition, he saw the spread of Taliban ideology as a threat to his security (Colbel, Suzanne 2008). The spread of the Taliban mentality to the Jammu and Kashmir region of India is very dangerous for the security and unity of this country. The government of India has been experiencing unrest and dissatisfaction with its Muslim population in the state since 1987, and this spread of unrest in areas adjacent to and adjacent to India could have allowed it to spread into India. On the other hand, given their rivalry and

hostility with India, Pakistani political circles were looking for such an opportunity to have a limited war with their rival and keep the Kashmir issue alive. Therefore, they were not reluctant to turn the disgruntled Kashmiri elements in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir into riots and jihad against the Indian government. The most important groups involved in terrorist activities in the Indian Kashmir Valley are the Mojahedin Party, Harakat al-Ansar or Jamaat al-Ansar, Jaish Muhammad (Khaddam al-Islam), Lashkar-e-Taiba (Dawat al-Arshad), Hizbut-Tahrir, Harakat Al-Mujahideen, Al-Amr Al-Mujahideen, Islamic Front of Jammu and Kashmir, Al-Badr, Jamaat-e-Mujahideen and Daughters of the Nation, Ansar Ghazwa Al-India. According to Indian officials, except for the Mujahideen Party, the majority of whose members are Kashmiri, most of the organizations mentioned are Pakistanis, whose activities have been banned under India's counterterrorism laws passed in 2000. (Afghan Annual Report, 2003) According to Indian government assessments and reports, in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, between 1990 and 1990, three people were killed in terrorist operations, including civilians, the military, and the terrorists themselves. is. In addition to the above operations, the hijacking of Indian Flight No. 814-IC in December 1999, which was flown to Kandahar and demanded the release of passengers belonging to terrorist groups imprisoned in India, attacked the Jammu and Kashmir State Parliament in October 2001, and the parliament. India had another terrorist attack on December 13, 2001, in which the Indian government implicated extremist Muslim groups inspired by the Taliban and Pakistani intelligence agencies. (Misra 24-23, 2005) This infiltration of terrorist elements, known as cross-border terrorism, increased tensions between the two countries and led to the limited Cargill War in May 1999, which pitted the two nuclear powers into a full-blown war. And put the destroyer. Therefore, given the demographic context of the Kashmir region, which has a large Muslim population, and India, in total, has a Muslim minority of 140 million, the spread of ethnic, religious, and sectarian unrest in India could have serious consequences for its security. To be a country and shake the socio-political foundation of the people of India, who are of ethnic and religious diversity, and to confront the Indian rulers with severe ethnic and religious revolts.Instability and security threats in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir have cost the Indian government so much that the Indian government is forced to maintain thousands of military personnel to maintain border security and prevent the infiltration of cross-border terrorists, whom Pakistan calls freedom fighters. In addition, infiltrating these elements into other Indian states that share a border with Pakistan is another issue facing the Indian government (Sharifi, Nader, 2008). Turning Afghanistan into a centre for extremist Islamic groups during the Taliban era has threatened the region's security and stability, which the Indian government considers vital to its security. The presence of Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and other volunteers from Pakistan to Algeria has been a training ground for extremist groups and terrorist activities in South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. It is a potential threat to India's security. According to Indian sources, the Taliban are under direct Pakistani influence and put Pakistan in a superior position vis-. Vis India, to the detriment of India (Kalantari, Jalal, 2008). This is a matter of concern not only for India but also for other countries in the region, such as Iran, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Because some of these countries are facing challenges from extremist Islamic groups on their soil, a consensus has emerged among them to oppose the Taliban. The holding of an extraordinary conference in Tehran with the presence of the above countries has shown their concern about the emergence

of this extremist group in Afghanistan. Iran saw the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan as a conspiracy by the United States to discredit true Islam. During this period, Taliban forces assassinated Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e-Sharif, and tensions between Iran and Afghanistan escalated. In addition to the above security threats, the widespread cultivation of poppies in Afghanistan and the export of narcotics and arms smuggling to neighbouring countries became a major source of insecurity for all neighbouring countries. The drug trade, which generated significant revenue for the warlords and the Taliban, continued to grow, with Afghanistan's neighbouring countries in Central Asia, Iran, Pakistan, and India being used as transit routes for drugs to Europe and the United States. According to Indian officials, Pakistani officials earn between $ 90 million and $ 136 million yearly from opium poppy cultivation, mainly in proxy wars with India in Jammu and Kashmir. (2003, Sibal)

India's role in the post-Taliban Afghan state-building process

Given India's significant presence in all areas of reconstruction and construction in Afghanistan, the country also has broad political and economic goals. As one of the emerging economic powers, India needs consumer markets, and naturally, Afghanistan could be a good market for Indian goods. Another issue in India-Afghanistan relations is India's access to energy resources in Central Asia. India needs much energy to develop its economy and industry. Although the country is talking seriously with Iran and Pakistan over the natural gas pipeline, India wants to have more diverse resources. Access to these energy resources is possible through Afghanistan, which can benefit Afghanistan and India. Another issue is curbing extremist currents. Establishing stability and calm in Afghanistan can prevent the spread of extremist forces in Afghanistan and neighbouring areas. This will avoid extremist movements in Kashmir, India. In this regard, the Indian government has common interests with Iran because such activities threaten the security of India and Iran.

India has invested heavily in the transit route from Chabahar port to Zabul, Zaranj, and Delaram. This way, India wants to remove Pakistan's obstacles in sending Indian goods to Afghanistan and beyond. However, developments inside Afghanistan have raised concerns for the Indian government. The assassination of a road construction project worker by Taliban-linked extremist forces has exacerbated India's problems. Before he was killed, the kidnappers warned that all Indians working in Afghanistan must leave Afghanistan within two hours.

Some Indian observers consider these actions suspicious and see the hands of their rivals in this matter. In addition, given the rise of pro-Taliban groups in Pakistan's border state of Baluchistan, the spread of terrorist activities in Afghanistan, and the evidence that some Pakistani elements have aided the Taliban, there are many concerns among Indian officials. Some experts are raising the issue that the Indian government should not tie all its chances in Afghanistan to the government. Finally, it can be concluded that the fall of the Taliban government was a very positive development in India's interests. With the fall of this government, one of the components that caused instability in its security zone was eliminated. The Indian government has decided to make the most of the opportunity and engage Afghanistan with economic, political, trade, and economic cooperation. Establish deep and

comprehensive relations and prevent the growth of extremist forces in Afghanistan, which are to the detriment of that country, by uniting and cooperating with countries that share a common vision for Afghanistan. However, the Indian government has less leverage due to the lack of a common border with Afghanistan. The rise and resurgence of the Taliban and the inability of the central government and NATO to maintain order and security in Afghanistan have raised serious concerns among Indian officials. Undoubtedly, establishing stability and security will positively affect India, and it will be able to achieve its political and economic goals in the Central Asian region. Access to new and diverse sources of energy, oil and gas and transit routes to Central Asia is one of India's essential goals. The Government of India has also provided the following assistance to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2001-

1. $ 70 million for the construction of the Zaranj-Delaram road (one of Afghanistan's major transportation routes connecting the country to Iran),

2. Donate three Airbus aircraft to Afghan Ariana Airlines, train Afghan personnel and provide support and maintenance to these aircraft.

3. Donation of 274 buses to the public transport service, 101 utility vehicles (garbage, sprinklers, water bulldozers) for Kabul Municipality, and 300 cars to the Afghan National Army.

4. Reconstruction of Indira Gandhi Hospital and Habibieh School with a capacity of 13,000 students.

 5. Training technologists, diplomats, teachers, bankers, computer experts, and other Afghan specialists.

6. Construction of 5000-ton cold storage in Kandahar.

7. Delivery of protein-fortified biscuits to feed Afghan children (under this program, one million Afghan children received 100 grams of fortified biscuits daily).

8. Funding for the construction of the Afghan Legislative Assembly; 9. The construction of ZaranjDelaram road will continue at a length of 218 km. (India, because it does not have transit access to Afghanistan through Pakistan, wants to access Afghanistan through Iran and the above road.)

10. Reconstruction and completion of Selma Dam and its electricity generation project in Herat province.

11. Supply 69 tons of medicine and medical equipment for Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, Sheberghan, Herat, and Kandahar.

12. Providing medical equipment and modernization of Indira Gandhi Hospital Children's Health Center.

13. Establishment of an advanced printing house, construction of radio and television stations, and completion of some existing stations.

14. Providing an unmistakable composite ink for marking and holding elections.

15. Sending five senior banking experts to restructure the structure of the National Bank of Afghanistan. (Annual Report 2004-2005, 2)

In 1985 and 1995, the level of India-Afghanistan relations and interactions expanded. In February, Karzai visited India, and in return, Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh visited Kabul in August. During Karzai's visit to India, he was accompanied by eight cabinet ministers, and two memoranda of understanding were signed on civilian aircraft, mass media, and intelligence. (Annual Reports 2 - 1, 2006 - 2005) Among the necessary measures taken by the Government of India in year 1, we can mention the continuation of previous construction works and some other works as follows:

1. Construction and implementation of power transmission towers from Khmer Bridge to Kabul and enabling power transmission from Uzbekistan to Kabul.

2. Grants to 500 Afghan students for long-term courses in India and 500 scholarships for short-term studies and capacity building for five others.

3. Provide 1,000 sewing machines for women's organizations in rural Afghanistan.

4 Establishment of facilities and completion of 10 radio and television stations.

5. Rehabilitation and reconstruction of communication networks in 11 provinces.

6. The construction of Afghanistan's new parliament with a budget of $ 67 million is scheduled to be completed in 2010 (Shafiee, Nozar, 2009).

The Impact of Iran's Policies on the Government-Building Process in Afghanistan

Iran's goals and policies in Afghanistan can be divided into two parts: declarative policy and action policy:

A. Declaration policy

The Afghan people themselves must make decisions about the future of Afghanistan. This principle is known in international law as the "principle of the right to self-determination."

- Foreign countries should not interfere in Afghanistan's internal affairs. In international law, this principle is the "principle of non-interference in the affairs of others." - Every government in Afghanistan should be inclusive and include all ethnic and religious groups in this country. This principle is called "constructive intervention" (Jafari Valdani 2009).

B. Implementing policy

- Geopolitical principle: According to this principle, Afghanistan is a country that is in the neighbourhood of Iran, and regardless of the nature of politics and government in this country, Iran must come to terms with the ruling government and have a worthy position about the government in Afghanistan.

- Geoeconomics principle: According to this principle, Iran tried to prevent the infiltration and infiltration of hostile powers in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, with the expansion of Iran's influence

in Afghanistan, the axis of Persian-speaking civilization (Iran, Afghanistan, Tajikistan) was realized as a strategic axis.

- Geostrategic principle: Afghanistan has critical economic capabilities, and the scope of Iran's presence and influence in Afghanistan could provide the basis for the optimal use of this country's financial qualifications and capacities. This is especially important to create a relatively prosperous Afghanistan so that the problems of that land do not send people to Iran.

We are establishing a balance of power and preventing the removal of Persian-speaking groups from the Afghan political scene, as well as the effective presence of Persian-speaking and Shiite groups in the political structure of Afghanistan. The result of these two factors is the expansion of Iran's influence in Afghanistan.

Iran's role in the Afghan state-building process during and after the Taliban

The Afghan problem entered a new phase following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Pakistan's strong support for the Taliban. With the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Iran's foreign policy entered a new phase. At this point, during the Afghanistan crisis, although Iran played an active role, in contrast, the part of Pakistan was not very effective. Pakistan was concerned that Iran and Turkey would expand their trade relations with Central Asia and that, in the future, Iran would become an essential route for Central Asian trade to the Indian Ocean through Bandar Abbas, thus rivalling the Pakistani port of Karachi. Another issue is Pakistan's need for oil and gas in Central Asia and its transit through the country. Pakistan had to dominate Afghanistan to achieve its goals because it is part of the transit route (Sajjadi, Abdul Qayyum 2009). In this way, Pakistan supported the Taliban, and eventually, with its financial and military support, the Taliban took control of all of Afghanistan.

At this point, Iran became a major supporter of the opposition forces of the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. (Jafari Valdani, 2003: 73) Finally, the "fall of the Taliban" created new opportunities for Iran in Afghanistan and eliminated one of Iran's most important security threats in its neighbourhood. After the fall of the Taliban, Iran continued to play a more active role by attending UN meetings in Geneva, Bonn, and the Emergency Loya Jirga. Iran supported the new development of Afghan state-building by encouraging Afghan groups to work together with the United Nations and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, as well as promoting local commanders to play a national role and strengthen their relationship with the central government.

In addition, Iran has been relatively active in rebuilding Afghanistan. "Sending humanitarian aid" to different regions, participating in road construction and electricity supply operations in western and northwestern Afghanistan, activating the transit route of goods to Afghanistan through Chabahar port, opening hospitals and medical centres in Zaranj, helping universities And their instructors, training and equipping the Afghan police force, reviving Afghan theatre and cinema through non-governmental organizations, educating children, especially Afghan girls, by public and private institutions, providing educational opportunities in various fields to Afghan refugee youth, and ... is among Iran's aid to Afghanistan. Iran also offered $ 600 million in grants to rebuild Afghanistan, more than Japan owed the Iranian president's visit to Afghanistan on August 13, 2002, the first visit by a foreign minister since the Loya Jirga. It

was an emergency and showed Iran's support for the new Afghan government led by Hamid Karzai. (Same: 75)

One of the dimensions of Iran's foreign policy towards Afghanistan in the new era has been its participation in Afghanistan's reconstruction. Afghanistan has not had a chance to develop due to the presence of foreign forces over the past two decades and internal problems. Still, today, in light of new world developments, attention to the modernization of Afghanistan is more necessary than ever. (Although European countries have not kept all their promises, the Afghan government is complaining about this). For Afghanistan to become independent, it must speak with one voice. This will be possible within the framework of national unity and efforts for state-nation-building and cooperation based on mutual respect with other countries, especially its neighbours.

Afghanistan's government evolution has changed dramatically over the past three decades. Some of these changes have been in the interests of Iran and its foreign policy's success, and others have been in Iran's national interests and security. They are mainly considered failures of foreign policy. Suppose we want to consider the consequences of Iran's foreign policy decisions in Afghanistan. The victory of the Afghan Resistance Movement in 1370 was a success for all anti-communist actors, including Iran. The four-month rule of Burhanuddin Rabbani, which lasted until 2002 and for the second time in the history of politics and government in Afghanistan, is considered the rise to power of Persian speakers was another success. Still, the inability to maintain this success is a failure. The rise of the Taliban, both because we could not identify and anticipate their emergence and because the group succeeded in gaining control of 90 per cent of Afghanistan, and ultimately because of its direct role in assassinating Iranian journalists and diplomats. It was a bitter failure for Iran's decision-making apparatus. (Shafi'i, 1384: 12) Therefore, the four months of Burhanuddin Rabbani's rule can be considered a desirable and expected result because it was in Iran's favour, and before that, the framework of the Peshawar Treaty was defined. The continuation of Rabbani's rule, which officially or unofficially lasted for nearly ten years, is one of the unexpected and desirable results because Rabbani had to hand over power after four months, but he refused to hand over power. For various reasons, the Persian language strengthened its position despite the bitter events of this period. The "Taliban rule" was an unexpected and unfortunate outcome, as a force suddenly emerged that Iran not only did not know enough about but also succeeded in gaining control of large parts of Afghanistan.

"Developments after 9/11 are considered unexpected and desirable, as the Taliban have been ousted from power and the position of Iran's friends in Afghan rule has been strengthened. As a result of the collapse of the Taliban administration, forces friendly to Iran gained influence in the region. However, recent events have not been wholly favourable to Iran. From the Bonn Summit in 2001 to the Loya Jirga elections in December and February 2003, developments have occurred to Iran's disadvantage, and this trend has continued to weaken Iran's position. (Vaezi, Hamzeh 2007).

International variables

Central Asia suffered a geopolitical vacuum after the end of the Third Cold War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, and global and regional authorities sought a new role in it. They came out. Afghanistan's geographical location is still a source of competition and intervention for world powers. The United States, Britain, Russia, and China are globally active in this regard. Still, after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of the bipolar system, a power vacuum was created in the region, which gave the internal forces the potential to try to strengthen their influence. Some powers grew in the country while influencing. Domestically, he was influential in the international arena, including al-Qaeda and its supporters in the country, the Taliban. These groups took advantage of the freedom of action created in the post-Cold War (II) space for their activities and sometimes even threatened the interests of superpowers such as the United States. Some theorists believed that in the world after the end of the Second Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar system, competition would decrease, and we would face a calmer world.

However, contrary to the expectations of these optimistic groups, the world has witnessed a new round of competition to define the international system in the contemporary context. The emergence of recent crises in different parts of the world and the continuation of previous conflicts in the Middle East and Africa have always been accompanied by severe concerns (SaeediMeshkini, Qadir,2008). The United States intervened in the aftermath of 9/11 by taking a unilateral approach and waging war in Afghanistan and Iraq under the guise of fighting terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and securing the global space. Circumstances and events like this show that the new era cannot be considered calm, and the world will face recent crises in the 21st century.

9/11 was a direct attack on the United States, which shook the country like a shock and inevitably had a profound effect on the international system as well as on the internal developments of this administration. Following this incident, the United States pursued new diplomacy and policies, the basic strategy of which was its foreign policy in the post-9/11 era. Eliminating or at least reducing the Afghan society that fostered terrorist elements and establishing a liberal democratic value system in the shadow of institutionalizing liberal norms and values in Afghanistan could make this land a model for other countries in the region. Throughout its history, the United States has experienced and continues to experience all three models of state-building, nation-building, and simultaneously (state-building with nation-building). The military invasion of Afghanistan and the creation of a new power structure and government through the drafting and approval of a new constitution in this country is a clear example of state-building from above (Keyvan Hosseini, 2009 "A": 22-17). The dramatic changes in the international environment in recent decades have led to profound changes in how actors are exercised. In such a way, the container of the current world is narrowed for the use of power tools on a large scale. The world no longer resists the continuous ignition of the fires of bloody wars as in the past, so the use of soft power in various aspects over hard power has excelled to the extent that even the global superpower is not apolitical from paying serious attention to new methods of imposing the will in the age of communication and information (Shahramnia et al., 2012: 73); Therefore, the United States, as a superpower in the international

arena after the Cold War, has sought to expand its control over soft power in the global arena in the following ways, which are:

- Having multiple internal and external communication channels.

- Bringing socio-cultural traditions and ideas closer to the edge of the abyss

- A calm, scattered, and continuous movement to conquer public opinion by the media along with the people (not the media that intends to manage view) and the use of public diplomacy (Sajjadpour; Mehdizadeh, 2012: 88).

- Creating media news discourses inside and outside the country in different languages.

- Accept that people no longer have to use internal media and design programs that can take advantage of people's participation in higher affairs.

- Trust in people even in the face of harsh criticism.

- Paying attention to the design and reflection of programs that reflect the idea of globalization from localization (globalization of programs) (should look out of the outside window, not out of the inside window).

The US invasion is the fifth state-building process in Afghanistan's political history, which is an aspect of US activities that shows the significant impact of the international dimension of politics on the issue of Afghanistan.- Paying attention to the existence of a diversity of votes inside and its reflection outside (it is no longer the case that all society thinks the same is over), The presence of an assortment of opinions and the pluralism of votes is a strong point even in opposition to the government. Obstacles to government formation - nation-building in the aftermath of the US invasion of Afghanistan - Almost all of Afghanistan's neighbours oppose the continued presence of US forces in the form of military bases. The natural consequence of this is the severe scepticism of Afghanistan's neighbours about the situation in the country, and this scepticism will have its functions in bilateral and multilateral interactions. Creating distance or not building mutual trust is one of the results (Ansari, Farooq 2003).

Continued instability in Afghanistan and the continued activities of insurgent groups have created a shared sense among extremist groups in other countries, mainly in Central Asia. They will further stabilize the phenomenon, leading to a wave of unrest in the area.

- The continued presence of US troops in Afghanistan means strengthening the position of extremists and extremist factions in countries that support insurgent groups. This is an opportunity given to them by the US and increases regional instability and reduces. Security will be for the neighbouring countries.

- The presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan and the region will cause the tension and resolution of the Afghan problem to be long-term and cross-border and reduce the control of the government of this country, which has weak capabilities from the beginning and has internalized tensions inside Afghanistan. Its spread will increase.

- The process of new state-building is primarily due to the culture and content that has taken on a non-indigenous and Western dimension; Hence, it can be considered a tool to create and spread domestic and international violence and instability.

In general conclusion, it can be said that Afghanistan is one of the countries that has always been in trouble due to the existence and influence of governments and superpowers. Hence, the political history of this country and the nation-state-building process has become incomplete, which has endangered the political and social stability and security in this country, and this has consistently raised the possibility of its spread to neighbouring countries (Shamloo, Mehdi 2008). Other countries have made it possible; However, the nation-state-building process in this country has also been of non-indigenous and sometimes foreign origins, which has been imposed on this country, which can be seen everywhere in the historical scene of this country from the formation of Afghanistan to the present. The environmental and international impact has sometimes been so significant in this country that it has diminished and even erased the role of domestic elements and agents; however, these two elements, along with the aspects of the middle analysis level, play a complementary role in the sustainability and survival of the historical developments and events of this country. Gestalt effects can be seen in this country's affairs, especially the Cold War events. Noted. Therefore, the nation-state-building process in the new era has shown foreign interventions and endogenous aspects as in its early days. In this regard, it has brought consequences that can lead to instability in this country and the relationship. Strengthen politics with other countries, call on extremist groups, and turn it back into a critical point to overshadow other regions (Korski, Daniel 2009).

Of course, as stated, problems such as the continuation of violence in the structure of the country, political poverty, economic poverty, failure to solve the problem of the Taliban and the neo-Taliban, etc., in general, provide a basis for the continuation of some tensions within the system; As the situation in Afghanistan is still complicated and the goal of the Taliban has been to gradually replace the Taliban, which the United States has sought to reduce the security vacuum created after the Taliban through a bilateral security pact; However, the presence of the Taliban may indicate that the United States has not been able to remove this element from Afghanistan, and the United States, aware of this, has sought to establish relations with moderate Taliban (good Taliban) groups while sharing the Taliban in the future (Mousavi, Sidersoul 2008). The political situation in the country took them (the Taliban) out of the movement. It creepily contributed to the stability and security of the country by engaging in politics (albeit with democratic and pacifist features), thus creating a crisis in this regard. The government is nearing its end; however, this can backfire and lead to insecurity or instability, or it can perpetuate and institutionalize conditions of tension and instability in society.

Over the past 19 years, under President Hamid Karzai and President Ghani, Afghanistan has had a legal system and framework for governing. Progress has been made in restoring government authority and implementing development programs in some cases. However, this process has been accompanied by a general lack of effectiveness and accountability, making governance and good governance incapable. Lack of a clear national vision for Afghanistan's development and security Lack of coordination, technical capacity, patrimonialism, and the

weakness of civil and political institutions have been essential factors in the weakness of governance over the past 19 years.

Suppose we want to divide the regional actors in the state-building process in Afghanistan before 9/11 (Taliban era) in terms of influence and influence. In that case, we can provide the following model:

(1) Leading actors: Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and Afghan domestic groups

(2) Quasi-peripheral actors: The United States, Saudi Arabia, India, China, Central Asian countries, and the United Nations.

(3) Peripheral actors: The European Union, Japan, and others. It is necessary to explain a few points here. First, Iran and Pakistan have been identified as critical players in the Afghan crisis. These two regional powers have addressed Afghanistan's significant issues in recent decades. Secondly, although the political-military groups of Afghanistan, mainly due to the social and ethnic divisions in this country, are considered essential actors and should have been included in the group of leading actors because these groups are somehow in A proxy war was fought in favour of Iran and Pakistan, we have placed them in the territory of proxy actors. Finally, although the roles of the quasi-peripheral actors may be strong and weak about each other, we have put them in a row with a bit of condescension.

Third, the behaviour of influential countries in the Afghan crisis was regulated mainly to create domination, influence, and dependence. In this regard, based on the behaviour and actions of countries involved in the Afghan situation, the behavioural patterns of these countries can be divided in terms of nature as follows: Iran and Pakistan had the necessary influence in Afghanistan, But each tried to create more political and cultural power (Iran) or domination (Pakistan) by further expanding their influence. Pakistan's Afghanistan conquest policy can be seen in the formation of the Taliban and this group's adoption of a totalitarian approach. Iran's policy of creating dependence can be seen as strengthening Persian-speaking and Shiite groups and sharing their power. Appeared. Other actors have sought more influence in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of 9/11, one of the domestic actors, the Taliban, and its foreign ally, al-Qaeda, were removed from the Afghan political-military scene and replaced by moderate forces, primarily technocrats. The new party, whose social base is predominantly Pashtun, entered Afghanistan in the form of the two currents of Rome and Peshawar. The Roman movement led by Mohammad Zahir Shah enjoyed international support, and Pakistan supported the Peshawar movement led by Pir Said Ahmad Gilani. The appearance of Shah and Gilani, who have causal and relative relations with each other, are both parts of the moderate spectrum of Afghan political currents. The first change was eliminating an extremist force recognized by only three countries and replacing it with an average, technocratic power recognized by the international community. The Northern Coalition, one of the major players in the previous period, participated in the government during this period. This coalition no longer exists as in the past, and each of its member groups is now trying to gain a share of power by coordinating with current trends in Afghanistan. Although there is still some solidarity between the groups of this coalition and the countries that support them, this convergence seems to lead to a rupture and connection with other powers.

A Critical Perspective and Legal Review of the Afghan Presidential Election

Sovereignty in Afghanistan belongs to the nation; it is one of the ways of exercising electoral freedom. Presidential elections were the country's most critical type of elections in 2003 (Official Gazette, 2003). The president is the highest official and the head of the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Article 60). He is also the head of the government and has executive, judicial and legislative powers. These powers have given the president a special place in Afghanistan's legal system. He has been called "the highest official in the country, the chief executive officer, with the most political and administrative power (Abdul Ali Mohammadi 2012).

" Considering the importance of the presidency. In this part of the research, the Republic has tried to criticize the presidential election based on the constitution. Although the presidential election is one of the topics that most constitutional writers have addressed, the present study seeks to answer the central question: What are the gaps and shortcomings in the presidential election in the Constitution? What are the considerations regarding the conditions of the presidential candidates, and is it necessary to include other conditions? Is the term of the presidency four years or five years? Likewise, the type of presidential election system and its scenarios, and finally, the study of how early elections are held, constitute the sub-questions of this part of the research.

Conditions of Presidential Candidates

Although imposing restrictions on elected office seems contrary to the principles of democracy, it is impossible to leave the administration of society to everyone. Therefore, in different countries, considering presidential candidates' cultural, political, and social conditions, conditions such as (age, citizenship, gender, education, signature collection, etc.) have been determined (Abdul Wahid Niaz 2014).

The Afghan constitution stipulates that presidential candidates must be "Afghan nationals, Muslims and born to Afghan parents and have no citizenship of any other country; no less than 40 years old on the day of their candidacy; "Humanity, crime, or deprivation of civil rights have not been condemned.

In addition to the conditions stipulated in the Constitution, Article 73 of the 2016 Electoral Law provides other conditions for candidates for electoral seats, some of which also relate to presidential candidates who must submit a written application for registration as a presidential candidate. These conditions include registering a specific name and address, making a copy of a document identifying the candidate, information on non-conviction, age, health status, movable and immovable property, current and current residence, and last place of work. Similarly, the presidential candidate must provide a list of names, registration card numbers, and fingerprints of 100,000 voters, provided that at least 2% are from each province. (It is noteworthy that this number of IDs and voting cards have become mandatory to prevent those who are not widespread and have only run for fame or other reasons). If the presidential candidate is a government employee, in addition to the above conditions, he must submit an

official document of resignation from office. The candidate is also obliged to introduce and announce his two deputies to the Election Commission at the same time as his candidacy and to pay the precondition amount of one million Afghanis; this amount will be used if he wins or obtains at least ten per cent of the legal votes. Will be paid to the candidate in the first round of elections. For the sake of clarity, the conditions set out in the Constitution regarding the relationship between presidential candidates are discussed in detail below-

1. Citizenship

Can be a candidate. According to the constitution, one of the conditions for presidential candidates is that the candidate must have Afghan citizenship, be born to Afghan parents, and not have citizenship in another country. This means that if a presidential candidate acquires Afghan citizenship and is not returned to their Afghan parents, they are not eligible to run for president (Sarwar Danesh, 2012). Similarly, a person whose parents are of non-Afghan citizenship or citizenship, or even dual citizenship, can run for president. Mentioning "does not have the citizenship of another country" implies that the presidential candidate does not have the citizenship of another country at the time of candidacy, so if the presidential candidate leaves the citizenship of another country before registration and has only the citizenship of Afghanistan. It should be noted that according to the constitution, there are no restrictions on women running for president.

2 Being a Muslim

Being a Muslim is another condition for running for president of Afghanistan. The constitution only stipulates that one is a Muslim and not a follower of a particular religion, so there is no restriction on the candidacy of followers of the Twelver Shiite and Ismaili religions. However, religious minorities such as Hindus and Sikhs do not have the right to run for president because they do not practice Islam (Abdul Wahid Niaz 2012). Although some writers have considered this condition discriminatory, according to the constitution, the government of Afghanistan is the Islamic Republic, the official religion of the people is Islam, and no law should be against Sharia; therefore, ruling non-Muslims is against the explicit provisions of the constitution. It should be noted that a candidate being a Muslim does not need to be proven like a stateless person but must be proven otherwise.

3. Age

Completion of age - Annual age is religiously considered the age of intellectual maturity. According to the constitution, a presidential candidate must not be less than forty years old on the day of his candidacy. In addition to having the necessary experience, determining this condition is also rooted in religious beliefs and psychological issues. Psychologically, the age of forty is the beginning of maturity adulthood. With regard to the age condition of the president, it is debatable that the maximum age of the "presidential candidate" has not been determined; this gap allows older people with reduced mental capacity to enter the presidency, although, in the constitutions of most countries the maximum age of the president has not been determined. Still, considering the importance of this position, it is necessary to limit it to the full age of the president.

4. Not to be convicted of crimes against humanity

The presidential candidate should not have been convicted of crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity and their punishment are provided for in the Penal Code. According to Article 335 of the Penal Code, committing murder, torture, extermination, enslavement, expulsion or forced displacement of a population, imprisonment or severe deprivation of liberty contrary to the basic principles of international law, rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution Forced pregnancy, forced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence at the same level, persecution of any particular group or group for political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other reasons related to any of the These acts, or any other offense, fall within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and the final instrument of the Roman Diplomatic Conference, which is recognized worldwide as unlawful under international law, the forcible disappearance of persons, the crime of racism, and other inhumane acts intentionally inflicting grievous bodily harm or grievous bodily harm, or on mental or physical health, provided that the perpetrator deliberately and knowingly committed part of a widespread or organized attack on a civilian group is a crime against humanity (Abdul Wahid Niaz 2012).

In this case, what needs to be further debated is whether Afghan presidential candidates have committed crimes against humanity in the four rounds of the presidential election, especially in the 2009 presidential election, in which the penal code is in force. Have various reasons not been tried? Getting an accurate answer to this question requires a separate investigation, but what is clear is that although many candidates have been charged in the case, none of the presidential candidates has been convicted of crimes against humanity by the court. The existence of such a condition in the constitution in the case of presidential candidates prevents the commission of inhumane crimes by those who are trying to achieve the presidency. The provision of the body requires the establishment of the rule of law.

5. Not to be convicted of a crime

One condition that prevents him from running for president is not being convicted of a crime. According to Article 31 of the Penal Code, a crime is a crime punishable by lengthy imprisonment (more than 5 to 6 years), second-degree imprisonment (more than 16 to 20 years), and first-degree incarceration (more than 20 to 30 years) in this law. Year) or death sentence. Accordingly, if a presidential candidate has been sentenced to more than five years in prison by a court, his criminal act is considered a crime. According to the constitution, he cannot run for president.

6. Lack of deprivation of civil rights

The Constitution and the Electoral Law prohibit the deprivation of civil rights as obstacles to running for president. Still, the election law does not provide the necessary explanations regarding the prohibition of civil rights. According to the Penal Code, a person sentenced to more than ten years in prison or less than ten years for crimes against the state, public safety

and security, and crimes against humanity is deprived of rights and privileges, including running for office (article 62). In this case, using the penal code makes it possible to deduce the deprivation of civil rights, which is considered a subordinate punishment. Unless it has been restored by law or court, as a result, if a person is sentenced to more than ten years in prison or even to less than ten years in prison for crimes against the state, public safety and security, and crimes against humanity, they will be barred from running for president.

The Electoral Law also stipulates another condition under which persons who command or are members of illegal armed groups may not run as candidates. To establish the command or membership of individuals in armed criminal groups, a separate commission consisting of representatives of the Ministries of National Defense, Interior, General Directorate of National Security, and Directorate of Local Authorities, chaired by the head of the Complaints Commission, reviews the issue and makes the necessary decision. The Complaints Commission will review any complaints in this regard, and its findings will be final.

 Considering what was discussed above, at least two points should be considered regarding the conditions of the presidential candidates (Article 73). The first is that the Constitution does not provide for literacy and higher education for presidential candidates. Literacy, along with higher education and managerial ability, are urgent needs in running a country. Therefore, considering the issue's importance, especially since holding elections is financially costly and requires security measures, it is necessary to pay serious attention to this regard. Secondly, it is essential to follow more stringent standards than presidential candidates because paying one million Afghanis and collecting the names, registration card numbers, and fingerprints of one hundred thousand people is not difficult.

In contrast, the candidate may use this opportunity to gain fame or even run for office with the goal that none of the candidates will be able to get fifty-plus one in the first round. In particular, the situation can be improved in two ways; first, in addition to collecting names, registration numbers, and fingerprints, the primary identity card of one hundred thousand people is to be collected for registration. Secondly, increasing the amount of precondition money from one million Afghanis to at least five million is better. The above solutions may be considered contrary to the right to vote, which is accepted as one of the fundamental rights of citizens, but how can those who abuse this right be silenced?

Candidacy period and term of the presidency

The term and duration of the presidency are the critical issues discussed in the president's election. In democracies, the periodicity of power is one of the guaranteed principles of democracy because people can use this opportunity to reconsider their previous choices and consider someone else worthy of the presidency.

1. **Presidential term**

There is no consensus among constitutional experts on the re-election of the president. Some consider re-election unimpeded and even feel the president to have done an excellent job of fulfilling his legal duties, rewarding him for his superb service and political and social image, and encouraging his competencies. Others, however, see the repeated re-election of a person to the presidency as tempting to perpetuate and concentrate power and ultimately find it

unhelpful. Because it prevents the lotteries of other candidates and does not allow others and the most deserving to compete in a more or less healthy and equal competition with the president at the helm of power and to shed new blood in the arteries of the republic with their victory (Abolfazl Ghazi 2004). However, according to the accepted principles of modern democracy, the limitation of the presidency is now considered the main one (Article 72). The Afghan constitution recognizes a two-term presidency because no one can be elected president for more than two terms. 20 As can be seen, while acknowledging the two-term presidency, the Constitution does not explain the sequence. The president can run for president consecutively, but not if he does not run for office. Or, if the candidate does not win the election, the right to run and be elected for another round is reserved. But no person can run for president for more than two consecutive or alternate terms.

The US Constitution did not restrict the term of the presidency. Some countries do not prohibit the re-election of the President on an intermittent basis, meaning that if the President has been elected President for two consecutive terms, he can run for President again after a hiatus (article 114). Still, in practice,

2. Term of presidency

According to the second paragraph of Article 61 of the Constitution, the president's term of office ends on June 1, the fifth year after the election. Two important points can be discussed in this paragraph. The first point is that there are different opinions regarding the term of the presidency. Some of them consider the time of the presidency to be five years, but others think this term to be four years, except for the first term of the presidency (2016). This is the question that arises: is there any ambiguity in this case that has caused controversy?

To explain this, I consider it necessary to describe the presidency in detail in the following two tables:

The first term of the presidency: 2004 - 2009

At the beginning of the year	End of the year	Year
2004/9/22	2005/10/10	first year
2005/9/22	2006/10/10	second year
2006/9/22	2007/10/10	third year
2007/9/22	2008/10/10	fourth year
2008/9/22	2009 May	Fifth year

If it is observed that the term of the presidency in the first round has lasted nearly five years, the reason is that the first elections were held in 2004 and not the first of Gemini in the same year. The first of June of the fifth year, when the work of the president ends and the work of the new president begins, is the first of June of 2009, which is why the first term of the presidency covers nearly five years. But did. Is counting the year of the presidency in the

following terms also by the constitution? We assume that the elections, according to the set time, took place within 60 days before the first of June of the fifth year, and the president took office on the first of June of 2009, when the second term of the presidency will be completed and how many years Would you accept?

The second round of the presidency

At the beginning of the year	End of the year	Year
2009/5/22	2010/10/10	first year
2010/9/22	2011/10/10	second year
2011/9/22	2012/10/10	third year
2012/9/22	2013/10/10	fourth year
2013/9/22 The first day of the fifth year, the day of the end of the previous president, and the beginning of the new president		

One of the things that should be provided for in the constitution is a presidential term. Considering the above table, the time of the presidency, except for the first term, is four years. It's the fifth year that the previous president's term ends and the new president must begin his tour. It would be better to predict a period instead of the first of June in the fifth year of the year if, in the United States Constitution, this period is four years, in the French Constitution, five years, and in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran four years in opinions have been asked.

The Independent Election Commission (IEC), responsible for holding the elections, announced technical, financial, security, and climatic reasons and its unpreparedness for the 2009 presidential election as reasons for the delay in holding the polls. However, considering the explicit provision of the constitution regarding the timing of the presidential election and the responsibility of the Independent Election Commission to administer and monitor every election in the country, Delay in holding the election is a clear violation of the constitution and Justifies the holding of elections. On the other hand, the presidential election was not born from the first round according to the time specified in the constitution, and this practice continues to be unconstitutional.

The second point to be discussed is the last part of the second paragraph of Article 61, "It ends after the election," about which there is a great deal of disagreement. As discussed above, the President's term ends on June 1, the fifth year, and there is no ambiguity regarding this constitutional provision. In addition, the constitution stipulates that elections be held within thirty (30) to sixty (60) days before the end of the president's term to prevent the president from continuing to work after the deadline. However, the implementation of this ruling will be challenged when elections are not held on time. The Constitution does not provide such a clear solution. If, in the 2009 presidential election, the election was postponed. As a result, the issue was referred to the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution. The Supreme Court addressed

the problem in a session dated 1/8/2009 and clearly stated that according to the Constitution, the work of the President will end on June 1, 2009. However, due to the problems raised by the Independent Election Commission and the collective agreement of experts and presidential candidates who agree to postpone the elections to hold a healthy election (It will not be acceptable for the highest judicial body of the country to interpret or provide advice on a constitutional opinion based on the collective opinion of experts and the consent of the presidential candidates. To analyze the law, there are specific mechanisms that must be interpreted according to that law), according to the jurisprudential rule "Our survival is Ali Ma Kan" 33 He declared the president and his deputies in favour of the people and the system until the appointment of a new president, in the spirit and analysis of the constitution.

The third presidential election in 1393 was also postponed, and again, based on the theory of the Supreme Court, it was emphasized to continue the president's work. Similarly, the fourth presidential election, which was held following the time stipulated in the constitution before June 2009, was not fit for similar reasons. The Supreme Court decided to continue the president's work until the president's election and election. He issued his consent.

According to the constitution, the work of the president ends on the first of June of the fifth year, but mentioning the sentence after the election does not mean that the government does not pay attention to its responsibility for holding elections on time and the president consistently violates the explicit provision of the constitution. Continue to work after the fifth year by referring to the Supreme Court and citing the advisory theory or interpretation of that reference.

In any case, the question with the extension of the president's term of office is, is there any other legal solution if the presidential election is not held on time? In response, it should be said that the Constitution has a vacuum in this regard. At the time of amending the form, the circumstances in which the elections may have been held on time could not predict how the President of Jamhraar would continue to work.

According to the constitution, the continuation of the president's work from the first of June of the fifth year onwards is against the explicit provision of the body. Transitional or any other title looks better. Because the people's will is not involved in the formation of such a government, although the will of the people is not reflected in the continuation of the president's work, the president has at least previous legitimacy. In contrast, the interim or transitional government is absolute without a popular vote. Still, It will form the basis of a political agreement between the presidential candidates and the political parties, which has legal legitimacy and cannot and may even pave the way for a crisis. To fill this gap, the Electoral Law adopted in 2016 provided a solution, according to which it accepted the extension of the president's work. "They continue to work."[16] Including such a provision in the election law is contrary to the explicit requirement of the constitution because the constitution specifies the time of the presidential election and the term of the presidency.

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[16] Article 6, Article 104, Election Law.

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Another issue that needs to be clarified is that, according to the provision of the third paragraph of Article 61 of the Constitution, "elections for the appointment of a new president shall be held within thirty to sixty days before the end of the term of office of the President." Given Afghanistan's political, security, and social situation, this constitutional provision is problematic in several ways. First, holding elections in Afghanistan is not free of safety, technical, and political challenges. Hence, the constitutional deadline is "thirty to sixty days before the end of the President's term," i.e., the first month of pregnancy to 31 months of Saur, sufficient time. It is not for holding elections because the elections may go to the second round, in which case this problem will be doubled.

They were considering that June 1 is the fifth year of the end of the president's term and the beginning of a new period; thirty days before the first of June, the final results of the presidential election must be announced for the new president to take office on the first of June. On the other hand, according to Article 47 of the Electoral Law, the new president must take office thirty days after announcing the results. The implementation of this ruling also seems complicated in practice because to implement this ruling of the election law. The election results were reported until the end of the month of pregnancy, thirty days later, on the first of June, when the president should start his work. The entire election process must take place in the month of pregnancy.

The presidential election system and its scenarios

Representatives (Bijan Abbasi 2012). According to Article 61 of the Constitution, Afghanistan has a two-tier majority system. This means that the president is elected by free, public, secret,

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[17] Article 61 of the Constitution.

and direct voting with more than fifty per cent of the votes (absolute majority) whenever, in the first round, no candidate can win a majority of more than fifty votes. Won one hundred votes, the election for the second round will be held within two weeks from the announcement of the election results. Only two candidates who won the most votes (simple majority) in the first round will participate in this round.

It should be noted that how the president is elected affects the extent of the president's powers. When the people directly elect a president, he usually has more power because he has the degree of democracy, legitimacy, and strong support of the people. However, if the president is elected indirectly, i.e., through parliament or parliament and elected assemblies, his powers are limited[18]. A survey conducted by the Afghanistan Institute for Strategic Studies[19] on multi-republican competencies shows that most respondents want the president to be reduced[20]. Similarly, a 2012 United States Agency for International Development poll offers that 71 per cent of Afghan parliamentarians believe that the president is too powerful in the current Afghan political system. Nearly two-thirds of respondents, 64.8 per cent, think the president has too much power to make decisions about Afghanistan's electoral system. It has.

In any case, according to Article 61 of the Constitution, the type of electoral system for the Afghan presidential election is a two-term majority system.

1 Equality of votes

Secondly, concerning equality of votes, the question is, if there is a tie between two or more candidates who won the majority of votes in the first round of elections, how will the election round be held? There is no provision in the constitution in this regard. Still, the election law makes it clear that in the event of a tie between more than two candidates who received the most votes in the first round, the two candidates who meet the highest criteria, have a degree, academic degree, work experience in government or non-government offices, have a medal or honorary title, are appointed as candidates for the second round. In the second round of elections, the candidate who wins the majority of votes becomes the president. In the event of a tie between the candidates in the second round, the winning candidate will be announced as President based on the above criteria.[21] It should be noted that the requirements provided by the election law must be evaluated and approved at the time of candidate registration so that when invoking those criteria, the rival candidate cannot challenge the election process.

Given the issue's sensitivity, considering all aspects of it, it is necessary to anticipate a level of equality in the constitution. In addition, the criteria set for the status of equality of votes should

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[18] "In a country where there are no strong institutions, where the effects of opposition still exist, we have a centralized system," said Karzai, who called for the constitution to be concentrated in the presidency. We need one unit, not several centers of power "See Afghanistan Legal Education Fundamentals of Afghanistan, 98.

[19] The majority system is used in three forms: Absolute majority: means the majority of more than half of the voters, which is known as 50 plus one. Relative majority: The majority that is achieved over others, ie if someone has more votes than others, wins. Specific Majority: A special majority is in some cases more than or less than the absolute majority, such as two-thirds of the votes or three-fourths of the votes or 40 percent of the total votes and the like. For more details: Knowledge Server, Constitutional Law of Afghanistan, 588.

[20] Afghanistan Institute for Strategic Studies, Afghanistan Constitution and Society in Transition (Kabul: 2016), 66.

[21] Paragraphs 3 and 4, Article 45, Election Law.

be revised because the specified criteria cannot serve the public interest. For example, suppose one candidate has a doctoral degree but does not have work experience. How would it be preferred to another candidate with a bachelor's degree but twenty years of experience?

2 Death of one of the presidential candidates

The death of a presidential candidate is also one of the issues that the Constitution has considered. According to the sixth paragraph of Article 61 of the Constitution, "whenever one of the presidential candidates during the first or second round of voting or after the election and before "If the election results are announced, the re-election will be held following the provisions of the law." According to the explicitness of the constitution, if one of the presidential candidates in the first round or one of the two candidates who are eligible for the second round dies during the second round, re-elections will be held.

This point, in which the three cases, namely, the first round of voting, the second round of voting, and after the election, but before the announcement of the predicted election results, is ambiguous in several respects. First, the first and second rounds of voting include all stages of the election. The first round starts on the day of the candidates' registration and ends with the announcement of the final results. If none of the candidates receives more than 50% of the votes in this period, the second round of elections begins, which ends with the announcement of the final results of the polls. Therefore, the phrase "after the election and before the announcement of the election results" seems unnecessary. Secondly, it is stated in this paragraph that "during the first or second round of voting," the use of the word (voting) is not appropriate here because voting refers to the process of exercising the right to vote."[22] Therefore, it is better to use the first or second round of elections instead of the first or second round of voting. Unless the primary legislative intention is to use the word (vote) on the day of the election, all three cases mentioned in the constitution can be correct but are not free from criticism.

Away from the discussion of law and order and considering the situation, it can be said that the Afghan constitution has stated in the case of the death of a presidential candidate and re-election conditions that are not compatible with the situation in Afghanistan, it is acceptable that the right to choose One of the fundamental rights of citizens is to be respected and respected. Still, it would be better if, in the event of the death of one of the candidates in the second round of elections, instead of re-election, the election between the two candidates who received the most votes in the first round should be noted that the word "death" is used in the constitution, which includes natural death. Still, if one of the candidates is assassinated in the first or second round of elections, the constitution's position is clear.

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[22] If Article One Hundred and Six of the Constitution explicitly states that the quorum of each of the two National Assemblies shall be completed by a majority of the members present at the time of voting and its decisions shall be taken by a majority vote of the members present, unless otherwise specified in this Constitution. Did. Also consider Articles 81 and 92 of the Constitution.

3. Resignation of one of the presidential candidates

With the resignation of the presidential candidate, another critical issue is debatable. The constitution is silent on candidates withdrawing in the first and second rounds of elections. In contrast, the election law explicitly states that "if one candidate does not run in the second round, the other candidate will be declared the winner."[23] However, the question that arises, and the election law does not provide for such a situation, is whether the two candidates who received the most votes in the first round withdraw from the second round of elections. What is the solution?

It should be noted that the legitimacy of the president, who came to power due to the resignation of a rival candidate in the second round, is not free of criticism because, in this way, the right to vote is one of the fundamental rights of citizens. At the same time, the president may not have had the necessary popular support. In addition, given the importance and essential position of the presidency, whenever such a solution is envisaged, it should be envisaged by the constitution, not by election law. In the above cases, it is possible that a candidate will not be able to run in the elections due to other obstacles, such as being injured or other barriers, and the constitution is silent about such a situation.

4. Early presidential elections

According to the constitution, early elections are possible due to reasons such as resignation, dismissal, incurable illness, and the president's death. The form explicitly states that the first vice president assumes the powers and duties of the president in the event of the president's resignation, removal, or death or an incurable disease that prevents him from performing his duties. For more clarity in the above four cases, information is provided below.

5. Resignation of the President

One of the reasons for the early elections is the president's resignation. The president must personally announce his resignation to the National Assembly.[24] The purpose of the resignation of the President himself is to establish that the President has voluntarily agreed to leave the post without reluctance, coercion, or any other matter that impairs his consent.[25] It should be noted that the resignation of the President to the National Assembly does not mean that the National Assembly decides on his resignation, but only a declarative aspect because the

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[23] Article 5, Article 45, Election Law. It is noteworthy that in the 2009 elections, none of the candidates won more than 50 percent of the votes in the first round, and the second round of elections had to be held between President Hamid Karzai and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. However, due to Dr. Abdullah's cancellation of the run-off election, the IEC declared Hamid Karzai the winner.

[24] Article 3, Article 67, Constitution.

[25] Mohammad Ashraf Rasouli, Analysis and Critique of the Constitution, 109: 2.

President is at the head of all three branches. This means that, as in administrative law, the issue of the purpose of resignation is not raised concerning the president.

6. Dismissal of the President

According to Article 69 of the Constitution, the President is accountable to the nation[26] and the Wolesi Jirga. Charges against the President for crimes against humanity, national treason, or crime[27] may be filed (entered) by one-third of all members of the Wolesi Jirga. If this charge is confirmed by two-thirds of all votes of the Wolesi Jirga, the Wolesi Jirga shall convene a Loya Jirga within one month. Whenever the Loya Jirga approves the charge by a two-thirds majority of the total number of members, the president shall be removed from office, and the matter shall be referred to a special court.[28] The Special Court comprises the Speaker of the Meshrano Jirga, three Wolesi Jirga members, and three Supreme Court members to appoint the Loya Jirga. The lawsuit is filed by a person appointed by Loya Jirga, in which case the provisions of Article Sixty-seven[29] of the Constitution shall apply.[30]

It follows from the above constitutional provision that the president has only criminal responsibility towards the Wolesi Jirga; he has no political accountability. Similarly, it follows from the contrary meaning of Article Sixty-Nine that, apart from the crimes mentioned, the President will not be tried if he commits other crimes. While the president in the United States is prosecuted for treason, corruption, bribery, or other serious crimes,[31] On the other hand, according to the Shari'a decree, the President should be considered safe from committing crimes other than those mentioned above.

7. Death of the President

If the president dies for any reason, the vice president takes over the presidency, in which case early elections must be held within three months. Therefore, the death of the president will lead to early elections. In terms of time, having elections within three months seems impossible.[32]

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[26] There is no clarity in the constitution regarding the responsibility of the president to the nation, ie how the responsibility of the president to the nation can be clarified.

[27] It is noteworthy that crimes and crimes against humanity were discussed in detail in previous discussions. For information on national treason, see Article 238 of the Penal Code.

[28] According to Article 111 of the Constitution, the Loya Jirga is constituted in three cases: deciding on issues related to independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and the supreme interests of the country; Amendment of the provisions of this Constitution; And the trial of the President in accordance with the provisions of Article 69 of the Constitution.

[29] In the event of the resignation of the President or the death of the President or an incurable disease which prevents him from performing his duties, the First Vice President shall assume the powers and duties of the President.

[30] Article 69, Constitution.

[31] The United States House of Representatives can prosecute the President on the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission or by a simple majority, and it is up to the Senate to hear the case, which is chaired by the President of the Supreme Court. See: Dr. KamaluddinHarisiNejad, Comparative Constitutional Law (Tehran: Aydin Publications, 2008), 161. Last year, the case against Donald Trump was handled by the US Senate.

[32] Article 3, Article 67, Constitution.

Because of the above issues, to improve the conditions of the presidential candidates, the term and period of the presidency, and how to hold early elections, the following suggestions are presented:

1. The constitution does not provide for literacy, higher education, and the managerial ability of presidential candidates, which must be taken into account, and the precondition must be at least five million Afghanis.

2. One of the things that should be foreseen in the constitution is a presidential term; it would be better to predict a presidential time in the year.

3. The constitution is silent on withdrawing presidential candidates, but the election law addresses this issue. It is suggested that this be fully enshrined in the body.

4. The constitution considers the state of death of candidates. Still, the body's position is unclear about the assassination of candidates in the first or second round and situations such as injuries, injuries, and other obstacles.

5. Early presidential elections in the event of the president's resignation, dismissal, death, and incurable illness are provided for in the constitution. However, the election law does not set rules for holding early elections and their conditions, and specific rules must be set.

6. The constitution and election law do not provide a realistic timeline for the presidential election, as 60 days are not enough to hold the election, even though the president must take office thirty days after the results are announced. This is even the case with the run-off and early elections. Therefore, it would be better to consider a realistic timeline for holding presidential elections in terms of duration and climate.

7. The constitution does not provide a specific solution to the situation in which the presidential election could not be held on time for various reasons, so it is necessary to pay attention to this issue when amending the constitution. Although the 2016 election law recognizes the continuation of the president's work, this issue must be clearly stated in the body.

Reforming Afghanistan's electoral system and possible options for reform

In September 2005, there were approximately 6.5 million Afghan votes, which, despite significant shortcomings, was the most accessible and most competitive election that Afghans have ever experienced. Five years later, 2.5 million fewer votes were cast in the second Wolesi Jirga election, despite the election results being disputed for months by the election commissions and the judiciary. At the same time, the legislature's policies have been affected by the lack of a robust party system and strong individualism, and the Afghan parliament has not been able to play its role in decision-making properly. This part of the research discusses how the current parliament members are elected and considers the current system a significant obstacle to the development of adequate representation, which is deemed necessary for the quality of democracy. The method we are discussing is a single non-transferable vote. While the system is not the biggest problem in undermining democracy in Afghanistan, this section argues that it exacerbates existing problems and the development of broad political parties and

coalitions that can address policymaking to address significant challenges. The current issue is prevented.

The argument on this issue is made following two specific principles of political science literature. First, a strong legislature is essential to a functioning and efficient democracy.[33] A strong parliament can propose policies and obtain the necessary support, and after negotiations with the executive branch, approve them and monitor the performance of the said body, other institutions, and administrative bodies effectively and efficiently. Second, influential political parties and other stable coalitions represent the essential elements for solid legislatures. (The legal requirements and cultural influences of groups as official political parties vary from country to country. Specific historical legacies In some countries (especially in post-communist countries, such as Afghanistan), people's perceptions of parties are distorted. In such countries, even legislators enter the election campaign under several common principles, and as soon as they are elected, they try to fulfil those principles. In the present section, such coordination is seen as evidence of practical legislative cooperation, regardless of whether the coalition wants to present itself as a political party).

Coalitions and political parties are characterized by creating policies and mobilizing voters to support those policies. When Legislators enter parliament to pursue proposed guidelines, and in a parliament with hundreds of representatives, no one can tangibly follow a procedure or the existence of coherent and orderly political coalitions. It has been seen that modern democracies, which have been around for years, cannot function effectively at the national level without political parties. Without political parties, it will be complicated for voters to know how to vote. Leading to a change in national policies, the present study makes it clear that the electoral system of a non-transferable vote is an obstacle to democracy in Afghanistan by preventing the development of influential political parties in the Wolesi Jirga.

This part of the research identifies other problems related to the electoral system of non-transferable votes. As used in Afghanistan, the system has encouraged some confused candidates on the ballot, which has led to a sharp rise in voter demand, resulting in many votes being cast for candidates. They do not represent the people. The fragmented nature of the campaign in Afghanistan, which stems from a non-transferable single-vote electoral system in provincial constituencies, highlights the slight difference between successful and losing candidates. This leads to corruption and vote buying, which we saw in the Afghan elections. Given the dire security situation in Afghanistan, differences in the vote outcome are susceptible. Finally, the dynamics of the non-transferable single-member electoral system in the field of seats for women make the majority of female lawyers in parliament illegitimate so that female candidates can be elected in proportion to the number of male candidates in proportion to male candidates. Win the election.

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[33] "National Councils and Presidents: The Design of the Constitution and Electoral Dynamics" (Cambridge University Press, 1992) by Matthew Sugart and John Kerry; "Strong Legislature, Strong Democracy" Journal of Democracy 17, No. 1 (2006): 20-5 by Stephen Fash; Guide to the National Legislature: World Survey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

The second part of this pathology presents the strategic complexity of the non-transferable single-vote electoral system compared to other widely used electoral systems[34]. The third section describes Afghanistan's experience in using the electoral system in comparison with other countries that have used the electoral system, how the electoral system will be approved by revealing a single non-transferable vote in Afghanistan, and the specific results of the electoral system. Presents 2005, 2010, and 2018 Wolesi Jirga elections.

Ghazni province, and an overall assessment of the quality of Afghanistan's parliamentary elections. This part of the research includes discussions on how votes create representation, the challenges voters face with ineffective voting in the non-transferable electoral system, the development of coalitions and political parties in the Wolesi Jirga, women's representation, the problematic issue of Wolesi Jirga elections. Finally, this study proposes electoral reforms, taking into account the obstacles in the Afghan political space. In this regard, it evaluates the Afghan Electoral Commission's June 2012 amendments to the Electoral Law. It offers two alternatives that could reduce these shortcomings caused by the non-transferable single-vote electoral system.

Electoral system of a non-transferable single vote, its strategy, and complexity

Mechanically, the electoral system is a straightforward, non-transferable single vote. Each voter casts one vote for one candidate, and the candidate who receives the most votes wins several seats in a constituency.[35] However, strategically, the non-transferable single voice of a system is highly complex. No other electoral system has stood in the way of developing political parties in parliament or their ability to support voters.

Except for the non-transferable single-vote electoral system, other systems enable groups of candidates to elect representatives to the chambers of parliament so that support for one candidate can assist the group as a whole. This is true of proportional electoral systems [*36](used in most democracies). In electoral transfer systems[*37](for example, in Australia and Ireland) and the bloc electoral system, candidates are allowed to vote for multiple candidates (for example, in several Arab countries)[*38]. Co-voting is such that a coalition expects to gain a degree of representation, given the extent of support for constituencies, and enjoys the general

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[34]"Why Political Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America" by John H. Aldrich Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) "Creating Democratic Institutions: (The Party System in Latin America" by Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) "Arab Spring Electoral System Design" Journal Democracy 22, No. 4 (2011) 36-47 by Andrew S. Reynolds and. John M Carey.

[35] This issue is so complex that according to the electoral system, non-transferable single votes are reserved for nomads and women with special seats and quotas. Let us now discuss the strategic complexity of the first version of the non-transferable single-vote electoral system.
[36] According to the PR system, the parties present their list of candidates to the voters at the national or district level, and the voters vote for the parties and occupy the seats in proportion to the votes obtained.
[37] According to the vote transfer system, voters select candidates based on their preferred rank in single or multiple constituencies.
[38] According to the bloc's electoral system, voters can vote for candidates in proportion to the overall number of seats available. The candidates who get the most votes occupy those seats.

support of other coalition members. Because joint voting is not available in the non-transferable single-vote electoral system, any desire for collective action is not successful among Wolesi Jirga candidates.

Under a non-transferable single-vote electoral system, a coalition or political party can gain popular support if it meets the following three conditions:

1. Can accurately predict the amount of support.

2. Given the above amount, nominate the correct number of candidates.

3. Encourage voters to distribute their votes evenly to candidates.

Making a mistake in one or more of the above cases will result in losing coalition votes. If the coalition overestimates its support or nominates more candidates, the coalition votes will be lost, and the candidates will not be able to compete. If voters vote for one candidate more, the other candidates are likely to fail. If the coalition nominates a few candidates, it will win fewer seats despite attracting many voters.

Estimating voter support ahead of time is complex, even in large democracies with stable political parties that can achieve voter loyalty. However, in the case of Afghanistan, there is not even the first issue of electoral cooperation in the light of records and information that can measure the expectations of a political party or coalition in a given province.*

Estimating voter support ahead of time is complex, even in large democracies with stable political parties that can gain voter loyalty. However, in the case of Afghanistan, there is not even the first issue of electoral cooperation in the light of records and information that can measure the expectations of a political party or coalition in a given province.

The non-transferable electoral system is a solid barrier to the distribution of votes among the coalition. Under this system, candidates can individually increase their total votes because victory in the election depends on the total number of votes obtained. A vote is a vote that is obtained from the support of opponents or supporters. The non-transferable single-vote electoral system strongly encourages competition between future coalitions because they all want to attract the same voters. Thus, the system reduces coordination among politicians who can develop credible political parties, further strengthening political individualism and the "everyone for themselves" strategy.

As constituencies grow, so does the non-transferable single-vote electoral system damage. In countries where the electoral system is used, the number of seats in a constituency is less than ten. In Afghanistan, there are two seats in some provinces, such as Nimroz, Nuristan, and Panjshir, but in some regions, such as Kabul, it reaches 34 seats.

One of the problems in this regard is the large number of candidates. Some candidates can win with very few votes in constituencies where many candidates are candidates. This has led to an increase in demand due to the election victory despite winning fewer votes, thus encouraging more candidates to run in the elections. For candidates, this can be seen as a lottery because the gap between winning and losing candidates is small, and the formation of the legislature in various elections is likely to fluctuate sharply. At the same time, voters may receive a ballot

paper containing hundreds of candidates, which makes it challenging to identify and determine the candidate. For example, the Kabul election ballot in 2005 had 400 candidates, and in 2010, 660, and in 2018, 804 candidates were on the ballot. While voters may be divided into two possible associations, the logistical challenge of dividing votes into two, three, four, or more associations are also tricky. In addition to many candidates, barriers to cooperation increase when hundreds of candidates compete with each other. The greater the obstacles, the greater the support for a coalition.

The electoral system, the non-transferable single vote, and Afghanistan's experience with it

Given the many shortcomings, it is not surprising that the non-transferable single-vote electoral system is seldom used in the election of legislators from other democracies. The plan was used in Japan during the occupation by the United States between 1948 and 1993. During this period, the electoral system of the non-transferable single vote was severely criticized and eventually became the proportional system/member of the single constituency (SMD). Japan's election planners found that the complexity of the non-transferable single-vote electoral system increased as the number of candidates increased, thus limiting the number of candidates in constituencies from three to five. In such constituencies, the party's Japanese politics established orderly systems among significant parties (especially the ruling Liberal Democratic Party) to distribute campaign money among candidates, cash, and gifts to citizens to encourage equal voting. Elections in Japan were so costly that election spending was ten times higher than that of the US Gangs, a series of campaign money scandals coupled with enormous campaign spending. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, T overthrew Japanese political leaders and parties, eventually leading to reforms, and the electoral system became a single, non-transferable vote (Margaret McKean and Ethan Sheiner 2000).

The non-transferable single-vote electoral system was used in Taiwan's legislative elections in partially democratic elections from 1960 to 1990. Like Japan, it became a proportional electoral system in Taiwan. In Jordan, King Hussein's manipulation of the electoral system in 1993 led to the use of a single non-transferable electoral system for a multi-chamber constituency to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from mobilizing voters to select some candidates (Andrew Reynolds and Georgette Elket 1997). In the next election, further changes to Jordan's electoral law introduced an electoral system in which the electoral system was non-transferable and could not be identified by election experts. The overwhelming majority of the country's political parties were satisfied with the system they did not have. In 2015, the government reformed its electoral system and replaced the previous one with a proportional representation system.

Based on 40 years of experience using the non-transferable electoral system, it can be concluded that it is manageable in certain circumstances. Still, in a democracy, this system cannot turn votes into effective representation. While the electoral system uses a single, non-electoral ballot in the country, such as the Petkiran Islands, Afghanistan is the only major country that uses the electoral system.

Adoption of a non-transferable electoral system in Afghanistan

The emergence of a non-transferable single-vote electoral system in Afghanistan was accidental. The establishment of the system is based on widespread mistrust of communist-era political parties and civil wars, misunderstandings of the effects of individual votes on individual candidates in multi-chamber legislative constituencies, and possible government strategies to limit the emergence of regular and cohesive opposition. In 2004, the United Nations proposed a proportional system as the most appropriate system for the Wolesi Jirga but was rejected by an Afghan cabinet. After a cabinet minister did not correctly explain the proportional system proposed by the United Nations, President Karzai transformed the balanced approach into a non-transferable single-vote electoral system in which voters select candidates, not parties, lists. In the political bloc, the candidates can not show their party affiliation on the ballot papers (Andrew Dinalds,2006). The Electoral Law, passed by legislative decree, states that voters must vote for candidates instead of political parties. While Mr. Karzai's reluctance to talk about political parties is said to be logical and understandable, the passage of a single-vote non-transferable electoral system (at least support for the continuation of the system after 2005) is a strategic calculation to weaken political parties as potential opposition political sources go" (Andrew Wilder 2006)

Results of the use of the non-transferable single-vote electoral system in Afghanistan

In light of previous experience using the non-transferable single-vote electoral system in other countries, Reynolds and Wilder discussed how this system could be effective in Afghanistan. They enumerated the negative consequences of this system (Andrew Wilder and Andrew Reynolds 2004). Using a similar framework, Ibn Bakhsh examines and analyzes how a non-transferable single vote played a role in the upcoming 2005, 2010, and 2018 legislative elections: Turning votes into effective representation, the ability of voters to vote effectively and clearly, Establishing a stable party system and promote active women in parliament.

Turning the ballot into an effective representative of the Wolesi Jirga in 2005 and 2010 was not supported by most Afghan voters. In 2005, two million total votes were cast for the winning candidates (32%), and two-thirds of the votes were cast for the losing candidates. This also happened in the 2010 elections. 37% of the votes went to the winning candidates, and 63% of the votes were lost. Compared to the new and prosperous democracies, the number of lost votes is very high. However, in Iraq's first general election in January 2005, only 5 per cent of the vote was lost; That figure stood at just 1 per cent of the vote in South Africa's first democratic election in 1994. Two-thirds of the lost votes are less than the number because the extra ballots given to the winning candidate are lost (Martin Van Bejert 2008). In contrast, in the ballot or PR systems, coalitions of top-rated candidates also benefit from that kind of support. With this in mind, almost three per cent of the actual votes in the Afghan election will not become any representation.

The main problem with the non-transferable electoral system in Afghanistan's elections is that it poses significant obstacles to the effective representation of votes. Although some voters understand the legal obligation of lawyers, which is to pass laws and oversee the functioning

of the legislature, the majority of them, and even the lawyers themselves, are assigned to the tribes, groups, and communities that support them. They know they belong. This allows lawyers to direct resources and assistance to their respective areas and even perform other tasks, such as resolving disputes and trying to allocate university seats. This leads to fragmentation and individualism in electoral policies, so people choose well-known candidates. In addition, Afghanistan's provincial constituencies, with a lack of strong political parties and a global ideology, have led to local representation. This has created a sense of disenfranchisement among some unrepresented people (NoheKaborn 2010).

All three recent parliamentary elections have shown that, as expected, the electoral system will turn a single non-transferable vote into a lottery. In 2005, the first seat in each province won with about 11.5 per cent of the total vote and the last heart with 5.7 per cent of the total vote (in Kabul, the previous lawyer to win the election won about 0.5 per cent of the vote). In the 2010 election, the voice was even more fragmented, with the first winning candidate in each province receiving less than 10 per cent of the vote. The similarities in the 2005 election separated only 864 votes from the first winning candidate and the last winning candidate (except for the female candidate who won by quota and with fewer votes), reducing the figure to 622 votes in the 2010 election. Given the electoral irregularities and manipulation of the 2018 campaign, this vote difference could call into question the results—another result of this election. The results of the election are so unpredictable that the majority of the winning candidates in 2005 lost the next election (out of 194 candidates who re-entered the election campaign, 80 to 93 of them were able to retain their seats, and this statistic in the 2018 election There was also a profound change.[39]) Uncertain election results have caused suspicion and unfair elections and the whole process as a whole (Kaborn and Anna Larson 2011).

Effective votes

Evidence suggests that despite the Afghan Election Commission's efforts to make ballot papers available to illiterate people using images and symbols, the majority of Afghans, due to a large number of candidates and ballot papers in the form of posters, The electoral system creates a non-transferable single vote, unable to identify candidates. Due to the high level of illiteracy among women, this issue seems more tangible among female voters.[40] Similarly, most candidates just entering the political arena have difficulty communicating with voters about their identification on the ballot. These problems have caused the number of lost votes in the 2005 and 2010 elections to remain slightly lower in 2018. In 2005, 5 per cent of the ballots were returned because 2.9 per cent were incorrectly marked, and another 2.1 per cent of white ballots were cast in the ballot box. While invalid ballots (excluding ballots cast for fraud) fell to 3.2 per cent, both are very high compared to other countries' elections. Invalid ballots were

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[39] This discrepancy shows that there are many differences in the information about the Afghan elections that are reported by different individuals and institutions. Re-elected members of parliament in the report "Reducing Representative Governance" (Larson and Caborn) 80; In the Afghanistan Development Report (Bin Smith) (Library of the House of Representatives: London) 88 people; In the report of the "Final Report of the International Election Observation Mission in Afghanistan in 2010" (Bethesda, International Organization for Democracy, 2011) 87 people; And 93 people in the report of the 2010 Wolesi Jirga elections in Afghanistan.
[40] Gender Unit of the Afghan Independent Election Commission, 2010, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Lessons Learned from Women's Participation in Afghanistan's 2009 Elections. Kabul

less than 1 per cent in South Africa's first election, 1.1 per cent in Iraq in January 2005, and about 2.4 per cent in Liberia's November election.

Create a party system

Because candidates were not allowed to show their party affiliation on the ballot in the first parliamentary elections, the non-transferable single-vote electoral system was expected to delay the development of a stable party system, highlighting political divisions in Afghanistan and the legislature. The results of the 2005 and 2010 elections confirmed these concerns. As noted, political parties are integral to a country's democratization. It is affiliated with a parliament characterized by individual, unstable, unaccountable policies. Therefore, under the current system, political parties do not have enough oxygen to grow well enough, raising concerns. Give.

In the 2005 election, 16 per cent of the 2,800 candidates represented registered political parties, and party candidates won less than one-third of the seats in the House of Representatives. However, in the 2010 election, one in ten of the 2,600 candidates belonged to political parties. While the new law, passed in 2009, allowed political parties to display party symbols on ballot papers, they had to register with the Ministry of Justice before doing so. Due to the complexities of registration, only five political parties could complete the registration process before election day. This issue was not widely used in the 2018 elections either, or some candidates, given that their political activities in Aqaba were found to belong to a specific party. Still, their party logo was not included in the ballot papers.

In the 2005 election, Andrew Wilder identified 33 parties, the Coalition and the Organization, the largest of which was Younes Qanuni, the party of the New Afghanistan, which won 25 parliamentary seats. The new Liberal Democratic coalition of 14 parties won seven seats, while the left-wing parties won six. The bloc supporting President Karzai consisted mainly of small mixed political groups, including figures from the Northern Alliance and leaders of the communist era and jihadist organizations. Parliament 2010 was chaotic, with less than one-third of lawyers affiliated with political parties and coalitions. In 2005, 93 lawyers (37%) were independent or affiliated with minor parties; in 2010, the figure rose to 155 independent lawyers (62%). The total number of seats shows that pro-Karzai lawyers remained the same between 2005 and 2010; parties and coalitions opposed to the president's policies lost half of their hearts. But lawyers whose loyalty is vaguely increased by about 50%.

Through various studies of Afghan elections, researchers such as Kaborn and Larsen have shown how political parties in Afghanistan have been severely damaged by the current system, both in the ballot box and in parliament. The researchers showed how weak parties and organizations have led to inefficient procedures that have led to a lack of coordination and support for candidates in the election and their ability to campaign strategically in a non-single-vote system (Anna Larson 2010). They also found that some candidates wanted to increase their party affiliation to get votes in various constituencies and ultimately strengthen their chances of winning as individuals." This ambiguity has also limited the development of solid groups in the Wolesi Jirga because most lawyers do not want to take a particular political position permanently. Political instability benefits the president because he mobilized sources

of support to gain lawyers during important voting. Finally, the large number of seats in parliament has led lawyers to form strong blocs and block legislative strategies.

If we see a robust party system in Afghanistan, the shortcomings and problems of a non-transferable single system will become more apparent. But given the incentives of the electoral system in Afghanistan, what if political parties started to make progress? In this case, the electoral system made the non-transferable single vote even more difficult for parties with strong popular support.

Women in the Wolesi Jirga

Afghanistan's election law allocates two seats in each province (a total of 68 seats, including 3 out of 10 nomadic seats) to female candidates. In practice, these seats are based on the proportion of the population in the provinces, ranging from 1 to 9 seats in Kabul province. The quota of seats allocated in the first place by the female candidate who has won the most votes does not take into account that the female candidate has won the most votes compared to the successful male candidate (i.e., if a female candidate in a province If more votes are cast than the male candidate, his voice will be counted in the same quota seat) (Oliver Luff,2012).

Women's political advances have been dramatic compared to their repression during the Taliban, Mujahideen, and even earlier 1990s under other regimes. Over the past decade and a half, the mechanism for allocating or allocating seats to women has seen remarkable success. In 2005, 68 women were elected to parliament, the highest number in Asia, despite fears that giving women seats in parliament, compared to their male counterparts and rival candidates, who won fewer votes, could anger men, despite the opposition to women's participation in life. In general, this system has not been challenged by any faction in all three rounds of elections. In all three election games, women have shown that they can compete side by side with male candidates, and in some cases, they have been even more successful than men despite their poor circumstances. Nineteen women (just under ten per cent of all members of parliament) won enough votes in the 2005 election to run for parliament without a quota, up from 18 in 2010. In the 2005 elections, Fauzia Gilani won the highest number of votes in the western province of Herat despite extreme male candidates backed by the warlords. In the 2010 elections, women topped the list in Nuristan, Badakhshan, Farah, and Nimroz provinces. In the latter region, Nimroz, a female candidate, was able to run for second place and win the remaining "open" seats in the province, bringing the number of seats held by women to 69 this year. This statistic led to the candidacy of 418 women in the 2018 parliamentary elections, of which 70 women entered the Afghan parliament.[41]

However, while the 2005 election saw great strides in women's participation and was primarily maintained in the 2010 election, adequate women 's involvement went far beyond their legislative participation. As Ms Wordworth points out, there have been various factors that have prevented women from being present in Parliament to mobilize women for their common interests. One of the most important factors was the lack of political blocs in parliament to come together on collective positions. The reason for this was the non-transferable single-vote

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[41] Reduction of Representative Governance, 2010 Parliamentary Elections in Afghanistan and Its Distorting Impacts, Kabul, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2011.

electoral system. Brin added that political instability and individual policies formed in the absence of such groups have added to the problem (Kaborn and Anna Larson, 2007). Another researcher named Lef Ayatollah has suggested that the electoral system has restricted the non-transferable single vote of female candidates so that they do not campaign on gender-related work programs. This is because in the current local political environment and where "acquaintance" is critical, forming coalitions among women in a larger area means that fewer resources have been used compared to gaining the support of local (male) elders who can create large groups. Provide votes to candidates based on regional solidarity (Oliver Loof, 2011).

How accessible and fair were the 2010 and 2005 elections, and what lessons were learned from the election process with the SNTV system

Although there were profound shortcomings in the administrative and political process of the 2005 elections, the quality of free or fair elections in the 2010 elections reached its lowest point.[42] It is possible that the country's slide into violence and the spread of corruption and supportive policies that took place in the early years disrupted the election, even though it was part of any electoral system. However, it was also strongly possible that the incentives that the non-transferable single vote produced for the corruption of the electoral system would make matters worse again. A total of 2,000 complaints of electoral fraud, as well as 1.3 million votes in the 2010 election, were annulled, in fact, 25 per cent of the total and more than the number of invalidated ballots in the previous year's presidential election, of which There was criticism (Goodson, 2005).

The non-transferable electoral system (SNTV) was chosen for Afghanistan when the country was in transition. Occasionally, Afghans and the international community, and even those who recommended using this electoral system in 2005, have expressed concern about the suitability of this system for Afghanistan, saying that it is a post-election electoral system. In this country, it should have been considered and reformed. The results of this electoral system have been what some have doubted. During its first seven years in office, the Wolesi Jirga, or Afghan House of Representatives, has shown that it is a mechanism for trade, customer service, the emergence of coalitions, and a place where people with not-so-good pasts have dramatically dominated the country's future (Berman et al., 2019). The new Liberal Democrat and Progressive Parties have faced severe obstacles in conveying their messages and choosing candidates. As expected, women have been unable to mobilize effectively on their common interests. President Karzai's team may have hoped that the electoral system would delay the emergence of new political parties, fragment opposition political parties, and increase the ability of influential people in the provinces to support and elect their supporters in parliament, Weaken. Perhaps President Karzai's ideal scenario was for a loyal Pashtun bloc to emerge with this electoral system, with the executive backed by the legislature (Callen & Long, 2015). Although this electoral system helped to disintegrate the opposition and prevent the formation of new political parties, this electoral system also led to the disintegration of the foundation in support of President Karzai in the absence of a united party within the whip. As in the last three

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[42] "Final Report of the International Election Observation Mission in Afghanistan 2010" (Bethesda, International Organization for Democracy, 2011)

presidential elections, the help of the majority for the "pro-government" group has often been fluid and unreliable (WEIDMANN & CALLEN, 2013).

Was. The electoral system of the non-transferable single vote was adapted with many mistakes in this country. It was a blow to the millions of Afghans who deserved a transparent system for electing and appointing the first democratic parliament in their country. Suppose the same method is used in the next few rounds of elections. In that case, there is reason to believe that the fragmentation and intellectual constraints of the legislature will continue and that Parliament as a whole will not be very effective in defining and protecting the national interests of this country. And the candidates who reach parliament seats through bribery and coercion will continue. Without economic, social, and organizational change, no electoral system can ever turn a non-liberal form of government into a democracy. Likewise, given the current situation, it must be borne in mind that under any electoral system, there will likely be corruption and irregularities in the elections. An adequately organized PR system reduces the risk of fraud and irregularities during the election. And effectively encourages the emergence of new political parties. And prevents wrongdoings during Afghanistan's 2005, 2010, and 2018 Wolesi Jirga elections (Dadabaev, 2020).

Mixed PR system and non-transferable single vote (SNTV - PR)

In terms of the number of Wolesi Jirgas, it will have the same 249 seats. One hundred fifty-nine members of parliament from across the provinces will be elected based on a single non-transferable electoral system, as in the 2010, 2005, and 2018 elections.

In this hybrid system, the number of members elected from each province based on the non-transferable single-vote electoral system will be approximately two-thirds of the number selected in the 2005, 2010, and 2018 elections. (For example, in Kandahar province, instead of 11 people, there are seven people; in Takhar province, six people instead of 9 people, etc.). At least two seats will be reserved for each section. In this hybrid system, the constituency of Kabul province will be divided into three parts. Kabul A, Kabul B, and Kabul Province, each with seven seats, will have a single non-transferable vote under the electoral system. Kabul will have a total of 21 seats, not 33 seats. The rest of these seats will be selected through the PR list electoral system.

Similarly, Herat province is divided into Herat city and Herat province. These adjustments significantly improve the size of constituencies and are likely to reduce the excessive number of candidates and the fragmentation of the polls that existed in previous elections. Under the hybrid system, only seven provinces will have more than six seats, and all constituencies will have less than ten seats in the non-transferable single-vote system (Ghadiri, Sara T., 2010).

Eighty (35 ٪) members of the Wolesi Jirga will be selected from a national list on a proportional basis. Any group or coalition of candidates from political parties, associations, or official groups can be included in these lists. Candidates can run independently or as a member of a group or list (Giustozzi, 2014). The seats in the PR list are then distributed based on the total number of votes cast by the candidates on each list in the non-transferable single-vote electoral system. As in the 2005, 2010, and 2018 elections, voters will use a single ballot for the constituency candidates using only a non-transferable electoral system. That vote will

determine the outcome of the electoral system's non-transferable single vote. It will also count if that vote was cast for a candidate who participated in the PR coalition to determine the popularity of the national lists.

- As in the 2010, 2005, and 2018 elections, ten seats will be allocated to nomads.
- Sixty-eight seats are reserved for women. Its 48 seats will be elected at the provincial level, as in the previous three rounds, but another 20 seats will be selected from the national lists.

This system has already been tested and is the democratic way to elect a national parliament. The same hybrid systems are used in over thirty countries, including over one billion people. These hybrid systems include components of the non-transferable single-vote electoral system and proportional lists of the PR system.

There are specific reasons why such a hybrid system is necessary for the needs of the country's young democracy:

- Small constituencies in provinces with low voter turnout reduce the complexity of ballots.
- Such a system dramatically reduces the level of "lost votes" and makes Afghan voters feel their vote could change. In the proposed method, the number of votes cast for the losing candidates will be less, and even the " parties " failed candidates will help their colleagues and strong candidates in the national list to win the election.
- This system will pave the way for the formation of parties and encourage groups working on common interests to position themselves within the framework of political organizations.
- Independent candidates can still run in the electoral system in a non-transferable single-vote system. In this system, fewer members of parliament are elected from the provinces, thus at least paving the way for independent candidates to enter parliament, which is famous. It is more conducive to representing the people, although, in the short term, it creates the conditions for victory for those with access to the sources and means of violence.

Hybrid and alternative system: Vote Limited-PR electoral system:

Another alternative system that can be suggested is the hybrid PR system with limited votes. For voters and election organizers, this system is the more accurate hybrid system proposed above. While preserving the system's benefits, it reduces the barriers created by the electoral system to form non-transferable single-vote coalitions and political parties. But the only difference is that instead of voting for one candidate in a non-transferable single voting system, in this hybrid system, voters can give priority to two candidates on the ballot to be elected. As explained in the discussion of the SNTV-PR hybrid system, limited votes are cast because, in this electoral system, a voter can launch more than one vote but cannot vote for the number of seats in that constituency (in which case Votes were called "unlimited"). In the provinces of Afghanistan, where only two seats are contested, the voting system will be unlimited (because two votes will eventually be cast), but this is relatively rare. In this hybrid system, candidates have the right to participate in elections by joining political coalitions through a party and

national lists or independently. As in the above system, votes were initially cast among rival candidates from the provinces. However, votes cast for candidates on party lists or national coalitions include votes cast to determine and distribute seats under the PR system. This system encourages voters to support candidates who are members of partnerships while encouraging candidates to join political coalitions (Coburn, 2015).

However, in both of those mentioned above, mixed electoral systems encourage the formation of political coalitions by legitimizing participation in elections to win national seats by the PR system. The fact that one candidate wins a vote does not mean that their counterparts in that coalition will fail in the election. Still, the mixed PR system and little voices provide another advantage. has it. That prevents candidates from thinking only of themselves in the race. In a non-transferable single-vote electoral system, a coalition of candidates faces the strategic challenge of distributing votes fairly among candidates and putting severe pressure on candidates to snatch/steal votes from their coalition members. In contrast, a mixed PR limited voting system allows voters to support more than one coalition candidate. This strongly reduces coalition members from hitting each other and facilitates cooperation between candidates for a joint campaign, which will benefit all coalition members (Coyne & Pellillo, 2011).

These systems are intended to create a hybrid system of a non-transferable single vote and PR system and to divide the seats from two-thirds to one-third among the components of that different system.

There are still other key differences. Ballots in each of these alternative systems are very simple. This means that the ballot papers will be the same as those used so far and will be attached to the list of candidates that voters will prefer. In addition, both models will award seats to candidates because each person receives the highest votes in the province. However, candidates will also be allowed (although not required) to join coalitions and compete nationwide for seats in the PR system. Therefore, the votes for each candidate participating in the sections will be collected during the distribution of seats in the PR system, encouraging more cooperation between the candidates. (Coburn & Larson, 2009)

Implementing any of the above suggestions requires the following:

- I am afraid of border lines or borders in Kabul and Herat provinces.
- Educate voters and political parties about the implications of the new system.
- Keep party symbols on the ballot in the right place.
- They are gaining political support from prominent political actors, including those who see their interests in the current electoral system.

These changes are relatively logistically adjustable because each proposed model's ballot papers and counting do not change. When the votes are counted, the next round in each system is the distribution of seats based on the PR system. It is recommended that 80 centres, distributed nationally based on the PR system, be based on a specific method. Once the number of seats for each of the coalitions has been determined, those seats will be distributed to the candidates who competed at the provincial level and failed, according to their competition in

that province. For example, if one of the coalitions wins 15 of the 80 PR seats at the national level, 5 of the seats will be awarded based on quota retention for women (as in the case of the five female candidates in which the coalition received the highest number of votes). At their provincial level, they did not succeed in obtaining a single non-transferable vote / restricted ballot based on the electoral system. Still, their voices are distributed based on the sum of the votes from their constituency being the highest), with ten seats remaining. According to the same method, it is distributed to the other "ten losing candidates" regardless of their gender (male/female) (Ghadiri, Sara T., 2010).

Another advantage of this hybrid system is that it encourages political coalitions to support strong female candidates and their election victory. Ideally, this is thought to have a growing impact, with even a small number of seats reserved for women causing a sudden upheaval in the election of women as competition between coalitions and political parties rather than centres reserved. The findings of women will increase. Therefore, the number of people who win seats in the elections will grow at the same time. As described above, arrangements are also being made to support other groups, such as nomads (Coburn & Larson, 2013).

The first steps to implementing these proposed models are to delineate the boundaries of Kabul province and significant cities and educate voters and politicians about the new electoral system. Determining the boundaries of each new system will create significant challenges, given the forces working to protect the interests, and will exacerbate local competition. However, the presence of a large number of seats in Kabul and Herat provinces, compared to the change in the boundaries of those constituencies with a smaller share, may prevent this. It is also true that successful voter training on any of the new systems for elections in the coming years requires political support, funding, and coordination. However, it should be relatively easy to familiarize voters with these proposed systems, at least on its core issues, as none of the proposed methods will bring about fundamental changes in voting (Coyne & Pellillo, 2011).

Finally, the successful revision of the electoral system has encouraged the formation of political parties and coalitions, reduced the fragmentation of the Wolesi Jirga, increased relations between voters and their lawyers, and satisfied most political leaders in the surrounding team. They are not presidents; they win. This path to reform the election is likely to be difficult, and any alternative system will face resistance. Those who succeed in the polls according to the current laws are sceptical of any reforms in the election process. The report shows that the current system has significant shortcomings for the Wolesi Jirga elections. The non-transferable single-vote electoral system prevents cooperation between politicians and those who may try to have a single program. Also, the system delays the growth of parties and causes the ballots to be bulky, without good candidates being among those ballots, which causes a large part of the ballots to be lost to the candidates and used not to win the election. In addition, the peculiarity of the non-transferable electoral system, which attracted some Afghan politicians (meaning that voters can give priority to individual candidates), is preserved in the reform of the proposed methods, and many Reduce the shortcomings of the non-transferable electoral system and support the formation of coalitions and cooperation among Afghan politicians.

Pathology of Elections "Wolesi Jirga" Afghanistan in the Light of US House Elections

One of the topics discussed is the constitutional rights of each country. Parliament generally refers to a body whose particular function is to enact a law that may consist of one or two houses (Ghazi, 2009: 180). The existence of legislatures in the world is meaningful because they translate the demands, needs, and requirements of society with their tact and abilities in the form of legal approvals and adapt the social system to the changes that have taken place. Therefore, for the parliament to have excellent and desirable efficiency, elections must be held with the maximum presence of the people, correctly and following the laws of that country, so that competent representatives can enter the field and take control of differences of taste and social conflicts. (Zarei, 1390: 5-4). The Afghan constitution not only defines the legislature as a manifestation of the will of the nation; Rather, by drawing the general framework of the country's electoral system, it has defined and explained the mechanisms governing the electoral system of the House of Representatives in a one-step method and accordance with the simple majority system. - The deputies have provided the ground for the facilities and arrangements for the institutionalization of the two-party system, which will at least reduce the number of parties, groups, and tendencies. This is vital for Third World countries, especially Afghanistan, which has recently embarked on a cycle of democracy and drums up attractive civil society slogans. (Mohammadi, 2016: 257). However, the American legal and political system, with its experience, the first written constitution, and features such as the separation of powers, the presidential regime, and the bicameral system, play an essential role in the House election system. The constitution of this country, in addition to paying particular attention to the legislature, has dealt with the mechanisms governing the electoral system of this institution by logical methods. In addition to the constitution, other laws, customary and practical party criteria, have defined the system of a relative majority of votes to win the seat of the House of Representatives. Given the commonalities of the US and Afghan electoral systems and the unity of the electoral system, the view of this section is a comparative approach to the mechanisms corresponding to the electoral system of the Afghan and US House of Representatives to answer questions such as commonalities and What is the difference between the election system of the Wolesi Jirga of Afghanistan and the US House of Representatives? What are the most common injuries of the Wolesi Jirga electoral system?

It seems that due to the development of the US House election system and the lack of necessary and sufficient studies in Afghanistan in this field, the scientific and practical findings of the US House of Representatives elections can highlight the commonalities and differences. And adopt appropriate methods and approaches to be effective in the mechanisms governing the elections of the Wolesi Jirga of Afghanistan. Regarding the research background, it should be noted that no scientific work containing a comparative approach in this field has been written. Therefore, the mechanisms of the Afghan Wolesi Jirga and the United States House of Representatives will be discussed first. Then, the most critical damage to Afghanistan's Wolesi Jirga election system is stated.

Conclusion and suggestions

The electoral system used so far in the election of the Wolesi Jirga of Afghanistan (House of Representatives) has demonstrated democratic stability and political legitimacy since its

inception in 2005. Afghanistan uses a non-transferable single-member electoral system in 34 provinces, electing legislature members with a special quota mechanism for women. The electoral system (which did not change between 2005 and 2010) prevented the development of political parties and determined the candidates' campaigns and voting methods. The system has reduced the effectiveness of the Wolesi Jirga as a decision-making room within the Afghan government, similar to the Presidential Executive Office. In this section, the relationship between the electoral system and effective representation, democracy, electoral corruption, and the quality of the electoral process in Afghanistan is studied and discussed. The non-transferable single vote first assesses the strategic complexity of the electoral system. Then, the effects of the system on Afghanistan and new proposals for electoral reform are sought. The general orders of this section of the chapter are:

1. Any reform must come to the forefront of the current system and prevent radical change.

2. The current system's complexity can be reduced by having fewer elected representatives from the provincial constituencies. Fewer delegates also reduce the likelihood of split votes and make it easier to administer and organize ballots.

3. Considerable space must be created to encourage and facilitate the development of political parties, groups, and coalitions in the current parliament. By doing so, the political blocs will be more formalized over time, and the system can allow voters to be considered during elections.

4. Each new system should facilitate the selection of well-known and legitimate independent candidates.

5. It is necessary to avoid complexity in the system. Not only should voters be educated on how to vote, but they should also be provided with sufficient information about how their vote plays a role in forming the government.

6. Each new system should facilitate the selection of well-known and legitimate independent candidates.

7 .It is necessary to avoid complexity in the system. Not only should voters be educated on how to vote, but they should also be provided with sufficient information about how their vote plays a role in forming the government.

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According to the PR system, the parties present their list of candidates to the national or district-level voters, and the voters vote for the parties and occupy the seats in proportion to the votes obtained.

According to the vote transfer system, voters select candidates based on their preferred rank in single or multiple constituencies.

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Chapter 4

Results and Discussion

A democratic government is a government where all citizens, directly and indirectly, participate in power and monitor how the government operates. After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 and the simultaneous start of the Bonn process, Afghanistan (with the arrival of international donors) began the technical and political process of democratization. This process includes restoring the presidential system in the state apparatus, Parliament comprised of houses (House of Representatives and Senate), provincial councils, political parties, and elections. Everyone was waiting for the growing strengthening of democracy and its institution in Afghanistan. However, with the passing of a long period of democracy in Afghanistan, democratic values and institutions are still under significant threat. The growth of violence creates obstacles in the way of elections, people's despair and despair of democracy to meet their security and economic needs, restricting media activities, reducing women's civil and political participation, empowering groups incompatible with democracy, and creating obstacles in the way of democracy, raise many doubts. Elections are manifestations that deliver a democratic essence of civilization and the development of modern societies. In other words, human beings use this mechanism to get rid of disorder and chaos and properly distribute power and wealth in the relations of life and management of the country's affairs. Since elections deal with the issue of human beings and human beings also differ in intellectual tendencies, some may adhere to moral and legal principles, and others may be extravagant and disobey the law and ethics. In such a situation, when the effectiveness of social controls is reduced due to the complex relationships of life, legal experts have imposed legal penalties based on theoretical foundations with the aim of mutual understanding and social cohesion to prevent disorder and chaos. It also contains the loss of the rights of others.

A questionnaire was prepared, and the responses from citizens eligible for the vote were collected from significant provinces of Afghanistan, as described in Chapter 1. The responses collected were analyzed using different SPSS tools. In this chapter, by referring to first-hand sources using the survey and interview method, the researcher finds out why people have moved away from the democratic process and examines the causes of fraud.

Table 4.1 Gender of the Respondents

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	male	200	81.0	81.0	81.0
Valid	female	47	19.0	19.0	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Table 4.1 shows the gender of the respondents in the study area. The data shows that out of 247, only 47 (19 per cent) were females, which depicts the male dominance in terms of political participation in Afghanistan. The remaining 81 per cent of males have an active share in

political activities. Civil and human rights organizations in Afghanistan have worked on gender equality over the years, holding training and awareness-raising workshops for women. Since the violation of women's rights is mainly committed because of the patriarchal society, which is primarily men-dominated, women in society should be informed about their rights. The expectation of women in society will increase after participating in seminars and awareness-raising programs on their rights. Men in this society traditionally consider themselves the owners and remain unaware of women's rights. As a result, the crisis of freedoms and rights in families has intensified, leading to the emergence of various forms of violence.

Article 83 of the Afghanistan Constitution specifies the procedure for entering the House of Representatives; it provides the conditions under which at least two women from each province must join the House of Representatives. Also, Article 84 of the Constitution specifies the method of appointing one-third of the members of the Senate. It obliges the President to elect fifty per cent of the members from among women. The above is an additional privilege given to women, emphasized in the Constitution, and implemented. The body seeks to address women's illiteracy and address this problem, which is one of the leading causes of violence against women in Afghanistan. Article 44 of the constitution states: "The government is obliged to design and implement effective programs to balance and develop education for women, improve the education of nomads and eradicate illiteracy in the country." Article 54 of the Constitution states: "The family is the most important element of society and is supported by the government." The government is taking the necessary measures to ensure the physical and mental health of the family, especially children and mothers, to raise children and to eliminate customs and traditions contrary to the rules of the holy religion of Islam." Article 54 also seeks to respect the status of women; however, she has been cautious in dealing with the prevailing custom in the society that causes violence against women, and the government has considered itself responsible for eliminating the trade contrary to the teachings of Islam. The government's policies should favour empowering women in society and politics and involving them in development.

Table 4.2 Nationality of the Respondents

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Pashtun	53	21.5	21.5	21.5
	Other	28	11.3	11.3	32.8
	Hazara	39	15.8	15.8	48.6
	Tajik	107	43.3	43.3	91.9
	Uzbek	20	8.1	8.1	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

In Afghanistan, there are different claims of the majority and minority of the four significant nationalities: Tajiks, Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. So far, no statistical data is available to determine which of the two major Tajik and Pashtun nationalities is a minority or a majority. Other ethnic groups in Afghanistan include Sadat, Bayat, Nuristani, Gajar, Pashaiee, Turk, etc. These tribes are also mentioned in the national anthem of Afghanistan, and in general, we can say that Afghanistan is a country with several ethnic groups and different beliefs. In Table 4.2, there are four significant nationalities, including the other segments, which include minority ethnic groups, with the first group showing Tajik nationality at 43 per cent versus 21 per cent Pashtuns. However, there is another belief that the Pashtun ethnicity, based on its ethnic and ideological beliefs, has not believed in democracy for the past 20 years and has focused more on traditional practices such as the Loya Jirga, the ethnic leader, and the custom of their heritage traditions. However, according to the above statistics, which show 15.8 per cent of the Hazara nationality, the other 20 people in this study are Uzbek nationals.

The country's population is estimated at 33.6 million this year. According to the Afghan National Statistics and Information Office, 17.1 million (51 per cent) are men, and 16.5 million (49 per cent) are women. Of these 33.6 million people, 23.8 million (70.8 per cent) are rural, 8.3 million (24.7 per cent) are urban, and another 1.5 million (4.5 per cent). It is also made up of nomadic populations. The estimated population in the 2021 solar year includes 364 central districts, 24 temporary districts, and 34 provincial capitals[43]. The World Bank's estimate of Afghanistan's population differs significantly from the official Afghanistan estimate. The United Nations estimates Afghanistan's population is over 37 million, about four million more than Afghanistan's official estimate. The reason for the difference is probably in the calculation methods and the difference in the definitions.[44]

According to the above explanations, the ruling regimes in Afghanistan, considering the nationality and ethnic diversity for national unity, seek to create space and support policies in which people from all parts of Afghanistan can participate. One of the most important examples of this is the discussion of the Pashtun ruling in Afghanistan in the last two centuries, which stated that only two kings or the leader of Tajik could become the president or king of Afghanistan for a short time.

Table 4.3 Age group of respondents

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	18-25	85	34.4	34.4	34.4
	25-35	135	54.7	54.7	89.1
	35-45	27	10.9	10.9	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

[43] https://nsia.gov.af/home
[44] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2020&locations=AF&start=1983

Table 4.3 shows that out of 247 respondents to this study, the majority, 135 people, are in the age group of 25-35 years, which is more intellectual genius than the group, is between 18 and 25 years old and shows a 34 per cent. People between the ages of 35 and 45 are among those who have experienced voting in Afghanistan's past elections, and it will be apparent in future sections of this chapter that if they are dissatisfied with the democratic process, especially elections,

According to official statistics from the Afghan National Statistics Office, about 47 per cent of Afghanistan's population (about 16 million people) are under the age of 15. About 20 per cent (about 7 million people) are between 15 and 24 years old. This age group makes Afghanistan one of the youngest countries in the world. [45]

According to researchers, Afghanistan is the youngest country in terms of age group. The ages of 25 to 35 and 18 to 25 comprise most of the respondents (Table 4.3). This group is the majority of students studying more (LÓPEZ, 2019). They are not aware of the elections in Afghanistan in the last twenty years. This can only be learned by adding themes and tutorials to this class. Therefore, to create a culture of elections and democratic processes, the government can strengthen this process by emphasizing democracy and elections in the curriculum of schools and universities. However, in general, elections and democracy are in the form of projects that came to Afghanistan from foreign countries, especially the West and the United States. Emphasizing education in academic institutions should become a popular custom in the country, and the youth should be informed about the benefits of democracy in the education system.

Table 4.4 Existence of respondents' voting card

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	177	71.7	71.7	71.7
	No	70	28.3	28.3	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

The voting card is one of the first conditions for citizens, both men and women, to vote. In most democracies of the world, after the age of 18, they are eligible to vote. The Voting Card is issued in different forms, sometimes separately and sometimes in an additional condition in the Electronic National identity card. Afghanistan adopted its constitution on December 5, 2001, following the creation of the first constitution by the Loya Jirga* in December 2003 under the Bonn Agreement. The Government of Afghanistan explained the voting card to its citizens

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[45] https://nsia.gov.af/home

*LoyaJirga is a Persian word meaning circle and circle, and the word Pashto means big. The Loya Jirga in Afghan political literature refers to the Consultative Assembly of Elders and the Constituent Assembly for the approval of constitutions and sometimes the appointment of the head of government. The Loya Jirga is convened at the invitation of the President, except for the Loya Jirga, which is intended for the President's court under Article 69 of the Constitution.

for participating in the Presidential (June 2004), Parliamentary, and Provincial Council elections (September 27, 2005).

As shown in Table 4.4, among the people who filled out the questionnaire at home, 71.7 per cent of them had a voting card and had participated in the previous elections. About 70 people did not have that voting card, or they have been missing it for various reasons, such as moving from one province to another in Afghanistan. This statistic shows that the government has played a good role in encouraging people to get ballots and go to the polls. However, in other parts of the research, it will become clear that the first condition of voting, which is the abbot of the voting card, is not a reason to participate in the elections and go to the polls.

However, since the explanation of the voting cards in the first and last elections in Afghanistan in 2019, and because the voting cards in Afghanistan were not proportional, the specific database has been explained to the people in its traditional form, paving the way for widespread corruption and explanation of fake cards. It has facilitated participation in elections to benefit specific individuals and groups.

Table 4.5 Voting rate of people who had a voting card

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	151	61.1	61.1	61.1
	No	96	38.9	38.9	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

According to the description in Table 4.4 and its comparison with Table 4.5, it is clear that the majority of people who had a voting card voted. The number of voters who answered 'Yes' in the questionnaire is 151 out of 247. Those who don't have voter cards were 38.9 per cent. Beliefs about not voting in political activities can stem from two factors. One is that citizens think elections are based on the interests of the system and not on national interests. Secondly, they know their vote will not be decisive based on the fraud in the elections. However, for various reasons described in other sections of this chapter, people don't vote in the election.

Table 4.6 Number of respondents in voting periods

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Once	58	23.5	23.5	23.5
	Twice	64	25.9	25.9	49.4
	three times	46	18.6	18.6	68.0
	more than three times	28	11.3	11.3	79.4
	Not voted	51	20.6	20.6	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

The number of times respondents cast their vote, according to a survey of 247 people, was 25.9 per cent of those who cast their ballots twice in two general elections and those who voted three times 46 and more than three times, who are 11.3 per cent of the electorate, participated in the voting process. These two groups (who vote three or more than three times) are smaller than those who voted twice. This shows that people with voting experience became distrustful of Afghanistan's democratic process and elections and played a smaller share in the polls than in the first one they participated in.

The third group is people with 58 who voted once and did not have previous election experience, and their interest in the election was due to the new impact of this phenomenon in their lives. The last group that did not vote was 20.6 per cent of the total 100 per cent who did not believe in various factors such as fraud and electoral fraud, the lack of security in their area, and the fear of the Taliban.

Table 4.7 Voting for the next presidential election

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	136	55.1	55.1	55.1
	No	46	18.6	18.6	73.7
	I do not know	65	26.3	26.3	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Regarding the question: Will you vote in the next presidential election in Afghanistan? Respondents are divided into three categories: Yes, No, and I do not know. The most significant number of participants, 136 out of 247, responded positively to participating in the election. The second group, 18.6 per cent of the total 100 per cent of the population, said they would not vote. Non-participation in the polls is explained in Table 4.5, adding that the lack of security in Afghanistan in most parts of the provinces, especially in the districts of Afghanistan, and the fall of control to the Taliban have caused people to fear participation in the elections. These are the reasons why people do not participate in democratic processes. These reasons have led most people to distance themselves from the government and join the Taliban in some districts. They also have no faith in the democracy that the government of the Republic of Afghanistan supports.

The latter group, more significant than the number of those who do not vote and reach 65 people, has chosen I do not know the answer. The group's main reason is that Afghanistan's future is uncertain, democratic beliefs are manipulated by widespread fraud, and Afghanistan's security is disrupted daily.

Also, the previous presidents of Afghanistan failed to fulfil their promises to the citizens day and night. Rising corruption, drug trafficking, explosions, suicide, lack of balanced development, nepotism, and an unsustainable economy are why people do not participate in elections.

Table 4.8 Vote for the next National Assembly (Parliament) elections

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	126	51.0	51.0	51.0
	No	60	24.3	24.3	75.3
	I do not know	61	24.7	24.7	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

With a comparative view of the turnout in the presidential and parliamentary elections, citizens are less interested in participating in the parliamentary elections. Various reasons for this low turnout can be mentioned, one of which is the voting system SNTV (single vote non-transferable). This system, discussed in detail in previous chapters, paves the way for corruption and the absence of political parties in parliament and reduces the presence of those with no financial backing. Members of parliament colluded with the presidency to shake the foundations of democracy over the past two decades and undermine public confidence in the power of their representatives. For example, last year in 2020, when members of the National Assembly went on summer vacation, 16 laws, including the Anti-Corruption Law, the Corruption Informers Protection Law, the State-owned Companies Law, the Mines Law, and the Municipal Law, passed the parliamentary filter and approved, enacted by decree of the President.

Members of parliament were more interested in their interests. In most cases, they delayed the approval of the budget due to their lack of participation in the implementation of government projects and repeatedly refused to approve it.

According to the above explanations, however, 51 per cent of the people in the upcoming parliamentary elections have given a positive answer to participate in the polls. Therefore, it can be seen in Table 4.8 that 24.7 per cent of the 247 respondents do not know whether they will participate in the parliamentary elections or not. At the same time, 60 respondents said no and said they would not run in the next parliamentary elections. The government of Afghanistan can solve this problem by changing the voting system and including the real representatives of the people in the House of Representatives and the House of Elders. This could increase the government's response to parliament in the future.

Table 4.9 Vote for the next provincial council elections

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	113	45.7	45.7	45.7
	No	62	25.1	25.1	70.9
	I do not know	72	29.1	29.1	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Regarding the turnout in the provincial council elections, out of 247 people, only 113 answered that they want to elect their representatives in the affairs of a province. This statistic is very low compared to presidential and parliamentary election turnout. But in the other part of this questionnaire, a 25percent of people say they will not participate in this election. This is the reason for not participating in the provincial council elections, which is due to the inefficiency and corruption of the regional council members. The latter option also includes those who gave an unknown answer and their number is 72 out of the total number of respondents. As the insecure situation in the districts was raised earlier in the chapter, the only reason people do not want to vote in provincial council elections is that regional council representatives in the last decade have not spoken or defended the rights of the people at the district level. They did not go to the districts during their representation due to insecurity and were concentrated only in the city centre. However, the main tasks of provincial councils include overseeing development projects and their implementation, overseeing government performance, and socially restoring and resolving ethnic conflicts.

The Afghan constitution states that the provincial council shall contribute to the government's development goals and the improvement of the province's affairs as specified in the law and shall consult on matters relating to the region.

In the eighth chapter of the constitution, the "administration" chapter, the administration of Afghanistan is divided into central administration units and local administrations (Rubin, 2004b). Provincial councils are part of the local government. However, the constitution of Afghanistan emphasizes the principle of centrality. It states that the necessary competencies are given to local administrations to accelerate and improve economic, social, and cultural affairs and involve as many people as possible in development affairs. However, with the direct stimulation of the Afghan constitution regarding the position of the provincial councils, the local council members have not been able to respond to the needs of the citizens of their respective provinces, so people do not believe in participating in the provincial council elections. Whenever the government wants to increase the role of the people, it must first raise the political stability and security at the district level and reassure the people that their representatives meet their needs. That is when we can see more people in the provincial council elections at the ballot box.

Table 4.10 Eligibility of women to vote by men

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	112	45.3	45.3	45.3
	No	9	3.6	3.6	49.0
	I do not know	126	51.0	51.0	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Afghanistan has been a patriarchal country that has never seen a woman president, queen, Director of Parliament, or Director of the Elder House. According to the conditions mentioned in the research questionnaire, we asked the women if their husbands or a male member of their family would allow them to participate in the elections. The responses were collected in the form of Yes, No, and I Don't Know. Most respondents, representing 126 women from the survey, responded, I do not know the answer. This is a sign of a patriarchal atmosphere and challenges all activities in the field of women's rights in Afghanistan that have been implemented in the last 20 years. The issue of gender equality has been accepted in many societies worldwide, especially in developing communities. However, it remains a problem in third-world countries such as Afghanistan. Thus, 45.3 per cent of the participating members said their male family members allowed them to participate in the elections. This statistic shows that most women in Afghanistan, whose primary right is to elect a representative, still do not have it. About nine survey respondents answered negatively, indicating that men in their families are not allowed to participate in the elections. In this way, the Afghan government must define an influential role for women in its future policies to be empowered as half the body of society.

Table 4.11 The polling station is located in the location.

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	221	89.5	89.5	89.5
	No	26	10.5	10.5	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

From the beginning of the first election after the Bonn Agreement until the 2019 elections, there were between 5,000 and 7,000 polling stations throughout Afghanistan, which, in the latter case, reduced the security problems. The majority of polling stations were chosen to be mosques and schools due to the traditional nature of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the government has played a valuable role in announcing and informing the addresses of the mass media.

The findings of the present study show that out of 247 members participating in this study, including men and women, 89.5 per cent were aware of the location of the polling stations, but

26 of them were unaware of the existence of polling stations. The problem with polling stations in Afghanistan is the insecurity in different parts of the country, which remained closed in most elections due to the Taliban threat. Another issue related to the polling stations was the issue of being far away and located in mountainous areas, which were difficult to reach; at the same time, when the votes were transferred to the polling station, there was an opportunity to change and convert the ballot papers.

Table 4.12 Knowledge about voting in the presidential election

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Yes	235	95.1	95.1	95.1
Valid	No	12	4.9	4.9	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Most of the information is presented through the mass media in Afghanistan due to the participation in the elections in graphic and visual form. The government, with support projects from Western countries, especially the United States, is bringing the process of registration, election participation, election day, and beyond to the public mind in the media. Therefore, the answer to whether you know how to participate in the presidential election and vote has been found to be the most positive answer: (yes). Only 4.9 per cent of the respondents said they did not know how to vote in the presidential election in the poll. However, the remaining 235 understand how to participate in this democratic process. It is noteworthy that the number of candidates for the presidential election is small, and they will be identified quickly by the election badge and the candidate's photo in question.

Table 4.13 Knowledge about voting in the National Assembly (Parliament) elections

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Yes	219	88.7	88.7	88.7
Valid	No	28	11.3	11.3	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Compared to Table 4.12 and how the people vote in the presidential election, it can be said that the people have little knowledge about the voting process in the parliamentary elections. Only 28 eligible voters do not know how to run in the parliamentary elections.

In the last parliamentary elections in Afghanistan, the number of candidates in Kabul province reached more than 2,500, which is a problem for voters. 88.7 per cent of respondents answered that they know how to vote in parliamentary elections. This is because the number of candidates in each province, especially in Kabul, is too much, and people have difficulty choosing their

favourite representative. Suppose the government makes the conditions for candidacy more regular for those who want to run. In that case, the number of parliamentary candidates may be reduced in the next elections, and the dispersion of votes will be reduced. With this mode, voters can easily vote for their favourite candidate.

Content Studies of Democratic Beliefs in Afghanistan

In the political discourse of democratically empowered societies, discussing cultural contexts and the maturation of the democratic personality process is critical. This critical issue can be paused to the extent that some Authors have limited the discussion of the cultural context of democracy and have focused more on the concept of democratic personality, which is, in fact, the main engine of mobility and dynamism of democratic processes. At the same time, the issue of democratic personality has a special place because most crisis-stricken societies suffer from a lack of institutionalization of democratic values , and most political and legal mechanisms are based on purely authoritarian values. Therefore, in light of the hot and current discourses in the country, the discussion of the formation and why of the democratic personality should come out of the chambers of thought and become the dominant discourse of our political society. A democratic society needs a democratic personality that can rely on its core foundations and work to expand it and does not give its fellow human beings a chance and does not like it; on the other hand, some writers see democracy as a set of attitudes derived from open ideas without authoritarianism, the democratic character is considered as the main component of a democracy and gives it more consistency and strength. Why? Because of this character, the result of a rational process is formed under the name of democracy and the umbrella of the society's political culture. On this account, the collective beliefs, attitudes, and values that shape this process under the name of democracy are political culture, so political culture is the basis for forming a democratic personality. It is, in fact, the political culture that has paved the way for the emergence of a democratic personality, in the shadow of which democratic rulers rely on the seat of power based on the will of the people.

Table 4.14 Satisfaction with democratic processes in Afghanistan

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Somewhat satisfied	65	26.3	26.3	26.3
	I'm not satisfied	49	19.8	19.8	46.2
	I am not satisfied at all	71	28.7	28.7	74.9
	No democracy in Afghanistan	13	5.3	5.3	80.2
	I am neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	33	13.4	13.4	93.5
	Very satisfied	16	6.5	6.5	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Every phenomenon in society needs to test the will of the citizens. This means that no process can continue until people accept it. Democratic processes are also among these phenomena that require a suitable platform for survival in societies. People's satisfaction with democratic processes is directly related to political agents and pro-democracy institutions. This means that whenever the government can play a good role in this process, people are just as satisfied with democracy.

Table 4.14 shows that 28 per cent of respondents said I am not satisfied at all. This indicates the people's dissatisfaction with the democratic process. At the same time, out of 245 people, only 16 said they were delighted. This statistic shows that only a small number of people are happy with the democratic beliefs in Afghanistan. 5.3 per cent of respondents said that they No to democracy in Afghanistan, as described in the earlier sections of this chapter, as those who had been under the umbrella of the Taliban for years and no longer believed in democratic processes because they did not enjoy the benefits of a democratic system, they are the same group that responds negatively to all democratic processes. However, after those who say they are completely dissatisfied, the following criterion is the hand of the group whose answer is somewhat satisfying. The government should create a democratic opportunity for this class of people so that, in the end, it can place this group among the satisfied and accepting members of the democratic process. However, another group of 49 people answered, "I am not satisfied," which is a slightly better criterion than the group "I am not satisfied at all." Still, the government can lead this group to positive answers by answering the principle of meritocracy.

Table 4.15 Type of governance in Afghanistan

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	A joint from both government	40	16.2	16.2	16.2
	Democratically elected government	200	81.0	81.0	97.2
	Islamic Emirate	7	2.8	2.8	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Government practices vary from country to country. It may not be possible to find two countries in which the system of governance is the same. Government techniques can be categorized into several general headings. Parliamentary System, One-party government, Presidential government, Semi-presidential government, Absolute monarchy, Constitutional monarchy, and Islamic Emirate. The government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has changed the suspicion of the Islamic Emirate system to the government of the republic for only twenty years. However, some people want the Emirate and are still operating under the umbrella of the Taliban. In response to the question of what kind of government citizens like, Three responses were obtained, with the highest response rate chosen by the elected democracy, including nearly 200 respondents. However, in answer to the next question, 16.2

per cent of respondents were looking for a joint Emirati government and democracy. By explaining the benefits of a democratic system and involving the group in democratic processes, the government can lead them to choose the type of democratic governance and democracy.

However, the latest result is that out of 247 respondents, 7 want the Emirate Islamic system. The reason for choosing this system was the primitive beliefs of Islam. Experience has shown that none of the governments formed based on the interpretations and perceptions of the clergy have been successful, and the rights of religious minorities have consistently been violated. The governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia, for example, have restricted many of the fundamental freedoms of religious minorities.

Table 4.16 The economic situation in Afghanistan

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Relatively bad	42	17.0	17.0	17.0
	Neither good nor bad	26	10.5	10.5	27.5
	very bad	165	66.8	66.8	94.3
	It is relatively good	10	4.0	4.0	98.4
	I do not know	3	1.2	1.2	99.6
	Very good	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Different theories about the government's social responsibility towards economic, political, and social groups have been presented. All public policy analysts believe that governments' social responsibility reflects how they support organizations, institutions, companies, and social groups. The factors, necessities, and structural contexts for implementing government social responsibility through economic policymaking must be increased so that people can participate and vote in democratic processes based on the comfort of the future. In this regard, various factors can affect the manner and trend of government social responsibility towards the private sector and the economy. Among these factors and components, we can mention the role of political issues, competitive members, and moral and legal aspects. The government's social responsibility is to provide the basis for the mobility of various socio-economic groups and entrust them with part of the government's duties in the public sphere. One of the essential advantages of democratic systems is a stable economic system, job creation, and welfare. Citizens go to the polls and exercise their political rights to achieve prosperity. Afghanistan's traditional economy is highly dependent on social conditions. Although present in all countries, this dependence is much more robust in Afghanistan. Political unrest, social strife, etc., have all led to a waste of financial resources in the Afghan economy.

Among the respondents surveyed in Table 4.16, the highest number of respondents, 66 per cent of the total respondents, said that the economic situation in Afghanistan is terrible. Twenty-six respondents thought that Afghanistan's financial situation was neither good nor bad. But then, only 4.0 per cent of respondents were relatively optimistic and chose a reasonably good answer. A group of 42 respondents described Afghanistan's economic situation as fairly bad. Recently, only one person said that Afghanistan's financial situation is excellent.

Table 4.17 Satisfaction with the performance of members of parliament

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	166	67.2	67.2	67.2
	No	81	32.8	32.8	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Parliament has not exercised its legal authority to oversee the functions of ministers and other high-ranking executive officials and has always exercised it for its benefit. According to the law, it is up to the parliament to review their credentials based on the president's proposal and ultimately approve or reject them, which the president has repeatedly violated, and members of parliament have remained silent. A large number of ministers who had to get the vote of approval from the parliament continued to work as acting ministers without the vote of the parliament, which caused a new wave of widespread dissatisfaction, and the parliament could not exercise its power. Parliament has not been successful in legislating due to the absence and incompleteness of members and quorum. People know that parliament has significant legislative powers. The main channel for presenting the draft law is the executive branch. Most bills are proposed to the House of Representatives for approval by the executive branch.

Members of parliament have been disbelieved for their irresponsible statements in support of criminal cases for the people. Parliament has not been successful in monitoring either. Deputies who either went abroad on holiday or used the excuses of insecurity in their provinces to stay in Kabul will hold an overnight emergency meeting to deal with security and defence agencies. This shows that the members of the House of Representatives do not care about the national interest except for their benefit and protection of their dignity, and they have gathered to defend each other's claims against the law and the nation. These are among the causes of public dissatisfaction with the performance of members of parliament, with 166 out of 247 participants saying in Table 4.17 that they are not satisfied with the performance of members of parliament. Only 32 per cent of their activities seem satisfied.

Table 4. 18 The level of people's satisfaction with the presidency of Mohammad Ashraf Ghani

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Relatively satisfied	52	21.1	21.1	21.1
	I'm not satisfied	63	25.5	25.5	46.6
	I am not satisfied at all	80	32.4	32.4	78.9
	I am neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	29	11.7	11.7	90.7
	Very satisfied	23	9.3	9.3	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

President Ghani is the head of the Afghan government's three legislative, judicial and executive branches. Afghanistan's presidential system has given a lot of power to the president, and energy is concentrated in one more address. President Ashraf Ghani did not win the 2014 election. However, with the over-insistence of US Secretary of State John Kerry, he established a national unity government with his rival, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. This scenario was repeated in the 2019 elections. The people could not specifically choose a candidate and restore their belief in democracy and elections. The level of dissatisfaction with the president increased. In Table 4.18, in response to the question, how satisfied are you with President Ghani? The highest answer was I am not happy, which indicates dissatisfaction with 32.4 per cent of the total research set. In a wrong step, 63 out of 247 people answered that I was not satisfied. In general, the second answer shows a kind of relative dissatisfaction with the performance of the president. The result of these dissatisfactions is first the fraud of the presidential team during the elections and then the dependence of all power on one person. The president is a traditional thinker, given that studying for a doctorate at one of the best universities in the United States. Nevertheless, he thinks of tribal ideas and prioritizes traditional beliefs. In choosing ministers and people close to him, he does not believe in other people except his lineage and language. Relatively satisfied is another answer that is marked by 21.1 per cent of respondents. But 11.6 per cent said neither satisfied nor dissatisfied. For this class of people, the behaviour of the president was not significant, and they were generally in favour of the current situation. The latter group is a staunch supporter of the president, who makes up 23 people of the 247 members.

Table 4.19 Recognition of the Afghan Independent Election Commission

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	216	87.4	87.4	87.4
	No	31	12.6	12.6	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

The Afghan Independent Election Commission (IEC) has "administration and oversight of all constitutional elections and referendums in the country." The Independent Election Commission's (IEC) mission and its powers are enshrined in Article 156 of the Constitution (Shah, 2004). According to the article, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) is considered the sole body in election administration, monitoring, and referendums, and it acts independently. Following the Constitution, the Commission is responsible for holding elections. It can monitor any election in the country: presidential elections, Wolesi Jirga (parliament) elections, provincial council elections, district council elections, village council elections, and municipal council elections. , Municipal elections, referendum. It is noteworthy that the Commission could not conduct the rest of the polls in Afghanistan except for the first three elections.

The Afghan Electoral Commission is receiving a lot of attention in three areas. 1: when announcing the list of candidates. 2: election day. 3: announcement of results. Therefore, most of the people of Afghanistan know this institution through mass media and the activities of the Commission. Table 4.19 shows that 87.4 per cent of those surveyed know the Commission. However, the other 31 out of 247 people are not familiar with it, and this unfamiliarity is related to those who have just reached the age of 18 and have not yet participated in the elections. In general, it can be said that the majority of people are familiar with the Commission but are sceptical about the Commission's activities.

Table 4.20 The amount of information about the last presidential candidate

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No, I did not get enough information.	67	27.1	27.1	27.1
	Yes, I received enough information	157	63.6	63.6	90.7
	I did not receive any information	13	5.3	5.3	96.0
	I do not know	10	4.0	4.0	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

For the first time, presidential candidates can make their information public when registering for the election. The second time is when these candidates, according to the law, have 60 days to introduce their activities and programs to their clients or those who want to vote for them. The second program ends 48 hours before election day. During the first two months of the election, presidential candidates can campaign in their favour through mass media such as radio and television, magazines, newspapers, social media, debates, conferences, press conferences, and face-to-face campaigns. The question in Table 4.20 shows how much public information voters know about the presidential candidates. The highest answer is 'Yes, I received enough information at a rate of 63.6 per cent of the total number of people participating in this survey.

Besides those who answered: 'No, I did not get enough information,' 67 respondents out of the total population surveyed have responded. This shows that the government has not obstructed the election campaigns and has provided a suitable opportunity for all presidential candidates. In the other section, 5.3 per cent answered that they did not receive any information because these people live far from cities and in areas with no video, audio, or print media. Recently, ten respondents said they did not know. Candidates should not focus on big cities to inform about their activities and campaigns because statistics show that information about presidential candidates is still not widely distributed in all parts of the country.

Table 4.21 The amount of information about the last parliamentary candidate

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No, I did not get enough information.	89	36.0	36.0	36.0
	Yes, I received enough information	118	47.8	47.8	83.8
	I did not receive any information	40	16.2	16.2	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

According to the election calendar, candidates for parliament have only 30 days to campaign. In Table 4.21, in response to the question, how much information did you receive about the parliamentary election candidates? The answer, 'Yes, I received enough information,' with 47.8 per cent of the total responses, indicated insufficient information for voters. The reason for this is the diversity of candidates becomes evident, as described in previous pages of this chapter. The majority of those who know they do not have a popular base and cannot get votes still run for election. This has made it difficult for people to get the information they need widely from parliamentary candidates. Eighty-nine people answered the question, 'No, I did not get enough information.' Some have not received any information, constituting 16.2 per cent of the respondents. Because election campaigns are run at the personal expense of the candidates, those with more money can campaign more for themselves, and those with less money cannot campaign enough for themselves. Naturally, the poor person as a candidate among the other people with good financial sources has not been identified, or their campaign is unsuccessful.

Given that the Independent Election Commission determines the spending ceiling for parliamentary candidates. Nevertheless, hundreds of thousands of Afghanis (the currency of Afghanistan) are being spent on the election campaign. Therefore, in the upcoming elections, the government must have profound control over how the parliamentary candidates spend in coordination with the financial and security institutions.

Table 4.22 The amount of information about political parties in the last (parliamentary/ presidential) election

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No, I did not get enough information.	86	34.8	34.8	34.8
	Yes, I received enough information	103	41.7	41.7	76.5
	I did not receive any information	35	14.2	14.2	90.7
	I do not know	23	9.3	9.3	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

One of the benefits of the political party system, as compared to the independent candidate system, is that the number of candidates who fill the nomination for the candidacy for election is reduced. Candidates are nominated only through the party. This will reduce costs due to the diversity of candidates and increase people's discernment; parties, unlike individuals, in addition to presenting a detailed plan, expose their best people to the people's choice to fulfil various responsibilities. In recent decades, parties have significantly impacted the formation of electoral systems and have become the basis for dividing electoral systems into majority and proportional. Based on this, it seems necessary to study the positive and negative impact of parties on the manner of holding elections, the selection of decision-making and executive managers, and determining the social structures of societies.

But in Afghanistan, the parties, as described in previous chapters, are more traditional and are rooted in ethnicity, religion, language, and even the tendency to civil war. Given that in the first election in the last 20 years, all candidates ran independently. Still, in the previous election, we saw the presence of party representatives in parliament and the presidential election. Table 4.22 examines the role of political parties in elections, with 14.2 per cent of respondents saying they did not receive any information. But the next group of 86 people answered, "No, I did not get enough information," which indicates that, as expected, people are not aware of the activities of political parties. Those who have received enough information are 41.7 per cent. Twenty-three (9.3%) people in this study said we do not know.

Table 4.23 The level of people's participation in election programs and campaigns

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	129	52.2	52.2	52.2
	No	118	47.8	47.8	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

In some countries, such as the United States, the campaign begins months or even years before the election date and usually takes a long to complete. Parties organize networks of volunteer staff and professionals in a specific geographical area to raise funds on the one hand and public relations bases for news and advertising on the other. These polls may require a lot of travel. In other words, public donations and support groups and organizations should be spent on polling programs and funding the trip of candidates. Thus, the analysis of an election campaign can be divided into two parts: first, the collection of public donations and support groups and organizations. and second, spending on advertising, polls, and delegate travel.

But in Afghanistan, election campaigns are always costly. Sometimes, most people who come to the campaign are looking for financial gain or a goal other than listening to the candidate's plans.

Table 4.22 shows that 52.2 per cent of the population participated in the election campaign. Still, the author's experience participating in dozens of election campaigns indicates that these people participated more for the two reasons mentioned earlier. At the same time, the statistics in the same table show that 118 people out of a total of 247 people did not participate in these campaigns. People don't join in campaigning because they know about the campaigns' commercial burden or have been in remote areas of the country where these campaigns have never been held.

Table 4.24 Participate in which type of election campaigns.

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Create branded hashtags on social networks	11	4.5	4.5	4.5
	Workshop/seminar/conference	29	11.7	11.7	16.2
	Newsletters / Promotional Cards / Brochures	18	7.3	7.3	23.5
	Public speeches	21	8.5	8.5	32.0
	Election Campaign	66	26.7	26.7	58.7
	I did not participate	102	41.3	41.3	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Table 4.23 indicates that 41.3 per cent of respondents did not participate in the election campaigns. The reason for not participating is explained in Table 4.22. But since then, 66 people who have campaigned have been in physical form. The reason for participating in these election campaigns was due to two previous reasons, which were explained earlier. 11.7 per cent of those who participated in the election campaigns were Workshops/seminars/conferences organized by election support institutions or the Afghan Election Commission itself. After that, we saw 21 others at the table who participated in public speeches. However, 7.3 per cent of those surveyed saw it through newsletters / promotional cards/brochures, which are city-wide, or campaign announcements. The latest case is 11 people participating in election campaigns through branded hashtags on social networks. We now conclude that in election campaigns, social media is potent in the current era and is a reason to control public opinion. Through social media, a candidate or the election commission itself can quickly launch an election campaign or provide information to citizens about the election. Candidates and election support institutions can increase the participation of the people in the future by investing in this crucial issue.

Table 4.25 The rate of election fraud

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	198	80.2	80.2	80.2
	No	49	19.8	19.8	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

The law explicitly addresses violations. Violations are rooted in the type of views and approaches. The concept of election irregularities differs from the irregularities in the business market and traffic in impact radius. The territory and extent of election violations depend on the political yard and the fate of a nation. While driving, the offence is not a personal aspect with a small and pervasive radius. Of course, from a mechanical and hardware point of view. Electoral violations, like other phenomena, have become a cliché, while the issue of elections should be looked at with more sensitivity and accuracy. Many social anomalies are formed in social contexts. Many political monsters are rooted in "political appearances." Elections are a political issue; political parties with identity cards and individuals with political identities are not allowed to maneuver, and the "cost of political activity" is high. Those who do not know the rules to enter the political arena may go through legal crime cases. These cases have increased so much in this area that we are witnessing their effects on reducing public trust.

Given the above explanation, the rate of positive response to whether you witnessed election fraud is high. Table 4.24 shows that 80.2% of the participants believe the previous elections were rigged, and 49 out of 247 respondents said there was no election fraud. Most respondents believe that elections in Afghanistan are full of fraud, which might be one of the significant reasons people stay away from electoral processes.

Table 4.26 People's satisfaction with the 2019 elections in Afghanistan

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Relatively satisfied	38	15.4	15.4	15.4
	I am not satisfied at all	116	47.0	47.0	62.3
	I'm not satisfied	57	23.1	23.1	85.4
Valid	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	28	11.3	11.3	96.8
	Very satisfied	8	3.2	3.2	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

The common denominator of these two questions and the high level of solutions show that people are dissatisfied with the 2019 election process. In Table 4.25, the highest percentage of the answer is 'I am not satisfied at all' with the results of the 2019 general election with 47 per cent of the total respondents. Also, the answer 'I'm not satisfied' shows dissatisfaction with content and is close to the first answer, with 57 people out of 247. Notably, eight people answered satisfactorily despite widespread fraud and said they were generally satisfied with the last election. On the other hand, those who chose the Relatively Satisfied option reached 15.4 per cent, and those who answered neither happy nor dissatisfied were 28 per cent.

Table 4.27 Adequate information and turnout in the upcoming elections

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Yes	189	76.5	76.5	76.5
Valid	No	58	23.5	23.5	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

In the survey, due to widespread fraud, we concluded that if this democratic process is strengthened and trust is built, we will see a large turnout in the upcoming elections. The question asked respondents, 'If you are given enough information, will you vote in the next election?' We received two answers. Those who agreed comprised 76.5 per cent of the total number of people who participated in the survey. This kind of attitude shows the political rationality of the citizens and also the belief in the democratic ideas of the citizens. Despite the citizens' negative and unacceptable results, they will participate in the next election if they are provided with enough information about the election. The second answer is negative: 58 people out of the total number of observers said they would not participate in the upcoming elections due to the lack of information. This shows the discussion of disbelief in the democratic process

and means that other people no longer believe in the electoral process. It is suggested that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, by providing sufficient information about the elections and guaranteeing transparent, fair, and free elections, create a favourable environment for many eligible citizens. This could pave the way for most Afghan citizens to an accountable and acceptable government.

Table 4.28 The degree of neutrality in the election process

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Yes	37	15.0	15.0	15.0
Valid	No	210	85.0	85.0	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

The widespread fraud of the information provided on the previous pages became apparent. Among the questions asked by the respondents, a question was asked in connection with their view that the elections are unbiased. Only 37 (15%) out of 247 believed the election was neutral, and 85% of respondents thought elections were not impartial. A fair election is one of the essential characteristics that all democracies emphasize. Countries at the top of the list in democratic campaigns always look for this trust between the government and the general public. This building of trust raises people's belief in the government and tests a system's degree of authority and legitimacy.

Table 4.29 Need for New Election Laws in Afghanistan

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Yes	211	85.4	85.4	85.4
Valid	No	36	14.6	14.6	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

After the concerns of candidates, political parties, the international community, election-related civil society organizations, and citizens about the inefficiency of election commission members in holding the 2018 parliamentary elections, announcing the results of the parliamentary elections, and ensuring the transparency of the elections, the basic need was considered. The government of Afghanistan began to work on a plan to amend, add, and remove some articles of the electoral law or a new draft of the law. But with minor changes, the law is still in place. The government should seek to amend or create a new law to respond to the election according to the people's will. In this research, we asked the citizens whether the election law should be changed. The majority of respondents, 85.4%, answered yes to the change of the election law, as the last elections have all led to a crisis. People know that the election law also has shortcomings and the inefficiency of individuals and persons working in the Afghan election

process. Table 4.28 shows that out of 247 respondents, 36 rejected the change in the election law.

Table 4.30 Taliban's role in Afghanistan's future politic

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very unlikely	22	8.9	8.9	8.9
	Unlikely	30	12.1	12.1	21.1
	most probably	172	69.6	69.6	90.7
	I do not know	23	9.3	9.3	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

What can be said with certainty beyond all ambiguity is that history in Afghanistan is not over. The future of this country depends on various variables that do not have a specific status; hence, it can flow in different directions.

Hence, the Taliban has been an undeniable fact of Afghan society in the last three decades. The military group took Afghanistan for the first time from 1996 to 200. The Taliban are an extremist Hanafi sect and Islamic religious group that they believe is the guardian of the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan. In the last 20 years, the Taliban have achieved more of their military goals by carrying out suicide and explosive attacks against civilians and domestic and foreign military forces. In the present study, people were asked how they see the role of the Taliban in the future system of Afghanistan. 69.6 per cent of total respondents answered 'most probably. Following that, 30 people (12.1%) responded 'unlikely,' 9.3% of the people had no opinion at all, but 22 people thought that the presence of the Taliban was doubtful.

Most people believe in the presence of the Taliban in the future political system of Afghanistan because the US government has given too much concession to the group. This group, the majority of whose leaders are blocklisted by the United Nations, is a prominent human rights violator and kills the innocent people of Afghanistan. The United States has been in talks with the group for years to secure US interests in Asia. Therefore, the rise of the Taliban after many years of investment and the killing of hundreds of thousands is not far from the truth.

Factors of non-participation in elections and democratic processes

Participation in elections and voting are essential components of citizens' political behaviour. The question of the reasons and motivations of citizens to participate in elections is one of the most important topics studied in political sociology. However, in case of disbelief in the above characteristics or threats from a confident person or group, this participation can be evaluated negatively. In this section of the chapter, we seek to answer questions about the non-participation of the people in the elections. This is to search and evaluate the components of democracy, especially elections. The most significant emphasis will be on knowing what factors have led to people participating or not participating in the polls.

Table 4.31 Fear of Taliban

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No Fear	45	18.2	18.2	18.2
	Neutral	36	14.6	14.6	32.8
	Fear	71	28.7	28.7	61.5
	Moderate Fear	35	14.2	14.2	74.7
	High Fear	60	24.3	24.3	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

The question for Table 4.30 is, What do you think is the main reason for less citizen participation in the election process in Afghanistan? Different answers have been suggested in this section, among which one option was 'Fear of Taliban,' and the responses were collected as 'No fear, Neutral, Fear, Moderate Fear to High fear. 28.7 per cent, the highest of the respondents, expressed 'Fear' as the main reason for non-participation in election processes. After that, 60 of the respondents mentioned high fear. These two responses show great fear of the Taliban militant group. We conclude that the Taliban is an objective fact and a potential force against democracy. People who vote to vote are most afraid of the Taliban. No Fear is the answer for those who represent 18.2 per cent of the respondents. This group either lives in areas not under Taliban rule or has no fear of fighting the Taliban ignorance and participates in democratic processes. Thirty-six respondents responded as neutral. This is a normal phenomenon that they are neither afraid of nor optimistic about. The group typically lives inside Afghanistan's major cities, especially Kabul. The only fear of this class is suicide and explosive attacks, which are also unpredictable. 14.2 per cent of people said they have a Moderate Fear of the Taliban.

It has become clear that the Taliban is one of the most important indicators of the absence of the people in the democratic process, especially in elections. Therefore, the government should take action to fight the Taliban, eliminate this group or integrate this group into a republic through peace negotiations. Otherwise, the people's belief in democracy and elections will be undermined.

Table 4.32 Lack of security in election

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Extraordinary security	41	16.6	16.6	16.6
	Good security	27	10.9	10.9	27.5
	Medium security	44	17.8	17.8	44.3
	Low insecurity	51	20.6	20.6	66.0
	Extraordinary insecurity	84	34.0	34.0	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

The concept of security has a multidimensional definition, including physical and non-physical. However, in Afghanistan, security is more focused on the physical dimension and the survival of individuals in this country. The word security in Afghanistan is mainly used against two groups: ISIS and the Taliban. The two groups have occasionally clashed with the republic, killing thousands of civilians and Afghan security forces. In the last 2019 elections, nearly 7,000 polling stations were identified. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) announced the closure of almost 2,000 pre-election polling stations due to a lack of security.

In the question asking people about the level of security during the election, 34 per cent of people responded that the security situation during the elections was 'extraordinarily insecure.' After that, 20.6 per cent of people stated that the conditions were low insecurity. Medium security was the answer of 17.8 per cent of the respondents who examined security in the usual way. And 16.6 per cent of people said that security was extraordinary and that they were satisfied. But 10.9 per cent said security was good.

Table 4.31 shows that elections face a considerable challenge, which is insecurity. But in addition to security threats from the two terrorist groups, Taliban and ISIS, there is also intellectual insecurity. This intellectual insecurity is the existence of electoral fraud that has often plagued the Afghan people. The government must pave the way for both security sectors to provide a safe environment for democratic processes and elections.

Table 4.33 Corruption in the Government of Afghanistan

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No corruption	31	12.6	12.6	12.6
	Very little corruption	16	6.5	6.5	19.0
	Moderate corruption	27	10.9	10.9	30.0
	Low corruption	49	19.8	19.8	49.8
	Extraordinary corruption	124	50.2	50.2	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Corruption is considered one of the chronic diseases and the oldest system injury in society. Corruption is greatly affected by the community's political, economic, cultural, and judicial systems because this phenomenon is a violation of administrative justice and a loss of rights of citizens. It is also very harmful to society in terms of economic development. Corruption means the use of political power to achieve personal and illegitimate goals. Legal corruption means enacting discriminatory laws in favour of powerful politicians and classes favoured by the government. Corruption can be divided into several types, the primary type of which is economic corruption, which is the result of interactions between tyrants, bureaucrats, and citizens. Economic corruption means actions and behaviours that cause the multiplication of wealth and deep class divisions and disturb the economic order. In Afghanistan, the first two are more accurate; therefore, in Table 4.32, it is shown that 50.2 per cent of the respondents have chosen the extraordinary corruption option. However, only 12.6 per cent of the respondents said there was no corruption. 6.5 per cent of people believe that there is minor corruption. In contrast, 10.9 per cent of people said there is Moderate corruption, and 19.8 per cent believe there is low corruption in Afghanistan.

By undermining government systems to secure the interests and goals of the majority, corruption causes a loss of limited economic benefits and imposes enormous costs on society. Corruption also slows economic growth because it reduces the incentive for domestic and foreign investors to invest. Corruption generally causes regression and decline of small companies' service and business activities, monopolizes critical economic activities in the public or private sector (influential people and dependents in power), and generally strengthens "monopoly structures." Finally, corruption undermines the legitimacy of governments. It endangers the stability and security of societies and damages the values of democracy and ethics, such as elections and belief in government, thereby impeding political and social development. Corruption undermines public confidence in the government's ability, and political will to curb extravagance and dashes hope for a better future. Corruption calls into question the government's moral legitimacy and, as a result, undermines public trust and social acceptance.

Given the widespread corruption, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is committed to combating corruption and must take the proposed anti-corruption policies seriously. Those at the top and bottom of the government should be punished if they have committed corruption.

Table 4.34 Belief in the Election Process

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Absolute belief	25	10.1	10.1	10.1
	Belief	18	7.3	7.3	17.4
	Unbelievable	29	11.7	11.7	29.1
	Disbelief	31	12.6	12.6	41.7
	Absolute disbelief	144	58.3	58.3	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

According to Article 33 of the Constitution, "Afghan citizens have the right to vote and stand for election." Choosing and not being elected is the backbone of democracy. Democracy in Afghanistan, nearly two decades after its founding, has received a great deal of attention from the international community, and countless sacrifices have been made for its survival. Therefore, it is expected that the process of democracy will become stronger every day and that people will believe in it more. In addition to the security of the elections, enthusiasm and motivation are required to win the people's votes. Televised debates and challenging candidates can excite and mobilize the election and the people and increase the incentive to participate in the election.

In Table 4.33, people were asked about their beliefs in the election process. 58.3 per cent of the respondents expressed absolute disbelief in electoral processes, and 31 (12.6 per cent) respondents voted disbelief. 11.7 and 7.3 per cent of respondents answered Unbelievable and Belief, respectively. Only 20 (10.1%) of 247 people have absolute faith in the election process. According to the statistics and widespread frauds in the last two presidential and parliamentary elections, the people's belief in the democratic process has been damaged. People are not sure that their vote is crucial, that the votes they cast at the ballot box are decisive, or that fraudsters change the figures. When the people's vote is less taken into account in the last few elections, one should not expect the people to participate in long queues, accept the possible dangers in the polls, and give legitimacy to fraud and fraud.

Table 4.35 People's interest in democracy

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Great interest in democracy	111	44.9	44.9	44.9
	Interest in Democracy	53	21.5	21.5	66.4
	Moderate democracy	34	13.8	13.8	80.2
	Low interest in democracy	19	7.7	7.7	87.9
	Not to democracy	30	12.1	12.1	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Democracy is a government that belongs to the type of collective decision-making. In this government, representatives are elected by the majority of the people to govern them. After long deliberation and consideration, the elected representatives of the people pass the laws and inform the people In such a way that it is not hidden from anyone to establish freedom and equality in society based on it. The existence of democracy requires two general principles (universal oversight of collective decision-making and equal rights in the exercise of this oversight). The beginning of the revival of a democratic system in Afghanistan marked the end of the dark period of the Taliban and the influx of foreign forces, especially the United States, to dismantle the nests of terrorism and institutionalize and rebuild Afghanistan. The United States and its supporters insisted on institutionalizing democracy and establishing a democratic system based on the electoral process, which eventually took place after Bonn agreed and ended

the interim period. In this regard, the United States and its allies have also invested heavily in Afghanistan, which has often been criticized for lacking proper management and oversight. The finger of criticism of most political analysts has been pointed at the wrong policy of the United States of America to bring about a democratic system ahead of time and without considering the situation in Afghanistan.

The respondents were asked to examine their interest in democracy. 44.9 per cent of respondents showed 'Great interest in Democracy' in the democratic process. Twenty-one per cent chose the answer 'Interest in Democracy.' 13.8 and 7.7 were the answers of Moderate democracy and Low interest in democracy, respectively, and 30 people in this study answered no to democracy. According to the statistics mentioned, there is still a belief in democracy and the future of democracy.

The United States mainly imports Afghanistan's democracy, but the United States has failed to neutralize terrorist groups and provide security in Afghanistan. After nearly two decades of US intervention in Afghanistan and ousting the Taliban, the Taliban's military and diplomatic power are growing by the day, to the point where the United States is now pushing to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. The US Signed a political-military agreement with the Taliban. Nevertheless, the prospect of building a lasting democracy in the current context of Afghanistan looks very weak. Further criticism of the process of democratization in Afghanistan by the United States is the wrong policy of this country to bring a democratic system ahead of time and without considering the conditions of Afghanistan.

Most importantly, the US-led democratization effort in Afghanistan seems flawed from the start, unlike in Iraq, where the United States has established a parliamentary system with some scrutiny and balance, and local and national elections have been held. In Afghanistan, the United States has a centralized presidential system with a weak parliament capable of overseeing the president. In this way, the president can appoint all the governors of the provinces, and the main power will be directed from the centre. On the other hand, the George W. Bush administration did not oversee a process allowing Afghans to elect their first post-Taliban president freely; instead, they elected Hamid Karzai to lead the Afghans in approving the election.

Table 4.36 People's participation in democratic processes

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Extensive taking part	85	34.4	34.4	34.4
	Many taking part	32	13.0	13.0	47.4
	Moderate taking part	60	24.3	24.3	71.7
	Low taking part	30	12.1	12.1	83.8
	No taking part	40	16.2	16.2	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Table 4.35 shows that 34.4% of people are interested in political participation and have chosen the 'Extensive taking part' answer. In contrast, 16.2% of all respondents believe that people would not participate in the democratic process. 13% of respondents responded that 'many are taking part.' Those who responded to the participation of the people in the Moderate taking part democratic process were 24.3%, and only 12.1% responded that the involvement of the people in the democratic process would be low.

Public participation in public affairs shows a unique relationship in terms of the type of political structure and its functions, which determines the citizens' views and attitudes towards the functioning of the political system. Thus, firstly, the political participation of citizens is effective in establishing a democratic system, and secondly, democratic processes are influential in shaping the values of political culture. Accordingly, a high percentage of change can be predicted by relying on the current situation and the government's excessive emphasis.

Table 4.37 The rate of participation of the neighbours of the respondents in the democratic process

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Most people vote	49	19.8	19.8	19.8
	Most people stay home and do not vote	139	56.3	56.3	76.1
	I do not know	59	23.9	23.9	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Regarding sociological studies, the beliefs of individuals and people living in one neighbourhood are always influenced by another. This is especially true of traditional countries. Afghanistan is also one of the traditional countries and agrees with the phenomenon (community village). In Afghanistan, the majority of people are affected when an incident occurs in a neighbourhood, and the mindset is the same. In this part of our research, we seek to answer the question: Do your neighbours participate in the democratic process and elections? We received three answers. The first answer, with a high score of 56.3 per cent, was that most people stay home and do not vote, which shows that people do not participate in the election due to insecurity and distrust and sit at home. The government should launch more programs to encourage people to participate in the polls and make them aware of the benefits of participating. Because in case of low turnout, the government will not have enough authority, and its legitimacy will be challenged. The following 49 (19.8%) respondents said Most people vote. This is also a matter of concern, as it is small in number and needs to be encouraged by the government and election support institutions. But 23.9% chose the other answer I do not know. The latter is due to the fact that Afghan society has entered a new phase of development and modernization for the past 20 years and has brought the traditional culture of life to modernity. In modern and urban culture, many citizens do not seek traditional relationships, know their neighbours' beliefs, and are unaware of their political orientation and interest in sharing with their neighbours. However, the government should increase its incentive programs in this regard so that it can draw more people to the ballot box. It is worth noting that these

incentive programs are focused on several rounds of elections as the elections approach, and people are more likely to encounter them in the short term. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) can raise awareness of the status and value of popular participation at least one to two years before the election through various programs at the city and village levels.

Table 4. 38 Performance of the Independent Election Commission in the election process

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	29	11.7	11.7	11.7
	I am not satisfied at all	103	41.7	41.7	53.4
Valid	I'm not satisfied	62	25.1	25.1	78.5
	Relatively satisfied	43	17.4	17.4	96.0
	Satisfied	10	4.0	4.0	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Electoral commissions are the only body to conduct elections and investigate electoral complaints. To date, many electoral disputes have been resolved through the mediation and involvement of powerful political actors (both national and international). The mechanism created for such a purpose has been ignored. The result is that electoral institutions have no means of enforcing their rulings. As a result, the credibility and efficiency of these institutions have been undermined.

Therefore, regarding the question of whether the respondents are satisfied with the performance of the Independent Election Commission in the election process, 41.7 per cent of the respondents chose 'I am not satisfied at all.' As many as 62 (25.1%) people answered, "I'm not satisfied." Then, 17.4 per cent chose relatively satisfied. This process has been reduced to such an extent that only ten respondents (4 %) have chosen the 'satisfied' option. According to Table 5.37 statistics, to resolve inconsistencies and contradictions in the electoral system, the reforms should begin with an overview of the electoral framework to include various local and national elections across the spectrum of political decision-making processes. The Afghan parliament must be improved through electoral reform, and the protection of the electoral process must be maintained in any meaningful electoral reform. Electoral reform should not be seen only as a "technical distribution of parliamentary seats to election winners" or as a matter of "electoral voting methods" but as electoral reform to empower voters through voting and the distribution of seats during the election process. After the election, decision-making procedures within parliament are designed and focused on.

Information required by citizens to vote

Following every election in Afghanistan, the finger of blame and criticism of the members of the election commissions has been pointed out, and there has been talking of weak management or the inability of individuals. Apart from the lack of work capacity and failure to manage election commissions, allegations of fraud have led to the acceptance of election results,

creating another challenge to the electoral process in the country. Non-acceptance of the 2014 election results led to the formation of a national unity government, but the 2019 election also faced similar problems. That is why most people have lost faith in the election process. In this part of the research, we seek to find citizens' needs for information. How much data is needed from the government, especially the IEC and election support institutions?

Table 4.39 The amount of information needed about how to vote

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no need	38	15.4	15.4	15.4
	Low need	16	6.5	6.5	21.9
	Moderate need	22	8.9	8.9	30.8
	High need	19	7.7	7.7	38.5
	Most needed	152	61.5	61.5	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Table 4.38 shows that the need for information about elections is very high. 61.5% of Afghans are looking for the most needed information. At the same time, 38 people said they did not need any information. But 8.9 per cent answered Moderate need. Sixteen out of a total of 247 people answered that the answer is low need, and 7.7 per cent of people answered high demand. With this, it can be seen that citizens need information on how to vote. As explained at the beginning of the chapter, large numbers of candidates in parliamentary and provincial council elections are challenging for those who vote, and the majority face difficulties in voting. The government should make the system electronic or set up procedures to facilitate the voting process, given that it uses a traditional paper system for voting. The benefits of this work can reduce the level of fraud and confusion among the people regarding voting.

Table 4.40 The amount of information needed about polling stations

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no need	21	8.5	8.5	8.5
	Low need	26	10.5	10.5	19.0
	Moderate need	46	18.6	18.6	37.7
	High need	56	22.7	22.7	60.3
	Most needed	98	39.7	39.7	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Polling stations are the most crucial place for a country's elections. These centres have exceptional security and geographical location so citizens can use their votes with peace of mind.

In Table 4.39, citizens with 39.7 per cent chose the most needed. As a result, 22.7% of people chose 'High Need,' and 18.6% chose Moderate Need. 10.5 per cent was a low-need response, and only 21 of the total respondents said they did not need any information.

Afghanistan is one of the countries where ballots are not printed inside this country. This trend has led to the price of the ballot paper being much higher than in many countries. In the 2014 presidential election, one vote's cost was $9. The ballot paper has unique markings that are determined by the Afghan Election Commission so that voters can use them quickly without mistakes. Following the publication of ballots, the IEC is required by the Afghan Electoral Law to prevent the misuse of these ballots, ballot boxes, and other election materials before, after, and on Election Day. These measures include packing, sealing, marking, and the specific way of closing, transferring, holding, and opening it in the presence of domestic and international observers, which must be done by the procedure pre-written by the Electoral Commission.

Table 4.41 The amount of information needed about security arrangements to protect voters

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no need	23	9.3	9.3	9.3
	Low need	17	6.9	6.9	16.2
	Moderate need	33	13.4	13.4	29.6
	High need	52	21.1	21.1	50.6
	Most needed	122	49.4	49.4	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Electoral systems are a fundamental component of democratic political systems. Their importance is not only due to their role in building a democratic society but also to the effects that the functions of this system have on the political, economic, and social dimensions of society. In the first elections in Afghanistan, along with the police, the Afghan National Army, intelligence security, and peacekeeping forces protected the elections. The biggest challenge in election security is the existence of the Taliban group, which disrupts the security of citizens during the voting process. In Table 4.40, 49.4% of respondents stated security is the most needed. Similarly, 21.1% of the total respondents responded 'high need,' and 13.4% of respondents answered to ensure the security of the Moderate election. Only 23% thought that security was not needed.

During the last elections in Afghanistan, the Taliban group carried out explosions, rocket attacks, and threatening letters to prevent citizens from going to the polls. According to the previous pages of this chapter, nearly 2,000 polling stations were closed due to insecurity. In

the latest case, the Afghan Ministry of Interior announced in the 2019 elections that 72,000 security, defence, and intelligence forces had secured the presidential election. Is. Given all this force and guard, the Taliban repeated warnings to citizens, urging them not to vote. At the end of the election, the Taliban cut off the fingers of dozens of Afghan citizens for voting. According to the research findings, it is suggested that the government provide mental and physical security for the citizens regarding the polling stations. On this basis, the participation of the people in the upcoming elections can be increased.

Table 4.42 The amount of information needed about Islam and elections

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no need	29	11.7	11.7	11.7
	Low need	21	8.5	8.5	20.2
	Moderate need	52	21.1	21.1	41.3
	High need	54	21.9	21.9	63.2
	Most needed	91	36.8	36.8	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

The Islamic government, in the past, was achieved through allegiance to the ruler; hence, loyalty to the government in the past was in the form of "loyalty to allegiance." "Allegiance and voting based on the divine appointment of the ruler is the duty of the people, and this allegiance and popular choice strengthens the foundations of the government and is a kind of declaration of readiness to accept the appointed sovereign because, as the ruler can with the help of a group of people, the government Because God appoints the ruler, the people still have to accept his rule and be worthy of his administration, even though their allegiance and voting is not the source of his legitimacy.

Afghanistan is a very religious country, and even its constitution states that no law can be created against the beliefs of Islam in Afghanistan. This country's official religion is Islam. Therefore, all cases should be Islamized and addressed from the address of religion. Elections in Afghanistan should be handled adequately, from the talks of religious schools and mosque pulpits. Citizens consider themselves responsible, and holding and participating in elections is a religious obligation. From what can be seen in Table 4.41, 36.8 per cent of the respondents chose the Most needed option. Then, 21.9% of people chose the High-need option.

Similarly, only 11.7 per cent of all respondents said they did not need any information about the election and Islam. Given that, we saw that the need for information about Islam and the elections is very high. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, especially the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs, is responsible for disseminating information about the elections through mosques in coordination with the Independent Election Commission and election support institutions. Print copies of books on Islam and elections should be added to the curriculum of universities and schools. Make it clear to the people that democracy,

especially elections, is not against their religious aspirations and does not contradict the beliefs of Islam.

Table 4.43 The amount of information needed about electoral law and human rights

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no need	23	9.3	9.3	9.3
	Low need	21	8.5	8.5	17.8
	Moderate need	50	20.2	20.2	38.1
	High need	52	21.1	21.1	59.1
	Most needed	101	40.9	40.9	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Elections belong to the people. The principles of democratic elections are rooted in the concept that citizens have the right to participate in their country's public and governmental affairs. These rights (sovereignty of the people overpower) are reflected in various international instruments and conventions, which can be found in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 25 of the Convention on Civil and Political Rights (J. A. Their, 2006b). Elections are held to show the will of the people and those in power as the only source of energy. The elections determine who will take the elected seats and run the government in the people's interests. Elections are not the only apparent aspect of expressing the people's will. The true expression of democracy, the free expression of the right to vote, and the right to self-determination based on public participation, transparency, and accountability are also essential aspects of elections.

To hold fair and democratic elections, governments must respect the following rights (according to Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 22 Civil and Political Conventions). Table 4.42 shows the high need for information on election law and human rights. The highest option, 'Most needed and High need,' was chosen by 40.9% of the people. However, only 9.3% of people did not want information and used the no-need option. The right to participate in communities and political parties, the right to participate in candidate support rallies,

- The right to hold peaceful rallies in support of the candidates
- The right to move freely to establish election support headquarters
- The right to freedom from all forms of intimidation, violence, or other hostile conduct in the expression of political interests and opinions
- The right to express a political statement without any interference
- The right to freedom of expression and political thought includes the right to search, access, and disclose information and information to develop the right to vote.

Therefore, according to the above explanations, the Independent Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan is responsible for using its legal position to hold elections in Afghanistan after the Independent Election Commission. By strengthening human rights institutions, the government should make it clear to the people that the right to vote is a natural and crucial right for the citizens of Afghanistan.

Table 4.44 The amount of information needed about how to file an electoral complaint

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no need	21	8.5	8.5	8.5
	Low need	21	8.5	8.5	17.0
	Moderate need	46	18.6	18.6	35.6
	High need	56	22.7	22.7	58.3
	Most needed	103	41.7	41.7	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

The Independent Electoral Complaints Commission (IEC) is the institutional body in Afghanistan that handles election complaints in Afghanistan under the Afghan Election Law. The only way that, according to the statistics obtained so far in this chapter, shows that it is taking the path of electoral fraud and fraud is the Electoral Complaints Commission. 41.7% of citizens answered 'Most needed' that they need information about election complaints. Similarly, 56 people answered 'High Need,' and only 8.5 per cent of people said they did not need this information.

The Complaints Commission was first established as a temporary body to deal with complaints about the 2005 Wolesi Jirga elections. This initiative was repeated for the 2009 presidential elections and the 2010 Wolesi Jirga. Until the adoption and signing of the Afghan Election Law in 2014, the Complaints Commission became independent from the Electoral Commission and became permanent.

Provincial commissions have the following powers under Article 30 of the Afghan Election Law:

Examine the objections to the list of candidates and voters and the conditions and characteristics of the candidates raised during the elections. Investigation of complaints arising from election violations provided that the complaint has been registered following the provisions of this law at the appointed time. It is issuing advice, warning, and ordering corrective action to the person or agency that has committed the violation. It imposes fines following the provisions of the electoral law, issuing an order to recount votes in designated polling stations before the announcement of the election results and recognizing invalid ballots—elimination of candidates for justified reasons under the law. Identify electoral crimes following Article 97 of the Electoral Law and refer them to the judiciary (J. A. Their, 2006b).

Therefore, the most important proposal for the Government of Afghanistan in dealing with electoral complaints is to train citizens to file complaints or to announce them through the mass media. With such an investigation, the citizens believe that if someone cheats, he will be investigated and prosecuted.

Table 4.45 The amount of information needed about political parties

		Frequency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	no need	33	13.4	13.4	13.4
	Low need	23	9.3	9.3	22.7
	Moderate need	53	21.5	21.5	44.1
	High need	62	25.1	25.1	69.2
	Most needed	76	30.8	30.8	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Table 4.44 shows that 30.8 per cent of respondents think that information about political parties is 'Most Needed' in electoral processes. Similarly, 21.5% of people responded that information about political parties is of 'Moderate need', and 13.4% said they did not need information about parties. However, in the current situation, the existence of parties is one of the necessities of modern life as it is one of the most influential institutions influencing the decision-making and executive processes of countries and acts as a link between the people and political sovereignty. In today's societies and political systems, there is almost complete consensus on the need for partisanship, and parties are referred to as the wheel of the machine of democracy. Our country's current system is witnessing the emergence of different political parties and groups with different ideals and ideas after the Taliban regime. Still, after almost two decades of democracy, political parties have not been institutionalized, and none of the parties can do exceptional work—real parties, including political participation, political socialization, political relations, etc. Although the parties' names have been heard many times, the vast majority have only carried the party's name. Despite the failed experience of political parties in the country, the belief in the need for systematic, organized, formal, legal, and purposeful institutions remains strong. If the morbid structure of political parties is not improved, damages and obstacles are not removed, political parties will turn responsible citizens into indifferent and irresponsible citizens by heating the election environment through propaganda, debates, talks, and essential issues. A minority of popular participation in elections hinders one of the grounds for political development.

Challenges that the democratic process in Afghanistan is facing

Democracy is a set of principles and methods that defend human freedom. Democracy is the institutionalization of freedom based on the rule of the majority and the protection of the rights of individuals and minorities while respecting the wishes of the majority and strongly advocating for the fundamental rights of individuals and minority groups. A democratic

government is a government where all citizens, directly and indirectly, participate in power and monitor how the government operates. After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 and the simultaneous start of the Bonn process, Afghanistan (with the arrival of international donors) began the technical and political process of democratization. This process includes restoring the presidential system to the state apparatus; the parliament consists of parliaments (House of Representatives and Senate), provincial councils, and elections. Everyone was waiting for the growing strengthening of democracy and its institution in Afghanistan. But with the long history of democracy in Afghanistan, democratic values and institutions are still under threat. The growth of violence, the obstruction of elections, the frustration and despair of the people for democracy to meet their security and economic needs, the restriction of media activities, the reduction of women's civil and political participation, the empowerment of non-democratic groups and the obstruction of democracy; It has raised many doubts about democracy in this country.

In this part of the research, we look at the current and future challenges faced by the path to democracy in Afghanistan. For the respondents in the questionnaire, we raised several challenges in one question. We asked them to rate each question based on their views.

Figure 4.1

Source: The author's calculation is based on   primary data.

Afghanistan has faced significant security-political challenges in recent years. After 2014, security responsibilities were transferred from international forces to Afghan forces, which imposed high human costs on these forces. In previous years, terrorists in the winter went from the battlefields to their shelters in the region to prepare for the New Year's battles on the one hand, and the leadership levels of these groups had to think of formulating their war strategy for the New Year. Afghanistan is one of the most religiously conservative countries in the Islamic world, and any intellectual and ideological changes in the Islamic world can affect Afghanistan. Islamic fundamentalism has grown significantly in Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh since the 1990s. Because Afghanistan is adjacent to the Indian subcontinent, the

rise of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism in the region could have profound implications for Afghanistan's security and political relations.

As shown in Figure 4.1, most people have chosen the 'strongly agree' option on security and terrorism as a challenge in the path of democracy and progress. Then, there are those who 'agree' that security and terrorism are the main challenges in Afghanistan. But the last people are those for whom this issue is typical and think security and terrorism have nothing to do with democracy and elections.

Figure 4.2

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

The economy is the most critical indicator of progress and a factor of prosperity in society. As shown in Figure 4.2, it is clear that our respondents, with a majority strongly agreeing, have shown that strengthening the economy and eradicating poverty is the only way to achieve an ideal democracy. Few respondents chose the option 'low agree". But those who choose to 'agree' still make up a quarter of the above pie chart. To eradicate poverty and strengthen Afghanistan's economy, various suggestions for sections of society can be defined through a better situation. Since economic growth is essential to reducing poverty, the poor must genuinely benefit from that economic growth. Poverty alleviation is related to the ability of the poor to have a better life. Collect, control, and preserve assets; access to quality opportunities and services.

1- Strengthening the agricultural sector is necessary to continue economic growth, given the international community's limited assistance and accelerating the poverty alleviation process. As many as 75.6 per cent of people with low incomes over 15 are illiterate[46]. They cannot take advantage of better job opportunities that require higher skills. According to the process of poverty alleviation, they should benefit through the growth of the love of agriculture, the sector in which the poorest poor are concentrated.

2. Investing in human development that leads to economic growth, improving public welfare, reducing poverty, and connecting gaps in all areas between Afghanistan and other countries in

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[46]https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan

the region. While expanding the supply of education, health, and essential services, Afghanistan needs to pay more attention to improving access and quality in less-covered areas. Especially the groups that are less paid attention to, such as girls and the poor

3- Risk management and reduction, geography facing natural hazards, economic structure, and a high poverty rate of families whose ability to provide services is limited) coordinate assistance to prevent and reduce risks and help people deal with the adverse effects of injuries. Particular attention should be paid to developing an effective social approval system that can accelerate the process of poverty alleviation and modulate and improve the effectiveness of investment in human development and the agricultural sector.

Figure 4.3

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Insecurity, illiteracy, unemployment, corruption, drug addiction, lack of public awareness of youth rights, and instrumental youth use are other significant challenges facing youth. Millions of young people are currently unemployed in the country, and the government has not implemented a practical plan to address this problem. National Youth Union recently announced that out of 16 million eligible people, 13 million are unemployed or low-income [47]. People participate in democratic processes to prosper for the rest of their lives. Unemployment is one of these problems.

Figure 4.3 shows that the 'strongly agreed' people choose the option, and those who have chosen agree also offer more than a quarter. However, only the last part, after those who disagree, has been selected by people who do not care and believe that unemployment has nothing to do with elections and democracy in the country. To curb and control unemployment in society and take a step towards eradicating it, the government must first review labour laws and regulations and make the necessary changes based on the needs of society and its realities. Put the fight against corruption and turn to the principle of meritocracy and respect for

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[47]https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---
publ/documents/publication/wcms_734455.pdf

knowledge and expertise at the top of his management from top to bottom. End the games in an indecent and unprincipled way and mediate the games. Undoubtedly, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs has a heavier legal responsibility in this regard than other ministries. This ministry must act seriously, decisively, and transparently in terms of planning and its implementation in the relevant institutions. Unless the issue and problem of unemployment in society, especially for this country's unemployed and wandering youth, are planned and acted responsibly, we cannot expect a precise and reliable political and social stability vision.

Figure 4.4

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

In its calculations, UNESCO has classified education into five levels: "preschool, primary, secondary, higher, and other types of formal education." The organization also stated in a report that Developed countries spend the most on education (primary and secondary). On the other hand, developing countries spend the most on (higher) education. (Of course, there is not much cost in Afghanistan for the higher education system, but more attention is paid to higher education than elementary school.) The primary high illiteracy rate is especially among women in Afghanistan. Developing societies are the result of investing in their education. Figure 4.4 shows that the available answers have a variety of different respondents. Except for those dissatisfied with the impact of education, schools, and literacy on the electoral process and democracy, all other participants have similar beliefs. Afghanistan is one of the few countries where many people suffer from illiteracy, which is still high despite many efforts. The leading causes of illiteracy among the country's citizens are the continuation of forty years of wars and the lack of education services. According to the explanations and demands of the people of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, especially the Ministry of Education, to increase the education capacity, policies and programs should be developed to improve literacy and education.

Figure 4.5

Measure the challenge of Government/weak authority

Legend:
- Disagreement
- Low agree
- Indifferent
- agree
- Strongly agree

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Figure 4.5 shows that the most agreeable people comprise the majority of this governance circle. It is followed by agreement, but a small part agrees. Therefore, it can be concluded that the government is one of the essential elements hindering the progress of democracy and elections in Afghanistan. But what is power? In administrative law literature, management refers to formulating decisions or policies and putting those policies into action, as well as the timely execution of the following programs. The wisdom and logic of governance are to solidify the organic link between politics and a system's resources. In other words, "good governance" refers to government policies that effectively use human and economic resources to serve the interests of its constituents.

"Good governance" strengthens the relationship between government and the market, government and citizens, government and the private sector, government and the social sector (civil society), government and the political sector (political parties), and government and the international community.

"Good governance" has significant consequences such as "legitimacy and building national consensus," "creating a suitable environment for broad political participation of citizens in the system," "respect for the rule of law," "respect for human rights values," "generalization of leadership accountability culture and "Management towards society," "promoting the principles of transparency in the structure of the system," "accountability to national and international programs" and "observing the culture of balance and proportionality in the structure of the system" for the community.

Governance with this contemporary approach has little history in Afghanistan and has been used for the first time since the Bonn Conference and the fall of the Taliban. The documents of the Bonn Conference, adopted in December 2001, speak of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, which constitute essential elements of "good governance." Still, nothing is said about the structures, mechanisms, and practices of governance at this conference. The Bonn Conference, launched in the early days of the fall of the Taliban, focused on the division of political power. Except for the limited number of participants in the conference, all those involved in the war system and political power in Afghanistan. This principle caused one to focus less on the managerial challenges of this political power.

Figure 4.7

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Most of Afghanistan's energy, especially electricity, is still imported. This energy comes from neighbouring countries and shows Afghanistan's excessive dependence on this area. According to Figure 4.6, the people of Afghanistan are incredibly accepting of the response that electricians are essential and have a significant impact on the democratic and electoral process. Limited energy resources have become a severe challenge in the present age. Electricity is one of the most important clean energy sources for a developing economy like Afghanistan. This issue is essential when other energy sources, such as oil and gas, are the country's most important source of income.

On the other hand, the demand for gas and petroleum products increases. Therefore, in this study, a theoretical model based on the concept of duality and the theory of structural change in development economics has been designed, which shows that increasing the use of electricity has expanded the industrial sector and the relative shrinkage of the agricultural industry and the structural development process. Empirical evidence based on the production functions of the Iranian economy also confirms this.

Suppose the Afghan government can get the energy it needs from hydroelectric dams such as Naghlu, Mahipar, Surobi, Kajaki, and Harrod by focusing on barriers and compliance with international water laws and protecting the water rights of its neighbours. In that case, it can generate more electricity and prevent floods. Take control of the country.

Also, the development of solar or solar power stations such as Herat and Kandahar and the construction and creation of such projects in other provinces can solve many of the citizens' problems and make electricity available to them at a low price.

Suppose the government provides the electricity generated by the manufacturing and industrial companies at a low price. In that case, it can significantly impact the industry and support manufacturing and industrial companies. For example, if the government can provide electricity to industrial estates without a stroke, it will reduce environmental pollution on the one hand and increase domestic production on the other.

Figure 4.7

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Figure 4.7 shows that the vast majority of people agree that corruption in the authorities is the reason for the lack of development of democracy and the way forward. The consensus on the answers shows that the government must be cautious about this. According to development sociologists, economic-financial corruption is the opposite of anti-development. Development in that country cannot be unveiled in any society and government with economic corruption. However, the concept of development crystallizes different meanings and examples. But in simple terms, development can be defined as a society's comprehensive and balanced development. Sociologists consider development the engine or centre of gravity, although this does not mean ignoring the dimensions of political, cultural, social, human, environmental, and development. Therefore, the main consequence of the corruption of government officials is the inhibition of social life from the development cycle.

Corruption by the authorities reduces people's participation and distrust of the government. Experiences and observations of corrupt governments show that people are increasingly

distancing themselves from such governments and see the government as the cause of the spread of poverty, unemployment, and other anomalies. For example, in recent days, the Afghan House of Representatives has rejected the government's "national agenda" program, with many citizens calling the parliament's decision the only popular decision. Decreasing income levels and increasing purchasing power are directly related to the corruption of government officials. Decreased popular political participation and distrust of the government will exacerbate the crisis of legitimacy and often create other problems. The breakdown of the authorities causes the class gap to widen and the emergence of the novice class in society. People with low incomes and the lower classes are interpreted. In Afghanistan, we are witnessing the emergence of a new and newly arrived class. A class style that did not eat a generation ago has reached billions in the capital following the corruption of the financial sphere from state and public assets. The widening of the class gap raises many social problems, including violence, addiction, immigration, unemployment, ordinary and organized crime, and many other issues. The corruption of government officials wastes public resources and opportunities. Undoubtedly, no government has unlimited resources and opportunities to develop and meet the needs of society. Responsible governments mobilize all resources for the development of the country. However, corrupt rulers use all options and resources for personal or team gain. An excellent example of this is the waste of Afghanistan's vast financial resources and golden chance over the past two decades. If the bell of looting had not been rung in Mr Karzai's government and the financial corrupters had been dealt with decisively and seriously, the current face of Afghanistan would undoubtedly have been better.

Figure 4.8

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

In Figure 4.8, most respondents have chosen to be ordinary and indifferent to road problems in Afghanistan. During the elections, the transfer of election materials and the return of votes used

by the government were the only problems. Afghanistan is one of the most mountainous countries, and most of them are difficult to cross. The better the quality and standard roads and highways, the better the market for buyers and sellers, and the price difference through the high cost of transportation. Of course, in such conditions, farmers and artisans can easily offer their products to suitable markets with good transportation in a short time and with less consumption. Thus, it becomes clear that in the absence of proper and essential ways of transport system services, it will not be possible and lead to a lack of progress in agriculture, industry, trade, and other sectors of the national economy. In addition, proper transportation, energy, tax relief, proximity to the point of sale, etc., are factors that directly impact the choice of location of enterprises and should be considered in the planning of enterprises. To improve this situation, four suggestions are made:

1. Gaining the trust of international countries.
2. Reconstruction and development of airfields.
3. Reconstruction of highways and construction of railways and their connection to railways of neighbouring countries.
4. Support the private sector. Given the geopolitical importance of Afghanistan and the role of transport in improving the economy, the government must pay serious attention to this issue and think about the Afghan economic development plan by removing obstacles.

figure 4.9

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

The result of the last elections in Afghanistan has not been able to meet the citizens' expectations. Hence, people commit crimes out of poverty and hardship. If development occurs, no one seeks to commit a crime in everyday life. Chart Figure 4.9 chooses the extraordinary answer, and most people believe that crime and its implementation are an obstacle to the development of democracy. These factors vary due to cultural, economic, and

political differences in different societies. These factors in a general division can be divided into three categories:

A) Individual or biological factors such as sex, age, and organs;

B) psychological factors such as pessimism, aggression, and prejudice;

C) Social factors include disordered family, parental incompatibility of the reference group, immigration, and the press.

There is no consensus among thinkers on the number or extent of the role of these factors. Each of them, according to their tendency and expertise, has considered this issue and felt a particular group of these factors only as effective in committing criminal acts or attached the most importance to it. Suggestions that can be made: increase social capital among citizens, create collective environmental defence through the formation of local community centres (such as keeping alive and reviving active local centres), use the neighbourhood guard and increase interaction between neighbourhood guards and residents, create Homes, buildings, and institutions with a realistic view of the environment, increasing the presence of police in the neighbourhood and crime hotspots, shaping spatial identity, spatial affiliation and creating social attachment to the environment and reducing the heterogeneity of the neighbourhood through residential stability and maintaining residents, in the end, the community.

External factors affecting the election process

Studying external electoral factors and behaviour as topics in political sociology, which mainly seeks to know how and how to vote among different strata and groups in society, is of considerable importance. One of the aspects of this group of studies is recognizing and determining the most critical components affecting electoral behaviour and expressing the importance and effectiveness of the studied societies from different variables. Elections not only play a role in shaping and directing policies and programs but also go beyond the symbol of widespread acceptance and legitimacy, which must be repeated at the highest national level every few years. Experts propose various approaches to understanding the factors and components affecting public participation and success in elections; one of these approaches is to re-read past competitions, especially elections. The health of a democratic system and its satisfaction are often reflected in the level of participation. Therefore, understanding why people are willing to vote and what motivates them to participate in politics can help make political, economic, and social decisions.

Figure 4.10

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

The graph above shows that most people, close to 80 per cent, have balanced the role of radio during elections. In other parts, their usefulness is around 40 to 45 per cent. The radio's primary function is framed regardless of the defined media policies. Any split and birth of new media is a spark of crystallization and maturity for which radio has been the basis. With development and progress today, this trend has become one in which the existence or negation of the "concept of sound" in all modern media has become a qualitative way of using it by the audience. Therefore, it can be said that "radio, the mother of new media," will have a special place and importance among all media.

Easy media interpolation capability to improve quality, content transfer, and message engineering (mobile applications or Internet sites, etc.) and rely on this advantage, reducing costs (using less Internet traffic, reducing storage space) etc.) Also, modernizing and using the tastes of influential people in society is one of the essential benefits that have increased the position of this media among all media. Although today, a significant range of audiences, the taste for image tendency has been strengthened, and they choose their preferred media accordingly. Still, it should be noted that the professional audience has access to radio in the traditional way (ordinary receivers). And even eclectic (mobile radio apps) add to the importance of this medium. The power of radio integration allows audiences to access content and information more easily. This is important because, unlike in the past, due to the growth and development of knowledge and the promotion of people's expertise and ability, most people do not enjoy similar working and even living conditions. From this perspective, there are many differences between people. For example, walking, driving, some sports, cycling, and even the type of employment people had before is a daily behaviour that is a function of their social status. Therefore, in the bright world of media, only radio can transmit information to people without disturbing the desired process and daily intellectual and mental turmoil. Otherwise, other media can be used only when the audience is at rest to see, like follow, read, and even interact, which cannot be adapted to the situation of all people. This medium never imagines an end and takes on a new daily form to convey messages.

Figure 4.11

Effect of Television about the elections

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Figure 4.11 shows that the respondents chose television as the most helpful tool for obtaining information about elections. The most critical media is a country's television in the present era. One of the most vital infrastructures of communication and information structure in the current age is the responsibility of the media. At no point in history has relations between (nation-states) been as excellent as in modern times. On the one hand, media engineers work on public opinion by reflecting news and information among the components of the public arena and increasing the level of public awareness, and on the other hand, by collecting and reflecting the opinions, criticisms, and opinions of people and officials, the relationship between rulers (government) and people. They are achieving the effectiveness of television in increasing people's participation in performing the role of IRIB in clarifying the views of candidates and political groups, identifying the function and performance of IRIB in encouraging and increasing political participation and vitality in elections, creating electoral enthusiasm On TV. The presidential and parliamentary elections marked a turning point in the role of the television media in the election campaign. Candidate interviews, campaign videos, and televised debates between pre-politically-political-political figures seem to have played a vital role in how viewers perceive each candidate and ultimately affect how they vote.

Figure 4.12

**Effect of Newspaper or other print media about the elections**

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

The role of print media cannot be overstated, as the literacy rate in Afghanistan is low, and nearly half of the population is illiterate. However, in terms of the structure of the print media, the impact of images and graphics can be considered necessary. Figure 4.13 shows that trustworthy answers play the highest role and the low usefulness of print publications. The print media is quiet compared to radio and television.

Compared to neighbouring countries, print media is one of the most popular publications, and Siraj Al-Akhbar and Shams Al-Nahar have excellent historical reputations. However, the ratio of the developments of the last half-century and the successive wars has ended the literacy level of the people, and the people have been far from studying and researching. The media has always been a supporter of government reform moves. Suppose a government does not use the media to inform and enlighten public opinion. In that case, it will face the fate of many governments in Afghanistan's history in the last century. The print media's responsibility is to spread knowledge and raise awareness by creating a culture among the people. As a result, it must be said that Afghanistan's print media has a great mission: to turn the country's cycles of democracy. The relationship between democracy and the media is inevitable. In the absence of print media, there will be no democracy, and in the lack of democracy, the media will not be able to operate impartially.

Figure 4.13

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Figure 4.14 shows that the respondents voted against the role of the village elders for successful elections. Village and ethnic elders do not play a positive role. But let us not forget that Afghan society is a traditional society, which cannot be ignored. Traditional societies like Afghanistan are legitimized by councils' and elders' decisions on a task. Anthropologists, ethnographers, and scholars engaged in global comparative studies are more likely to use the terms village elders and ethnic group in their purest sense, which refers to an understanding of equality; Max Weber, for example, points out that we should call groups of people "ethnic groups or ethnic elders" who have a mental belief in their common ancestry. This belief is essential in promoting group formation.

In contrast, it does not matter whether or not there is an objective blood relationship. Ethnic membership differs from kinship precisely because it is a hypothetical identity. Thus, ethnicities and ethnic groups are individuals with a common tradition, culture, and sense of identity that distinguishes them as a subgroup of the larger national community and other community members. Each nation has a broad kinship structure, which includes material and spiritual solidarity, the element of connection, and the sense of belonging to the country. These factors include language, the specific geographical area in which the people lived and were, the values, customs, the belief in a common need that is often mythical, and the common notion that strengthens one's belonging to a particular people. Research shows that village elders do not influence the democratic process, especially elections; it is a general belief, not a specialized one. Therefore, the government must use the elders of the villages and councils to encourage the people to go to the polls. The Ministry of Immigrants and Tribes can strengthen the role of the elders in the democratic process by building good policies.

Figure 4.14

Effect of Mullahs or teachers about the elections

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

Afghanistan's legal system is based on Hanafi jurisprudence and modern law. The constitution of Afghanistan does not contradict the Sharia rules. These are the issues that Afghan religious scholars have emphasized in several meetings of religious scholars in support of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Foreign troops are present in many countries. Saudi Arabia hosts American forces. The country's mullahs and clerics have always insisted on the US occupation of Afghanistan and have been stoned for democracy and democratic processes. The clergy affirms political legitimacy in traditional countries. The government of Afghanistan has issued fatwas in several national meetings of mullahs and religious scholars, declaring that the Taliban's war against the system and democracy is forbidden and has no religious basis. The Organization never approved this internal matter in Islamic countries. The Afghan government has failed to build a consensus against Taliban military attacks by Islamic nations. Figure 4.15 shows that religious scholars and professors have no credible role in the electoral process. But it should not be left unsaid that the part of professors in schools and universities can be more appropriate, and it is the professors who direct the thoughts and beliefs of students. Suppose the benefits of democratic processes in the educational system, especially the educational system of religious schools, are made known, and mullahs and clerics explain it through the pulpits of the mosque. In that case, democracy can be introduced into the lives of Afghan citizens through the address of religion. As in the early days of Islam, beliefs were more about political Islam and did not prevent any activity that increased the role of the people in governance and elections.

Figure 4.15

Effect of Candidate campaigns about the elections

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

An election campaign is a set of actions taken by a candidate or party to attract voters' attention, a process that, in addition to selecting the right person or persons to run for office, plays a vital role in dynamism and social education.

The campaign naturally begins with the candidate or party organizing networks of volunteers and professionals across a given geographical area to raise funds on the one hand and Establish other bases as public relations for organizing news advertising and polls, which may require much travel on the other words, public donations and support groups and organizations should be spent on advertising programs and Poll and fund travel expenses of delegates. In Afghanistan, however, these issues are impractical, and election campaigns are mainly about candidates' speeches and public parties. The majority of people are challenged in these campaigns. They believe in making financial concessions, and most receive money at the end of their participation in movements and campaigns. Therefore, it can be seen in Figure 4.16 that the degree of extraordinary effectiveness is not very high, and the participants have chosen a more balanced option.

Figure 4.16

Effect of Political parties about the elections

Source: The author's calculation is based on primary data.

In recent decades, parties have significantly impacted the formation of electoral systems and have become the basis for dividing electoral systems into majority and proportional. Based on this, it seems necessary to study the positive and negative impact of parties on the manner of holding elections, the selection of decision-making and executive managers, and determining the social structures of societies. The formation of parties is usually the result of political events and external realities such as elections, revolutions, protests, and the like. For example, in most cases, the party is formed so that the supporters of an electoral candidate gather together and activate the individual election campaigns. These campaigns become a party in the mentioned process, i.e., the approval of the constitution and planning to gain power. Therefore, the roots of party formation are closely related to electoral systems. The respondents examined the role of the parties in a balanced way, and the good thing is that they have neither many supporters nor many opponents. It is concluded that if the parties are, in the true sense of the word, it is to serve the people's interests in democratic systems. They have found a suitable platform for growth and development in Afghanistan.

Figure 4.17

Effect of Friends and family about the elections

The Afghan society is traditional, and the people are more influential than the first person in the family. All decisions come from within families. Figure 4.18 also shows that the respondents have emphasized balanced and valuable options more. Therefore, the role of friends and family in Afghanistan's democratic and electoral process cannot be ignored.

The family is the leading and most fundamental institution in which every human begins his life; the family affects the development and growth of a person in various genetic, biological, educational, spiritual, and psychological dimensions. Theoretically and practically, much attention has been paid to the family in the political field. The family has an essential place in the social thought of Islam, and many references have been made to the importance of this institution in religious sources. There are many differences between different socio-political thinkers regarding the significance and influence of the components of social structure. Still, in Islamic social thought, the hierarchies affecting social life are the individual, family, social environment, and the form of politics, respectively. Sociologists have studied the institution of the family in terms of design, function, formation, elements influencing it, and how this institution controls other aspects of social life. The most critical question in political socialization is what socialization is and what is necessary.

Consequently, what is the definition and scope of political socialization? To what extent is the role of the family decisive and influential among the various elements and channels of socialization? The structure of society has many complex and intertwined dimensions that can not be separated from each other. Of course, the divisions made in theory have a sociological aspect and are presented in an ideal way that does not necessarily have an objective element. The study of the family and its impact on the political socialization of the next generation is no exception to this rule. Therefore, from a realistic point of view, it should be said that the institution of the family, along with other channels of socialization, has a decisive role in the political arena of society. The importance of the institution of the family and its role in political

socialization stems from the fact that all human beings experience it, and the main foundations of the personality of individuals in the family are formed. This influence is so broad and deep that some people have the characteristics developed in the family institution for the rest of their lives. They are created in all their thoughts and behaviours in the fields of individual and collective life influenced by that personality. The most crucial goal of political socialization is to transfer the values of the political system to future generations. The rulers in various fields try to use the conditions to maintain the stability and continuity of basic life by activating the primary and secondary channels of the value transfer mechanism. Therefore, these channels, of which the family is one of the most important and immediate, are vital in the political system's short-term, medium-term, and long-term planning and decision-making.

Besides the above questionnaire, an interview based on a structured questionnaire was conducted, as described in Chapter 1. The interviews were carried out with Politicians, Election Authority members, and Social Activists.

The first question we asked respondents was 'how satisfied are they with the democratic processes in Afghanistan? Most of our respondents showed satisfactory views about the democratic processes in Afghanistan. However, the threat to Afghan democracy is its weak electoral college, security, and mismanagement of financial assets. As quoted by one of the respondents, Mohammad Omar Daudzai (Representative of the President of Afghanistan in Regional Affairs and Chief of Staff to President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani in the 2019 election), *"Democracy is the best kind of government, and humanity has not yet found a good alternative to this kind of government. But the mistakes that have taken place in the last twenty years have hurt this trend.''* Afghanistan is a country that has recently acquired democracy. The democratic system in Afghanistan is a new experience. However, establishing democracy in Afghanistan has seen many ups and downs. For the past 20 years, neither President Karzai nor President Ghani has been able to take full advantage of the international community's opportunity for Afghanistan to make Afghanistan a fully democratic country.

In the next part of the interview, we tried to figure out the significant issues Afghanistan's democracy faces. Different responses were obtained from the respondents. The threats of the Taliban are one of the main reasons responsible for the unsuccessful process of democracy in Afghanistan. The other reasons include lack of security, weak electoral system, unstable government, and lack of trust among people in election processes. The main thing is that the government has not been able to strengthen itself in the last 20 years, although there has been generous assistance from the international community. Planning and management problems created a vacuum that the Taliban filled today. Afghanistan has not been able to bring governance to the district level in these twenty years. The government has failed to provide our villages with essential services such as drinking water, electricity, and well-built roads. The government has not even established a judicial system at the village level. One of the most critical problems in Afghanistan is the lack of security and political stability. This security is not only in human safety but also in military security. Corruption is also one of the essential critical challenges that threaten democracy in Afghanistan.

The lack of awareness goes back to the fact that a subject is not understood until it is taught. A poor society is no longer tolerable. Democracy is the art of living, and those without basic living facilities do not seek the art of living. Another critical issue is that people consider their votes invalid. This means that they believe that whether I vote or not, my vote will not affect the fate of the election.

In another part of the interview, we asked respondents about their views on the role of media in elections. There are two places where the press deals with democracy and elections: awareness; it is the responsibility of the media to inform the public about all the happenings in the election and other democratic processes. In Afghanistan, media freedom has played a positive and a negative role in understanding Afghanistan's social context. The positive part is that citizens often have access to issues through these media, and if these media were state-owned, no one would have known about such matters. For example, some revelations and information circulations by the government and the people were made through the same media. The downside was that these media outlets often wreaked havoc on national identities, dossiers, and ethnocentrism based on their financial and logistical resources. However, in general, one cannot expect much from Afghan media, like the world media, because these new and inexperienced media outlets are fair and impartial in disseminating information. The second argument is that the media should help people make wise decisions about the candidate they should vote for. This double act never happened in the Afghan media during the elections. Democracy cannot reach a republic without debate. If there is no debate in democracies, people will not be able to distinguish between bad and worse or good and better. This is a kind of shortcoming of the media.

In the following interview session, we asked the respondents if the process of the last presidential and parliamentary elections was free and fair. There were no positive responses from the respondents. According to respondents, the recent presidential and parliamentary elections were unfair and full of fraud. Afghanistan's electoral system is based on the copy, and there has been no election that can be called fair. In one province, a person becomes a parliament member with 200 votes, or sometimes, if someone comes from the United States, he becomes a parliament member without proper standards. How can someone be an American citizen with a green card and represent the people in parliament?

In the next part of the interview, we tried to find out why there was a lack of public participation in elections. The lack of public involvement is due to the lack of trust and security, as well as the mismanagement of election processes discussed earlier in this chapter. Besides these, one of the factors is the end of the literacy level of the people in Afghanistan. Other issues include lack of proper government management, lack of planning, etc. All these problems went hand in hand and paved the way for election fraud in Afghanistan. Accordingly, the people of Afghanistan did not participate in the democratic process and elections due to a lack of political knowledge and information.

After the fall of the Taliban in 2001 and the invasion of the U.S., it was for the first time that a democratic election was held in Afghanistan. However, the withdrawal process of U.S. troops has made Afghanistan the talk of the day. A question asked respondents what the role of US withdrawal from Afghanistan will be in upcoming elections.

The first debate after the withdrawal of US troops would be whether the Afghan government could stand on its own two feet. Second is the Taliban's ease in taking control. I quoted one of the respondents, Dr Faramarz Tamana (2019 presidential candidate of Afghanistan," *I think the 2019 election was the end of democratic elections in Afghanistan because nothing in this country came out of this country to continue. A non-native and imported democracy that no attempt was made to institutionalize. Therefore, I do not believe democracy will remain and elections will have a democratic form and image. And the withdrawal of US troops hurts this process. So, we move away from democracy and back to traditional systems like the Loya Jirga and the Dispute Settlement Council."*

It can be said that the withdrawal of the US can negatively affect the democracy of Afghanistan. The Taliban has been in opposition to Democracy from the beginning as the group believes that democracy has no roots in the country, which has been a ground of battle for many decades.

Political parties play a significant role in democratic processes. In Afghanistan, a political party is just a word to say. Afghanistan has had several political parties; however, most independent candidates have always been influential in elections. Keeping this in view, we asked respondents about their views on the role of political parties in the presidential and parliamentary elections. One of the advantages of democracy is building political parties and activities in the form of laws, but no political parties have performed democratic activities. More than 100 parties are registered with the Afghan Ministry of Justice, but this is only in large numbers, and they are weak in political activities. The past political parties were far more robust and capable than the new parties, filling the gap so that there was no opportunity for other parties. However, the role of the parties could be strengthened, but the former president of Afghanistan, Mr. Karzai, was not interested in this issue and believed more in the tribal system. The current president still faces problems in governance that do not give him a chance to improve the parties.

There are no political parties in Afghanistan in the true sense of the word. The parties in Afghanistan are the same jihadi and military parties that entered the political campaigns today. Their intellectual foundations and intellectual character cannot be changed any time soon. Political parties of the past were based on ethnic, regional, religious, and linguistic beliefs, which today are not without these characteristics. A series of political parties have been created over the last 20 years, but the maturity they must reach has not yet been reached, and their activities are not comparable.

In the next part of the interview, we ask respondents how they evaluate the performance of Afghan election commissions and non-governmental organizations regarding the elections. As per the majority of the respondents, the government's performance was moderate overall and negligible in most insecure places because of the presence of the Taliban. At the same time, the government was in a position where it knew the only reason for its persistence was elections. The function of international institutions regarding elections was to support and provide opportunities for this process. UNAMA's awareness of the election has been minimal, as has its distributed brochures and media attention. Unfortunately, the government did not pave the way for the polls, and most of the time, to lay the groundwork, it installed a kind of suspicion in the public mind that this government was directing the elections, not the people

and their votes .These election commissions rely on the president in their financial affairs, and the presidency can influence these commissions .To improve the functioning of the election commissions, it is essential to increase transparency and all the processes under the umbrella of the judiciary and be accountable to the Supreme Court.

In the next part of the interview, we aimed to relate Islam and democracy. We asked respondents how they can combine Islam and democracy and what the position of democracy and political parties in Islam is. Although the answers were different, we tried to figure out common concerns of respondents regarding Islam and democracy. Democracy is a way to control power, and power is a matter of foresight, the product of the formation of social relations between human beings. Power has no inherent moral logic and is a savage phenomenon; when the volume of power increases or the density of power occurs, savage behaviours are created, which is the root of many bloodsheds in history. As a result, when we look at things from a moral point of view, it is the moral duty of human beings to strive for power. To test the power, when we look at the human experience of several thousand years, we go from the empire of the Sumerians to ancient Egypt, ancient Iran, and ancient Rome. Along the way, scholars, philosophers, epistemologists, and philosophers, from the Bozorgmehr Hakim to Socrates, Plato and Farabi, and the rest. The concern has been how to control power so that it does not become a destructive phenomenon. There have been theoretical and practical experiences in this direction.

The link between Islam and democracy is seen differently by Islamic political philosophers, the general Muslim population, and Western writers from various views. Presently, several Muslim-majority nations are Islamic democracies. Indonesia is the world's most democratic Muslim-majority nation. Certain Islamic scholars have rejected the notion of democracy since they believed it to be a foreign concept incompatible with Islam. Several countries have adopted a Sharia-based democracy system.

Creational sovereignty is the direct sovereignty of God over the universe, which has been in the form of natural laws. In the language of religion, God rules over this universe. However, the other issue between society and human beings is that God does not come directly to rule here, which is considered a legislative rule in the religious literature. These are like the laws that humans make with their own hands. The Qur'an does not specify any specific strategy for governing. It leaves it to human beings to create it with a moral and rational conscience and to make the contexts of society.

Allegiance is a pre-religious issue that was part of pre-Islamic Arab culture. It was also a matter of shaking hands with the other side to vote to approve a problem, which was allegiance. This culture already existed among the Arab tribes. When Islam came, there was no change in this form. There is no contradiction between current issues of elections and religious beliefs, and even Islam facilitates these democratic processes. It can even be said that democracy is a divine presumption. Because democracy prevents tyranny, and tyranny is the worst kind of contentment.

In the last part of the interview, we seek respondents' suggestions for improving the Afghanistan voting process or elections. Per the suggestions provided by the respondents,

criteria other than those provided by law must be changed for the president and the parliamentary candidates. The existing electoral system and regulations make it easier for the rich to gain power. An example of one of the criteria is to collect 100,000 IDs to run for the presidency. You know that only a rich person can buy a hundred thousand IDs and run for president.

Interestingly, in Afghanistan's presidential and parliamentary elections, literacy is not even mentioned, which is catastrophic. These conditions lead to the formation of a government of idiots. The parties should be formed in the first three axes of the Taliban, the second Mujahideen, and the third technocrats. The democracy and democratic texts should be included in textbooks. Another suggestion, as per respondents, is stopping foreign interference in the election process in Afghanistan. The respondents also suggested abolishing the Electoral Commission and creating a competitive election commission in which all persons are elected based on merit and ability.

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Chapter 5

Conclusion

Elections, political parties, and democracy are processes that are standardized over time in the light of continuous cultural efforts and the strengthening of a sense of citizenship in society's beliefs. Elections and party activities are promising and strengthen civil and civil liberties. According to the English sociologist Anthony Giddens, today's governments have internal unity. Those who govern in such governments can rule only with the active consent of the majority of society through elections and the free activity of parties. These are just democratic ideals that provide a way to express and satisfy.

After the democratic system became a global ideal, its initial steps in Afghanistan were slowly taken. With the fall of the dark era of the Taliban and the formation of the Bonn Summit, a significant change took place in the socio-political system of Afghanistan. On January 5, 2003, Afghanistan adopted a constitution that upheld democratic values. The law provided the right conditions for public participation and political competition. In light of this, mass media, such as press, radio, and television, grew, and many groups and parties were formed. Also, the parliament, which has a special place in democratic systems as its beating heart and is considered one of its components, has been considered the highest legislative authority and the manifestation of the people's will in the new system of Afghanistan.

Democracy was expected to be institutionalized in Afghanistan. However, after a long lifespan of democracy in Afghanistan, it seems that democratic values and institutions, especially elections and party activities, are still exposed to various threats due to the government's weakness, the spread of insecurity, the rule of law, and the empowerment of incompatible groups. It is with democracy. According to a report by The Economist, Sputnik ranked Afghanistan 143rd out of 167 democracies in 2017 in terms of democracy. It seems that what a democratic system deserves has not been achieved correctly in Afghanistan's history. What a democratic system deserves has not appropriately been achieved in the history of Afghanistan. The inability of the government to defend democratic values and institutions, the lack of inclusive and national political parties, ethnic and tribal political culture, and democracy in post-Taliban Afghanistan have brought many ups and downs. The issue of democracy is one of the most fundamental issues in Afghan politics. Only elections give democracy its central meaning, and civilized countries achieve dynamism, progress, excellence, and development by establishing democracy. Implementing democratic values in a country like Afghanistan is based on heterogeneity and ethnic divisions.

Bonaparte democracy is the cause of ethnic and tribal values , and, most importantly, traditional and religious values are fragile and have not paved the way for democracy. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes have experienced more authoritarianism in the course of history and are accompanied by many complexities in the political history of Afghanistan. Therefore, it is crucial to address the role of elections, political participation, and party activity in post-Taliban Afghanistan.

The goals we pursued in this research are summarised and will be discussed in more detail in this chapter.

1- Realistic understanding of the democratization process in Afghanistan, especially elections, political participation, and political parties.

2. Identify obstacles to critical challenges to institutionalizing elections in Afghanistan.

3- Scientific solutions to strengthen democracy in Afghanistan, especially elections and political participation.

Democracy is a system based on the people's active participation and free will. The people have the right to make fundamental decisions that affect their collective and individual destinies. Have a dynamic, effective, and equal share and be able to install and dismiss government officials and senior officials freely.

The idea of democracy prevails today and has crystallized as an ideal in many historical societies. Philosophers and political thinkers have debated it for over 2,500 years. The codified history of human life provides the earliest manifestations of democracy in the seventh century BC, Especially when the citizens of Athens realized their desired adaptation, cooperation, consensus, and influence in social life. The terms democracy, democratic thought, form, and politics came into being, as well as its in-depth study and interpretation. Other political and social scientists believe democracy originated in Sumer around 6,000 BC. Contemporary democracies emerged in the 21st century, and political scientists such as Huntington and Fukuyama have differing views on democracy.

But in Afghanistan, the waves of democracy in post-Taliban Afghanistan were high and low. However, democratization in Afghanistan's backward society and tribe may be considered an early and false wave. However, the socio-political process after the Bonn Treaty brought to light the reasons and data that expanded the general democratization process as a socio-cultural approach. This process was rooted in the following elements and supports:

1- The return of a large group of educated people, cultural figures, and intellectuals from Europe, America, and neighbouring countries with new cultural experiences and living in different spaces.

2. The presence and support of the United States, the West, and the international forces stationed in Afghanistan for the democratization process in this country

3- The growth of non-governmental organizations, civil institutions, and the activities of international organizations in Afghanistan

4- Formation and frequency of mass media in cities and their radius of influence in all parts of the country.

5. The relative flexibility of the three interim, transitional, and elected governments in the face of civic movements. It challenges the middle class, youth, and urban society.

In the contemporary history of Afghanistan, there have been two ups and downs to chart the manifestations of pro-democracy. In the 1940s (the decade of democracy), or the first wave of

democracy with the drafting and approval of the modern constitution, a wave of political tendencies and demonstrations was formed among intellectuals. But this period was concise, nagging, chaotic, and unstable and soon ended with the domination of authoritarian and militaristic forces and elements over political rule. At this stage, the wave of democratization as a socio-cultural ritual, the widespread success of the second opportunity, arose after the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, when people were optimistic about their liberation from the tyranny and darkness of the medieval regime. At this stage, the second wave of democratization as a socio-cultural religion gained widespread popularity and prestige—raising hopes for bright openings in social life and national-political destiny.

The second wave of democratization has two essential elements: talent and internal aspirations and external support and attention. The United States overthrew the authoritarian Taliban government, political liberation was achieved, and the central government fell to the Taliban rivals and was marginalized. A new democratic system emerged rapidly through national elections after the end of Hamid Karzai's interim government, and a formal democratic structure was established by adopting a new constitution. Consolidating democracy is a slow but purposeful process that can take years. Historical evidence and experience of the whole nature of democracy in backward societies such as Afghanistan and developing societies can help meet people's legal rights when the community's objective standards meet their political, economic, social, and cultural power. And the government believes in such an idea, and political groups can make independent societal decisions. Such a move is expected from a government that is the people's will. Afghanistan, a country whose political and social system has spent many years under active social divisions, including tribalist and partisan ideology, is now moving towards democracy. Guided democracy or the democratization by military means and the overthrow of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, such as what happened in Afghanistan, is the latest political-practical model that President George W. Bush and his neo-conservatives have led since 2001. According to this model, the United States, as the world's leading power, has an international duty and commitment to manage and guide the democratic process in the world. The transition to democracy in Afghanistan is widely believed to have taken place after the fall of the Taliban regime and the widespread presence of US and international allies in Afghanistan.

Still, there are differing views on the establishment of democracy in Afghanistan. From the technocrats' point of view, democratic tendencies have been formed in Afghanistan, but not at the general level. The lack of awareness of political culture and political socialization in Afghanistan has not been created dynamically and pervasively. Activists in the field of political circles are well aware of the democratization of the Afghan political system, which is why many political parties, organizations, and social groups in our society today call democracy their political goal and ideology and want it to be achieved. On the other hand, there are still difficulties and challenges facing the realization of democracy as serious obstacles.

Because democracy has four constituent elements at its heart, namely the holding of free and fair elections, a transparent and accountable government, the observance of civil and political rights, and the existence of civil society, winning elections in democracies must be recognized. Another essential feature of free elections in guaranteeing political equality among citizens can

be studied; this equality becomes clear when citizens are in elections without discrimination and Prevent participation; everyone's vote without regard to social status is of equal value. Based on a free and fair election, which in the first place depends on the existence of an electoral system in which it is determined who has the right to run for office? And who has the right to vote? And how are people's votes categorized and winners chosen? The fairness of a free election depends on how each election is conducted, from the voter registration and campaign period to the counting of ballots and guarantees of neutrality, the seriousness of the law, and the failure to commit any violations. The accuracy of the election results is questionable. This process was studied during the four rounds of presidential elections in Afghanistan, which made the first pillar of democracy in the notorious world and the elections in this land tired and depressing. Electoral fraud votes were one of the most challenging issues that questioned the legitimacy of the election and the system in domestic and international public opinion.

Can a system whose cornerstone is based on hypocrisy have the support of the people after winning? These are questions answered in the chapters of this research, but here, as a conclusion, several sub-headings of compression are mentioned.

A: The inability of the government to defend democratic values and institutions, especially elections

Democracy and all its features, especially parties and elections, need the government first and foremost because it provides security, the rule of law, the power of the game, peaceful competition, and the prevention of war and violence. So, as long as the government cannot monopolize legitimate violence and secure universal sovereignty, democracy - is the way of governing and exercising power.

The weakness and inability of the Afghan government have always led to the failure of democracy in this country. Government agencies are tools for weak and inefficient groups. Government sovereignty is inadequate in many parts of the country, and despite the absence of armed opposition groups, the government is growing, and crime and lawlessness are spreading. These characteristics have caused the Afghan government to have a detrimental effect on the fledgling democracy in this country and not have the necessary stability and durability. Democratic values and institutions are threatened, and the fragility of the state leads to the instability of democracy. The current government of Afghanistan has many shortcomings. He is not able to perform his duties and responsibilities. It cannot control the surrounding areas. It is known for corruption, inefficiency, etc., which indicates an unfinished government-building project in Afghanistan. Examples of government inefficiency can be considered in the following cases

1: Politics is personal

The treatment of people by government agencies is primarily personal, and personal animosities are based on friendships. The politicization of politics in Afghanistan does not end with the administration but also with the political parties. In a centralized structure where power is practically at the service, there is no guarantee for the participation of the masses and different strata.

2: Expediency determinations

The selection of appointments in the government is mainly based on ethnic, political, and religious interests, and merits do not play a significant role in it. A look at the ethnic and political backgrounds of the government caretaker, the transitional government, and Afghanistan's legitimate government illustrates this well. It shows that the deputy government ministers are appointed based on their power and influence in different parts of Afghanistan, not their capabilities. A transparent government is essential to democracy because government officials do not feel accountable unless comprehensive and accurate information on government performance and policy outcomes is available to the public. Government transparency means that information about all government affairs, including government policies, laws, directives, and practices, must be freely available.

Secrecy is the enemy of democracy. There is no place for secrecy in a democracy. Secrecy makes people unaware. Secrecy paves the way for government corruption and even conspiracies against democracy itself. According to Transparency International, corruption is "the abuse of power and authority given to self-interest, wasting resources, challenging good governance, restricting economic development, and providing services." It hinders the public interest and ultimately threatens the order of society. Abuse of public office for personal gain may exist at all levels of government and in all political systems. It is a problem that affects more or less all countries of the world. The existence of this state undermines the voters' confidence in the representatives. It undermines the trust necessary for the existence of democracy to the point that people no longer consider democracy defensible. Public assets for private and personal gain are prevalent in Afghan government departments, as this issue and its obstacles to elections are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. However, corruption in Afghanistan has become a contagious disease.

Afghanistan ranked 117th out of 180 countries in 2005 in terms of transparency. Presently, 165 rated, it was downgraded to one of the fifteen most corrupt countries globally. Afghanistan is one of the weakest countries in terms of transparency and is at the bottom of the list. It is also one of the most corrupt countries globally in terms of corruption. Financial and administrative corruption within the post-Taliban government led by Hamid Karzai became so deep and widespread that it was one of the three most corrupt governments in the world in Transparency International's annual assessment. In 2011, the government of Afghanistan became the fourth most corrupt government out of 182 in the world, and in 2012, it became the third most corrupt government. Afghanistan scored eight out of 100 in this evaluation. So, with such widespread corruption, it became a reality that it was rampant in elections and democratic processes. On the contrary, the post-Taliban government, which should have risen from financial and administrative corruption to health and transparency as a modern nation-state in nation-building, fell into the regression of bribery.

B. Lack of inclusive and national political parties

The party is the most important political organization in contemporary democracies. The party is a new phenomenon born of political democracy and the product of the transition from non-popular rule to popular rule and the nation-state. As Scott Schneider put it: "Political parties

created democracy, and modern democracy is inconceivable except with parties' help." "Parties are not just appendages of modern government; they are at the centre of it, playing a decisive and creative role."

The political party is the wheel of democracy. Our age is the age of representative democracy. Coordination and progress in political society are impossible unless the goals and aspirations of the people are cohesive and orderly. In a representative democracy, the people's representatives can't act in a coordinated manner to fulfil the people's will and act as representatives. This complicated process in the party is possible only if the people's representatives in political parties are organized and prudent. As in the fourth chapter of this study, it became clear that the parties did not influence the elections and even, like the former elders of the tribes and villages, lost their impact on the people and their right to vote. Representative democracy is meaningless and inconceivable without the existence of political parties.

Due to the traditional and tribal culture and multi-ethnic structure of Afghan society, political parties, in the strict sense of the word, have not yet been formed in this society. Existing political parties are mainly reactionary and developed due to cross-sectional and specific events. Unlike political parties in modern and developed societies, the boundary between political parties is the difference in political and social goals and programs. In our country, the differences between the parties are not based on political plans and goals but on tribal and blood differences. The common denominator of all political parties in Afghanistan is their tribal and traditional culture. Criticism of a person instead of personality, a pessimistic and suspicious attitude towards others, and a culture of eliminating rivalry and impatience are standard features of all political currents.

Afghan society is a society that has lost the opportunity for democratic values. The movement of this society started from the field of tyranny toward democracy. Still, authoritarianism, violence, irrationality, irrational irrationality, lack of logic and reasoning, the use of power, and the threat of traditionalism and antiquity are in the political culture of the parties. This disease can disrupt the new political order.

A: Tribal political culture

The existence of ethnic and tribal thinking

Culture encompasses countless subsets of customs, values, traditions, behaviours, norms, beliefs, and various social relationships and patterns.

Tribal political culture and the issue of democratization

 The move toward democracy will face serious obstacles. Cultural transformation is more necessary than anything else to successfully follow the path of democratization, legalism, and the rule of law in the country. The tribal and traditional culture of the society does not change and as long as the developmental, legalist, and democratic factors do not replace the traditional culture that opposes the development of legalism and democracy.

1- Perception of politics: coercion, rape, looting of and reliance on relatives and tribes
2- Consideration of a country as a group of tribes competing for power, wealth, and security;
3- Method of gaining power: force and reliance on military power to the people;
4- Consideration of collections outside the alien and hostile tribe;
5- Method of resolving differences in force and power;
6- Political, social identity: family and ethnicity
7- The basis of trust: ethnic and local
8- I consider the government to represent the superior, corrupt, and oppressive people.
9- The legitimacy of the state: persuasion among its tribes; Outside coercion of relatives
10- Rules of the game: gain power and suppress others;

Regarding the existence of tribal and ethnic thinking, it can be said that the political system of Afghanistan in the past and now depends on the closed and petrified structure of the tribe. Unfortunately, the design of Afghanistan's political, social, cultural, and economic system in the context of history is based on tribal ideas entirely dependent on extremist, regional, and fundamentalist traditions. Members of each ethnic group look at issues from an ethnic perspective before considering national interests and security.

As per the recent conclusion and overall conclusion of this study, it can be said that in a democracy, competencies such as lack of militarism, lack of inequality in wealth, political and social equality, media freedom, citizens' awareness, high political ethics, good governance, and national government there is. As in paragraph 2 of Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the existence of a democratic society is essential for implementing the people's rights and freedoms. However, the Afghan government suffers from a lack of legitimacy, low capacity, and a lack of transparency and accountability. Although the foundations of the rule of law, including a democratic constitution and judicial structures, have been established, the rule of law faces severe political challenges, poor accountability, and limited access. Despite relative progress in the welfare sector's education, health, and telecommunications sectors, the country's core infrastructure, including agriculture, remains intact due to the promotion of unfair policies, mafia economics, and growing political and economic corruption. Poverty and inequality are on the rise. The sections of the regime and the political community also face severe challenges due to ineffective and ill-considered methods in elections, nation-building, and conflict resolution, which result in the whole process with the risk of ethnicisation of politics and expansion of ethnic discourse. It is a controversial discourse. As a result, to achieve democracy and improve the situation, it is necessary to reconsider and avoid policies, including ethnocentric policies, mainly used as tools for participation and conflict resolution. Rising injustice, poverty, inequality, escalation of social divisions, mafia economy, increasing distrust, intensification of politics, and various forms of violence are defined dimensions of the current situation in Afghanistan, without which no country can move towards establishing a stable democracy.

Suggestions

1. The transition from traditional and tribal culture: This type of culture is one of the obstacles to the democratization and legalization of society. For democratization and legalism, the anti-developmental culture must be corrected and transformed. The characteristics of a tribal society community based on tribal culture are an obstacle to legalism and democracy. Therefore, the first and most crucial step in democracy is to create cultural transformation. The transition from traditional and tribal society and the change in the beliefs and attitudes of individuals is a necessary precondition for following the problematic path of democratization and the rule of law. The production of thought through scientific research corresponding to the needs of society, the use of valuable experiences of other human cultures, interaction and communication with modern societies, and the expansion of urban life are the essential strategies for transition from tribal society and achieving post-tribal society and, finally, culture.

2. The transition from ethnic society to citizenship society: In such a case, citizenship identity replaces ethnic, linguistic, and religious identity and relies on the uniqueness of each person as a citizen. Ethnic nationalism gives way to national and civic nationalism.

3. Structural reform: Another step in democratization is structural reforms. Structural reform means creating appropriate structures with democratic procedures using democratic methods. The principle of accountability and accountability to the people is one of the essential features of democracy, which, in traditional forms, non-accountability and ambiguity are serious. In closed and old systems, intra-structural relations are regulated not based on rules and regulations but on personal relationships and ethnic and tribal affiliations. In this case, judging individuals' success or failure is not based on laws and business bills. Still, individuals' ethnic status and social status determine their future destinies. Therefore, democratization and democratization will remain in the stage of slogans and aspirations until the structures are infused with the culture of democracy.

4. Strengthening political parties: Political parties also play an essential role in democracy, but only if they have a national and not an ethnic origin.

5. In objective solutions to follow the difficult path of democratization and the rule of law, education and establishment of modern schools, establishment of governmental and non-governmental higher education centres, promotion of work culture and prosperity of market and economic transactions, promotion of book culture and reading and also Promoting and expanding civic institutions is essential.